Ordering Emotions in Europe, 1100–1800

Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions

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Johannes Heil (*Heidelberg*)
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Ordering Emotions in Europe, 1100–1800

Edited by

Susan Broomhall

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Cover illustration: Nicolas Houel, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [1578], 105. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ordering emotions in Europe, 1100–1800 / edited by Susan Broomhall.
pages cm. — (Studies in medieval and reformation traditions, ISSN 1573-4188 ; Volume 195)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-30509-0 (hardback : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-90-04-30510-6 (e-book) 1. Emotions (Philosophy)—History. 2. Europe—Civilization—History. I. Broomhall, Susan, editor.

B105.E46O73 2015
128'.37094—dc23

2015027394

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual "Brill" typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities.
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ISSN 1573-4188
ISBN 978-9004-30509-0 (hardback)
ISBN 978-9004-30510-6 (e-book)

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In memory of Philippa Maddern (1952–2014)
Scholar, leader, mentor, friend.

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Acknowledgements

This volume emerges, in part, through the financial support and fellowship provided by the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (Europe, 1100–1800) (project number CE110001011). The Centre has supported, directly or indirectly, many of our interests in discovering how emotions make history, and has enabled many of the contributors of this volume to meet and exchange ideas over the past three years.

Colleagues at the Centre's headquarters at The University of Western Australia have provided valuable support and assistance, as well as shared ideas and thoughts on emerging research. Thank you to Director Andrew Lynch and Deputy Director Jane Davidson, Centre Manager Tanya Tuffrey, and staff, Pam Bond and Katrina Tap, who form a large part of the social and emotional glue that binds us together in a scholarly sociability, and who make the Centre such an enjoyable place to work. I would not have been able to achieve this work without the tireless and dedicated editorial assistance of Sarah Finn, Joanne McEwan, and Lesley O'Brien. I am sincerely grateful to them.

This volume exists because of the courageous Founding Director of the Centre, Winthrop Professor Philippa Maddern.[1] Pip passed away on 16 June 2014, after a determined battle against cancer that she refused to let define her or impede her from the work that she loved so much. Generations of students, early career scholars, and colleagues in the humanities, and especially medieval studies, in Australia were mentored by Pip, and benefited from her support, guidance, and carefully considered advice. She fought hard for women's studies, for history, for the humanities, and for staff and student rights on campus. She was equally determined in her research about ordinary medieval people—especially the marginal, the vulnerable, and those often deemed the hardest to find in the records. After completing a DPhil in fifteenth-century social history at Oxford in 1985, Pip returned to Australia where academic positions were scarce. She worked outside academia for a short time, and began to write and publish science fiction, combining interests in the sciences and the humanities that would later find voice in the interdisciplinary Centre of Excellence on human emotions and their histories that forms one aspect of her legacy.

1 See the Centre's Memorial Page for Philippa at http://www.historyofemotions.org.au/about-the-centre/research-roles/memorial-page-for-founding-director-philippa-maddern.aspx.

Pip's participation in scholarly events, through her supervision and her mentoring, assisted generations of Australian scholars interested in medieval and early modern studies and in gender analyses. Many of us remember her vital presence at the local seminars, Australian and New Zealand Association for Medieval and Early Modern Studies biennial conferences and Centre events, where she could always be counted upon to ask penetrating questions of every paper—on all manner of subjects—that she attended. Pip never failed to follow up young scholars at such gatherings and by emails afterwards, asking about their research and offering succour and support where needed. Many of us have benefited from her care and attention to us as young scholars entering academia. The establishment of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (Europe, 1100–1800) in 2011, of which Pip was Director, gave her new opportunities to support the next generation of Australian scholars through postdoctoral fellowships, travel bursaries and skills training seminars and to bring them into the Centre's research discussions and debates with leading national and international scholars.

Pip gave both heart and mind to everything she did. Her scholarly interests reflected her own experiences as a female scholar in the world of academia, and she always remembered the real-world contexts and challenges of those around her. The contributors to this collection were privileged to know Pip as a colleague and mentor, and as a very dear friend, and we dedicate this volume to her memory.

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List of Contributors

Han Baltussen
(PhD 1993, Utrecht University) is the Hughes Professor of Classics at The University of Adelaide, and a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. His research interests cover ancient philosophy and intellectual history more broadly, including the reception of the classics. He has held visiting fellowships at Harvard's Center for Hellenic Studies (Washington D.C., 1996–97), the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton (2006), and the Royal Flemish Academy in Brussels (2010). His most recent book is an edited volume entitled *Greek and Roman Consolations: Eight Studies of a Tradition and its Afterlife* (The Classical Press of Wales, 2013).

Susan Broomhall
F.A.H.A., is Professor of Early Modern History at The University of Western Australia. She was a Foundation Chief Investigator in the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (Europe, 1100–1800), and now holds an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship. She is the author of a series of works that explore gender, and more recently emotions, in early modern France, the Low Countries, and, through stranger communities, England. These include *Women's Medical Work in Early Modern France* (Manchester University Press, 2004) and (edited with Yasmin Haskell) a special issue of *Intellectual History Review*, "Humanism and Medicine in the Renaissance" (2008). She is editor of *Emotions in the Household, 1200–1900* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); *Spaces for Feeling: Emotions and Sociabilities in Britain, 1650–1850* (Routledge, 2015); *Gender and Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Destroying Order, Structuring Disorder* (Ashgate, 2015) and *Authority, Gender and Emotions in Late Medieval and Early Modern England* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

Louis C. Charland
is currently a Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Department of Psychiatry, and the School of Health Studies, as well as a member of the Rotman Institute of Philosophy, at Western University in London, Ontario, Canada. His previous appointments include the Clinical Trials Research Group at McGill University, the Toronto Hospital for Sick Children, and the Ontario Premier's Council on Health Strategy. Professor Charland has published widely in psychiatric ethics, the history of psychiatry, and the theoretical foundations of the

affective sciences. He is also the author and co-author of several public policy reports concerned with research ethics, mental health, and program evaluation. Professor Charland is currently an International Partner Investigator with the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (Europe, 1100–1800).

Louise D'Arcens
is a Professor in the English Literatures program at The University of Wollongong, and holds a Future Fellowship from the Australian Research Council. Her PhD was awarded by The University of Sydney. Her publications include *Old Songs in the Timeless Land: Medievalism in Australian Literature 1840–1910* (Brepols, 2011), *Comic Medievalism: Laughing at the Middle Ages* (D.S. Brewer, 2014), and edited volumes (with Andrew Lynch) *International Medievalism and Popular Culture* (Cambria Press, 2014) and (with Juanita Ruys), *Maistresse of My Wit: Medieval Women, Modern Scholars* (Brepols, 2004). She has also published numerous chapters on medievalism, as well as articles in journals such as *Representations, Screening the Past, Parergon*, and *Postmedieval*.

Raphaële Garrod
is a research associate at the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Cambridge. She is the author of Cosmographical Novelties: Dialectic and Discovery in Renaissance French Prose (1575–1630) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), the co-editor with Paul Smith of Natural History in Early Modern France: Poetics of an Epistemic Genre (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming 2016), and the co-editor with Yasmin Haskell of Changing Heart: Performing Jesuit Emotions in Europe, Asia and the Americas (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming 2016). She is currently working on a monograph about ingenuity in early modern France.

Yasmin Haskell
F.A.H.A., holds the Cassamarca Foundation Chair in Latin Humanism at The University of Western Australia. She is one of ten Chief Investigators in the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in the History of Emotions (Europe, 1100–1800), leading projects on "Jesuit Emotions" and "Passions for Learning." She has recently held visiting fellowships at All Souls and Christ Church Colleges, Oxford, and at Trinity College, Cambridge. She is the author of *Loyola's Bees: Ideology and Industry in Jesuit Latin Didactic Poetry* (Oxford University Press and British Academy, 2003) and *Prescribing Ovid: The Latin Works and Networks of the Enlightened Dr Heerkens* (Bloomsbury, 2013). She

has also edited, with Philip Hardie, *Poets and Teachers: Latin Didactic Poetry and the Didactic Authority of the Latin Poet from the Renaissance to the Present* (Levante, 1999); with Juanita Ruys, *Latinity and Alterity in the Early Modern Period* (MRTS and Brepols, 2010); and *Diseases of the Imagination in the Early Modern Period* (Brepols, 2011).

Danijela Kambaskovic
is a Research Associate in the Australian Research Council Centre for the History of Emotions (Europe, 1100–1800), at The University of Western Australia, where she is undertaking a project entitled "The New Life: Love written in the First Person and the European Renaissance." Danijela's book *Constructing Sonnet Sequences in the Middle Ages* was published in 2010, and she has published scholarly articles on the nexus of poetry and religion, cultural history of love and ethical and cognitive interpretations of the use of the five senses. She is also an award winning poet. Her latest works include an article on novelistic mechanisms used in sonnet sequences (*Parergon*, 2013), a book of poetry (*Internal Monologues*, Fremantle Press, 2013) and an edited collection of eighteen multidisciplinary essays on ideas surrounding the nexus of body and soul: *Conjunctions: Body, Mind and Soul in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (Springer, 2014).

Clare Monagle
received her doctorate at The Johns Hopkins University in 2007. In 2013, she published her first monograph with Brepols, *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard's Sentences and the Development of Theology*. She has also published articles in *Parergon, Viator, postmedieval, Culture, Theory and Critique*, and *Medioevo*. With Juanita Ruys, she is the co-editor of *A Cultural History of the Emotions in the Middle Ages, 350–1300* (Bloomsbury, forthcoming).

Juanita Feros Ruys
is Associate Director of the Medieval and Early Modern Centre at The University of Sydney and Director of the Sydney Node of the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (Europe, 1100–1800). Her research for the CHE includes the attribution of emotions to demons in the High Middle Ages, the emotional impulses towards suicide in the Middle Ages, and, with Yasmin Haskell, an exploration of academic emotions from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century. Her publications include the edited collection (with Louise D'Arcens) *Maistresse of My Wit: Medieval Women, Modern Scholarship* (Brepols, 2004), (with Yasmin Haskell)

Latinity and Alterity in the Early Modern Period (Brepols, 2010), and (with J. Ward and M. Heyworth) *The Classics in the Medieval and Renaissance Classroom: The Role of Ancient Texts in the Arts Curriculum as Revealed by Surviving Manuscripts and Early Printed Books* (Brepols, 2013). She is also the co-editor (with Clare Monagle) of *A Cultural History of the Emotions in the Middle Ages, 350–1300* (Bloomsbury, forthcoming).

François Soyer
received his PhD from The University of Cambridge in 2007. He is an Associate Professor in early modern history at The University of Southampton, and is currently a Research Fellow at the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (Europe, 1100–1800), at The University of Adelaide. For the CHE, he is conducting research on a project entitled, "Cultivating Fear and Hatred of the 'Other': The development of officially sanctioned anti-Semitic and Islamophobic sentiment in Catholic Southern Europe (1500–1800)." His publications include over a dozen peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, and three books: *The Persecution of the Jews and Muslims of Portugal: King Manuel I and the End of Religious Tolerance (1496–7)* (Brill, 2007); *Ambiguous Gender in Early Modern Spain and Portugal: Inquisitors, Doctors and the Transgression of Gender Norms* (Brill, 2012); and most recently, *Popularizing Anti-Semitism in Early Modern Spain and its Empire: Francisco de Torrejoncillo and the Centinela contra Judíos (1674)* (Brill 2014).

Robert Weston
is an Honorary Research Fellow at The University of Western Australia. His principal field of research is European medical history in the early modern period. His book, *Medical Consulting by Letter in France, 1665–1789*, was published by Ashgate in 2013, and he has also published chapters and journal articles on medical consultations by letter, the history of disease, masculinity and the role of emotions in medical practice.

R.S. White
is an Australian Professorial Fellow, Winthrop Professor of English at The University of Western Australia and Program Leader with the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (Europe, 1100–1800). He has published numerous books and articles on Shakespeare and is past President of the Australian and New Zealand Shakespeare Association and a Fellow of the Australian Humanities Academy. Among his other works are *Pacifism in English Poetry: Minstrels of Peace* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) and *John Keats: A Literary Life* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

Carol J. Williams
is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Medieval and Renaissance Studies at Monash University, where she works in a research collaboration with professors Constant Mews and John Crossley. They have recently published an edition and translation of the *Ars musice* of Johannes de Grocheio (Medieval Institute Publications, 2011), and are currently completing a translation of the *Tractatus de tonis* of Guy of Saint-Denis. Carol is also a performing musician, playing harp and rebec in the early music ensemble, *Acord*.

Spencer E. Young
is a Research Associate at the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions (Europe, 1100–1800), at The University of Western Australia. He is the author of *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215–1248* (Cambridge University Press, 2014) and editor of *Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities* (Brill, 2011).

Introduction: Hearts and Minds: Ordering Emotions in Europe, 1100–1800

Susan Broomhall

This collection explores how emotions were conceptualised and practised in the medieval and early modern period, and more specifically how they ordered systems of thought and practice—from philosophy and theology, to science and medicine. It does so in two specific ways. Firstly, the essays in this volume examine how emotions, as both bodily and psychic experiences, were understood to interact with more abstract intellectual capacities in producing systems of thought. Secondly, they analyse how these key frameworks of the medieval and early modern period were enacted by individuals as social and emotional practices, acts and experiences of everyday life.

Together the essays here demonstrate how systems of ordering the medieval and early modern world relied upon both the emotional realm and the more abstract intellectual component of reason; indeed, they follow a number of recent studies in insisting that such categories were not simple binaries but existed as far more intertwined connections between mind and body, and reason and emotion.[1] Hearts as well as minds were engaged in all ordering systems—in thought and practice—in the contexts studied here. This collection thus examines *how* they interacted in different systems of thought, in distinct and socially-specific contexts.

Moreover, this collection considers how thought was informed and shaped by the experiences of everyday life; it examines the writings of authors who were embedded in social and emotional relationships, observing those around them, their moral and social dilemmas, and the way society operated. And their observations, theories and determinations about how emotions were (or

1 Most recently, Elena Carrera in the "Introduction" to her edited collection, *Emotions and Health, 1200–1700* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 16. Similar arguments have been made in other recent works, such as Penelope Gouk and Helen Hills, eds., *Representing Emotions: New Connections in the Histories of Art, Music and Medicine* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2005); and Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro, eds., *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Brian Cummings and Freya Sierhuis (eds.), *Passions and Subjectivity in Early Modern Culture* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) and Danijela Kambaskovic, ed., *Conjunctions: Body and Mind from Plato to Descartes* (New York: Springer, 2014).

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should be) engaged in these aspects of life were to have a powerful impact in the contemporary world. They helped to shape moral and social values, educational, legal, spiritual and political practices, and influenced emotional realities for the sexes, the young and old, those of different races, faiths, ethnicities and social statuses—in both exceptional circumstances and on a day-to-day basis.

Following substantial anthropological work by such scholars as Robert I. Levy, Catherine A. Lutz and Geoffrey M. White, and Dewight R. Middleton, this collection understands emotions as "historically shaped sociocultural constructions more than they are personal possessions. They are processual events tied fundamentally to other domains of culture."[2] In this sense, the collection aims to visualise and bring forth how, in the medieval and early modern period, emotions were key to "defining and negotiating social relations of the self in a moral order".[3] Through the term 'ordering emotions', we interrogate both how emotions ordered systems of thought *and* how they were themselves ordered by multiple individual experiences in the world. Both aspects were active, dynamic and dialogic processes of negotiation, enacting emotional meaning and in turn producing other facets of self, identity, practices and behaviours. Through lived emotional experiences, individuals built, extended and renewed powerful systems of thought that shaped the medieval and early modern. In this context, we explore *emotions*, rather than *affect* as the latter term is understood in philosophical and critical theory scholarship, employing emotion in a broad sense, primarily analysing discursive, psychic and bodily dimensions that were social and relational as they were experienced, performed and narrated.[4]

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2 Dewight R. Middleton, "Emotional Style: The Cultural Ordering of Emotions," *Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology* 17, no. 2 (1989): 187–201, at 187. See also Catherine A. Lutz and Geoffrey M. White, "The Anthropology of Emotions," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 15 (1986): 405–36.

3 Robert I. Levy, *Tahitians: Mind and Experience in the Society Island* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), cited in Lutz and White, "The Anthropology of Emotions," 417.

4 See, for example, critical perspectives on affect theory by Ruth Leys, "The Turn to Affect: A Critique," *Critical Inquiry* 37 (2011): 434–72; and for discussion on terminology usage in the history of emotions framework, Stephanie Trigg, "Introduction: Emotional Histories—Beyond the Personalization of the Past and the Abstraction of Affect Theory," *Exemplaria* 26, no. 1 (2014): 3–15.

Interactions of Hearts and Minds

Interest in the emotions as a field is long standing, as is indicated by the depth of literary and philosophical discussion about the conceptualisation and terminology of reason and the emotions at this period.[5] Recently, there has been a surge in historical conceptual discussions such as those by the Stearns on emotionology,[6] Barbara H. Rosenwein on emotional communities,[7] or William M. Reddy on emotives.[8] A series of studies concerning the medieval and early modern period has begun to nuance our understanding of how emotions and reason or cognition were perceived to operate in relation to or in combination with each other. These works have deepened our understanding of notions such as 'the mind' which, as Elena Carrera has shown, was not simply conceptualised as an abstract intellectual entity at this period, but instead varied

5 Gouk and Hills, *Representing Emotions*; Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet, eds., *Le Sujet des Émotions au Moyen Age* (Paris: Beauchesne, 2008); Susan Broomhall, ed., *Emotions in the Household 1200–1900* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Jan Plamper, "The History of Emotions: An Interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns," *History and Theory* 49, no. 2 (2010): 237–65; Carrera, *Emotions and Health*; Susan McClary, ed., *Structures of Feeling in Seventeenth-Century Expressive Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012); Jonas Liliequist, ed., *A History of Emotions, 1200–1800* (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2012); Andrew Lynch and Michael W. Champion, "Understanding Emotions: The Things They Left Behind," in *Understanding Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, eds. Andrew Lynch and Michael W. Champion (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015). Yet another category represents the current state of research in the field by leading scholars such as Susan Matt and Peter N. Stearns, eds., *Doing Emotions History* (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2013).

6 Carol Zisowitz Stearns and Peter N. Stearns, "Emotionology: Clarifying the Study of the History of Emotional Standards," *American Historical Review* 90 (1985): 813–30; and Carol Zisowitz Stearns and Peter N. Stearns, *Anger: The Struggle for Emotional Control in America's History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

7 Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History," *American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (2002): 821–45; Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions," *Passions in Context* 1 (2010): 1–33; Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Theories of Change in the History of Emotions," in *A History of Emotions*, ed. Liliequist, 7–20.

8 William M. Reddy, "Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emotions," *Current Anthropology* 38, no. 3 (1997): 327–40 (commentaries, 340–51); William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and William M. Reddy, *The Making of Romantic Love* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). A summary of recent theoretical work can be found in Susan J. Matt, "Current Emotion Research in History: Or, Doing History from the Inside Out," *Emotion Review* 3, no. 1 (2011): 117–24.

in the thought systems of different authors across Europe.[9] Moreover, emotions were clearly perceived to be both bodily and mental experiences, as well as being connected to the soul within certain ordering systems. Scholars have explored the religious self as an integrated intellectual and sensory *persona*, and re-examined critically the idea of a separation between reason and passion in the context of faith.[10] This volume contributes to this growing literature by investigating the nature of these interactions within particular bodies of thought in specific social and cultural contexts. In particular, it reveals how emotions were understood, within these systems, to shape life experience, moral codes, and medieval and early modern societies generally. The essays featured here ask what role emotions played in ordering these systems, and how they were ordered and practised by these frameworks.

The volume comprises a number of case studies that analyse the co-operating role of emotions in conceptual ordering structures, such as philosophy, theology, natural philosophy, science and medicine, which were systems of thought, belief and practices that were also interacting, and at times mutually reinforcing. These structures shared certain foundational components, including their textual bases and ideas of authorship, understandings of gender and other social codes, and some functioned through the same methods of validation and training. As such, the collection as a whole develops our understanding of the way such ordering systems (and their ideas about emotions) interacted with each other, and shaped the social and emotional practices and lived experiences of contemporary individuals.

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9 Carrera, *Emotions and Health*, 6. Detailed recent work in this area by scholars of medieval and early modern philosophy and related areas includes Susan James, *Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Michael Schoenfeldt, *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004); Deborah Brown, *Descartes and the Passionate Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Henrik Lagerlund, *Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment* (New York: Springer, 2007); Simo Knuuttila and Pekka Kärkkäinen, eds., *Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy* (New York: Springer, 2008); and Cary J. Nederman, Nancy Van Deusen and E. Ann Matter, eds., *Mind Matters: Studies of Medieval and Early Modern Intellectual History in Honour of Marcia Colish* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010).

10 R.L. Falkenburg, W.S. Melion, T.M. Richardson, eds., *Image and Imagination of the Religious Self in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007); Sarah Coakley, ed., *Faith, Rationality and the Passions* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).

Authors explore the conceptualisation of emotions in the contemporary thought systems they study and tease out their rules of operation and management. This entails analysing, in relation to specific case studies, questions such as what emotions were expected to do, what they should do, what dysfunction they could create, how emotional life should be managed, and how emotions were involved in one's relationship with God. Thus, the essays to follow conceive of emotional practices in a variety of ways that reflect the contexts of their sources and the changing nature of Europe across the long period over which the collection extends. Emotion words, behaviours, practices and expressions do not transcend time but are intimately connected to their historical context.[11] Thus, we derive our interpretations of the meaning for emotional descriptors used in these works from contemporary texts and the precise circumstances in which they are located.

Religion shaped everyone's life in medieval and early modern society and the essays in this volume highlight how a wide variety of individuals, perhaps surprisingly wide, were able to disseminate their views about emotional aspects of spiritual life. Juanita Feros Ruys's essay explores intellectual debates about hierarchies of angels and demons in key religious texts from the High Middle Ages, and examines how emotional states were implicated in these frameworks. On the other hand, François Soyer demonstrates how popular beliefs in early modern Spain and Portugal about demonic forces and their power to induce sex changes—views that did not generally accord with those of contemporary theologians—could nonetheless be given a platform through Inquisition trials. A number of the studies here offer the opportunity to chart the shifting nature of the connections that were understood to exist between emotions and ethical frameworks, the extent to which emotions were regarded as sins, vices or virtues, or the ways in which they interacted with these to form a morality system. They reveal how differing views across our period, and indeed from different communities within it, produced distinct emotional and institutional practices; dynamic enactments that were subject to change.

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11 Amélie Rorty, "From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments," *Philosophy* 57, no. 220 (1982): 159–72; John Mullan, *Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Adela Pinch, *Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Emotion Words," in *Le Sujet des Émotions au Moyen Age*, eds. Nagy and Boquet, 93–106; McClary, ed., *Structures of Feeling*, in which McClary argues for the pivotal role of the seventeenth century in changing emotional regimes; and Carrera, *Emotions and Health*.

Powerful ideas about the role of emotions in spiritual life were also disseminated through religious education and training. Clare Monagle's essay analyses how, within the tradition of scholastic theology, Peter Lombard's views about the relationship between cognition, emotions and sexed bodies became a key resource and authority for generations of scholars. Spencer E. Young investigates the place of emotions in moral discourse following the thirteenth-century pastoral revolution, disseminated far and wide through a rich and influential literature created for preaching and pastoral care. Susan Broomhall demonstrates how religious assumptions about love and compassion guided calls for charity among the elite at court in sixteenth-century France, ideas that were rendered visible to a wider public audience through their publication as pamphlets, their performance in processions, and through the act of donation as a devotional practice. Yasmin Haskell and Raphaële Garrod both examine how the Jesuits circulated views about emotional practices as diverse as maternal love and homosocial friendship through their role as educators—of the elite in seventeenth-century France for Garrod, and of generations of boys in the classroom for Haskell.

Theorised connections of emotions to the arts, particularly music and literature, were also a subject of contemporary exploration. Carol J. Williams analyses how twelfth-and thirteenth-century musical treatises dealt with changing theories about mode and its relationship to emotional expression, as they harnessed the power of intense emotion to shape spiritual forms, such as liturgical chants. Louise D'Arcens examines Christine de Pizan's authorial and memorial techniques in the *Cité des Dames* (1405) in order to tease out Pizan's emotional relationship to a masculine textual tradition. She considers Pizan's combination of historiographic method with medieval mnemotechnique as one that enabled Pizan to create an authoritative and authorial space for a feminine counter-memory.

While D'Arcens's study shows how Pizan reached back to the past in order to locate herself emotionally and textually as an author, other essays examine the continuing significance of the classical world as a source of ideas about the emotions, sometimes drawing upon these in unexpected ways. Williams shows how twelfth- and thirteenth-century interpretations of emotion from the political and social theory of antiquity informed emerging musical theory, structures and practices, and specifically the regulation and purpose of intense emotions in liturgical and vernacular music. Han Baltussen traces the tradition of consolatory literature from the classical world to the fifteenth century, examining the reception of classical notions of grief in the work of Nicholas de Korto, Bishop of Modruš.

Of interest in Baltussen's essay are Nicholas of Modruš's psychological insights about bereavement. His views connected to an emerging body of

scholarship in the early modern period for which understanding the role of emotions was central—the realm of natural philosophy, science and medicine. Danijela Kambaskovic explores a series of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English treatises that tried to conceptualise ideas about the five senses in order to understand mental health and spiritual wellbeing. She observes how wider doctrinal debates about religious observance and identity were crucial to the way anxious medical men articulated views on sensual perception, and physical, mental and moral health. Louis C. Charland and R.S. White consider Shakespeare's use of emotions as a touchstone for comprehending a play that often perplexes modern audiences and scholars, *The Winter's Tale*. They propose that Shakespeare's notion of passions and affections as distinct chronic or acute emotional states is critical to making sense of this play. Robert L. Weston demonstrates how seventeenth- and eighteenth-century surgeons and physicians proposed therapies to their elite clientele by interpreting the physical and mental ailments that patients described within theoretical frameworks of how sexed and aged bodies of patients were assumed to think and feel.

These explorations of health care practices, through evidence from the literary world or the consideration of spiritual notions about the senses for contemporary ideas of mental health, remind us that individuals did not operate within only one conceptual ordering system. Nor, indeed, did they conceptualise the role of emotions as disconnected from the social worlds in which they lived, as we shall explore in the following section.[12]

Attached to the World: Emotional Thought and Practice

Why were individuals so concerned to regulate individual emotions and to understand the place of emotions within broader ordering structures? As the essays in this collection demonstrate, these were not abstract inquiries, but were practically-oriented investigations of the emotional phenomena of everyday life.

As we show here, the authors of such investigations were deeply connected to the social worlds around them, and their works were informed by them. They were men and women who lived in communities within monastic and scholarly institutions, at court, and in households that included family members, lodgers or servants. They interacted socially and professionally not only in oral discourse but through textual forms from manuscripts and published

12 For an example of this aspect in the context of medicine, see the special issue on "Humanism and Medicine in the Renaissance", eds. Susan Broomhall and Yasmin Haskell, of *Intellectual History Review* 18, no. 1 (2008).

treatises to letters in order to create scientific and spiritual communities, client bases, and close friendships, sometimes across countries. These emotional and communal experiences were explicitly reflected in the work of some of these authors—when physicians or theologians recognised the key role played by friends and family in supporting the ill or grieving, either physically, morally or emotionally, for instance, or when Jesuits celebrated the significance of homophilic friendships between men.[13] Preachers likewise emphasised the dangers to emotional relationships within families caused by the sin of avarice. In all of these contexts, the subjects of our studies necessarily employed strategies to manage the emotional content of their own lives, and saw it as applying to others in similar ways.

Furthermore, many of the texts studied here were authored by individuals deeply 'attached to the world' in an emotional sense too. Much of the impetus for the works under examination here was a distinct motivation to help, or to change, individuals or societies that stemmed from a love of, or fear for, humanity and a constant consideration of its potential relationship to the divine. This consideration is reflected in the decision of some authors here to utilise Barbara H. Rosenwein's concept of 'emotional communities' to explore these intersections. Rosenwein uses this term to understand how groups created accepted modes of emotional articulation shaped by both contemporary conventions and internal group dynamics, such as gender, race, faith and social status.[14] The works examined here were grounded in and generated by the emotional experiences of individuals who were members of particular religious, scholarly and professional communities, whose specific emotional repertoires they used in formulating and expressing their views.

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13 On medieval and early modern forms of sociability around the concept of household, see Broomhall, ed., *Emotions in the Household 1200–1900*; on the exchanges between colleagues, disciplines and ideas within the medieval university, see Spencer E. Young, ed., *Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities* (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Spencer E. Young, *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215–1248* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); on early modern forms of scholarly community, see Richard Kirwan, ed., *Scholarly Self-Fashioning and Community in the Early Modern University* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013); and on later early modern socialities and sociabilities, see Susan Broomhall, ed., *Spaces for Feeling: Emotions and Sociabilities in Britain, 1650–1850* (London: Routledge, 2015).

14 Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*. For a modified version of this as "emotional styles," see also Benno Gammerl, "Emotional Styles—Concepts and Challenges," *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* 16, no. 2 (2012): 161–75.

The role of emotions in the lived experiences of medieval and early modern societies is a key consideration for many of the texts considered here—providing perspectives on how one should live, interact, learn, and feel. Baltussen's study of *De consolatione* and the advice it gives on how one should grieve is an obvious example, as are Young's thirteenth-century texts for preachers, which offered suggestions on contemporary moral dilemmas about financial accumulation and transactions and the meaning of wealth in personal and social relationships. Complex scholastic arguments about how Lucifer could have rebelled, analysed in Ruys's chapter, also had worldly implications in terms of teachings about how the supernatural interacted with worldly bodies, and about one's relationship with God. The study by Weston of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century medical consultations by letter captures the competing dynamics at play in correspondence between elite clients and practitioners. These dialogues between patient and healer performed aspects of confession, and medical advice employed a rhetoric of empathy and professional authority that echoed some of Nicholas of Modruš's recommended practices of consolation from the fifteenth century.

Essays in this volume that address aspects of teaching relationships and prescriptive models—from preaching to private instruction and interactions within Jesuit classrooms—all highlight its interactive and dynamic nature, and thus the adaptive qualities of emotional instruction within these exchanges. Garrod, for example, analyses how Jesuits juggled their theological stance with pedagogical practices to create highly dynamic presentations of maternal love. Charland and White show how the passions schemas developed by Thomas Wright and formulated later by Théodule Ribot can be helpful in interpreting Shakespeare's theatre. Thus, ideas about emotions within ordering systems had to translate into emotional practices that would be sustainable and possible within the communities and contexts for which they were intended.

Social Identities, Emotional Capacities and Practices

Emotional experiences occurred not only within social worlds but also in relation to bodies—bodies within and on which emotions were produced in strikingly different ways. Scholarly attention has been placed upon medical views of somatisation as well as how pain was represented in and through bodies, and its connections to emotional dimensions.[15] Monique Scheer, in a recent

15 Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson, eds., *Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania

work that argues for the value of employing a Bourdieuain approach to historicising emotions as a kind of practice, considers "the mutual embeddedness of minds, bodies, and social relations in order to historicize the body and its contributions to the learned experience of emotion".[16] This is an approach that, as Stephanie Trigg has recently argued, is fruitful for historical and literary study as "it allows us to work across highly individualized literary texts; the texts, bodies, objects and practices of everyday life; as well as broader patterns of social movements and cultural change."[17] As the studies here investigate, female bodies were widely expected to experience and express emotional content differently to those of men, as Weston demonstrates, and thus would benefit in the eyes of medical practitioners or theologians from different persuasive, therapeutic or counselling techniques. Likewise, Haskell highlights how Jesuits considered that youthful, male minds required quite different strategies for practising and explaining emotional order to those of adults.

Thus ordering emotions was not simply an academic pursuit or an intellectual conundrum. These were matters that concerned everything in the world around their authors and within their own bodies. In the introduction to their collection on the representation of emotions from the Renaissance to the twentieth century, Penelope Gouk and Helen Hills argue that debates about passions were

> driven by fundamental concerns about the precise nature of the relationship between the individual and the society, the relationship between "nature" and "society," and the moral values seen to inhere in each; assumptions about children's development; notions of the soul and its relation to the body; and ideas about the body and its relationship to the

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Press, 2004); Fay Bound Alberti, ed., *Medicine, Emotion and Disease, 1700–1950* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, eds., *Embodiment and Environment in Early Modern England* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen and Karl A.E. Enenkel, eds., *The Sense of Suffering: Constructions of Physical Pain in Early Modern Culture* (Leiden: Brill, 2009); Fay Bound Alberti, *Matters of the Heart: History, Medicine and Emotion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Yasmin Haskell, ed., *Diseases of the Imagination and Imaginary Disease in the Early Modern Period* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011); Carrera, *Emotions and Health*; Joanna Bourke, *The Story of Pain: From Prayers to Painkillers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

16 Monique Scheer, "Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (and is that what makes them have a History)? A Bourdieuian Approach to Understanding Emotion," *History and Theory* 51 (2012): 193–220, at 199.

17 Trigg, "Introduction: Emotional Histories," 9.

> feeling subject—with concomitant assumptions about gender, age, race, ethnicity, and social class.[18]

This is certainly borne out by the studies in this collection. Age, social status, ethnicity, race and gender all affected ideas about the right ordering of emotions and consequent practices of feeling.

Our authors pay particular attention to the ways in which ideas about the emotions and the practices that they generated were inflected by gender. Indeed, as is shown here, gender ideologies were embedded in the ordering systems that regulated emotions in thought and practice. We consider how notions of masculinity and femininity, and gendered bodies, were fundamental to the way ordering systems understood and practised emotions. Susan James has argued that the emergence of a conceptual division between mind and body in seventeenth-century philosophy had profound implications not only for the relationship between reason and passion, but also for men and women's social and emotional lives.[19] Gender is a critical lens for analysis in medieval and early modern studies broadly, and provides a strong foundation for study of the interactions of gender and emotions specifically at this period.[20]

Most of the essays included here examine the lives and writings of men and, more precisely, men who held positions of power within their societies. Broomhall examines how apothecary Nicolas Houel emphasised contemporary notions about the appropriate emotional practices of civic men, and thus the activities that they rendered suitable, in order to advance his newly established charitable foundation. We consider how notions such as masculine authority were structured by gender and were themselves framed by emotional ideas and display—as scholars, preachers, philosophers, teachers, musicians, theologians, and medical practitioners. Thus, we suggest that contemporary gender ideologies shaped the works they created at a conceptual level, as well

18 Penelope Gouk and Helen Hills, "Towards Histories of Emotions," in *Representing Emotions*, eds. Gouk and Hills, 15–34, at 18–19.

19 James, *Passion and Action*.

20 Juliana Schiesari, *The Gendering of Melancholia: Feminism, Psychoanalysis, and the Symbolics of Loss in Renaissance Literature* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Sarah Coakley, *Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy and Gender* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Lisa Perfetti, ed., *The Representation of Women's Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Culture* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005); Susan Broomhall, ed., *Authority, Gender and Emotions in Late Medieval and Early Modern England* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Susan Broomhall, ed., *Gender and Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Destroying Order, Structuring Disorder* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015).

as in the social practices of text production, authorship, dissemination and performance more broadly. Gender ideologies underpinned conceptual systems that ordered world views and social realities. Monagle's analysis demonstrates how Lombard's *Sentences* established a view of male clerical authority that was founded upon gendered notions of emotion, reason and will, and examines how one man's theology could be transmitted and embedded in the thinking of generations of scholars. D'Arcens's consideration of authorial and memorialising strategies in Pizan's work explores her negotiation of an emotional and authoritative relationship to an overwhelmingly masculine textual culture.

Scholarly considerations of mental health and its interest in anxieties and melancholies were firmly understood through gender, and so too were the medical therapies that were prescribed. Gender was likewise instrumental in shaping the nature of Inquisition cases, in terms of fears among both theologians and the populace about the demonically influenced sex-changeable body, and the power of those whose views the court was willing to consider, as Soyer demonstrates. Jesuits' reflections and teachings about the love between Mary and the Christ child, studied here by Garrod, were informed by theological and practical considerations of the place of the sexes in the political, legal and social realm. Similarly, Weston's practitioners carefully considered the sex, and thus emotional state, of the patient or family member whom they addressed when producing epistolary consultations. The training of children rested upon assumptions about the sexes and their age-related capacity for emotional control and development. Indeed, in the modern domain, psychologist Stephanie A. Shields has argued powerfully that emotion constructs gender and likewise, gender inflects emotions. In a study that moves from the late nineteenth century to the present, Shields suggests that the very process by which we learn and then practice emotions is fundamentally shaped by gender.[21] Our collection reflects upon the nature of such processes in earlier periods.

Social identities thus always informed notions of how the emotions were to be ordered and practised, and by whom, but the essays here penetrate this reality further—they show how these ideologies did so in dynamic and adaptive ways, through emerging technologies such as new pedagogical practices, print or medical therapies, across the period.

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21 Stephanie A. Shields, *Speaking from the Heart: Gender and the Social Meaning of Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

This volume devotes historical attention to the ordering of emotions in both medieval and early modern thought *and* its translation as, and connection to, practices and experiences for individuals and communities. The essays adopt social, cultural and intellectual history approaches to analyse a wide variety of sources that explore aspects of religious, philosophical, scientific, medical and political thought, and the structures and practices that they generated. Many re-assess what are often key texts of their period in a new light to provide fascinating, and important, insights. They re-examine the works of well-known and well-studied theologians, authors, musical and medical theorists, from Lombard and Aquinas to Pizan and Shakespeare, using categories of analysis that have rarely been applied to their study. Employing the lens of emotions offers unexpected analyses into the *mentalités* and social realities that informed their construction, and presents sophisticated interpretations of the meaning of such texts. These investigations highlight shifts in both emotional expression and systems of thought from the middle ages to the seventeenth century (indeed, even the nineteenth with Ribot) that suggest these negotiations were not just produced between individual experience and ideas on an everyday basis, but some participants and collectives enacted significant and lasting change both to the system of thought and to the expressive mechanisms and performances of emotions. Gender played a key and consistent role in this dynamic process—time and again privileging male and female expressive behaviours and voices differently. These interacting and negotiated emotional states and systems of thought were flexible, inherently susceptible to change. Collectively, these essays provide compelling evidence of the dynamic and dialogic ways that emotions were conceptualised and ordered in key world views and ordering systems, and shaped these in turn, over the medieval and early modern period.

CHAPTER 1

Nine Angry Angels: Order, Emotion, and the Angelic and Demonic Hierarchies in the High Middle Ages

Juanita Feros Ruys

Order and the Existence of Angels

Integral to the high medieval understanding of God's providence was a deep and abiding faith in his rightful ordering of the universe; a sense that this universe was evenly balanced and uniformly graduated in all its aspects. Mary Franklin-Brown describes this insistence on order as "a habit of mind—even an impulsion—shared by virtually all Scholastic writers." Noting that this was heavily influenced by the writings of Aristotle, Franklin-Brown argues that "scholastic order was expressed through hierarchical division," to the extent that this "structured every stratum of thought and textuality."[1] So important was a logical and predictable universe to Scholastic thinkers that they used it to confirm beliefs they already possessed, such as the existence of angels. Although angels were an integral part of the medieval Christian inheritance, witnessed in biblical and patristic authority, the Scholastics still used first principles to prove that a properly ordered universe would have to contain them. Bonaventure suggested that the rational order of the universe required their noble substance,[2] while Thomas Aquinas argued that in the proper order of

1 Mary Franklin-Brown, *Reading the World: Encyclopedic Writing in the Scholastic Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 72. Scholastics, or Schoolmen, is a name given to the students and masters of the cathedral schools of the twelfth century and the nascent universities of the thirteenth who developed new approaches to philosophical reasoning combined with a focus on theology as an academic discipline. Through innovative academic genres such as the *disputatio* and *quaestio*, and emerging epistemologies such as the experiential, particularly drawn from new Latin translations of Aristotelian writings, the Scholastics began to categorize and explore the limits of human knowledge. See R.N. Swanson, *The Twelfth-Century Renaissance* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), ch. 5; and Clare Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard's* Sentences *and the Development of Theology* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), pp. 1–5.

2 Bonaventure, "De existentia angelorum," in Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron et Bonaventuriana quaedam selecta*, ed. Ferdinand Delorme (Florence-Quaracchi: Ex

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things, progression from one extreme to another required careful gradation through intermediate positions, so that between God and corporeal substances there would need to exist incorporeal substances, first those not united to a body (angels), and then those united to a body (souls in humans).[3]

But the placing of angels into an ordered creation did not end there. Angels themselves were thought to be hierarchically ordered: they were said to exist in nine orders in total, arranged into three hierarchies of three orders each. These were graded according to closeness to God, fullness of love, fullness of knowledge, and so forth, from the Seraphim at the top who glowed with a transcendent love of God, down to the messenger angels who ministered to humanity, as a number of biblical stories related. According to Peter Lombard in his *Sentences*, "some were made superior and some inferior to others by the wisdom of God . . . who orders all things with equitable rule."[4] Scholastic thinkers were clear that angels held their gifts, powers, and offices in proportion to their order, that there were grades and differences between angels, and that one angel could be greater than another.[5]

The idea of angelic hierarchies had been most influentially propounded in an early sixth-century treatise, originally written in Greek, entitled *The Celestial Hierarchy*. The author of this text, as well as a number of other treatises dealing

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typographia Colegii S. Bonaventurae, 1934), 295–304, at 300: "Cogit ulterius angelum ponere ratio ordinis universi, quia, si hic deesset, privaretur universum quadam nobilissima parte."

3 Thomas Aquinas, "De spiritualibus creaturis," online edition, Corpus Thomisticum (Fundación Tomás de Aquino, 2013) <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/qds.html>, a. 5, co.: "Secundo potest idem considerari ex ordine rerum, qui talis esse invenitur ut ab uno extremo ad alterum non perveniatur nisi per media. . . . Non igitur possibile est quod immediate sub Deo collocetur corporalis substantia . . . Sed oportet ponere multa media per quae deveniatur a summa simplicitate divina ad corpoream multiplicitatem; quorum mediorum aliqua sunt substantiae incorporeae corporibus non unitae, aliqua vero substantiae incorporeae corporibus unitae." Sylvain Piron, "Deplatonising the Celestial Hierarchy: Peter John Olivi's Interpretation of the Pseudo-Dionysius," in *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance*, eds. Isabel Iribarren and Martin Lenz (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 29–44, at 31 notes that "in Aquinas's cosmology and metaphysics, angels occupy a crucial place as warrants of world order and intelligibility."

4 Peter Lombard, *The Sentences, Book 2: On Creation*, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008), distinct. 3, ch. 2, p. 13; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in iu libris distinctae*, ed. Ignatius Brady, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971–81), vol. 1, pars 2 (1971), bk. 2, distinct. 3, ch. 2, p. 342: "quibus alii superiores, alii inferiores Dei sapientia constituerentur . . . aequo moderamine cuncta ordinantis."

5 Alain de Lille, *Hierarchia Alani*, in Alain de Lille, *Textes inédits*, ed. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny (Paris: J. Vrin, 1965), 223–35, at 225: "angeli habent proportionaliter et dona et officia et potestates . . . inter angelos gradus sunt et differentie . . . unus angelus maior est alio."

with knowledge of God, is known to scholars today as Pseudo-Dionysius. It would be difficult to overstate the influence the texts of Pseudo-Dionysius had on medieval thinkers,[6] due to the fact that their author was thought to be the same Dionysius mentioned in Acts 17:34, a personal convert of the Apostle Paul. His works were therefore accorded an almost apostolic authority and were cited or treated by some of the key theologians of the Middle Ages. The Fourth Council of Constantinople (869–870) cited "the great and most wise Denis,"[7] while Hugh of St. Victor wrote a commentary on *The Celestial Hierarchy* in the twelfth century. We can find authorities as influential as Bonaventure in the thirteenth century and Jean Gerson, Chancellor of the University of Paris, in the fourteenth century continuing to identify Pseudo-Dionysius with the Dionysius mentioned in the Bible.[8] Indeed, it has been claimed that Aquinas quoted Pseudo-Dionysius in his writings more often than Aristotle.[9] Throughout the Middle Ages and even into the time of Dante, the hierarchical division of the angels expounded by Pseudo-Dionysius was considered more correct than an alternative version put forward by Western patristic authority, Gregory the Great.[10] Characteristic of Pseudo-Dionysius's angelic hierarchies, and influential on all subsequent medieval citations of them, was their top-down demarcation, which has been taken as expressing Pseudo-Dionysius's "overall hierarchical theory of descending revelation and authority."[11]

The treatises that were penned on angels and their hierarchies during the High Middle Ages were the product of a concerted Scholastic attempt to categorise, analyse, and describe the functioning and nature of the universe. In

6 See Paul Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 73–77 and 237–40.

7 Norman P. Tanner, ed., *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 2 vols. (London: Sheed & Ward; Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 1:166: "magnum et sapientissimum Dionysium."

8 Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, principium, collatio 2, p. 29: "Hanc sapientiam docuit Paulus Dionysium, Dionysius Timotheum . . . De hac Dionysius, postquam fecerat libros *De angelica* et [*De*] *ecclesiastica hierarchia*, tandem fecit *De mystica sapiential* . . ."; Jean Gerson, "98. Notulae super quaedam verba Dionysii de coelesti hierarchia," in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Palémon Glorieux, 10 vols. (Paris: Desclée & Cie, 1960–73), 3:203–24, at 217–18: "Instrumentalis auctor fuit Dionysius Areopagita, theosophus ionicus, primum philosophus, dehinc conversus a Paulo et factus episcopus Athenarum."

9 Christian Schäfer, *Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite: An Introduction to the Structure and the Content of the Treatise "On the Divine Names"* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 16.

10 Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius*, 74, citing Dante, *The Divine Comedy*, Paradise, canto 28, lines 120–30.

11 Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius*, 75.

these treatises, angels were both existent, active parts of the universe, and also, as has been noted by a number of scholars, theoretical figures akin to modern thought experiments, which allowed the Scholastics a medium through which to interrogate the nature of the universe.[12] The sorts of questions raised in such treatises would have featured in school disputations, and so would have formed part of the basic conceptual training undertaken by young men in the university culture.[13] These ideas were therefore very much the property of a learned Latinate male elite, but could have flowed into more general circulation through dissemination into the monasteries, and to the public through preaching by ecclesiastics.

While the Schoolmen were concerned with many aspects of the functioning of the universe, one aspect was only just beginning to come under systematic consideration: the emotions. What these were, how they arose, what constituted them, how many there were and what distinguished one from another, their role, and their necessary relation to both soul and body, were discussed in such treatises, but usually received far less concerted attention than questions of, for example, volition and cognition. An important categorisation of emotional states was produced by Thomas Aquinas in his massive *Summa theologiae*, where he took into consideration the so-called "passions of the soul" (*passiones animae*), analysing these in twenty-seven *quaestiones*, each made up of several *articuli*.[14] Other Scholastic thinkers, such as Albertus Magnus and Jean de la Rochelle, were also in the process of attempting to understand the part emotions played within the human experience of the universe, and developed their own approaches to the same questions.[15]

Interestingly, although both angels and emotions featured in these thirteenth-century *summae*, there was in fact very little consideration of the intersection between these two categories. It was Aquinas's position that because "passions of the soul" required a somatic component, neither angels nor demons, being incorporeal, could experience them, although they could

12 Isabel Iribarren and Martin Lenz, "The Role of Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry," in *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry*, eds. Iribarren and Lenz, 1–11, at 7; and Piron, "Deplatonising the Celestial Hierarchy," 29.

13 Olga Weijers, *In Search of the Truth: A History of Disputation Techniques from Antiquity to Early Modern Times* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 125–26.

14 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, online edition, Corpus Thomisticum (Fundación Tomás de Aquino, 2013) <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2022.html>, "prima secundae," quaestiones 22–48.

15 Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 226–55; and Peter King, "Emotions in Medieval Thought," in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 167–87.

experience something akin to them in terms of "simple acts of the will."[16] As will be seen below, this lack of sustained theorisation around angelic and demonic emotions would create nearly irresolvable complexities when the Schoolmen attempted to explain how the angelic hierarchies failed and why the demonic hierarchies succeeded.

The Emotional Complexity of the Angelic Orders

Order was viewed as essential not just to the constitution of the angelic cohort, but to its divine function and mission as well. Knowledge of God himself and matters pertaining to providence were transmitted down through the angelic orders, from God, through the higher orders one by one, and to the lower orders according to their needs, so that the lower angels received only so much knowledge as their particular mission required. Thirteenth-century theologian Jean de Paris described how the higher orders, in seeing God, saw many things in him that were unknown to the lower orders, and they transmitted this knowledge by illuminating the lower orders, such that the higher orders were illuminated by God, the lower orders by the higher ones.[17] Indeed, so important was order seen to be in the functioning of the universe, that two entire orders of angels of the second hierarchy, the Dominions (also known as the Dominations) and the Principalities (also known as the Principates), were devoted to its maintenance. According to Alain de Lille's commentary on the angelic hierarchies, the gift endowed upon the Dominions was that the lower orders of angels would obey them, and their ministry was to guide humans to obey their superiors. Meanwhile, the Principalities possessed the gift of ruling over the inferior orders of angels and a ministry of guiding humans to rule their subordinates fairly and justly.[18]

16 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, "Pars prima," quaestio 64, art. 3, co; and "Prima secundae," quaestio 22, art. 3, ad 3.

17 Jean de Paris (Quidort), *Commentaire sur les Sentences: Reportation*, ed. Jean-Pierre Muller, 2 vols. (Rome: Herder, 1961–64), vol. 2 (1964), distinct. 9, quaestio 1, p. 102: "superiores, quia plus habent de lumine gloriae quam inferiores, ideo videntes Deum vident in ipso plura, quae non vident inferiores, et de talibus superior angelus illuminat inferiorem talia sibi demonstrando, non quod illa demonstrate in Deo videant, sed accipiunt a superioribus. Et ideo, secundum ipsos, superiores a Deo illuminantur, inferiores a superioribus."

18 Alain de Lille, *Hierarchia Alani*, 233: "Sunt alii spiritus superioribus obedientes et inferioribus imperantes, qui sicut habent in munere ut inferiores ordines eis obediant, ita habent in ministerio ut homines moneant, ut suis maioribus obedient . . . habent in munere quod inferioribus principantur et homines edocent modum principandi inferioribus."

Yet within, and indeed at the head, of this pervasive context of regulation and hierarchy, stood not constraint but unboundedness, since the highest angelic order, the Seraphim, were seen as possessing a gift and an office not pertaining to rule, but to an all-encompassing and selfless love. A focus on the nature and primacy of this love grew more pronounced throughout the Middle Ages. In Pseudo-Dionysius's *Celestial Hierarchy*, the Seraphim were associated, through the etymology of their Hebrew name, with warmth and light.[19] Such warmth and light soon came to be explicitly evoked as a form of love, and by the High Middle Ages, commentators were expatiating on the nature of that love. In his early twelfth-century commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius, Hugh of St. Victor explained that the Seraphim were called "blazing" and "illuminating" because they were ablaze with the "love" of their Creator and warmed others through that blaze of "brotherly love."[20]

With the explosion of theological interest in the nature of love, and particularly divine love, through the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, increasingly complex and affective descriptions of the love possessed by the Seraphim became a feature of works dealing with the angelic hierarchies. Alain de Lille described the ministry of the Seraphim as one of intensely burning feeling because the whole order blazed more intently than any other with divine love.[21] In turn, Simon de Tournai described the Seraphim as pre-eminently burning in selfless love,[22] using here the word for the particular Godly form of love, *caritas*, rather than the more general *amor*. Bartholomeus Anglicus wrote of the Seraphim as beings enflamed within by a more intensely blazing emotion of brotherly love,[23] and an anonymous addition to a manuscript of Bonaventure's

19 *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, trans. Colm Luibhéid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 162.

20 Hugh of St. Victor, *Commentariorium in "Hierarchiam Coelestem" S. Dionysii Areopagitae* (*Patrologia Latina* ref. 175. 1023B): "Seraphim namque, quia ex amore Creatoris sui tanquam vicini et proximi, et in se ardentes sunt et ex se alios accendunt, *ardentes* sive *incendentes* interpretantur . . . et tamen ipsi specialiter ardentes vocari debuerunt, qui ipsius amoris ignem et primi concipiunt, et fortius ardentes ad caeteros quoque accendendos flammam dilectionis emittunt."

21 Alain de Lille, *Hierarchia Alani*, 229: "incalescentis affectionis"; "magis incalescit amore diuino."

22 Simon de Tournai, *Sententiae*, in Alain de Lille, *Textes inédits*, 307–12, at 309: "In quidbusdam enim spiritibus, qui pre aliis ardent caritate, et ideo 'incalescentes' dicuntur affectione resultat diuina apparitio, ardenti caritate resultationis existente causa."

23 Bartholomaeus Anglicus, *De proprietatibus rerum. Volume I: Introduction générale, Prohemium, et Libri I–IV*, eds. Baudouin Van den Abeele, Heinz Meyer, Michael Twomey,

writings depicts the Seraphim as a fire, or inflammation, or a burning of love.[24] Meanwhile Bonaventure himself, known as the Doctor Seraphicus, powerfully evoked the love of the Seraphim as ongoing, focused, piercing, inward, sweet, wise, and keen ("amor continuus, intensus, penetrativus, intimus, suavis, sapiens, acutus"), the kind of love that teaches how to love with the whole heart ("hic amor docet diligere ex toto corde").[25]

Medieval thinkers were not untroubled by this primacy of emotion within order, and some attempted to explain more fully the arrangement of the first hierarchy of the angels which contained the Seraphim in prime position, then the Cherubim, who were especially gifted with knowledge ('scientia'), and third the Thrones, who were gifted with judgement ('iudicium').[26] Alain de Lille felt compelled to clarify that after 'love,' knowledge is next most "worthy and fruitful," so that the Cherubim rightly hold second place in the hierarchy through their knowledge of divine things that is fuller than that of all the orders below them (though not fuller than that of the Seraphim).[27] Alain appears desirous of avoiding an objective hierarchisation of angelic gifts, however, when he points out that although the Seraphim and Cherubim are ranked higher than the Thrones, it must not be considered therefore that love is inherently more worthy than reason—only that it is more fruitful, because it can bring forth the fruit of blessedness.[28]

Albertus Magnus solved the same issue by considering the different forms of love distinguished in the Latin language. He declared that 'amor' was a form of love common to both rational and non-rational creatures (animals), and so it had to be considered lesser than knowledge and understanding, which was the property of the rational creature alone. This would rank the Cherubim above the Seraphim. 'Dilectio,' however, involved the conscious choice and

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Bernd Roling, and R. James Long (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), bk. 2, ch. 8, pp. 114–15: "ardentiori motu dilectionis intime inflammantur."

24 Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, 413: "incendium seu inflammatio et ardor amoris."

25 Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, visio 4, collatio 2, 247.

26 Indeed, David Keck (*Angels and Angelology in the Middle Ages* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 57) points out that Michael the Scot placed the Cherubim above the Seraphim precisely because "he valued knowledge over love."

27 Alain de Lille, *Hierarchia Alani*, 230: "Et quia post dilectionem dignior et fructuosior est scientia, secundum locum optinet ille ordo qui post Seraphin pleniorem habet scientiam de diuinis."

28 Alain de Lille, *Hierarchia Alani*, 232: "Nota quod non ideo Seraphin et Cherubin preponuntur Thronis, quia dilectio dignior sit ratione, sed quia fructuosior est, quia ex ea consequimur fructum beatitudinis; ideo et primo loco et prima Seraphin notantur."

discretion of its possessor in being bestowed upon a beloved, which gave it a rational component and put it beyond the bounds of 'amor,' while 'caritas' stood another step beyond the power of 'dilectio' in that it judged its beloved to be beyond price. For this reason, 'caritas' had to outrank knowledge ('scientia') and the Seraphim accordingly took priority over the Cherubim.[29] Bonaventure, however, stresses the importance of angelic impassibility in the hierarchy, noting that the Thrones hold the gift of tranquillity of judgement so that their judgement is never affected by any emotion, since justice can be perverted by one either loving or sorrowing beyond proper measure.[30]

Order, Emotion, and Rebellion

Yet this explication of the primacy of love in the angelic hierarchies, and the idyllic vision of nine orders of angels operating in harmony, each devoting itself to its particular assignment, gratefully accepting the revelations bestowed upon it by the order above and gently passing on requisite knowledge to the order below, concealed a dark flaw in the system. For fundamental to Christian biblical and salvation history was the belief that one of the angels in heaven, Lucifer, led a rebellion against God in which he was joined by a number of other angels. These rebellious angels were in consequence flung down from the empyrean heaven to the ethereal one, condemned to spend eternity as the devil and his demons, and consigned to everlasting suffering from the Day of Judgement. In such a divinely ordered cosmos, how could this have been possible? Attempts to explain this mystery set in motion an extraordinarily complex interplay of concepts dealing with order and emotion.

Medieval understandings of order and the emotional dispositions surrounding it required that the leader of the rebellion, Lucifer, be the highest of the angels, one so clothed in beauty and knowledge that he would actually aspire through pride, in the words of Isaiah 14:12–13,[31] to equivalence with God

29 Alberti Magni, *Super Dionysium De caelesti hierarchia*, eds. Paul Simon and Wilhelm Kübel (Aschendorff: Monasterii Westfalorum, 1993), cap. 7, p. 92: "Dicimus igitur, quod scientia dignior est amore communiter sumpto, sed minus digna caritate, et propter hoc ordo seraphin superior est."

30 Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, visio 4, collatio 4, 259: "Tertium est tranquillitas iudicii, ut non pervertatur iudicium in quacumque passione; si enim inordinate amo vel doleo, pervertitur iudicium; istud respondet ordini Thronorum."

31 Isaiah 14:12–13: "how have you fallen from Heaven, Lucifer, you who rose in the morning . . . you who said in your heart: I will ascend into Heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God." (*Biblia sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem*, ed. Robert Weber, 4th edn,

himself. Pride could not have worked on an angel who was lower in the orders, for the nature of order itself prohibited this. As Jean de Paris observed, a pauper does not seek instant elevation to the position of king, but looks for an intermediate betterment in situation; therefore, Lucifer must have been of the first order to covet divine equality. Moreover, the adherence of the other angels to Lucifer clearly indicated both his primacy and his leadership over them.[32]

This simple interdependence of order and emotion—pre-eminence eliciting pride—raised profoundly disturbing questions for the medieval belief in order, and despite numerous ingenious explanations offered by the Schoolmen, these were never fully resolved. The primary question was how a Seraph, which Lucifer must have been insofar as he was pre-eminent over all the other angels, could have rebelled against a God to whom he was bound by such an ardent and intense love. To address this problem, the nature of the angelic hierarchies themselves had to be redefined. Augustine noted the suggestion that there were different classes of angels and that Lucifer was only the leader of a sub-celestial sub-category of angels, himself no more than an archangel (the second lowest of the nine orders).[33]

Yet this did not solve the difficulty whereby scripture suggested that some angels fell from every order, which would have meant that some of the Seraphim also turned against God. This proved such a disturbing challenge to the inherent goodness of hierarchy that hierarchy had to be removed entirely as a factor in play. Instead, it was argued that the rebellion must have come about *before* the angels were distributed into their nine orders, and that the gifts evinced by each of the orders subsequently were bestowed when the good angels were confirmed in grace following the rebellion of the others. This was the position enunciated by Peter Lombard, who explained that the scripture allotting fallen angels to every order was

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emended Roger Gryson (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994): "quomodo cecidisti de caelo lucifer qui mane oriebaris . . . qui dicebas in corde tuo in caelum conscendam super astra Dei exaltabo solium meum.") Translation is the author's own.

32 Jean de Paris, *Commentaire*, vol. 2, distinct. 6, quaestio 6, p. 91: "angelus appetiit aequalitatem Dei. Sed si fuisset de inferiori ordine, istud non ita cito appetivisset, sed prius aliquid intermedium. Sicut pauper homo non immediate appetit se esse regem, sed aliquid medium inter ipsum et regem. Item, patet ex consortio, quia multi alii angeli sibi adhaeserunt in peccato. Et hoc non fuisset, nisi fuisset primus et nisi haberet aliquem principatum super illos."

33 See Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, in *On Genesis*, trans. Edmund Hill (Hyde Park: New City Press, 2002), 3.10.14, p. 224 and 11.17.22, p. 441.

> not because they had been in those orders and later fell to ruin, but because, if they had remained steadfast, some of them would have been in each of the orders since they, like the ones who remained steadfast, had different degrees of fineness of nature and discernment of form.[34]

In other words, there existed a natural hierarchy amongst the angels, but they had not yet, at the time of the rebellion, been formalised into orders. Most especially, Lombard emphasised, "there were not Seraphim, or Cherubim, or Thrones at that time," since if these angels had blazed with love or been powerful in wisdom, as was their function, "they would not have fallen."[35] This solution had the advantage of avoiding awkward questions regarding the failure of hierarchy, but raised a serious question of its own: if rebellion had occurred before the existence of hierarchy, then what was its motivating factor?

For some, the answer was an emotional disposition that was an integral part of a hierarchy. Vincent of Beauvais suggested that Lucifer's pride led him not only to desire equality with God, but also dominion over the other angels: "ille æqualitatem Dei & principatum aliorum angelorum superbè appeteret." In their turn, these angels would not have been motivated by pride, as Lucifer was, since not all of them would have desired to be like God, but they would naturally have sought the comfort of Lucifer's leadership, to be his followers.[36] In other words, their natural disposition towards order and subjection could be seen as, paradoxically, disruptive of divine hierarchy. If we probe further, however, and ask why the other angels should have wanted this, the potential answers again reveal the complicated interplay of order and emotion.

The Franciscan theologian Peter John Olivi considered the grades of affection amongst the blessed and saw this as naturally directed according to distinction, so that every being loved his superior more than himself, and desired

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34 Silano, *Sentences, Book 2*, distinct. 9, ch. 4.3, p. 41; Lombard, *Sententiae in iu libris distinctae*, vol. 1, pars 2, p. 374: "Ideoque Scriptura dicit de singulis ordinibus aliquos cecidisse, non quia fuissent in ordinibus et postea corruerint, sed quia si perstitissent, eorum aliqui in singulis fuissent ordinibus, qui et in naturae tenuitate et in formae perspicacitate differentes gradus habebant, sicut illi qui perstiterunt."

35 Silano, *Sentences, Book 2*, distinct. 9, ch. 4.2, p. 41; Lombard, *Sententiae in iu libris distinctae*, vol. 1, pars 2, p. 374: "Non enim tunc caritate ardebant, nec sapientia pollebant, neque in eis Deus sedebat: si enim haec habuissent, non cecidissent; non ergo tunc erant Seraphin vel Cherubin vel Throni."

36 Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum naturale* (Dvaci, 1624; facs. edn, Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1964), bk. 2, cap. 88, col. 136: "Non quia voluerunt omnes similes esse Deo sicut ipse, sed idem cum eo voluerunt, scilicet quod ipse esset eorum caput sicut appetebat." [paraphrased in text].

greater glory for his superior than for himself. Only in this way could the affection between those of different grades be righteous and devoid of envy.[37] Olivi noted that in this life, the power of affection was so strong that one could be drawn to one's fellow companion to the extent of wanting to die for them, or of finding life without them and their loving company the greatest form of death. This was especially true of relationships within a hierarchy, where those lower in the order were held within the emotional realm of their superiors just like infants in the womb, or chicks under their mother's wings.[38] If applied to the angels, these ideas would have meant the lower orders adhering to their leader Lucifer and following him in his bid for greater glory, no matter the cost to themselves. But were these ideas so applicable?

Olivi addresses this matter directly in Quaestio XLIII of his *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum* where his answer is a startling confirmation of the disruptive power of social love amongst the angelic cohort in heaven. Here Olivi paints a picture of the pre-eminence of Lucifer as sparking not just his own inordinate self-love, which became productive of his pride and presumption, but also a powerful flow of love towards him from the other angels who contemplated his superiority. Indeed, in some ways, the other angels' communal love for Lucifer was anterior to Lucifer's love of himself, since

> he saw himself reflected within each heart as if he were the singular and universal head of all, and seeing his power over each of them, he saw himself multiplied and magnified, just like a man who sees himself reflected in many mirrors at the same time.[39]

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37 Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones de novissimis ex Summa super iv Sententiarum*, ed. P. Maranesi (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 2004), quaestio 6: "Queritur an beati diligant meliores se plus quam se," p. 128: "sic unusquisque plus diliget superiorem suum quam seipsum, quia maiorem gloriam vult superiori quam sibi: aliter esset ibi affectio iniusta et invida."

38 Olivi, *Quaestiones*, quaestio 6, p. 133: "in vita ista videmus quod tanto amore amicitie quis afficitur ad filium vel patrem vel fratrem vel sponsam vel socium, quod libentissime se exponit morti pro eis; et est sibi summa mors vivere sine ipsis; et multis videtur quod tantum vellent non esse quam in eternum hic vivere sine omni amicabili societate. . . . et precipue ubi superior se habet ad inferiorem, sicut sol ad parvum lumen candele, et ubi inferiores quodam modo continentur infra virtutes et affectus superiorum suorum, sicut infantes in utero matrum et velut pulli sub alis galline."

39 Petrus Iohannis Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Bernard Jansen, 3 vols. (Quaracchi: Ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1922), 1:719: "videndo enim se esse in corde uniuscuiusque tanquam singulare et universale caput omnium et videndo

Why the angels should have chosen to bond to Lucifer rather than remain loyal to their Creator was also, for Olivi, a matter of emotional disposition: the angels enjoyed ("fruebantur") the company of the other angels in heaven, who were close to them and visible to them, more than they could enjoy the company of God, who was distant and not visible to them. Experience of a visible, beloved good will always stir feelings more powerfully than the theoretical existence of a non-visible good, even if that good is objectively greater.[40] Accordingly, there arose a powerful communal feeling amongst the angels such that they felt like one body, connected to their head in Lucifer, and they saw themselves reflected in him just as sons do in their father's heart.[41] Thus, through the bond of love ("per nexum amoris"), they formed a single body with him ("totum erat unum corpus"), and their natural inclination was to cling to his friendship, whatever that might cost.[42] As a result, and Olivi's language here is telling, they could "more easily and more powerfully be *disordered* in love of him."[43]

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potestatem suam super unumquemque, sic videbat se multiplicatum et magnificatum, sicut homo qui videt se simul in multis speculis." Piron ("Deplatonising the Celestial Hierarchy," 39, n. 42) points out that elsewhere, Olivi refers to the higher angels' communication to the lower angels of aspects of God as a form of reflection, and comments: "Olivi had a strong taste for mirrors."

40 Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, 1:717: "Inter cetera autem ad quae facillime et vehementissime movetur affectus est visibilis experientia boni amati, quamquam sit secundum se longe minus quam sit aliud bonum absens et visibiliter inexpertum."

41 Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, 1:720: "sic erant ei connexi sicut membra suo capiti et sic videbant se esse in illo sicut filios in corde patris." It might be noted here that Olivi's language as applied to the angels is highly anthropomorphic, and Piron ("Deplatonising the Celestial Hierarchy," 42) himself argues that for Olivi, "angels become more akin to humans than they do with most theologians." Tiziana Suarez-Nani points out that this has more to do, however, with creating a distinct gulf between created beings, whether angelic or human, and the transcendence of God. See Suarez-Nani, "Pierre de Jean Olivi et la subjectivité angélique," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 70 (2003): 233–316, at 305: "l'humanisation de l'ange apparaît comme une réponse radicale face à ce que le franciscain considérait comme une divinisation illégitime des créatures spirituelles: il faillait donc détrôner les anges pour mieux reconnaître et célébrer Dieu dans sa majesté et sa transcendence."

42 Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, 1:720: "ideo sequestrari ab illo et ab amicitia illius secundum se et absolute erat contrariissimum naturali nexui et voluntati eorum."

43 Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, 1:721: "hinc est quod facilius et fortius potuerunt deordinari in amore sui." Emphasis added.

It is within this context of mutual affection amongst the angels that Olivi returns to the question of Lucifer's primacy, finding it resolved by recourse to the dynamic interplay of both order and affection. Lucifer had to have been the highest angel, Olivi contends, because those angels who followed him through the free action of their natural affection and their delight in his friendship would have devoted these feelings to one superior to him, if such existed. By the same token, Lucifer himself would have chosen to dedicate his natural affection to an angel greater than himself, had one existed.[44] As a consequence, the manner in which both hierarchy and emotion function necessitated that Lucifer be the highest angel; this reified the problem of hierarchy itself being implicated in rebellion.

In attempting to explain away the failure of hierarchy to hold the angels in loyalty to God, then, medieval Schoolmen found it necessary to explain away the angelic hierarchies themselves, arguing either that Lucifer was only a lower angel, or that the nine orders of angels described by Pseudo-Dionysius did not exist from first creation. Yet, had they pursued this line of thought to its natural end, they would have reached a disturbing conclusion: if hierarchy was in no way implicated in the rebellion of the angels, then the motivating factor had to be one or more of a range of emotional dispositions—love, pride, envy, or hatred. Indeed, it is telling that in summarising the fall of the angels, Vincent of Beauvais reduces it to simple emotional dispositions: those angels who turned towards God adhered to him in love, those who turned away from him did so in hatred and envy.[45] Yet, implicit in this line of thinking would have been a disturbing corollary: the existence and influence of emotions in the universe prior to the creation and functioning of order.

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44 Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, 1:731: "Non est autem verisimile quod si habuit superiores, quin illi qui secuti sunt eum multo libentius etiam secundum suam affectionem naturalem et secundum maiorem delectabilitatem visibilis amicitiae eligissent adhaerere superioribus plus quam illi. Non etiam est verisimile quod ipse non plus secundum suam affectionem naturalem praeelegisset sequi suos superiores sibi visibiles quam solum se ipsum."

45 Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum naturale*, bk. 1, cap. 33, "De conuersione bonorum ad lucem increatam," col. 42: "Itaque cum a Creatore quidam eorum auersi sunt, caeteri ad eundem conuersi sunt. Conuerti fuit ei charitate adhaerere. Auerti odio habere vel inuidere."

The Emotional Complexity of the Demonic Orders

Once the angels had fallen, however, there arose the question of how to envisage them in their new circumstance as demons. Although they had become demons through their own attempted overthrow of divine order, so pervasive was the doctrine of order in the medieval world that they were nevertheless pictured as submitting to order in their new forms.[46] In his *Sentences*, Peter Lombard declared that

> just as among the good angels some rule over others, so also among the evil ones some have been given precedence over others and some are subject to others. Indeed, for as long as the world lasts, angels rule over angels, men over men, and demons over demons.[47]

The principle of equivalency in creation came to suggest that the demons were arranged in replication of the angelic hierarchies—that is, in nine orders, at the head of which stood an order defined by its extreme emotional disposition. In his description of the demonic hierarchies, Alain de Lille noted the contradictory concept of a demonic order, describing it as an *ordo inordinatus*, or rather, an *exordo*, and he somewhat apologetically entitled the pre-eminent demonic order—in *ficto vocabulo* as he puts it—the 'Anti-seraphim.'[48] Because the primary ministry of the Seraphim was to blaze with love for God and to inspire humans to the same, the function of the Anti-seraphim was accordingly the deterrence of humans from the love of God and others, and a diversion of their love to the world.[49] Yet William of Auvergne perhaps more accurately captured the emotional equivalency of an anti-order of demons aligned against the Seraphim when he described such an order as not only luring humans from the

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46 On the high medieval envisaging of demonic, and indeed human hierarchies, upon the model of the angelic orders, see David Luscombe, "The Hierarchies in the Writings of Alan of Lille, William of Auvergne and St Bonaventure," in *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry*, eds. Iribarren and Lenz, 15–28.

47 Silano, *Sentences, Book 2*, distinct. 6, ch. 4, p. 25; Lombard, *Sententiae in iu libris distinctae*, vol. 1, pars 2, p. 356: "Et sicut inter bonos angelos alii aliis praesunt, ita et inter malos alii aliis praelati sunt, et alii aliis subiecti. Quamdiu enim durat mundus, angeli angelis, et homines hominibus, et daemones daemonibus praesunt."

48 Alain de Lille, *Hierarchia Alani*, 230.

49 Alain de Lille, *Hierarchia Alani*, 230: "huic officio sunt deputati, ut homines arceant ab amore Dei et proximi, et inuitent ad amorem mundi."

love of God, but themselves blazing with an immense hatred of God: "majori creatoris odio exardescunt."[50]

William turned his attention in several chapters of his *De universo* to the kind of relations that might pertain between the inferior and superior orders of demons, and between these orders and their prince.[51] Here he took a dialectical approach, weighing up all the considerations involved in assigning order to demonic spirits. Beginning with the mechanics of power itself, he questioned the idea of demonic hierarchies, arguing that none of those who were themselves condemned by divine judgement could have the power to sanction punishment against others. He pointed out that in the case of demons, not only was their putative leader equally condemned along with his followers, he was the more given over to punishment as his crime had been the greater.[52] Moreover, the incorporeal nature of the demons would complicate the establishment of order, since they were immune to physical coercion. As William asked:

> How can some be superior to others, unless they are also more powerful, and how can they be more powerful unless they are stronger, and how can this be, if they have no sanction of harm over the others?[53]

He thought it an error of the unlearned to believe that the devil was able to chastise or beat other demons.[54]

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50 William of Auvergne, *De universo*, in Guilielmi Alverni Episcopi Parisiensis, *Opera Omnia*, 2 vols. (Aureliae, 1674; facs. edn Frankfurt-am-Main: Minerva, 1963), vol. 1, pt. 2, pt. 3, ch. 10, 1035bD.

51 See William of Auvergne, *De universo*, vol. 1, pt. 2, pt. 3, ch. 14, 1044aG: "De pace inter se dæmonum, & an inferiores superioribus pacifice obedient"; vol. 1, pt. 2, pt. 3, ch. 15, 1045aA: "Quomodò maligni spiritus inter se sint pacati, & obediunt principi suo in despectum creatoris, & num possent rebellare suo principi"; vol. 1, pt. 2, pt. 3, ch. 16, 1045bD: "Quâ potestate superiores dæmones coërcent vel subjiciunt minores, & Angeli sancti dæmones quoscunque."

52 William of Auvergne, *De universo*, vol. 1, pt. 2, pt. 3, ch. 10, 1036aF: "cùm reverà non aliter aliquid laudis habeat, aut gloriæ, nisi cùm præest eis aliquis ad eos torquendos; hoc autem ibi non est, cùm ipse princeps eorum non solùm in eadem damnatione sit, sed tanto etiam in majori, quantò constat plus esse sceleratum omnibus aliis."

53 William of Auvergne, *De universo*, vol. 1, pt. 2, pt. 3, ch. 16, 1046bE: "Quomodò autem superiores eis erunt, nisi sint & potentiores eisdem; & quomodò potentiores nisi sint & fortiores, quàm ipsi: qualiter erunt fortiores, quàm ipsi si nihil possunt in læsionem eorum?"

54 William of Auvergne, *De universo*, vol. 1, pt. 2, pt. 3, ch. 16, 1045bD–1046aE.

In the end, the answer to the issue of demonic hierarchies came down to a delicate balance between divine order and demonic emotions. To punish demonic pride, which had led the demons to rebel against his easy yoke in the first place, God rightly compelled them to be held in service to "a most worthless and savage tyrant," knowing how the proud suffer such dominion.[55] Demonic emotions proved a double-edged sword to William's reasoning. On the one hand, the undoubted pride and wrath with which the demonic community was riven, "just like a kind of spiritual tempest,"[56] meant that peace and co-operation between them was unlikely. Their wrath would mandate that peace amongst them would be impossible and they would be stirred up within themselves and against each other by a violent restlessness.[57] Indeed, there could be no love, compassion, or pity amongst the demons, because the pestilential passions by which they were rocked—wrath, hatred, pride, and envy—so stunted any natural inclination to brotherly love that it was unable to function. In any case, the vestige of natural love left in the demons following their rebellion and fall was so damaged that it could not operate effectively.[58]

Yet, while emotions could be viewed as rendering unlikely the establishment of demonic orders, they could also provide the crowning argument for them. As William conceded, one had to take into account with what great wrath and hatred these demons blazed against their Creator and humanity. So powerful were these emotions that they actually compelled a kind of truce amongst the demons, taming their internecine hatred and refocusing it upon a common enemy, in a way equally seen in human interactions. As a result, William concluded, "you can observe from what affection, or what most

55 William of Auvergne, *De universo*, vol. 1, pt. 2, pt. 3, ch. 15, 1045aA: "justitia creatoris, quæ non immeritò nequissimo, ac sævissimo tyranno eos subjici voluit, qui mitissimum nobilissimæ servitutis ejusdem jugum damnabilissimè abjecerunt. Deinde consideranda est tibi nequitia superbiæ eorum, quæ non mèlius, aut convenientiùs puniri potuit, quàm subjectione turpissima, quâ vilissimo omnium eorum subjecti sunt."

56 William of Auvergne, *De universo*, vol. 1, pt. 2, pt. 3, ch. 14, 1044aH: "velut tempestas quædam spiritualis."

57 William of Auvergne, *De universo*, vol. 1, pt. 2, pt. 3, ch. 14, 1044aH–bE: "Iracundia, & pax contraria sunt . . . consequens videtur nullam pacem apud alios esse sed potiùs turbulentissima inquietudine unumquemque illorum in se, & ad invicem exagitari."

58 William of Auvergne, *De universo*, vol. 1, pt. 2, pt. 3, ch. 15, 1045aC–1045bA: "iram, & odium, superbiam, invidiam, & alias hujusmodi pestilentissimas passions . . . naturalem dilectionem . . . adeò læsa, adeòque impedita."

worthless intention, they obey their prince—namely, in hatred of the Creator and of humanity."[59]

Conclusion

In establishing order at the heart of the angelic and demonic communities, particularly in accord with Pseudo-Dionysius's celestial hierarchies, medieval theologians found themselves unable to dispense with, or even separate order from, the troubled question of affect and its disruptive real-world consequences. How could the angelic hierarchies be envisaged except with love as their capstone? But then how could love become so perverted as to lead to rebellion and the transformation of the angelic cohort into demons? How could demons be pictured other than as filled with bitterness and hatred? But then how could they remain in their properly ordered ranks, bound together in mutual pursuit of their objectives, rather than fragmented through envy and hatred, or in open rebellion against their leader? No matter how finely the words of scripture and other authoritative texts were massaged, or how cleverly the prehistory of angelic creation was adumbrated, at each critical juncture, emotion emerged as an obstacle to the creation of a cohesive story about the angels and their demonic alter egos, with the influence of emotion capable of undercutting, problematising, and at times even overshadowing divinely constituted order.

In part, this difficulty arose because the story of the creation of the angels and their fall was not primarily investigated by medieval thinkers in terms of affect and effect, but in terms of free will, the ethics of volition, the inherent goodness of creation, and questions of divine and angelic foreknowledge. Because 'emotions,' as we conceive them today, were only in the process of becoming a subject of concerted inquiry in the High Middle Ages, and because the idea of applying such a concept to spiritual creatures remained either unconsidered or largely discounted, a major means of explaining key moments in biblical history was closed down. Angelic and demonic 'emotions' created anomalies and disturbances in the traditional Christian stories of

59 William of Auvergne, *De universo*, vol. 1, pt. 2, pt. 3, ch. 15, 1045aA–B: "Tertiò odium, & ira, qua in creatorem benedictum, & homines exardescunt, ut se invicem non impugnent, quin potiùs se ad invicem coadjuvent in impugnationem nostrum. Et hoc apud nos etiam frequenter experiri potuisti, quòd inimicitia unius inimicos illius plerunque conciliat, & concordat . . . Ex his igitur advertere potes, ex qua affectione, vel intentione nequissimo principi suo obediant, videlicet in odium creatoris, & hominum."

creation and sin, and so disrupted customary lines of analysis. This highlights the importance of pursuing a long history of emotions, even in cultures such as the European Middle Ages in which 'emotions,' as we currently theorise and term them, did not necessarily exist. Such a history allows us to cut through and see where issues of affect problematised the existent structures of reasoning. Had a medieval theologian compiled a cohesive account from the various contemporary reflections upon demonic and angelic hierarchies, a disturbing picture would have emerged: the original angelic cohort torn apart and seduced into rebellion by a deep love between angels, the demonic hierarchies sustained in ordered structure by a mutual hatred of God. It might have appeared to such a thinker that if order truly stood at the heart of the universe, it did so only in a problematic relationship with emotion, and that in many ways, emotion must have been anterior to it.

CHAPTER 2

Christ's Masculinity: *Homo* and *Vir* in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*

Clare Monagle

Introduction

In book three of his *Sentences*, written around 1156, Peter Lombard asked 'Whether God could have taken human form in the female sex?'[1] This question was posed in the context of his larger treatment of Christology, to which the book was devoted. Lombard sought to reconcile competing theological authorities on the Incarnation in order to present the coherence and clarity of Christian doctrine. At stake in his work on the Incarnation was an understanding of the crucial formulation of one person and two natures. That is, Lombard attempted to explain through logical reasoning how it was possible that Christ be his own divine person; fully God and fully human at the same time. In order to answer, as much as he could, this problem, Lombard plumbed the patristic tradition for arguments about Christ's being. He inquired, for example, about the extent of Christ's humanity, the nature of his bodily life, and who should be blamed for the crucifixion. And, as we have seen, in asking whether or not God could have been born a woman, he inquired into the necessity of Christ's masculinity. In so doing, he also necessarily inquired into Christ's embodied emotional identity. Christ's human nature was gendered, and in living as a man he was imbricated in masculine modes of feeling and being.

Lombard's *Sentences* is one of the most important books in the canon of what we call scholastic theology, so-called because the discipline emerged out of the cathedral schools of Northern Europe. These schools would eventually become the first universities, the *scholae*.[2] Scholastic theology was practised

1 Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, ed. Ignatius Brady, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Acquas, 1971–81), vol. 2 (1981), bk. 3, distinct. 12, ch. 4, p. 83: "Si Deus potuit assumere hominem in sexu muliebri." English translation from Peter Lombard, *The Sentences, Book 3: On the Incarnation of the Word*, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008), 49.

2 On the development of a new 'scholastic method' in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, see Gillian R. Evans, *Old Arts and New Theology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); and

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and taught in these new educational institutions, and aimed to transform young scholars into theologians capable of understanding and systematising the complicated and contradictory history of Christian doctrine. Lombard's *Sentences* was the first textbook of this discipline. In this work, Lombard produced a compendium of theological opinions for the novice student, which aimed to help him to see the overarching coherence of the tradition despite its seeming layers of competing ideas. The method employed by the author of the *Sentences* to build coherence was dialectical reasoning. That is, building on the insights of scholars before him, Lombard organised Christian doctrine into four books, and proceeded methodically through each book to point out where authorities disagreed, and to suggest how these differences might be reconciled. In doing this, Lombard produced a valuable teaching resource; not only did he compile sources for students, he also taught them a method of reading and interpreting. Subsequent to its publication, the *Sentences* fast became one of the most copied manuscripts of the Middle Ages, and became a crucial part of training in theology throughout this period.[3]

Why use the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard as my case study? Surely if we are to make claims about scholastic theology writ large, we ought to look at Aquinas as the most famous exponent of the method? I have chosen Lombard's *Sentences* because it inaugurates the scholastic project, in as much as it is the work that was selected and used to train theologians in the new universities. It was also endorsed at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. By charting the career of the *Sentences* we can see how dialectical theology moved from the controversies of the twelfth century, as evinced in the experiences of Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers, to become part of the hegemonic mainstream of intellectual and political life in the High Middle Ages. Lombard offers a suitable beginning point for thinking about theology as gendered in the Middle Ages.[4]

Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). See also, Constant J. Mews, "Philosophy and Theology, 1100–1150: The Search for Harmony," in *Le XII^e siècle: mutations et renouveau en France dans la première moitié du XII^e siècle*, ed. F. Gasparri (Paris: Le Léopard d'or, 1994), 159–203.

3 The most important treatment of Peter Lombard's ideas, in any language, is Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard* (Leiden: Brill, 1994). For a more accessible account of Lombard's theology and works, see Philipp W. Rosemann, *Peter Lombard* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). On the reception of Lombard's *Sentences*, see Clare Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard's Sentences and the Making of Theology* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013).

4 On the development of the schools into universities, see Stephen Ferruolo, *The Origins of the Universities: The Schools of Paris and their Critics, 1100–1215* (Palo Alto: Stanford University

The other reason, I argue, that Lombard's *Sentences* is an apposite place to think about performing a feminist reading of scholastic thought is a historical one. Writing in the twelfth century, Lombard was writing just before the relatively *ad hoc* cathedral schools were transformed into the more highly structured universities. This was a moment of profound transition for women's access to education. While the monasteries held a monopoly on higher education, some women in convents were able to access the same educational program as their male monastic counterparts. While there was still asymmetry in educational opportunities for male and female monastics, there was at least no hard-line structural barrier to certain women accessing the monastic curriculum. The schools, however, with the explicit function of training clerics, were exclusively male domains. This development meant that women were, necessarily, excluded from the theological cutting edge after this process began.

The section of the *Sentences* in which Lombard ponders the idea of God taking form in the female sex has been little noticed by scholars of medieval thought. In terms of content, it has been overshadowed by an extended discussion of the nature of Christ's humanity, which also takes place in book three. In that section, Lombard had been moved to ask "Whether Christ, according to his being a man, is a person or anything."[5] Lombard's inquiry here was into the quiddity of Christ as *homo*: he wanted to know what sort of 'thing' Christ's humanity constituted. This was a controversial formulation, one that received very serious criticism in the years subsequent to the work's publication. Lombard's critics were not only concerned with points of doctrinal nuance, but also with the limits of how far theological inquiry could actually go. Surely Christ's humanity need not be analysed, but should be accepted and revered as sacred mystery, argued critics of the *Sentences*.[6] Book three of Lombard's *Sentences* was, thus, much more concerned with Christ's humanity than his masculinity. The section on the nature of Lombard's humanity is the most extended treatment of any topic within any of the books. It is also one of the most original sections of the entire work. On the other hand, his section on "Whether God could have taken human form in the female sex?" is brief and cursory. Lombard reprises an argument by Augustine in order to explain why God could not have taken form in the female sex. The issue is not presented as an intellectual problem, but as a 'no-brainer,' if you will.

Press, 1985). On the increasing clericalisation of intellectual and political life, see R.I. Moore, *The First European Revolution, c.970–1215* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

5 Lombard, *Sententiae*, vol. 2, bk. 3, distinct. 10, ch. 1, p. 72: "An Christus secundum quod homo est sit persona vel aliquid." Translated in Silano, *The Sentences, Book 3*, 41.

6 On the Christology of Lombard, see Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy*, 73–112.

So, why spend time on the question here? What does it offer the study of medieval intellectual and gender history, as well as medieval histories of embodiment and emotions? What can be gained from establishing that gender was not a particularly important category of analysis for this particular medieval intellectual? The answer, I suggest, lies in tracking the comparison between the universal category of *homo*, as explored by Lombard when it pertains to Christ's humanity, and the gendered definition of *vir*, when used to discuss why Christ needed to be a man. The difference in the way that Lombard deploys these terms, I argue, offers fresh insights into an elite clerical understanding of masculine authority. In the *Sentences*, Lombard asks what the theological relationship is between Christ's universal humanity, and his sexed and feeling body. In pondering how this question plays out here, I want to suggest that we might find a way into understanding not only medieval scholastic conceptions of Christ's humanity, but also the gendered assumptions that inform theology in the High Middle Ages.

The organising principle of scholastic texts is to prove the logic of Christian doctrine. They are ordered around the inviolable reality of doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, which must be explained in terms of human argumentative speech. The ineffable and the transcendent must be constituted in post-lapsarian human terms. This means that scholastic theology often seems to elide the emotional, the gendered, and the embodied, because writers are trying to explain realities they believe to transcend such human categories. But, of course, they build the transcendent in their own image. In what follows, I want to suggest a method for reading these elisions, these absences, as signs of a medieval theological imaginary that elevated the rational and the masculine over the emotional and the feminine. There has, of course, been work done on what scholastic theologians have said about gender, about the *passiones animae* (emotions), and about the implications of embodiment.[7] What has not been done as thoroughly, however, is to think about the ways that scholastic theology could be understood to be a project of sorts, and how that project was gendered as masculine.

Gender, Historiography, Theology

Amidst the flourishing interest in medieval gender studies over the past forty years or so, treatises of scholastic theologians have been surprisingly little

7 In particular see Simo Knuutila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004).

utilised by scholars.[8] The most important exception to this can be found in the work of Joan Cadden, who has articulated the concepts of sexual difference that can be found in theology, and explained the complicated classical and Christian intellectual genealogies that have informed these concepts.[9] Little attention, however, has been paid to the gendered nature of medieval theology itself. That is, while scholars have isolated moments where theologians speak about women, they have not often interrogated scholastic texts for how their guiding assumptions, and modes of analysis, betray a gendered perspective. As Ruth Mazo Karras has pointed out:

> That medieval European universities were exclusively masculine is so obvious as to be hardly worthy of comment. This very obviousness has meant that scholars have not seen the need to look more closely at the complex ways in which these universities were gendered institutions.[10]

I would take this critique further, and suggest that not only do we need to look at how the university was gendered, but we also ought to consider how its thought was itself gendered in countless, unspoken ways.

There are some good reasons that we have seen little in the way of analysis of the gendered nature of scholastic discourse. Scholastic theology attempts to transform the Christian doctrinal tradition into a coherent systematic project. That is, scholastic theologians begin with the Truth of key doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation. Faith in the absolute *res* ('reality') of these things, as revealed in the Christian history, forms the foundational insight of the discipline of theology. The task of the theologian is to show how the accreted and complicated history of Christian doctrinal thinking, from the religion's earliest days, can be apprehended and organised into a synthetic whole. That is, the theologian aims to show the deep structural logic at the heart of the Christian tradition. As I have said, they do this through the practice of dialectic, in which

8 Three key texts in this field, among many, are Carolyn Walker Bynum, *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Dyan Elliott, *Proving Women: Female Spirituality and Inquisitional Culture in the Later Middle* Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Barbara Newman, *From Virile Woman to Woman Christ: Studies in Medieval Religion and Literature* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995).

9 Joan Cadden, *The Meanings of Sex Difference in the Middle Ages: Medicine, Science and Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

10 Ruth Mazo Karras, "Sharing Wine, Women, and Song: Masculine Identity Formation in the Medieval European Universities," in *Becoming Male in the Middle Ages*, eds. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen and Bonnie Wheeler (New York: Garland, 2000), 187–202, at 189.

various authorities are read in juxtaposition, and the role of the theologian is to broker their difference into an overall agreement that supports and illuminates the *res*.[11]

As such, these works do not unfurl rhetorically in ways that make them easily accessible to modern eyes and ears. This perhaps explains their relative neglect in the field of medieval gender studies. As dialectical works, scholastic texts are technical and abstract, and deploy very particular vocabularies. They are, firstly, very difficult for the uninitiated to read. Secondly, these texts utilise a very distinct and distant authorial voice, in which the guiding assumption is that the role of the *auctor* ('author') is to systematise Christian doctrine through the application of analytical categories. Crucial to the production of a treatise is the prior assumption of the *auctoritas* ('authority') that will enable them to manage the *auctoritates* ('authorities') whose thought is being synthesised. As readers, we are not privy to the psychological and intellectual processes by which a scholar moves towards assuming his own *auctoritas*. Instead, the texts we read are at the end of long processes of education and acculturation that enable an author to be an *auctor*. Scholastic sources, then, often evade our attempts to understand their ideas in a broader cultural context. The author, as the manager of dialectic, assumes a depersonalised and critical voice. It is ostensibly the voice of reason, and is neither emotional nor idiosyncratic.[12] This voice is necessarily masculine, because only men could access the training required to produce this type of authority in the Middle Ages. Although the voice of the *auctor* pretends to neutrality and reason, it is entirely masculine in its structural context.

Work in the feminist history of philosophy has gone some way to pointing out how ubiquitously in the history of Western thought reason has been gendered male. In her ground-breaking book *Man of Reason*, Genevieve Lloyd analysed core texts from the canon of Western thought in order to reveal the ways in which the articulation of the neutral or impassive position of reason was premised upon a set of binarised oppositions that derogated femininity as material, hysterical, and irrational, as opposed to the calm call to reason

11 For a more detailed discussion of how these theological concerns are transformed into a pedagogy, see Marcia L. Colish, "Systematic Theology and Theological Renewal in the Twelfth Century," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 18, no. 2 (1988): 135–56, at 138–41.

12 See Alastair J. Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages* (London: Scolar Press, 1984).

invoked by normative philosophical discourse.[13] Lloyd's work emerged at a time of a flourishing of feminist critiques of the history of philosophy, coming out of both Francophone and Anglophone contexts. The objective of these critiques was to argue that philosophical discourse was never a neutral space of inquiry performed with the neutral tool of logic, but was always grounded in a categorical dialectic between masculinity and femininity that was constitutive of the project of doing philosophy itself.[14]

With the notable exception of Julia Kristeva's work on Thomas Aquinas, the feminist writers engaged in the above project have not considered scholasticism in their retelling of the Western philosophical tradition.[15] This is not surprising: their problem is with the traditional narration of Western thought. This is a story that begins with classical philosophy and then takes an extended break in transmission until Descartes. With brief occasional mentions of Augustine, Abelard, and Aquinas, the story of Western thought is one that tends to marginalise medieval thought as being excessively theological, rather than philosophical. Consequently, feminist critiques have attempted to wrestle with this pre-existing intellectual genealogy; hence they have not applied their methods of reading to scholastic treatises.[16] And scholars of scholasticism, for their part, tend to be interested more in the minutiae of ideas and the place of scholastic thought within contemporary theological confessional concerns than in unpacking the gendered assumptions that undermine scholastic thought.[17]

I want to argue below that insights from the feminist history of philosophy can be fruitfully applied to the study of medieval theological ideas. In doing so, I aim to recuperate, in a broad sense, scholastic theology for medieval gender studies. Following the explosion of work on female mysticism in the Middle Ages, in which scholars have shown the myriad forms of devotional agencies utilised by medieval women, it behoves us to supplement this work with a more nuanced understanding of the gendered presumptions that underscore the production of orthodoxy in the Middle Ages. This must go further than

13 Genevieve Lloyd, *Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

14 For a series of essays by a number of feminist philosophers engaged this project, see Genevieve Lloyd, ed., *Feminism and the History of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

15 Julia Kristeva, *Tales of Love* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

16 See Lloyd, *Feminism and the History of Philosophy*.

17 For an introduction to scholarship of medieval thought, see Richard Cross, *The Medieval Christian Philosophers: An Introduction* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013).

pointing out misogynistic moments in medieval texts. We must also begin to unpick the ways in which the licensed God-talk produced by the universities structured elite knowledge production and carved off dialectical reasoning as the province of a masculinised mind.

The *ordo rationis*: The Figure of the Theologian

Genevieve Lloyd writes:

> The history of philosophy is not just a succession of positions and arguments. It is the history also of the idealized figure of the philosopher as the epitome of the supremacy of reason.[18]

This figure is implicitly masculine, yet it adopts an authorised, universal voice that speaks for reason itself. Although theological inquiry ought not to be conflated with philosophical inquiry, I would argue that Lloyd's analysis of the ideal figure of the philosopher, when pushed, also pertains to medieval theology. Take, for example, the way that Lombard inaugurates book three of the *Sentences*. He writes:

> In the first book, through the unassailable witness of the saints, we said something on the inexplicable mystery of the most high Trinity. Then, in the second book, observing the certain rules of authority, we indicated the order of creation of things and the fall of man. Now, the order of reason requires that, in the third and fourth books, we discuss the restoration of man accomplished through the grace of the mediator of God and men, and the sacraments of human redemption by which man's bruises are bound up and wounds of sins are cured.[19]

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18 Genevieve Lloyd, "Introduction," in *Feminism and the History of Philosophy*, ed. Lloyd, 1–26, at 5–6.

19 Lombard, *Sententiae*, vol. 2, bk. 3, incipit, p. 23: "Sic enim rationis ordo postulat, ut qui in primo libro de inexplicabili mysterio summae Trinitatis irrefragibili Sanctorum attestatione aliquid diximus, ac deinde in secundo libro conditionis rerum ordinem hominisque lapsum sub certis auctoritatis regulis insinuavimus, de eius reparation per gratiam Mediatoris Dei et hominum praestita, atque humanae redemptionis sacramentis, quibus contritiones hominis alligantur ac vulnera peccatorum curantur, consequenter in tertio et quarto libro disseramus." Translated in Silano, *The Sentences, Book 3*, 3.

Throughout this formulation, in numerous ways, Lombard authorises himself as theologian. His subject position as author is not idiosyncratic or personal—it emerges from the testimony of saints. He observes the rules of authority and follows the order of reason, the *ordo rationis*. The extensive apparatus of sacred witness, rules of authority, and the rational order in which he proceeds vouchsafes Lombard's position. These types of introductory statements are commonplace in medieval theology but are often overlooked by today's scholars, who are more interested in theological content itself. That is, theologians and intellectual historians who work on scholastic thought tend to be interested in unravelling the particular theological positions taken by a given historian, and placing them within a larger intellectual genealogy. Lombard's little beginning here, uncontroversial as it is, offers a different kind of insight. It offers a glimpse into the construction of the figure of the theologian. The theologian, as opposed to Genevieve Lloyd's philosopher, is not the epitome of reason. But, he is authorised by his access to the *ordo rationis*. The order of reason, understood medievally, is the perfect logic of the logos's work in the world. The role of the theologian is to detect this *ordo* in the world of created things, and make its rationality clear to his students and readers.

Some would argue that scholastic thought is essentially a tool of inquiry, a dialectical technology of solving contradictions that was used for theological training but could just as possibly be applied to other realms such as law or philosophy. It could be suggested that while we can argue that certain theological ideas can be shown to be gendered, that this method itself was gender neutral. I hope that, in the above, I have shown the opposite. In order to use the technology of dialectical reasoning, an *auctor* had to authorise himself as universal in order to categorise the competing theological opinions under his purview, and satisfactorily resolve their differences into synthesis. This was a tool, yes, but not one that was accessible to all. Access to the *ordo rationis*, which made theology possible, was only available to the elite clerical men who attended the schools. This was a very limited franchise indeed.

It is very telling that the two women, about whom we know, who attempted to make intellectual interventions in the world of twelfth-century Latin intellectual culture both felt the need to refer to their femininity in their writing. Neither Heloise nor Hildegard, as eloquent and rigorous as they were, deployed the neutral non-gendered voice that we see in Lombard. This is partly because of genre: both women are renowned exponents of the epistolary form, which in its demand for the situated salutation insists upon writers defining their own status in relation to the receiver. So we see Heloise writing to Abelard in her salutation "To her master, or rather her father, husband, or rather brother; his

handmaid, or rather his daughter, wife, or rather sister; to Abelard, Heloise."[20] And we see Hildegard, in her famous letter to the Prelates of Mainz declaring:

> This time is a womanish time, because the dispensation of God's justice is weak. But the strength of God's justice is exerting itself, a female warrior battling against injustice, so that it might fall defeated.[21]

But the need for these women to authorise themselves in this way cannot only be understood in terms of the generic conventions of the letter. As *Auctoritas* was gendered male, as we have seen, consequently a female writer needed to negotiate her own position within that economy in order to justify her intervention. Just as the universal voice occupied by male theologians ought not to be understood as a neutral writing voice, nor should female explanations of their own authority be read as merely rhetorical. Heloise's and Hildegard's active attempts to craft their own gendered *auctoritas* speaks, I believe, to the increasing ways that the masculinisation of schools, both on a structural and intellectual level, were precluding female participation.

In the centuries after Heloise and Hildegard, it could be argued that we move into a period of a new dialectic; that between the gendered discourse of theology and the gendered discourse of mysticism. Scholarship in the past forty years or so has done much to restore the thought and deeds of mystical women to the records, and in so doing has shown how they both subverted and supported normative economies of authority. Although beyond the purview of this chapter, I would suggest the need for further work on these normative economies of authority. What was the *ordo rationis* seemingly apprehended by medieval theologians? And how did masculine institutions such as the papacy and the university limit access to it? In short, if we are to understand

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20 Betty Radice, trans., *The Letters of Abelard and Heloise* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), 109. On Heloise, see Constant J. Mews, *The Lost Love Letters of Abelard and Heloise: Perceptions of Dialogue in Twelfth-Century France* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), and any subsequent editions. See also Barbara Newman, "Authority, Authenticity, and the Repression of Heloise," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 22, no. 2 (1992): 121–57.

21 Hildegard of Bingen, "Letter to the Prelates of Mainz," in *The Letters of Hildegard of Bingen*, eds. and trans. Joseph L. Baird and Radd K. Ehrman, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 1:79. On Hildegard's life, works, and career, see Sabina Flanagan, *Hildegard of Bingen: A Visionary Life* (London: Routledge, 1999); and Barbara Newman, *Sister of Wisdom: St Hildegard's Theology of the Feminine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); and Barbara Newman, ed., *Voice of the Living Light: Hildegard of Bingen and her World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

the recourse taken by mystics towards the domain of the irrational and the embodied, we must also begin to understand better the degree to which reason was gendered male in the Middle Ages.

Lombard on Christ's Masculinity

After his authorising introduction, Lombard moves on to the various Christological discussions that make up his third book. It is here that he asks whether God could have taken form in the female sex. Peter Lombard, unsurprisingly, says no. He writes:

> It is also usual for some to ask, if only for effect, whether God could have taken human nature according to the female sex. Some judge that he could have taken human form in the female sex as he did in the male; but it was done more suitably and fittingly that be born of a woman and take male form so that the liberation of both sexes might be shown. Hence Augustine, in the book *84 Questions*: 'The liberation of humankind had to manifest itself in each of the sexes. And so, because it was necessary that he take the form of a male, which is the more honourable sex, it followed that the liberation of the female sex manifest itself in the fact that man was born of a woman.[22]

This very cursory treatment of the question occupies a very small section of book three of the *Sentences*. On the one hand, we might be surprised at how unnecessary God's incarnate masculinity is. It seems that Christ's masculinity was accidental; it was possible that he could have taken the female sex, but it was sensible that he did not as he was necessarily going to be born of a woman anyhow. So it just makes sense. From this statement, it becomes clear

22 Lombard, *Sententiae*, vol. 2, bk. 3, distinct. 12, ch. 4, p. 83: "Solet etiam quaeri, quamvis curiose, a nonnullis, si Deus humanam naturam potuit assumere secundum muliebrem sexum. Quidam arbitrantur eum potuisse assumere hominem in femineo sexu ut assumpsit in virili; sed opportunius atque convenientius factum est ut de femina masceretur et virum assumeret, ut ita utriusque sexus liberatio ostenderetur. Unde Augustinus in libro *84 Quaestionum*: 'Hominis liberatio in utroque sexu debuit apparere. Ergo quia virum opportebat suscipere, qui sexus honorabilior est, consequens erat ut feminei sexus liberatio hinc appareret, quod ille vir de femina natus est'." Translated in Silano, *The Sentences, Book 3*, 49.

that Christ as *homo* manifests all humanity, male and female. Christ as *vir* was merely a structural necessity.

What are we to make of this brief interlude in the *Sentences* where the question of God's potential femininity is briefly posed, but also derided at the same time? We need to read it in the context of book three of the *Sentences*, taken as a whole, which seeks to explain how Christ could be one person, with both human and divine natures, as per the formula that emerged from the Council of Chalcedon (451CE). According to Christian doctrine, the salvific work performed by Christ's resurrection was possible because he had each nature. He must be fully God, because he must have the power to make a supernatural intervention into human history. He must also be fully human, so as to be able to make the sacrifice of life that was adequately reparative for the fall. Hence the solution that he be *una persona, dua natura*: he was one singular person, bearing two natures. The problem for Lombard, however, was that a number of revered authorities, whose opinions he was trying to synthesise in the *Sentences*, had previously offered Christologies in which the logic did not necessarily follow that of the Chalcedonian formulation. Lombard's work, in the *Sentences*, was to bring these competing authorities together, explain how some were potentially in error, and attempt to find a way through the competing theories to argue for a useful explanation of this incarnational paradox.

This was not an easy task. Lombard was moved to ask, as we have seen, "Whether Christ, according to his being a man, is a person or anything."[23] He was asking about the reality of Christ's humanity, and whether his human nature had 'thingness.' There is no need to go into the very complicated theology of this conversation. I merely wish to make the point that in writing book three of the *Sentences*, Lombard was partly compelled by the desire to make sense of Christ's humanity, to understand what it meant theologically that he be *homo*. Implicit, then, to the question of what it means for Christ to be *homo*, is the larger question of what it means to be human. In talking about Christ's humanity, Lombard was also necessarily producing a form of Christian anthropology. And so, on the one hand, Christ's humanity must be universal; it must transcend male and female in order to redeem both sexes. On the other hand, however, to be human is to be created in a sexed body. Christ as *homo* necessitates also that he be Christ as *vir*. Lombard writes concerning Christ's humanity: "And so God took on the whole human nature, that is, soul and flesh and

23 Lombard, *Sententiae*, vol. 2, bk. 3, distinct. 10, ch. 1, p. 72: "An Christus secundum quod homo est sit persona vel aliquid." Translated in Silano, *The Sentences, Book 3*, 41.

properties and accidents of both."[24] Christ has a fully human nature, which encompasses all of the accidental characteristics enjoyed by humans. These accidental particularities are necessary to Christ's humanity.

What this reading of Lombard allows us to see is a profound tension within normative medieval Christian theology around Christ's gender. Christ as *homo* redeems all, offering universal salvation for all who confess the faith. For a scholastic theologian such as Lombard, this was a fascinating intellectual problem. What was the nature of his humanity? How did it intersect with his divinity? And in these discussions, Christ's masculinity is barely discussed. Lombard's task is to define Christ's humanity conceptually. But, as we have seen, a crucial part of Christ's humanity is becoming flesh, and so becoming incarnate in a sexed body. Yet, when Lombard discusses the meaning of Christ's masculinity, he quotes Augustine saying that the form of the male is the "more honourable sex." Christ was a sexed man because it was more fitting to his dignity, and Lombard suggests that it was the default position. In a book devoted to unpacking definitions in Christian theology, to taxonomising doctrine into a workable manageable *corpus*, the extended discussion of *homo*, concomitant to the short shrift given to *vir* and *mulier*, shows us the degree to which gender was not a category of analysis in this period. In fact, Lombard, tells us that one might only raise the question of the possibility that Christ could be born a woman, 'for effect,' so laughable is the suggestion.

In another section of book three of the *Sentences*, Lombard explains to his readers what other aspects of humanity were taken on by Christ, alongside his sexed body. Lombard writes:

> Of man's defects which Christ assumed in his human nature. It is also not to be passed over that the Son of God took on a human nature that was capable of suffering: a soul capable of suffering and flesh that was capable of suffering and mortal. And so that he should be shown to have a true body he took on the defects of the body: hunger and thirst and suchlike; and so that should be shown to have a true soul, he took on the defects of the soul, namely sadness, fear, pain, and suchlike.[25]

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24 Lombard, *Sententiae*, vol. 2, bk. 3, distinct. 2, ch. 1, p. 29: "Totam igitur hominis naturam, id est animam et carnem, et honorum proprietates sive accidentia assumpsit Deus." Translated in Silano, *The Sentences, Book 3*, 7.

25 Lombard, *Sententiae*, vol. 2, bk. 3, distinct. 15, ch. 1, pp. 92–93: "De hominis defectibus quos assumpsit Christus in humana natura. Illud quoque praetermittendum non est, quod Dei Filius naturam hominis accepit passibilem: animam passibilem, carnem passibilem et mortalem. Ut enim probaretur verum corpus habere, suscepit defectus corporis: famem

Lombard's point here is that Christ experienced a bodily life, one that hungered and thirsted and felt emotions keenly. Lombard also pointed out, however, that Christ did not take on all the "true defects of man," noting that he "assumed the defects of punishment, but not those of fault."[26] Lombard limits Christ's sensual humanity to aspects of sensation and to feeling, but refuses him the possibility of being at fault. That is, he refuses him a human will capable of sin. Christ's humanity then is capable of a human emotional range, but not capable of human error and culpability.

None of this particular section would seem to provide insights into Christ's masculinity. Lombard seems to be detailing a range of gender-neutral categories for understanding human experience, such as hunger, suffering and fault. But when we take the way that Lombard discusses culpability and fault in other parts of the *Sentences*, we realise that he is still valourising Christ's masculinity in certain ways, even in his gender-neutral language. For one of the key points where Lombard theorises sin and culpability in the *Sentences* is in his discussion of Eve's failings in the garden, about which he says "[a]nd so he tempted the woman, in whom he knew that reason was less vigorous than in the man."[27] Eve's sin becomes the test case for culpability, and one of the foundations upon which Lombard developed his theology of the will. It is utterly necessary for humans to have free will so that they can choose, or abjure, God freely. For humans to be at fault they must have used, and abused, their will. They must have chosen sin freely. All humans, except for Christ, have the capacity to sin. But women are excessively vulnerable, due to the weakness of their rationality. When, then, Lombard tells us that Christ could not experience fault, he was also telling us that Christ was less like a woman than a man, in as much as it was a woman who had committed the ultimate fault. Christ may have experienced human emotional regimes, and sensual embodiment. He could not, however, be culpable in the manner of humans generally, and women particularly.

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et sitim et huiusmodi; et ut veram animam probaretur habere, suscepit defectus animae, scilicet tristitiam, timorem, dolorem et huiusmodi." Translated in Silano, *The Sentences, Book 3*, 57.

26 Lombard, *Sententiae*, vol. 2, bk. 3, distinct. 15, ch. 1, p. 93: "Suscepit autem Christus sicut veram naturam hominis, ita et veros defectus hominis, sed non omnes. Assumpsit enim defectus poenae, sed non culpae." Translated in Silano, *The Sentences, Book 3*, 57.

27 Lombard, *Sententiae*, vol. 1, bk. 2, distinct. 21, ch. 1, p. 433: "Unde et mulierem tentavit, in qua minus quam in viro rationem vigere novit." Translated in Peter Lombard, *The Sentences, Book 2: On Creation*, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008), 57.

Conclusion: For Effect?

As we have seen, Lombard notes that some ask the question about Christ as a woman "if only for effect." In so doing, he suggests the question is itself so preposterous that asking it is a rhetorical technique rather than a truly dialectical inquiry of the type that generates theological practice. This aside "for effect" takes us into the performative world of this theology, where it is taught and lectured upon. Here it offers us another way into the gendered mode of the schools, alongside the method of close contextual reading that I deployed in the section above. We might take note here of another apposite insight from feminist work in the history of philosophy. Following particularly from the work of Michèle Le Doeuff, scholars have sought to unpack the imaginary of philosophical texts.[28] They have looked at the world of metaphor, jokes, examples, and asides that can be found in philosophical texts, in order to situate those texts in the world of their creation, and in the fantasy imaginary of their creator. Trying to realise the 'imaginary' of a philosophical text enables the reader to glimpse the political unconscious at the heart of a text's project. Lombard's "for effect" might seem only a slight textual intervention, yet it betrays the degree to which the idea of a God being incarnate as a woman was incapable of being considered. It is a telling fault line. Lombard's own logical process had led him to the point of posing the question; his inquiries into Christ as *homo* had invariably necessitated his move into understanding Christ as *vir* or *mulier*. And yet, in spite of the dialectical possibility of Christ as woman, it could only be spoken of "for effect."

What, then, is the imaginary suggested by "for effect" here? It might be useful to return to the Latin here, *quamvis curiose*, which can also be translated as "meddlesomely" or "interferingly." All of these translations take us into the world of the self-conscious cleverness of the schools, where young scholars were debating ideas, and challenging their masters. The static form of the treatise all too often reduces the dynamism of the medieval classroom to a static discourse, and yet the *quamvis curiose* suggests the classroom was a playful place, where scholars posed questions to each other, which might seem fanciful or ridiculous or vexatious, in order to test the limits of their capacities to reason and argue. That a question about the possibility of a female messiah would be a cause of shock or mirth, as evinced by the *quamvis curiose*, tells us both about the experimental and playful intellectual world of the schools, and also about the things that were at the limits of the schoolmen's horizons. Christ

28 Michèle Le Doeuff, *The Philosophical Imaginary*, trans. Colin Gordon (London: Athlone, 1989).

was necessarily and utterly human, in as many respects as possible, but it was impossible that that humanity could be womanly.

This very small reading of book three of Lombard's *Sentences* begins, I hope, a larger project of investigating the complicated ways in which theology was gendered in the Middle Ages. Of course, the content of theology itself bore many statements that revealed a sense of the profound inferiority of the female sex, even though all souls were considered equal and capable of spiritual redemption. In unpacking Lombard's distinction between Christ as *homo* and Christ as *vir*, I have provided but one example from among many possibilities. But the gendering, I want to argue, runs deeper than this. It lies in the pretension of scholastic theology to speak universally, informed by access to the witness of the saints and the *ordo rationis*, but which in fact is the province of an exclusively Latinist, male, and clerical world. Scholastic theology, when read now, supports this pretension. It seems impersonal and systematic, to be without context or personality, and in many ways, a closed system. Our task is to restore it to the place of history, in particular the place of gender history. And in doing this, we need to understand the relationship between theories of emotions and embodiment, and those of gender. The often unspoken conceptual correlations between ideas of womanhood, the body and emotions have been theorised and historicised within the history of philosophy. The same work can, and also ought to, be done, I have argued, with the history of medieval theology.

CHAPTER 3

Modes and Manipulation: Music, the State, and Emotion

Carol J. Williams

Music is commonly considered to be a 'language of the emotions'; a language which expresses emotions that listeners are moved by.[1] While that seems commonplace today, musicologists and music historians have exercised caution in seeking a link between music and emotion in music from the distant past. This caution has fostered the assumption that medieval music was simply not expressive and that the relationship between text and melody in song of this time was ordered by principles not easily understood. Rather than apply the aesthetic understanding of the link between expression and emotion of one age to another, this study examines the words of the musician theorists of the Middle Ages to discover what they thought about music and emotion. The surprising result is that there is a significant body of writing on this topic and that it demonstrates aesthetic sophistication throughout. The fundamental question underlying this study is: how does music operate expressively to provoke an emotional response in the listener? The answer in many cases is that the power of music to operate expressively is found in the pitch scaffolding of the modes. The scope of this study of emotions and music focuses on the period between the 11th and 14th centuries, from Guido of Arezzo to Guy of St Denis, and draws on the learning of the earliest philosophers to provide its intellectual context.

Plato, in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, expressed his plan to make music serve the state.[2] To do this, only the sober and ordered music of a restricted range of modes was acceptable. Like Plato, Aristotle stressed the importance of the role of music in education and dedicated the last section of the *Politics* to a full discussion of modes and their function in the well-ordered state. The idea of the power of *modus* along Platonic lines was projected into the Western Middle Ages by a number of writers, the most significant being Boethius. However,

1 See Deryck Cooke, *The Language of Music* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).

2 The ideas presented here have been developed from a number of stimulating discussions with Philippa Maddern over several years. It is with gratitude that this essay is dedicated to her.

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there was a problem in that the sounding world that had produced the Greek understanding of *modus* was no longer in existence, and as a consequence medieval music theory maintained a respectful but puzzled speculative distance. To compound the problem, the West had produced an enormous wealth of music, mainly within the Christian Church, which theorists and liturgical philosophers were attempting to bring to some kind of order. They applied the system of *modus* that had been inherited from antiquity and translated by Boethius to the living, sounding world of plainchant, and developed a new theory based on the ancient foundations. Medieval music theorists were confident of the power of music in worship, both for the state and the individual, and understood that power to lie within the ordering, classificatory system that they knew as *modus*. The eleventh-century Guido of Arezzo summarised this understanding in his *Micrologus*, and linked the expression of meaning, and the control of the concomitant emotion of the plainchant text, to mode. While the twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw the development of bodies of secular vernacular song with the troubadour and trouvère lyric song repertoires, where the expression of intense emotion was fundamental, it was not until the late thirteenth century, with the *Ars musice* of Johannes de Grocheio, that a theoretical response was presented. Grocheio was certainly influenced by the new translations of Aristotle, though he articulates the case for accepting music as having a function in the balanced operation of the state along Platonic lines. He established the theoretical ground that these vernacular songs were exempt from the control of modes, and the case is made in this chapter that the expression of intense emotions in these vernacular songs was only possible because they fell outside the accepted ordering system of control. Guy of Saint-Denis, at the very end of the thirteenth century, actively supported Grocheio's position and took the further step of developing his position that the expression of intense emotion within specifically modal liturgical chant was also acceptable and served a purpose in worship. It was his argument that specific liturgical chants could express intense emotions because they stepped beyond the modal limits of regulation in one sense or another.

There is considerable confusion about the medieval terms *modus, tonus*, and *tropus*; they are all terms for scale systems of one sort or another. Perhaps it was Boethius who set up the confusion by stating, "out of the species of the *diapason* consonance (octave) arise those things which are called modes, which they also name tropes or tones."[3] He continued:

3 Boethius, *De Institutione Musica* 4.15. I use Bower's translation throughout; see Calvin M. Bower, trans., and Claude V. Palisca, ed., *Fundamentals of Music* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 153.

> Tropes are systems that differ according to highness or lowness throughout entire sequences of pitches. A system is, as it were, an entire collection of pitches, brought together within the framework of a consonance such as the diapason.[4]

This definition of *tropus, tonus*, or *modus* is an effective one for the purposes of this chapter, and also encompasses the essential meaning of the Greek terms *harmoniai* and *tonoi*. I use the terms *modus, tonus, tropus, harmoniai* and *tonoi* in the most general sense of pitch hierarchies presented within a scale. All of these terms describe a way of proceeding: they are all essentially scalar and all present a relatively commonly agreed hierarchy of pitches. Clearly, there are significant technical distinctions between these terms but the broad definition provided here matches all of them very generally, so the differences between them should not bother us.

To make the claim that the control of the modes, or the scalar material—that is, the scaffolding of music—is a way to control the state seems fantastic today, but it is clearly stated in several works of at least the two most fundamental of the ancient philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. This idea, and others more broadly concerning the power of music over individuals and communities, had a strong developmental thread throughout the Middle Ages and beyond.

The plan to make music serve the state is expressed by Plato in the *Republic* and the *Laws*. The fundamental link between legislation and music in Plato's Greece is difficult for us now to comprehend, as is the concept that the modes (*tropoi*) of music are never moved without movement of the greatest constitutional laws.[5] However, it is clear that for Plato the influence of music on social behaviour was so profound as to be a virtual law, and it is no accident that the word for 'law' in ancient Greek, *nomos*, was also the word for 'song'; a form for praising the gods in a musically and ethically lawful manner. Plato presented music as a model that regarded law as an instrument for achieving harmony. Thus music contributed to the harmony of the soul in the same way that justice contributed to the harmony of citizens living together in a city. The musical model relied on the Utopian proposition that the correct laws aided by a

4 Boethius, *De Institutione Musica* 4.15. Translated in Bower and Palisca, *Fundamentals of Music*, 153.

5 Plato, *Republic* 4, 424b–c: "People should beware of change to new forms of music, for they are risking change in the whole. Styles of music are nowhere altered without change in the greatest laws of the city." Translations from Paul Shorey, *Perseus Digital Library*: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0168> [accessed 26 July 2014].

proper musical education would create a soul in harmony with itself in a city of citizens in harmony with one another. The mechanism through which music was to influence the state was through the education of those who were to take up the reins of government. The leaders would have an education that included only the best music, understood to be both imitative and representative. Music imprinted its shape and specific qualities on the mind of the listener via the relevant sense organ, the ears. Music did this without imposing its matter on the listener. Through mimesis the best music would project the best virtues and, through habituation, or the ethical process, these virtues would imprint themselves on the attentive listener. The distinguishing essence of music was called the *harmoniai* and, though technically the result of a specific ordering of pitches and rhythms, it was understood as an analogue for higher philosophical truths and was thus mimetic of higher universals.[6] Plato was communicating directly with the Academy in this discussion, but the citizens about whom he spoke belonged to a warrior class that did not engage in farming, business or any form of manual labour. Excluded from citizenship were all women, minors, slaves and immigrants.

To maintain a sober and ordered society the range of effective *harmoniai* or modes was sternly restricted. Plato seldom named individual *harmoniai* except in a passage in the *Republic* where he rejected all but the Dorian and Phrygian.[7] The Dorian imitated the tones and accents of a brave man under stress and the Phrygian portrayed moderate behaviour in prosperity through the same kind of mimesis.[8] There was less restraint in the later *Laws*, where Plato warned that the wrong use of music could make the hearer liable to fall into evil habits and thus corrupt the state.[9]

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6 The *harmoniai* were essentially scale patterns composed of a specific arrangement of tones and semitones. The names for these modes derived from contemporary ethnic tribes and regions, including the Dorians and the region Locris as well as regions within Asia Minor, including Lydia and Phrygia.

7 Plato's system of *harmoniai* is described succinctly with the minimum of technical detail in Gerald A. Press, ed., *The Continuum Companion to Plato* (New York: Continuum, 2012). See particularly the helpful chart at 210.

8 Plato, *Republic* 3, 399a–c. It should be noted that at different times and in different places, the characters of the modes changed. For Plato, the Phrygian concerns 'moderation' whereas for Aristotle it represents enthusiasm and possibly frenzy.

9 Plato, *Laws* 2, 669b: "Let us not hesitate, then, to mention the point wherein lies the difficulty of music. Just because it is more talked about than any other form of representation, it needs more caution than any. The man who blunders in this art will do himself the greatest harm, by welcoming base morals." Translations from R.G. Bury, *Perseus Digital Library*: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0166> [accessed 26 July 2014].

Like Plato, Aristotle stressed the importance of the role of music in education, and he dedicated the final three chapters of book eight of the *Politics* to a full discussion of music and its function in the well-ordered state. Aristotle also shared with Plato the view that music was a form of imitation (mimesis) and that it presented images of character. Like nature itself, music was capable of imitating moral qualities and human attitudes.[10] In order to justify the role of music in the state, Aristotle explained that music affects the character of the soul because it is through music that we acquire certain qualities of character.[11] Thus, it was through mimesis that music affected the soul. Since music made use of character likenesses, listeners would be affected according to the types of music they were made to listen to. To inculcate good character traits in young people, it was necessary to accept some modes of music and reject others. Aristotle considered the traits of a number of modes; for example, the Mixolydian, which was sad and grave, the Dorian, which was moderate and settled, the Phrygian, which was enthusiastic, and another, which was 'relaxed' and could enfeeble the mind.[12] Aristotle allowed only the Dorian because it imitated courage and promoted moderation and temperance; the Phrygian was ultimately rejected because it was associated with enthusiasm and consequently frenzy.

While Aristotle's works largely faded into obscurity until the twelfth century, the idea of the power of *modus* along Platonic lines was transmitted to the Western Middle Ages by writers such as Boethius, who projected this understanding of the power of music. He was aware of the reverence for music that was characteristic of the classical era and, because he was working on *Musica*

10 Aristotle, *Politics* 8, 1340a18–21: "but . . . melodies contain representations of anger and mildness, and also of courage and temperance and all their opposites and the other moral qualities that most closely correspond to the true natures of these qualities." Translations from H. Rackham, *Perseus Digital Library*: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0058> [accessed 26 July 2014].

11 Aristotle, *Politics* 8, 1340a8–12: "But it is clear that we are affected in a certain manner, both by many other kinds of music and not least by the melodies of Olympus; for these admittedly make our souls enthusiastic, and enthusiasm is an affection of the character of the soul."

12 Aristotle, *Politics* 8, 1340a40–b5: "for even in the nature of the mere melodies there are differences, so that people when hearing them are affected differently and have not the same feelings in regard to each of them, but listen to some in a more mournful and restrained state, for instance the mode called Mixolydian, and to others in a softer state of mind, but in a midway state and with the greatest composure to another, as the Dorian mode alone of tunes seems to act, while the Phrygian makes men enthusiastic."

as part of the quadrivial constellation of number,[13] it was largely speculative with little consideration of the sounding music of either the antique world or contemporary times. Boethius was a Christian Neoplatonist who interpreted beauty as the expression of the Good. This idea of 'the Good' was presented by Plato in his dialogue in the *Republic*, speaking through the voice of Socrates.[14] He wrote that the Good was the ultimate object of knowledge. The same idea was discussed by Aristotle in his *Nichomachean Ethics*. In the hands of Boethius, the Christian Neoplatonist, the pursuit of the Good became the pursuit of an understanding of God's works as they were illustrated through the seven liberal arts, particularly through music. Fundamental to the reasoning was the idea, again inherited from classical philosophers, that humanity was compelled to pursue the Good but that this could only be done through philosophical reasoning. It is for this reason that a very large part of the music theory of the Middle Ages was speculative, without practical reference to either the sounding music of the classical era, or that of its own time.

The sixth century was a particularly perilous time for the ongoing endeavour of learning, and if it were not for the work of the 'Latin transmitters' Martianus Capella, Boethius, Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville,[15] much of the classical Greek knowledge would have been lost. Of these four, Boethius is particularly important for his role in the preservation and transmission of music learning. Boethius (*c*.480–*c*.524) was a Roman writer and statesman who was richly educated in the tradition of the school of Athens. He came to the attention of Theodoric the Ostrogoth early, and rose to consul in 510. In 522, he was called to Ravenna to become Theodoric's *magister officium*. Perhaps with the sense that the ancient learning of the Greeks was under threat, he translated into Latin a large number of sources that have otherwise been lost. However, unlike many of his contemporaries, Boethius did not merely repeat classical learning; he was a speculative thinker in the Greek philosophical tradition. Thus, of the mathematical works, his *De institutione musica* is not merely an introduction to *musica* but a preparatory work for the study of philosophy in the

13 The quadrivium contains the four disciplines of the liberal arts concerned with number and comprised arithmetic (the science of number), geometry (the science of form), music (relations between quantities) and astronomy (the science of time).

14 Plato, *Republic* 6, 508e: "This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known. Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still than these you will think rightly of it."

15 For a fuller discussion, see Marcia L. Colish, *Medieval Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition, 400–1400* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 42–55.

neo-Pythagorean and neo-Platonic tradition.[16] Boethius explained that since human behaviour is influenced by music, it is essential to understand and control the fundamental elements of music; music was the unifying principle that brought the body and soul into harmony. Further, his explanation of *musica mundana* described music as an all-pervading force in the universe which determined the courses of the stars and planets, the seasons of the year and the combinations of the elements.

Boethius's *De institutione musica*, the single most influential music theory treatise of the Middle Ages, firmly projected the dislocation between *musica*, the mathematical discipline, and *cantus*, the musical practice of the time. This dichotomy generated a negative influence on the application of systematic musical thought to the rapidly growing body of chant of the early Middle Ages. It was not until Guido of Arezzo returned Boethius to the pantheon of speculative philosophers in the eleventh century that more practical music theory, responsive to current, sounding music, was able to develop.

Boethius believed that the modes had a role to play in the wellbeing of the state and drew on Plato's *Republic* almost verbatim to point out the moral dangers of the lascivious modes and the rougher ones:

> Plato holds that the greatest care should be exercised lest something be altered in music of good character. He states that there is no greater ruin of morals in a republic than the gradual perversion of chaste and temperate music, for the minds of those listening at first acquiesce. Then they gradually submit, preserving no trace of honesty or justice—whether lascivious modes bring something immodest into the dispositions of the people or rougher ones implant something warlike and savage.[17]

Using Plato,[18] Boethius explained how this occurred. First he promoted the sense of hearing since, of the senses, no path to the mind is as open for instruction, and it alone may "actually find pleasure if the modes are pleasing and ordered, whereas it is vexed if they are disordered and incoherent." Then he elevated *Musica* above the three other mathematical disciplines, since it

16 Calvin Bower, "Boethius," Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press: <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com> [accessed 11 June 2014].

17 Boethius, *De institutione musica* 1.1, translated in Bower and Palisca, *Fundamentals of Music*, 2; see also Plato, *Republic* 4, 424.

18 Boethius draws on Plato's *Timaeus* and *Symposium*, as well as the *Republic*, throughout the first chapter of book 1.

> is associated not only with speculation but with morality as well. For nothing is more characteristic of human nature than to be soothed by pleasant modes or disturbed by their opposites.

On the grounds that "likeness attracts, whereas unlikeness disgusts and repels" Boethius explained Plato's analogy between the soul of the universe and musical concord.[19] Thus,

> when we hear what is properly and harmoniously united in sound in conjunction with that which is harmoniously coupled and joined together within us and are attracted to it, then we recognise that we ourselves are put together in its likeness.[20]

Boethius provided a range of examples that demonstrated the power of music to control the behaviour of dysfunctional individuals within society and render them useful members within the community. In his retelling, it was Pythagoras himself who restored the adolescent of Taormina, drunk and over-exposed to the Phrygian mode, from frenzy to a state of absolute calm by ordering that the mode be changed. Other examples include those of Terpander and Arion of Methymna, who saved the citizens of Lesbos and Ionia from very serious illness through the assistance of song, and Ismenias the Theban who, by means of the modes, drove away the torments of sciatica from the Boeotians. Similarly,

> it is said that Empedocles altered the mode of music-making when an infuriated youth attacked one of his guests . . . and thus tempered the wrath of the youth.[21]

The link between music, the modes, and feeling was established by Boethius, who explained that just as one's physical state affected feeling, the converse was true, so that our physical state is affected by disturbed states of mind. Here Boethius hinted that emotions are embodied in the process of sensory reception and response. Though he goes no further than this with the idea, he illustrated it by referring to the rousing of the passions of those fighting in

19 Plato, *Timaeus* 35b. Translations from W.R.M. Lamb, *Perseus Digital Library*: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0180> [accessed 26 July 2014].

20 Boethius, *De institutione musica* 1.1, translated in Bower and Palisca, *Fundamentals of Music*, 2–3.

21 Boethius, *De institutione musica* 1.1, translated in Bower and Palisca, *Fundamentals of Music*, 5–6.

battle with the call of trumpets, and suggested that if this is true it must also be true "that a more temperate mode can calm the wrath or excessive desire of a troubled mind."[22] Though the example was probably drawn from the sounding world of Boethius's own time, this is exceptional and the rather forbidding speculative tone of the work must have made it difficult to access. This may be one explanation for the significant gap in transmission between the time when Boethius wrote the *De institutione musica* and the revival of learning associated with the Carolingian era, when this work was once more placed centre stage.

The world of music theory had changed fundamentally as it now had to grapple with rationalising an enormous wealth of song, produced mainly within the Christian Church. While speculative reasoning in music continued in some quarters, it was largely handed back to the philosophers, while the more practically oriented music theorists turned their minds to practical concerns. They applied the system of *modus* that had been inherited from antiquity and translated by Boethius to the living, sounding world of plainchant, and developed a new modal theory. This theory relied on the assumption of the power of music in worship, both for the state and the individual. That the power of music was located within the ordering, classificatory system known as *modus* was to provide the core theoretical issue for musicians of the middle ages.

Guido of Arezzo (born *c*.991–92; died after 1033) was a Benedictine monk and music theorist. He is best known for his development of a system of precise pitch notation through lines and spaces, and for propagating a method of sight-singing that relied on the syllables *ut, re, mi, fa, sol, la*, which with minor alterations is still in use today as the *solfège* system of sight-singing. His *Micrologus* was used throughout the Middle Ages in monasteries, and from the thirteenth century also in the universities. Next to the treatise of Boethius it was the most copied and read instruction book on music of the period.[23] Guido assumed the power of music in worship, both for his monastic community and the individual, and understood that power to lie within the ordering, classificatory system of *modus*.[24] In the *Micrologus* he linked the expression

22 Boethius, *De institutione musica* 1.1, translated in Bower and Palisca, *Fundamentals of Music*, 8.

23 See Claude V. Palisca and Dolores Pesce, "Guido of Arezzo," Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press: <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com> [accessed 9 June 2014].

24 See Charles M. Atkinson, "On the interpretation of *Modi, quos abusive tonos dicimus*," in *Hermeneutics and Medieval Culture*, eds. Patrick J. Gallacher and Helen Damico (Albany: State University of New York, 1988), 147–62.

of meaning and the control of the related emotion of the plainchant text to mode, and expressed this with surprising directness. Thus:

> Let the effect of the song express what is going on in the text, so that for sad things the neumes are grave, for serene ones they are cheerful and for auspicious texts exultant, and so forth.[25]

As this is a didactic text Guido had much to say of the technical detail of the modes, most of which it is not necessary to explicate here. The material he provided in Chapter Fourteen, "On the tropes and on the power of music," richly supported the argument that mode had a role to play in the wellbeing of society and the expression of the emotions of the individual.

As to the function of the modes in the state, Guido did not speak in the broad political terms of Plato or Aristotle, but the examples he chose to demonstrate the power of music were ones where a dysfunctional member of society was brought under control by the playing of music, and in some examples there was mention made of the affective power of a specific mode. His first example was the familiar story of the physician Asclepiades, who, by the application of carefully selected music, was able to recall a certain madman from insanity.[26] More telling was his next example:

> Also that another man was roused by the sound of the cithara to such lust that, in his madness, he sought to break into the bedchamber of a girl, but, when the cithara player quickly changed the mode, was brought to feel remorse for his libidinousness and to retreat abashed.[27]

This specifically connected the change of behaviour to the change of mode and also illustrated the extraordinary power of the sound of the cithara. This also featured in the following example, in which "David soothed with the cithara the evil spirit of Saul and tamed the savage demon with the potent force and sweetness of this art."[28]

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25 Guido, *Micrologus*, ch. 15, translated in Claude V. Palisca and Warren Babb, *Hucbald, Guido, and John on Music: Three Medieval Treatises* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 70.

26 Guido, *Micrologus*, ch. 14, translated in Palisca and Babb, *Hucbald, Guido, and John on Music*, 70.

27 Guido, *Micrologus*, ch. 14, translated in Palisca and Babb, *Hucbald, Guido, and John on Music*, 70.

28 Guido, *Micrologus*, ch. 14, translated in Palisca and Babb, *Hucbald, Guido, and John on Music*, 70. See also 1 Samuel 16:23.

For Guido, the modes also had a role to play in the expression of the emotions of the individual. He confirmed that different modes suited different personalities, such that

> one man is attracted by the intermittent leaps of the authentic deuterus, another chooses the delightfulness of the plagal of the tritus, one is more pleased by the volubility of the authentic tetrardus, another esteems the sweetness of the plagal tetrardus, and so forth.[29]

More general in nature and dealing with the individual response to music rather than specifically to mode, Guido observed that different styles of music suited different individuals, so that

> what displeases one is cherished by another; and anon, things that blend together delight this man, whereas that one prefers variety; one seeks homogeneity and blandness in keeping with his pleasure-loving mind; another, since he is serious-minded, is pleased by staider strains; while another, as if distracted, feeds on studied and intricate contortions; and each proclaims that music as much the better sounding which suits the innate character of his own mind.[30]

While music theory of the eleventh and twelfth centuries provided support and explanation for individual and community expression of emotion in the Latin of worship, there was nothing to support the twelfth- and thirteenth-century development of the vernacular language lyric song repertoires of the troubadours and trouvères. The expression of passionate emotion was the generating motive for most of these songs. This style rejected systems of order in the music, perhaps because with sophisticated rhyming patterns, carefully balanced line lengths, novel stanzaic patterns, and often-complex rhetorical structures in place there were so many controls operating on the textual level. For more than a century there was no response from the music theoretical

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29 Guido, *Micrologus* ch. 14, translated in Palisca and Babb, *Hucbald, Guido, and John on Music*, 69. The terms protus, deuterus, tritus, and tetrardus provide an alternative naming of the modes, such that protus is on D (Dorian), deuterus is on E (Phrygian), tritus is on F (Lydian), and tetrardus is on G (Mixolydian). Each of these has an authentic and plagal expression which, while maintaining the same pitch hierarchy, expresses it in a different register. See table 3.1 for a spelling out of this.

30 Guido, *Micrologus*, ch. 17, translated in Palisca and Babb, *Hucbald, Guido, and John on Music*, 76–77.

world, as these gems of sensuous human expression did not fit any of the moulds already constructed for song.

Johannes de Grocheio was one of the first from the world of learning to write about secular, vernacular song, and he was quick to find a function for it in the service of the state along Neo-Platonic lines. He articulated a case for accepting vernacular music as having a function in the balanced operation of the state possibly under the influence of the new translations of Aristotle. He was also one of the first to accept that this expressive song was not controlled or ordered by the musical modes. I would like to argue that it was the lack of the stricture of the modes that supported the expression of the intense individual emotions in these vernacular songs.

Little is known of Johannes de Grocheio,[31] and what we do know is derived from his proudly Aristotelian *Ars musice*, a highly original music treatise produced around 1270 in the intellectual ferment of the university colleges of Paris.[32] He may have been a regent master at Paris, though that is not certain; what is clear, however, is that he had received a very thorough education. Consistent with advanced training in the schools, the *Ars musice* demonstrated a profound acquaintance with both Platonic and Aristotelian concepts. Grocheio squeezed in a reference to Aristotle's *Physica* in the second paragraph of the work:

> It is thus the intention of the present work, as much as we can, to explain to them music, a knowledge of which is necessary for those wishing to have a complete knowledge of moving things and of movements.[33]

Though Aristotle did not consider music here, Grocheio used the reference as an opportunity to hint at the understanding that sound is the product of motion (the hand beating the drum), and that hearing is the reception by the sensory organ of the ears, of sound particles moved through the air from

31 See Christopher Page, "Grocheio, Johannes de," Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press: <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com> [accessed 13 June 2014].

32 For further background information on Grocheio, see the introduction of Constant J. Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio: Ars musice* (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2011), 1–31. Also useful is Constant J. Mews et al., "Guy of Saint-Denis and the Compilation of Texts about Music in London, British Library, Harl. MS.281," *Electronic British Library Journal* (2008): 1–34. Available at: <http://www.bl.uk/eblj/2008articles/pdf/ebljarticle62008.pdf> [accessed 26 July 2014].

33 Grocheio, *Ars musice* 0.2, relying on Aristotle, *Physica* 3.1.200b12, translated in Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 43. Translations of Grocheio are from this work.

the sound source. Whether he was also referring to the power of music to move the passions of the soul, or emotions (from the Latin *emovere*—to move from) is not clear, though discussions of this kind must have been current in Paris at this time when Aquinas was a strong influence. Grocheio's Neo-Platonic position is declared in that same paragraph, where he explained that "music . . . corrects and improves the behaviour of men if they use it in the way they ought."[34]

Part of the originality of his approach in this treatise is that although he was aware of different musical traditions in different places, which in itself is interesting, it was his stated aim to consider only the music of Paris:

> The parts of music are many and diverse according to diverse uses, diverse idioms, or diverse tongues in diverse cities or regions. If however we divide it (music) according to the use of the people of Paris, and just as is necessary for the use or community life of the citizens . . . our intention will be seen to be sufficiently accomplished. . . . (I)n our days the principles of any liberal art are carefully investigated in Paris.[35]

Whether he set up a distinction between the "people of Paris" and its "citizens" is not clear at this point, though for many types of music he considered, he had particular groups of people in mind. Grocheio was acutely aware of social distinctions of status and understood that music could be used to form a community in both inclusive and exclusive ways. A good example of this is found where he considered the motet, which

> ought not to be celebrated in the presence of common people, because they do not notice its subtlety, nor are they delighted in hearing it, but in the presence of the educated and of those who are seeking out subtleties in the arts.[36]

Ultimately, he examined how music could be used to improve the behaviour of the citizens of Paris.

Grocheio adopted a Neo-Platonic stance on the function of music within the state and how it may "correct and improve" the behaviour of its citizens, and constructed a cleverly illustrated argument using his broad knowledge of what music was being listened to on the streets of Paris. He divided music into

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34 Grocheio, *Ars musice* 0.2, translated in Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 43.

35 Grocheio, *Ars musice* 6.1, translated in Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 61.

36 Grocheio, *Ars musice* 19.2, translated in Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 85. Grocheio is probably referring to the cloister as the place where motets would best be appreciated.

three parts. The first was the music of the people, called simple or civil music, and this included predominantly vernacular styles;[37] the second was measured music referring to up-to-the-moment motets, hockets and other styles that used measure as a means of building up polyphony; the third was ecclesiastical music developed for the praise of God.[38] He investigated each of these in turn and explained that the musical forms of civil music "are ordained . . . so that through their mediation, the innate trials of humanity may be softened."[39] Thus, the *chanson de geste*, in which the deeds of heroes are presented,

> ought to be provided for the aged and working citizens and ordinary people while they rest from their usual labour, so that, having heard about the miseries and disasters of others, they may more easily bear their own, and each one may approach his work more eagerly. And therefore this song is beneficial for the preservation of the whole city.[40]

Grocheio directed the *Grand chant* or *cantus coronatus* to

> the kings and princes of the earth so that it may move their spirits to boldness and bravery, magnanimity, and liberality, which all make for good government.[41]

The lighter *chanson* or *cantus versualis* "ought to be performed for the young lest they fall completely into idleness."[42] The dance-related sung *estampie* was also directed to the young, since it "makes the spirits of young men and girls focus on it because of its difficulty and diverts them from depraved thought."[43] While Grocheio did not justify his argument about the social usefulness of

37 It is fascinating that Grocheio prioritised vernacular music over the other two (*musica mensurata* and *musica ecclesiastica*), both more esteemed categories with both the weight of scholarship (measured music) and centuries of preservation (church music) having been paid to them. Grocheio's *Ars musice* is the earliest evidence we have that vernacular music was attracting the attention of theorists.

38 Grocheio, *Ars musice* 6.1, translated in Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 61.

39 Grocheio, *Ars musice* 9.3, translated in Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 67. Thus, it is through the mediation of the musical forms that the efficacy of music to soften the trials of humanity is effected, whereas in other explanations the mode is the mediating medium for the power of music. This is an original idea that I have not come across elsewhere.

40 Grocheio, *Ars musice* 9.3, translated in Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 67.

41 Grocheio, *Ars musice* 9.4, translated in Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 69.

42 Grocheio, *Ars musice* 9.5, translated in Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 69.

43 Grocheio, *Ars musice* 9.7, translated in Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 69.

music by referring directly to Aristotle's *Politics*, it is clear that discussions of this type were current in Paris in the 1270s.

Grocheio's argument about the function of music in a well-ordered state was well made, but the efficacy of the modes in its operation was not mentioned. His reasoning on this appeared in the definition of the tones, where he specifically isolated civil and measured music from the operation of the tones "so that song, both public and precisely measured, which are not subject to the tones, are excluded."[44] It seems then, at least for Grocheio, that the power of music to "correct and improve" the behaviour of the citizens of Paris did not need to be mediated through the modes but was to be expressed through the musical forms themselves.

In describing the *ductia* or *carole*, Grocheio firstly suggested that the participation of young men and girls in this dance form had an effect on their hearts and, as well, that it was said to be effective against the passion called love sickness.[45] This is one of the few occasions in his work where the expression of emotion and music were expressly linked. And, it was not the mode which was operating as the analgesic but the complex of choreographic and musical elements; the form itself. Nonetheless, a number of the examples that Grocheio used to illustrate his argument survive and a significant proportion of these express particularly intense emotion. The first Grocheio drew on for example, was *Ausi com l'unicorne*, composed by King Thibaut de Navarre (d. 1253).[46] It is a particularly fine example of the *Grand chant*, with five stanzas and an envoy, and an unusual allegorical style. The form demonstrates a clever interweaving of number patterning with seventy-two syllables per stanza; Love's prison has three features—pillars of Desire, gates of Pleasant Sight, chains of Good Hope—and is guarded by three watchmen; it is written in eight syllable lines, and has four rhyme sounds in each stanza. It is, of course, also expressive of intense emotion. It seems that the effectiveness of this *Grand chant* was mediated through its form.

We have no certain dates for Grocheio's near contemporary, Guy of Saint-Denis, though he certainly flourished in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. He was perhaps the compiler of the manuscript in which his own

44 Grocheio, *Ars musice* 26.1, translated in Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 95–97.

45 Grocheio, *Ars musice* 9.8, translated in Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 69.

46 For a translation of the lyric, see Samuel N. Rosenberg and Hans Tischler, *Chanter m'estuet: Songs of the Trouvères* (London: Faber Music, 1981), 339–40. For the melody, see Hans Tischler, *Trouvère lyrics with Melodies: Tropatorum septemtrionalum poemata cum suis melodiis: Opera Omnia*, 15 vols. (Neuhausen: American Institute of Musicology, 1997), 13: 1 (no. 1184).

treatise uniquely appeared, and which also included one of only two transmissions of Grocheio's *Ars musice*.[47] That Guy quoted from Grocheio's work throughout his own treatise, not always completely agreeing with his more radical positions, suggests that these two were active participants in the same community of learning in Paris. Guy was possibly also abbot of Saint-Denis at the turn of the century.[48] Guy certainly agreed with Grocheio "that public and civil *cantus* (such as *cantilenae* and *rotundelli*) . . . are neither subject to the tones nor regulated by them,"[49] though his own treatise was entirely directed to examining the operation of the tones in liturgical chant according to the use of Saint-Denis. Also following tradition, Guy leaned towards the Neo-Platonic rather than Grocheio's Aristotelianism, as the following quote demonstrates.

> For since, according to Aristotle and Plato, man is like a certain world and hence is called by them a microcosm, that is, a lesser world, rightful operations and human laws ought to imitate divine law as completely as possible.[50]

Apart from this, Guy had little to contribute to the position that mode had a significant role to play in the wellbeing of the state.

He had much to say, however, concerning the power of the modes to control or moderate the behaviour of individuals. He commenced his argument by repeating Boethius's position that we are all "bound together by musical modes," so that none of us is "remote from the sweetness of song."[51] Having

47 For a description of this, see Mews et al., "Guy of Saint-Denis."

48 Constant J. Mews, John N. Crossley, and Carol J. Williams are currently bringing to completion an edition and translation of Guy's *Tractatus de tonis*. See also Constant J. Mews, John N. Crossley and Carol J. Williams, "Guy of Saint-Denis on the tones: thinking about chant for Saint-Denis", *Plainsong and Medieval Music* 23 no. 2 (2014): 153–178.

49 Sieglinde van de Klundert, *Tractatus de tonis: Guido von Sankt-Denis*, 2 vols. (Bubenreuth: Hurrican, 1998), 2:5: "Vel sicut quibusdam aliis magis placet qui cantus publicos et civiles utpote cantilenas et rotundellos et maxime cantus mensuratos quales sunt moteti. hoqueti. et huiusmodi. dicunt tonis non subici nec per eos regulari."

50 Klundert, *Tractatus de tonis*, 2:9: "Cum enim secundum Aristotelem. et Platonem / homo sit quasi quidam mundus | unde et microcosmos idest minor mundus ab eis dicitur recte operationes et leges humane legem divinam ut est possibile debent penitus imitari." This is an almost verbatim quote from Grocheio, *Ars musice* 4.9. See Mews et al., *Johannes de Grocheio*, 53. It ultimately derives from Plato, *Timaeus* 30b.

51 Klundert, *Tractatus de tonis*, 2:16: "non solum enim infantes ut dicit boecius immo etiam iuvenes atque senes ita naturaliter et affectu quodam spontaneo modis musicis adiunguntur. ut nulla omnino sit etas que a cantus dulcedine sit seiuncta." This derives from

considered humanity at large, again following Boethius, Guy argued that since we are "disposed differently in body and in mind," we will be moved variously by listening to musical harmonies and directed toward various passions of the soul. He continued:

> Indeed, the lascivious spirit, . . . is delighted by the more lascivious modes and often softened or weakened by hearing them. Again, the rougher mind either rejoices in more rousing modes or is further roughened by them.[52]

Guy called on the authority of his namesake, Guido, to provide detail on the characteristics of the different modes that may appeal to this diversity of minds. He explained

> that one may be delighted by the broken leaps of the . . . third tone . . . But another chooses the uxoriousness of the . . . sixth tone. And indeed, the garrulousness of the . . . seventh tone, pleases more, but for another . . . the eighth tone shows sweetness.[53]

While this argument was elegantly put it is, nonetheless, largely derivative. Guy's originality was revealed when he drew on his own experience of liturgical chant, both as a monk singing in the choir and later as a cantor directing and organising the chant repertoire for the celebration of daily worship at Saint-Denis.

Boethius *De institutione musica* 1.1, translated in Bower and Palisca, *Fundamentals of Music*, 2.

52 Klundert, *Tractatus de tonis*, 2:47: "Unde secundum quod homines aliter et aliter sunt corpore et mente dispositi secundum hoc armonias musicas audiendo. per ipsas dissimiliter ad varias anime passiones contingit eos affici vel moveri. et in ipsis motus varios. incitari. Lascivus quippe animus sicut dicit boecius ubi supra. modis lascivioribus delectatur. vel sepius eosdem audiens emollitur aut frangitur. Rursus asperior mens vel incitatioribus gaudet. vel incitatioribus asperatur." This derives from Boethius, *De instititione musica* 1.1, translated in Bower and Palisca, *Fundamentals of Music*, 2.

53 Klundert, *Tractatus de tonis*, 2:47: "Ita namque secundum guidonem capitulo .xiiij°. ubi supra. troporum diversitas diversitati mentium coaptatur / ut unus autenti deuteri idest tertii toni vel tropi fractis saltibus delectetur / Alius vero plage triti idest sexti toni eligat voluptatem. Et uni quidem autenti tetrardi. idest septimi toni garrulitas magis placet. Alter vero eiusdem plage idest octavi toni suavitatem probat. et sic de reliquis"; See also Guido, *Micrologus*, ch. 14, translated in Palisca and Babb, *Hucbald, Guido, and John on Music*, 69.

The position he took was surprisingly radical: firstly he confirmed that intense emotion is expressed in chant; secondly he explained that in order to do this, the melody of the chant must step beyond the established limits of the tone, and that it does this at the precise moment of intensity. He was very direct in his expression:

> Sometimes composers of chants of this kind rush into a kind of unrestrained ascent, either because of the sweetness of the melody they contain, or sometimes because of the matter on which chants of this kind are based. It is just as if they suffer a certain excess of mind or ecstasy in the manner of lovers or those rejoicing or sometimes of the sad and those who mourn. For this seems to be the case not only in that responsory *Conclusit vias*,[54] which exceeds the limits of the eighth tone at that point "et iudica,"[55] but also in that responsory of the same tone, *Tenebre facte sunt*,[56] at the point "deus deus,"[57] where the powerful cry of Christ is

54 The full text for this Palm Sunday responsory is: "Conclusit vias meas inimicus, insidiator factus est mihi sicut leo in abscondito, replevit et inebriavit me amaratudine; deduxerunt in lacum mortis vitam mean, et posuerunt lapidem contra me. Vide, Domine, iniquitates illorum, et **iudica causam animae meae**, defensor vitae meae." "The enemy has blocked my paths, the deceiver has become to me as a lion in hiding, he has filled and inebriated me with bitterness; they led my life into the pit of death, and they laid a stone against me. See, O Lord, their iniquities, and judge the cause of my soul, defender of my life."

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FIGURE 3.1 *Palm Sunday Responsory: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 17296 f. 121v.*

56 The full text for this responsory, the fifth of the nine for Matins of Good Friday is: "Tenebre facte sunt, dum crucifixissent Jesum Judaei: et circa horam nonam exclamavit Jesus voce magna: **Deus meus, ut quid me dereliquisti?** Et inclinator capite, emisit spiritum." "Darkness fell when the Jews crucified Jesus: and about the ninth hour Jesus cried with a loud voice: My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? And he bowed his head and gave up his spirit."

57



FIGURE 3.2 *Good Friday Responsory: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 17296 f. 132v.*

evoked. This is also the case in that responsory *Sicut cedrus*,[58] which at the point "in monte syon" also exceeds the limits of the fourth tone,[59] just as in that responsory *Qui custodiebant*[60] at the point "quia non est,"[61] and also in certain other Gregorian chants.[62]

58 The full text for this responsory for the second reading of the first nocturne on the Assumption of Mary is: "Sicut cedrus exaltata sum in Libano, et sicut cypressus in **monte Sion;** quasi myrrha electa dedi suavitatem odoris." "I was exalted like a cedar in Lebanon and as a cypress on mount Sion; I yielded a sweet fragrance like the choicest myrrh."

59



FIGURE 3.3 *Assumption Responsory: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 12044 f. 175.*

60 The full text for this responsory for Passion Sunday is: "Qui custodiebant animam mean consilium fecerunt in unum, dicentes, deus dereliquit emu. Persequimini et comprehendite eum **quia non est qui liberet eum**. Deus meus, ne elonges a me. Deus meus in adjutorium meum intende." "Those who have stood guard over my soul have taken counsel as one, saying God has abandoned him. Pursue and overtake him for there is no-one who might free him. My God, do not be far from me; my God, stretch out your hand for my assistance."

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FIGURE 3.4 *Passion Sunday Responsory: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 17296 f. 118r.*

62 Klundert, *Tractatus de tonis*, 2:35: "compositores huiusmodi cantuum vel propter melodie suavitatem quam continent | vel interdum occasione materie supra quam fundantur huiusmodi cantus | tamquam quendam mentis excessum vel extasim quodammodo passi amatorum seu letantium vel quandoque tristium atque lugentium more | in ascensum proruperint aliqualiter excessivum. Sic enim videtur esse non solum in Responsorio illo *Conclusit vias*. quod. scilicet. in illo puncto et iudica excedit limites toni octavi. et in illo Responsorio toni eiusdem. *Tenebre facte sunt* in illo puncto. deus deus ubi christi clamor validus designatur | immo etiam et in illo Responsorio. *Sicut cedrus*. quod etiam in illo puncto in monte syon excedit limites quarti toni. similiter etiam et in illo Responsorio. *Qui custodiebant*. in illo puncto. quia non est. et etiam in quibusdam aliis gregorianis cantibus."

The "unrestrained" ascent, and loss of control, that Guy proposed may be due to two possibilities: it may result from the sensual sweetness of the melody, such that it has been released to follow its own path; or, and this is the more important point, it is as if the composers of these chants "suffer a certain excess of mind or ecstasy." He linked this ecstatic state to the composing of the most intensely expressive chant and pointed out that it is at the most significant point within the chant that the limit of the tone is exceeded. Each of the four examples that he presented demonstrates the point. He continued to provide further examples of chants that stepped beyond the limits of the tones in order to specifically express an intense emotion. Though Guy's style can sometimes be overworked, repetitive and a little pedantic, it is passages such as this which bring the chant of early fourteenth-century Paris to life.

This chapter has focussed on how emotions were expressed in music by using a modal framework which imposed order on the music. It was the link between musical mode and order at the state level which inspired vigorous debate from the early philosophers Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle in particular. While this seems unrealistic today the theme of the ordering role of music in the affairs of the state and in the individual human elements of the state was too often convincingly repeated to be ignored.

Intense or excessive emotions though expressed through the body were understood to be the result of an internal imbalance and directly relatable to the rupturing of modal control by stepping beyond its pitch limits. Probably under the influence of Thomas Aquinas through the commentary work of Peter of Auvergne, Guy of Saint-Denis was able to articulate this principle clearly and to illustrate it with well-known examples from the liturgical practice of chant.

The three medieval theorists examined here—the eleventh-century Guido of Arezzo, the late thirteenth-century Johannes de Grocheio, and the early fourteenth-century Guy of Saint-Denis—all wrote with passion and conviction about music, both as a metaphor of higher philosophical truth and as the means through which moral qualities and human attitudes were generated. Barely concealed behind this theoretical writing is the sensual excitement of the sonic experience of music, an excitement that rings true for all humanity, now as then. This history of *modus* as an ordering principle for the state and individual emotions in the Middle Ages demonstrates how the modal system of ordering the world relied on both the emotional realm and the more abstract intellectual component of reason.

Appendix

TABLE 3.1 *A simple explanation of the modes* (*tones, tropes*)

I; Dorian; authentic protus		**D** E F G A B C D
II; Hypodorian; plagal protus	A B C	**D** E F G A
III; Phrygian; authentic deuterus		**E** F G A B C D E
IV; Hypophrygian; plagal deuterus	B C D	**E** F G A B
V; Lydian; authentic tritus		**F** G A B C D E F
VI; Hypolydian; plagal tritus	C D E	**F** G A B C
VII; Mixolydian; authentic tetrardus		**G** A B C D E F G
VIII; Hypomixolydian; plagal tetrardus	D E F	**G** A B C D

Note: Where the various names of the church modes are given, the pitch ranges of these scales are spelled out in pitch letter names. The bolded letters are called the finals and are the most important notes in the pitch hierarchies.

CHAPTER 4

Avarice, Emotions, and the Family in Thirteenth-Century Moral Discourse

Spencer E. Young

The seven deadly sins (or capital vices) have had an important place in the recent attention given to medieval emotions. Much of this historiography has focused on how the septenary can help establish the meaning of specific emotions in the Middle Ages or identify the emotional parameters of this period's different communities. In her work on early medieval "emotional communities," Barbara H. Rosenwein has argued that the desert fathers introduced crucial changes to the emotions when they constructed the tradition of the capital vices by turning some emotions found in ancient repertoires into sins.[1] Silvana Vecchio has investigated the changing relationship between emotions and passions, on one hand, and the vices and sins on the other, across the Middle Ages.[2] Even John H. Arnold's critique of the history of emotions as a historical project has suggested that the connection between the Western vocabulary of emotion and the medieval language of sin, confession, and penance is of particular interest.[3] These and other studies have demonstrated that the scheme

1 Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 48–49. On the methodological approach to emotional communities, see also her "Worrying about Emotions in History," *American Historical Review* 107 (2002): 821–45. There are numerous rich connections explored between anger as a capital vice and anger as an emotion in the essays found in Rosenwein, ed., *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). While the term desert fathers (and mothers) refers generally to leading late antique ascetics and monks practicing in the Egyptian desert, for this topic the key individuals were Evagrius Ponticus and John Cassian. Cassian himself was instrumental in bringing this tradition to the Latin West.

2 Silvana Vecchio, "Passions de l'âme et péchés capitaux: les ambiguïtés de la culture médiévale," in *Laster im Mittelalter/Vices in the Middle Ages*, eds. Christoph Flüeler and Martin Rohde (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 45–64. A similar argument is found in Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, "Les théories des passions dans la culture médiévale," in *Le sujet des émotions au moyen âge*, eds. Piroska Nagy and Damian Boquet (Paris: Beauchesne, 2008), 107–22.

3 John H. Arnold, "Inside and Outside the Medieval Laity: Some Reflections on the History of Emotions," in *European Religious Cultures: Essays Offered to Christopher Brooke on the*

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of the capital vices is not only critical for understanding the medieval moral tradition but that its development also constitutes a significant chapter in the history of emotions.[4] Although mindful of these studies, in this chapter I will look at another way in which the conceptual histories of the seven deadly sins and of the emotions might be usefully explored in tandem by concentrating on the moral work that emotions accomplish in thirteenth-century pastoral sources addressing the vices. By including moral judgements about emotions in their treatments of the vices, the authors of these sources also made a key contribution to the history of emotions in the Middle Ages.

While emotions appeared in medieval discussions of all of the capital vices, avarice presents a particularly fruitful area for this line of enquiry. Medieval moralists blamed avarice for the corruption of emotional norms, destroying relationships with God, family members, and fellow Christians. The thirteenth century, moreover, was a pivotal moment in the development of this discourse, in the wake of the remarkable commercial growth of the preceding centuries, the intensified concern with lay behaviour that accompanied the Fourth Lateran Council, and the emergence of the mendicant friars as leading administrators of pastoral care. Here I will draw especially from two leading moral treatises from the mid-thirteenth century authored by Dominican friars: the *Summa de vitiis* by William Peraldus and the *Tractatus de diversis materiis predicabilibus* by Stephen of Bourbon, although I will supplement them with other important contemporary sources. Both based at their order's convent in Lyon, William Peraldus and Stephen of Bourbon were deeply versed in the moral tradition and their respective works circulated widely among both learned and lay audiences, disseminating to a broad public the views they expressed about this vice and its debilitating effects on emotional health. While both treatises were intended especially for preachers (and primarily their fellow Dominicans) to draw from when composing sermons, they also reached an audience of university academics (including non-Dominicans).[5] As a result of this circulation, I contend, the prescriptions found in these works offer

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Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday, ed. Miri Rubin (London: Institute of Historical Research, 2008), 107–29, at 123.

4 See also Richard G. Newhauser, "Introduction," in *Sin in Medieval and Early Modern Culture: The Tradition of the Seven Deadly* Sins, eds. Richard G. Newhauser and Susan J. Ridyard (Woodbridge: York Medieval Press, 2012), 1–16, at 8–9, with useful bibliography.

5 For instance, the best extant manuscript copy of Stephen of Bourbon's *Tractatus* belonged to Peter of Limoges, a secular theologian who donated his impressive library to the College of the Sorbonne upon his death in 1306. On Peter of Limoges and his library, see the introduction to Peter of Limoges, *The Moral Treatise of the Eye*, trans. Richard G. Newhauser (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2012). Parts of Peraldus's *Summa* (and perhaps the entire text) were available in Paris very early, as I imply in my *Scholarly Community at the*

significant insights into the ways that late medieval Christians were taught to think about the relationship between their emotions and their morals.

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Few threats seemed as disruptive to the moral fabric of society in the high and later Middle Ages as avarice. From the eleventh century onwards, observers were taking greater notice of this vice's allegedly insidious effects, leading to what Richard G. Newhauser has termed a "renaissance of greed."[6] By the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, Parisian theologians were describing the spread of greed as nothing short of an epidemic, epitomised by the prevalence of usurers. For instance, the leading activist theologian Peter the Chanter remarked that while in former times one could scarcely find a single usurer in an entire city, practising in secret for fear of social reprisals, now multitudes of usurers operated openly and were invited to dine with princes.[7] Early thirteenth-century writers interested in social issues spent considerable energy on the detriment these usurers caused to the poor. Thomas of Chobham claimed that moneylenders afflicted the poor like a pestilence, stripping the destitute down to their very bones. As another sign of this vice's severity, he also noted that while those guilty of acts derived from the other six deadly sins did not always receive formal disciplinary action, every manifest usurer was worthy of excommunication.[8] William of Auxerre argued that while even murder might

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Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215–1248 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 176–77.

6 Richard G. Newhauser, "Justice and Liberality: Opposition to Avarice in the Twelfth Century," in *Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century*, eds. Istvàn Bejczy and Richard G. Newhauser (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 295–316, at 305.

7 Peter the Chanter, *Verbum adbreviatum. Textus conflatus*, ed. Monique Boutry (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), capitulum 48: "Antiquitus enim in tota ciuitate uix unus fenerator inueniebatur et ille quidem occultus. . . . Nunc autem fere nostrorum temporum 'fiunt iam ista palam, cupiunt et in acta referri.' Vnde proh dolor! quia isti tam detestabiles homines iam sunt facti principum et prelatorum etiam cubicularii, iam filios suos quos fenebri pecunia interueniente prouexerunt in cathedris ecclesie uident collocatos, ut sedeant cum principibus et solium glorie teneant."

8 Thomas of Chobham, *Summa de commendatione uirtutum et extirpatione uitiorum*, capitulum 5, ed. Franco Morenzoni (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 222: "Est etiam notandum quod non pro omni uitio excommunicat ecclesia. Non enim fornicatores omnes excommunicantur, neque gulosi, neque inuidi, neque superbi, neque accidiosi, neque iracundi. Set auari omnes manifesti excommunicati sunt. Auaros autem manifestos uocat ecclesia feneratores, quia ipsi quasi publice prostant in auariciis suis et non negant se esse tales. Et precipue pestiferi sunt inter pauperes et inmisericordes, excoriantes eos usque ad ossa."

be permissible in some cases, usury was always evil.[9] Robert of Courson encouraged priests to induce their parishioners to accuse usurers in public, a tactic he later attempted to implement on a larger scale at the Council of Paris in 1213.[10] And Jacques de Vitry thundered at length in his *Historia occidentalis* that "the disease [of] avarice occupies almost every heart," further lamenting that "by the work of this insatiable leech knights lose their patrimony and inheritances, the poor are robbed, [and] churches are plunged into misery."[11] These few passages aptly convey the depth of moral anxiety about the social costs of the commercial revolution.[12] Material prosperity was now within reach for many more people and in new ways. But it was more available to some constituencies than others, often through practices like usury that clearly violated longstanding (and biblically based) ethical norms.

While such denunciations of greed appear to brim with confidence in their moral clarity, one daunting aspect of avarice was, in fact, its deceptive ambiguity. Indeed, balancing the demands of moral justice with the benefits of economic growth or with the mere task of acquiring the necessities of life was a complex problem that exercised many of the finest minds of the thirteenth century.[13] As both William of Auxerre and William Peraldus acknowledged, even the most sophisticated intellectuals of the period were uncertain about the morality of many of the subtlest forms of usury (as well as simony).[14]

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9 Cited in Odd Langholm, *Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money, and Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200–1350* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 84.

10 Georges Lefèvre, ed., *Le traité De usura de Robert de Courson* (Lille: L'Université de Lille, 1902), 80–81. On Robert's actions at the Council of Paris, see John W. Baldwin, *Masters, Princes and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and His Circle*, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 1:302.

11 Jacques de Vitry, *Historia Occidentalis*, ed. John Frederick Hinnebusch (Fribourg: University Press Fribourg Switzerland, 1972), 78: "Sed . . . radice omnium malorum, peste scilicet auaritie omnes fere occupante et cupiditatis ueneno inficiente, adeo quod, usurarum crimine pessimo passim et quasi licite auaros feneratores possidente, per hanc sanguisugam insatiabilem patrimonia et amplas hereditates milites amittebant, spoliabantur pauperes, depauperabantur ecclesie."

12 Robert S. Lopez, *The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950–1350* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971).

13 See also James Davis, *Medieval Market Morality: Life, Law and Ethics in the English Marketplace, 1200–1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 34.

14 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, ed. Jean Ribaillier, 7 vols. (Paris and Grottaferrata: CNRS and Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1980–87), liber 2, tractatus 16, capitulum 3; vol. 2.2, p. 557: "Ponatur instantia [ignorantie] in subtilissimis laqueis symonie et usure de quibus etiam dubitant maximi magistri"; William Peraldus, *Summa*

Equally ignorant, William Peraldus maintained, were many of those beset by this particular vice, who "do not even know that they labour in this infirmity and therefore do not seek a cure."[15] Part of the problem, he admitted, was that behaviours motivated by this vice often seemed virtuous.[16] Temporalities were necessary for survival and an abundance of riches could be spiritually useful either as penitential alms for the poor or for other pious purposes.[17] While the corrosive effects of avarice seemed to be separating people from God, tearing apart families, and destabilising entire communities, the specific actions through which this vice wrought moral and social devastation were not always evident to moralists seeking its eradication.[18]

The moralists' dilemma was made more acute by the Fourth Lateran Council's requirement of annual confession, which stimulated a massive increase in the production of handbooks for confessors, centred on the various sins that parishioners might disclose in these encounters.[19] This pastoral literature aimed at helping clerics elicit full confessions and prescribe penitential remedies to reduce future violations. As Thomas of Chobham pointed out, however, many of the subtler sins of avarice, such as retaining more temporal wealth than is necessary, were almost never confessed and nearly impossible

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de virtutibus et vitiis (Venice: Paganinus de Paganinis, 1497) (hereafter Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*), tractatus 4, pars 1, fol. 465a: "quod etiam parati magistri non vident eos, ut patet in subtilibus laqueis usure et symonie, de quibus etiam summi magistri dubitant."

15 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 1, fol. 460v: "multi hac infirmitate laborant qui nesciunt se illa laborare; et ideo non querunt sanitatem."

16 On this kind of concern more generally throughout the Middle Ages, see Richard G. Newhauser, "On Ambiguity in Moral Theology: When the Vices Masquerade as Virtues," trans. Andrea Németh-Newhauser, in Newhauser, *Sin: Essays on the Moral Tradition in the Western Middle Ages* (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2007), Essay 1.

17 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 1, fol. 465a: "Secundo quia velati sunt necessitate naturali. Necessarium enim est aliqua haberi ad vite sustentationem . . . Tertio vero, quia sunt velati etiam spirituali utilitate. Qui enim habet divitias potest peccata sua elemosinis redimere et multa alia bona facere."

18 Along these general lines, see also the remarks of Alain of Lille, who proclaimed that "avarice weakens friendship, generates hatred, breeds anger, plants wars, nourishes controversies, and ruptures the bonds of children to their parents." See Alain of Lille, *Liber de planctu naturae* (*Patrologia Latina* ref. 210: 465), cited in Lester K. Little, *Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 36.

19 Leonard E. Boyle, "The Summa for Confessors as a Genre, and its Religious Intent," in *The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion*, ed. Charles Trinkaus, with Heiko A. Oberman (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 126–30. It is worth pointing out that confession was an important practice before the council.

to detect.[20] This meant that other measures were also needed to help accomplish widespread moral reform.

In addition to prescribing procedures for confession, many moralists therefore also promoted preaching as an effective tactic to combat avarice. On this score, Thomas of Chobham suggested that every sermon should deal in some way with the virtues and their opposing vices (a belief he acted upon by preaching tirelessly about these subjects throughout his regency at the University of Paris during the 1220s).[21] Vices were a leading focus of sermons, and avarice, or the love of money, was often at their very centre.[22] Peraldus himself claimed that of all the material on the capital vices in his *Summa*, his section on avarice was the most useful for preachers.[23] He drew inspiration from a passage attributed to the Apostle Paul (1 Timothy 6:10) when he proclaimed avarice as the root of all evils and the vice to which "the axe of preaching must be applied."

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20 Thomas of Chobham, *Summa de commendatione uirtutum et extirpatione uitiorum*, capitulum 5. In his own work for confessors, Thomas included such questions as whether a woman could legitimately request a divorce on the grounds that her husband was an incorrigible usurer and whether one could exact usury from non-Christians among the knotty issues causing moral uncertainty about this practice. See Thomas of Chobham, *Summa confessorum*, ed. F. Broomfield (Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1968), articulus 7, distinctio 6, questio 11a, capitula 1, 3, 5, pp. 504–07, 511. On the moral responsibilities of usurers' wives, with specific attention to Thomas of Chobham on this question, see Sharon Farmer, "Persuasive Voices: Clerical Images of Medieval Wives," *Speculum* 61 (1986): 517–43, esp. 517–18, 531–38, 542–43.

21 Thomas of Chobham, *Summa de arte praedicandi*, ed. Franco Morenzoni (Turnhout: Brepols, 1988), capitulum 6, p. 143. See also Franco Morenzoni, *Des écoles aux paroisses: Thomas de Chobham et la promotion de la prédication au début du XIII^e siècle* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 1995), 115–21. Many of these sermons are edited and found in Thomas of Chobham, *Sermones*, ed. Franco Morenzoni (Turnhout: Brepols, 1993).

22 The most notable treatment on avarice as the chief vice within the late medieval moral tradition is Lester K. Little, "Pride Goes before Avarice: Social Change and the Vices in Latin Christendom," *American Historical Review* 76 (1971): 16–49. As Richard G. Newhauser has documented, however, many of the concerns with avarice that arose in response to the social changes of the High Middle Ages were of older provenance. See his *The Early History of Greed: The Sin of Avarice in Early Medieval Thought and Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). See also the tempered remarks about the relative place of avarice and pride in several late medieval works in Alexander Murray, *Reason and Society in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 77–80, 436.

23 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 1, fol. 456b: "tractatus de vicio isto utilior est predicatori quam tractatus aliorum viciorum."

Otherwise, he thought, one focused in vain on evil's branches rather than its root.[24]

The manifold implications of avarice for the emotions were a long-standing concern among moralists hoping to eliminate this vice. Several early Christian thinkers had identified avarice as a pathological movement of the soul, and condemned the desire for money as unnatural.[25] Influenced by Evagrius Ponticus, John Cassian listed "the love of silver" (*filargyria*) as one of the principal vices, a scheme later modified by Gregory the Great into the concept of the seven capital vices. As a capital vice, this wicked desire for money gave rise to numerous subsidiary sins (sometimes called "daughter sins" or species).[26] Several of these subsidiary sins were themselves tied to the emotions. For example, the anonymous Dominican author of the penitential Summa *Cum ad sacerdotem*, written for confessors in the 1220s, defined usury (as a subsidiary sin of avarice) as "the zealous desire of the soul for receiving something above the principal."[27] Other subsidiary sins of avarice connected this vice with affect in different ways, perhaps none more pointedly than Gregory the Great's assignment of the sin "the unmerciful hardening of the heart" as one of avarice's daughters in his *Moralia* on Job.[28] While in the thirteenth century Gregory's list was more prescriptive for the scholastic analysis of this tradition than for writings devoted to its pastoral application, several confessors' manuals included similar sins under the heading of avarice.[29] Stephen of

24 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 1, fol. 459b: "Radix omnium malorum est avaritia. Ad avaritiamque ad radicem malorum precipue adhibenda esset securis predicationis. Frustra laboratur in extirpatione malorum si rami amputentur et radix ista relinquatur."

25 See Newhauser, *Early History of Greed*.

26 On the subsidiary sins, with special attention to Stephen of Bourbon's use of this concept, see my "The Subsidiary Sins as Guides to Early Dominican Pastoral Care and Moral Reformation in Stephen of Bourbon's *Tractatus de diversis materiis predicabilibus*," *Mediaeval Studies* 76 (2014): 169–215.

27 Joseph Goering and Pierre J. Payer, "The 'Summa penitentie fratrum predicatorum': A Thirteenth-Century Confessional Formulary," *Mediaeval Studies* 55 (1993): 1–50, at 30: "usura, que est studiosa animi cupiditas recipiendi aliquid supra sortem."

28 Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob*, ed. Marcus Adriaen (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), liber 31.45, p. 1610: "contra misericordiam obdurationes cordis."

29 For instance, the anonymous Dominican treatise from the 1230s entitled *Ad habendum* lists "immisericordia" and "incompassio." See Pierre Michaud-Quantin, "Deux formulaires pour la confession du milieu du XIII^{e} siècle," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 31 (1964): 43–62, at 61. The treatise by Cadwgan, Bishop of Bangor (1215–36) lists "obiurgatio cordis" among the sins of avarice for *claustrales*. See Joseph Goering and Huw Pryce, "The *De modo confitendi* of Cadwgan, Bishop of Bangor," *Mediaeval Studies* 62 (2000): 1–27, at 26. Robert Grosseteste listed both "inhumanitas" and "contra misericordiam

Bourbon's guide for confessors, located in the third part of his *Tractatus*, provided the most extensive description, labelling as the twentieth species of avarice: "mercilessness, a lack of compassion, and hardness of heart towards the poor and the afflicted." "This occurs," he wrote,

> when someone, out of excessive ardour and love of acquiring, demands or cheats money from the poor and afflicted . . . [or] when someone does not provide necessities for them, as much as he is able, when he sees them.[30]

In this and other ways, avarice therefore perverted the legitimate, 'rightly-ordered' love that was supposed to govern the relationships of earthly wayfarers with God and among each other. The blueprint for affective bonds within these relationships was the *ordo caritatis*, first articulated by Origen in the early third century. A host of late antique and medieval theologians adopted the *ordo* as a normative guide, including Ambrose of Milan (to whom most medieval writers attributed the scheme), Augustine, Hugh of St Victor, Peter Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas.[31] At the top of this order was God. Indeed, the theologian and Parisian bishop (1228–49) William of Auvergne played upon this notion when he suggested that avarice would not be evil if it did not also avert us from God. It would not be a sin, he claimed, if we could direct our soul both to the creator and to riches at the same time. Nor did he believe that it was a sin for someone to love money for the sake of good and pious uses. Those who infringe this order, however, are guilty of avarice because they love money for its own sake. William maintained that this kind of love must be reserved for

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cordis obduracio" in his *Perambulavit Iudas*. See Joseph Goering and Frank A.C. Mantello, "The *Perambulavit Iudas* . . . (Speculum Confessionis) Attributed to Robert Grosseteste," *Revue bénédictine* 96 (1986): 125–68, at 159.

30 Stephen of Bourbon, *Tractatus de diversis materiis predicabilibus. Tertia pars*, ed. Jacques Berlioz (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), pars 3, titulus 4, capitulum 19, p. 171: "Item, uicesima species, immisericordia et incompassio et duritia cordis erga pauperes et afflictos quando uel ex nimio ardore et amore adquirendi angariat homo pauperes et afflictos, et emungit pecuniam ab eis, uel quando non largitur eis necessaria prout potest et uidet eos indigere."

31 Origen, *Homiliae in cantica canticorum*, homilia 2.8, (*Patrologia Graeca* ref. 13:54.) On the development of the *ordo caritatis*, see David Herlihy, "Family," *American Historical Review* 96 (1991): 1–16, at 7–12. I have discussed the implications of the *ordo caritatis* for medieval treatments of almsgiving in my *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris*, 135.

God alone.[32] As with other capital vices (gluttony, for example), avarice represented the worship of something other than God, often likened to the idolatry mentioned in Galatians 5.

After God, the *ordo caritatis* listed, in descending order, parents, children, household members, and neighbours. Moralists therefore took a particular interest in the effects of avarice upon families. While the nature of the affective bonds within medieval families has a considerable historiography, moral and pastoral writings offer an additional useful and revealing source base, where the emotions perform crucial work in the establishment of moral claims.[33] If the notion that people in the Middle Ages had only limited affective ties to their family is unsupported by most scholars, the moral implications of the ways in which those affections were promoted or managed are still not entirely clear.[34] The subject of avarice is particularly illuminating here because, as Sharon Farmer has demonstrated, the morality of economic behaviour had emerged in the late twelfth century as a context for vibrant discussions about the mutual responsibilities among family members (and especially between wives and husbands).[35] Moralists from this period frequently embedded judgements about the emotional tenor within different family arrangements in their prescriptions against avarice.

According to this discourse, emotional loyalty within the marital relationship was especially vulnerable to the disruptive influence of avarice. Stephen of Bourbon explored this problem in his section on usury, as one of this vice's subsidiary sins. In one *exemplum*, the devout affection of a wife for her usurer husband is frustrated by his persistent economic iniquity. Despite the frequent

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32 William of Auvergne, *De universo*, in *Opera omnia*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1647; repr. Frankfurt, 1963), pars 2, capitula 52–53, 1:893–95.

33 See the remarks, and useful study, in Jenny Swanson, "Childhood and Childrearing in Ad Status Sermons by Later Thirteenth Century Friars," *Journal of Medieval History* 16 (1990): 309–31, esp. 310–11.

34 A few essential works on this question include Philippe Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life*, trans. Robert Baldick (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962); Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (New York: Basic, 1975); Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1500–1800* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977); David Herlihy, *Medieval Households* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); and Barbara A. Hanawalt, *The Ties that Bound: Peasant Families in Medieval England* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

35 See Farmer, "Persuasive Voices," 534–38. Among the important issues theologians discussed in this regard was whether a wife was expected to avoid living off the fruits of her husband's usury, and the extent to which she was also obliged to make restitution to the victims of his illicit activities.

entreaties of this usurer's 'good wife' that he be a pauper for Christ rather than a rich man for the devil, he refused to make restitution for his ill-gotten gains. Eventually, he was captured and put into prison. Expending all of his fortune to secure his release, the usurer found his wife weeping at their new condition. She was not weeping at their impoverishment, however, but rather at the fact that her husband no longer had sufficient means to make amends for his sins.[36] For Stephen, this woman's primary concern for her spouse's salvation both demonstrated her personal piety and modelled the type of affection a virtuous woman should have for her spouse.[37] A usurer's wife from Besançon, on the other hand, set an alternative example. While on his deathbed, her husband had entrusted her to make restitutionary alms on his behalf. But, as Stephen related, the widow married his enemy instead, bringing the money with her to the new relationship rather than donating it for the sake of his salvation. When another woman, shocked by such behaviour, scolded her about this, pointing out that her husband's dead body was still warm, she drily suggested that perhaps this woman might go blow on his corpse to cool it off. Stephen reported that this insulting remark was the only alms that this woman ever did for her late husband's soul. In contrast to the first example, this woman's callous lack of affection helped bring her avaricious husband to a fittingly ignominious end.[38] The story also served as a commentary on the fact that many contemporary marriages (and remarriages) were intended more for the management of temporalities than the nurturing of affection. As Martha C. Howell has stressed, men and women in late medieval towns experienced a high spousal turnover rate and did not live with the same spouse throughout much of their adult lives.[39] Furthermore, many widows remarried in the same trade (as we might

36 A. Lecoy de La Marche, ed., *Anecdotes historiques, légendes et apologues tirés du receuil inédit d'Etienne de Bourbon* (Paris: Librairie Renouard, H. Loones, 1876) (hereafter Stephen of Bourbon, *Anecdotes*), pars 4, titulus 11, p. 364. On the role of restitution as a way for usurers to receive forgiveness, set within the context of the emergent doctrine of purgatory in the thirteenth century, see Jacques Le Goff, *Your Money or Your Life: Economy and Religion in the Middle Ages*, trans. Patricia Ranum (New York: Zone, 1999). This particular *exemplum* is discussed at 85–86.

37 Stephen's expectation fits in with the views of other contemporary clerics on the moral obligations of the 'good wife' to help her husband achieve salvation. See Silvana Vecchio, "The Good Wife," trans. Clarissa Botsford, in *A History of Women in the West. II: Silences in the Middle Ages*, ed. Christiane Klapisch-Zuber (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 105–35.

38 Stephen of Bourbon, *Anecdotes*, pars 4, titulus 11, p. 369.

39 See Martha C. Howell, *Commerce Before Capitalism in Europe, 1300–1600* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 103–07. However, Howell warns against the idea that

assume of the woman from Besançon). Stephen deployed the absence of affection, which he linked explicitly to the usurer's marriage, as a warning against the eternal consequences of marrying a woman of dubious moral character.[40]

Other sins of avarice also threatened to dissipate marital affection. William Peraldus identified an additional source of friction in his discussion of gambling as a species of avarice, a behaviour he linked to a whole host of evils.[41] If the inveterate gambler was the head of the household, he warned, this behaviour would provoke the wrath of his wife and his entire household, eventually leading to physical violence. Nor were children spared, as gambling could lead to the disinheriting and prostitution of the gambler's daughters. In all such instances, the alleged disruption of the family's emotional harmony reinforced the moral claim against avarice.

In other contexts, however, it was the strength of a family's affective ties that could obstruct virtue. For example, moralists often used the term 'carnal love' to denote an inappropriate or excessive affection for one's kin. Avarice could inflame carnal love by leading a prelate to favour his parents or other relations instead of those under his spiritual stewardship, a practice Peraldus treated at length in a section on another of avarice's subsidiary sins, namely: "building Zion on blood relationships."[42] The validity of these emotional bonds, then, was subject to the moral approbation of the ends to which they were directed.

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marital affection and the management of temporalities are mutually exclusive, or rather that they are separable dimensions of the relationship during the period 1300–1600.

40 Also relevant on this matter is an *exemplum* culled from the sermons of Jacques de Vitry about a (non-usurer) husband whose avaricious wife (to whom he had entrusted the disposition of all his goods) does not give alms to the poor. After her death, the man decides not to pay alms for the sake of her soul, instead putting it towards finding a good second marriage. See Thomas Frederick Crane, ed., *The Exempla, or Illustrative Stories from the Sermones vulgares of Jacques de Vitry* (London: Folklore Society, 1890), 77, no. 182. A similar *exemplum*, with some intriguing differences, is found in the *Liber exemplorum* of a certain Master Wiger of Utrecht. In Wiger's version, the wife does not pay alms during her lifetime because it is she who is thinking of arranging a better second marriage for herself after her husband's death; however, when she dies first, the husband likewise refuses to pay alms on behalf of her soul. On Master Wiger, see David Ross Winter, "The Life and Career of Master Wiger of Utrecht (*fl.* 1209–1237): An Early Convert to the Order of Friars Minor," *Journal of Medieval History* 31, no. 1 (2005): 71–126; on his *exempla* collection, see David Ross Winter, "Master Wiger of Utrecht's *Liber exemplorum sub titulis redactorum*," *Journal of Medieval History* 38 (2012): 443–71. I am grateful to David Winter for sharing his transcription of this work with me.

41 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 2, caput 15, fols. 534b–537b.

42 "Peccatum edificantium Sion in sanguinibus": the phrase derives from Micah 3:10, though medieval moralists obviously used the phrase for a much different purpose than the biblical

Discussions about the moral legitimacy of familial affection, especially between parents and children, were also fraught with ambiguity when explored in monetary terms. Parents had a duty, of course, to provide for the material needs of their families.[43] Several canon lawyers argued that this duty stemmed from natural law, extending even to one's illegitimate children.[44] As Philippa C. Maddern has shown (for late medieval England at least), this view was widely shared by the lay public.[45] Moreover, numerous authors of late medieval penitential manuals explained that this obligation justified merchants in taking a moderate profit from their commercial activities.[46] Yet, as early Christian commentators like Basil of Caesarea had recognised, this responsibility could easily serve as a pretext to deny assistance to those outside the family circle. Wealthy individuals were not expected to disinherit their children entirely, but limits were needed to prevent the excessive concentration of wealth within a small number of hands.[47] The perceived devastation wrought by social inequality in the high and later Middle Ages elicited a similar re-evaluation of emotional ties between parents and children that might provoke a disproportionate concern for a child's material welfare. An anonymous Dominican treatise written for confessors in the 1230s entitled *Ad habendum* alluded to this problem when it included "disordered love of children" as a subsidiary sin of avarice.[48] The treatise does not specify, however, what such disordered love might entail. Clearer in its implications was Stephen of Bourbon's story about a dying usurer whom Dominic had encountered in Lombardy. With a priest at the man's bedside, Dominic asked the usurer (who had also been a successful lawyer) to arrange

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context would suggest. On this passage, see also Peter Partner, *Renaissance Rome, 1500–1559: A Portrait of a Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 11. Peraldus's treatment is found at *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus, 4, pars 2, caput 8, fols. 505a–508b.

43 Phillip R. Schofield, "Economy," in *A Cultural History of Childhood and Family in the Middle Ages*, ed. Louise J. Wilkinson (Oxford: Bloomsbury, 2010), 57–72, at 71. Also note the biblical directive of 1 Timothy 5:8, which declared that "if any man have not care of his own, and especially those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel."

44 R.H. Helmholz, *Marriage Litigation in Medieval England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 108.

45 Philippa C. Maddern, " 'Oppressed by Utter Poverty': Survival Strategies for Single Mothers and Their Children in Late Medieval England," in *Experiences of Poverty in Late Medieval and Early Modern England and France*, ed. Anne M. Scott (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 41–62, at 49–50.

46 See Odd Langholm, *The Merchant in the Confessional: Trade and Price in the Pre-Reformation Handbooks* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 43–44, 56, 70, 78, 114–15, 125.

47 See Newhauser, *Early History of Greed*, 27–28.

48 Michaud-Quantin, "Deux formulaires," 61: "inordinata dilectio filiorum."

restitution for his usurious gains. Yet the man refused because he did not want to impoverish his sons and daughters. When the fires of hell began to envelop this unrepentant usurer, he managed only to gasp that each of his limbs were burning before he died.[49]

The subtle ways that avarice could insinuate parental affection made it such a powerful trap. According to Peraldus, it was the devil's most efficacious trick for capturing, detaining, and drowning souls. Even when the avaricious were on the point of death, and they could no longer love riches for themselves, he stated, they could still love them for their children.[50] Peraldus further cautioned the usurer against leaving behind money for his heirs instead of making restitution, as that money would almost surely lead to his children's damnation as well. At any rate, Peraldus contended, they would not feel any more deeply for their father as a result. Instead, he warned, they will hardly think about him after his death and their charity towards him will wax cold as they consider how little good he did for them while he was alive.[51] Peraldus further stated that a father who taught his children to love temporalities was, in effect, hanging a millstone around their neck, thereby causing them to sink to the deepest part of hell.[52] Elsewhere, he explained that the avaricious father does to his children what is normally done to mice when they are covered with a sticky substance in an attempt to trap them. When the mice then run through straw, it sticks to them; they are subsequently burned with the straw, having collected the material for their own burning. Parents who teach their children to love temporalities do likewise as these temporalities become the very material by which their children burn eternally.[53]

Peraldus also called into question the very emotions that led parents to provide for their children in the first place. His most provocative argument in this regard was his contention that a parent's use of ill-gotten wealth to support children was not an act of love but rather one of hatred. In support of this claim, Peraldus adduced the story of a usurer and his two sons. One of the sons wanted no part of the father's morally dubious fortune, rejecting his patrimony to become a hermit; the other son, however, chose to remain with their father and pursue the family trade. When the hermit learned that both his father and brother had died, he was greatly pained at the news and certain

49 Stephen of Bourbon, *Anecdotes*, pars 4, titulus 11, pp. 366–67.

50 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 1, caput 6, fol. 465b.

51 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 2, caput 1, fol. 485a.

52 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 1, caput 3, fol. 458a.

53 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 1, caput 7, fol. 474b. I thank Richard Newhauser for assistance in making sense of this passage.

of their damnation. He petitioned the Lord that he might learn of their status. Led to hell, he searched fruitlessly for them until at last they both emerged from a fiery pit, biting each other and engaged in a vicious argument. The father complained that he was cursed because he had become a usurer for the sake of providing for his son while the son bitterly responded that he was cursed for having followed his father's wicked example.[54] Such a case helped illustrate for Peraldus just how thoroughly avarice could poison the parent—child relationship. Whereas a parent's provision of modest temporal support might be interpreted as a virtuous expression of love, avarice perverted this affection and induced parents to resort to vicious ways of meeting their children's material needs (and often well beyond those needs). Instead of lovingly helping their child, then, Peraldus asserted that such parents were hatefully ensuring their child's damnation and cultivating their eternal enmity. Peraldus thus reconfigured the terms of parental feeling in order to advance his moral claim against avarice.

The vice of avarice also corrupted parents and children in other ways to the detriment of family harmony. Remarking that avarice was a 'universal infirmity' affecting old and young, from the least to the greatest, Peraldus bemoaned that there was hardly any seven-year-old boy who does not greedily steal coins from his mother (making avarice even worse than the vice of lust, which in his view did not begin to afflict boys until they turned sixteen or seventeen!).[55] Yet petty theft from living parents was hardly the most disruptive offence. In his work on medieval households, David Herlihy pointed out that late medieval mothers (by virtue of their younger age at marriage) were especially susceptible to charges of avarice for living far too long and delaying the transfer of property onto their children.[56] Peraldus, for his part, levelled the accusation in both directions, depicting avaricious sons longing for the death of their father and greedy mothers selling their daughters to cutthroat murderers (*jugulatores*), all for the sake of a greater share of the patrimony. He further charged that

54 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 3, fols. 537b–538a. While this same story appears in the works of others (for example, see Peter the Chanter, *Verbum Adbreviatum*, c. 48; Stephen of Bourbon, *Tractatus de diversis materiis predicabilibus, Prima pars. De dono timoris*, eds. Jacques Berlioz and Jean-Luc Eichenlaub [Turnhout: Brepols, 2002], pars 1, titulus, 4, capitulum 2, pp. 77–78), Peraldus seems to have been unique in framing it with this particular claim about the emotions: "Talibus vero quod divitias amant propter amorem filiorum ostendendum esset in predicatione quod hoc non sit amare filios sed potius odire, id est divitias eis male congregare."

55 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 1, caput 4, fol. 460a.

56 Herlihy, *Medieval Households*, 124–25.

many children would rather that their parents burn in eternal hellfire than see their inheritance diminished in any way.[57]

Inheritance issues also appeared to ruin relationships among siblings. Stephen of Bourbon claimed to have observed this at first hand during a visit to Besançon, when a usurer of considerable reputation unexpectedly died in the middle of a meal. The man's two sons (each from a different mother) immediately began to fight over his wealth, giving no thought to his body or soul.[58] According to Peraldus, even full siblings would not hesitate to defraud each other if they were infected with greed. He explained that usurers are so treacherous that they will even ruin their brothers by freely conferring loans far above what they know their brothers will have the means to repay. Once the loan was on the point of default, the brother would be forced to hand over his share of the inheritance.[59]

The emotional damages of avarice stressed by moralists in pastoral texts also radiated outwards beyond the family—to the rest of the household, to neighbours, and to the entire Christian community. This was especially problematic in the case of usury. While biblical precedent gave some allowance for taking usury from one's enemies (and this was an open question in contemporary discussions), this practice was expressly condemned when taken from fellow Christians. Several moralists, including Peraldus, excoriated Christian usurers for plundering their co-religionists (which, they often added, Jews did not).[60] Avarice also threatened Christian community and subverted divinely sanctioned social hierarchies in other ways; for instance, in leading servants to rob their lords. Stephen of Bourbon, likely drawing upon his experience as a university student in the French capital before entering the Dominican order, complained that almost all servants of Parisian clerics were thieves.[61] Peraldus further enumerated wars, lawsuits, murder, and other sins among the evils that avaricious individuals perpetrate upon their neighbours. As he further emphasised, all of these hardened the greedy man's heart into

57 For a general treatment of late medieval views on the emotional capacities of children for their parents, see Philippa C. Maddern, "How Children were Supposed to Feel; How Children Felt: England, 1350–1530," in *Childhood and Emotion Across Cultures, 1450–1800*, eds. Claudia Jarzebowski and Thomas Max Safley (New York: Routledge, 2013), 121–40, at 130–34.

58 Stephen of Bourbon, *Anecdotes*, pars 4, titulus 11, pp. 364–65.

59 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 2, caput 1, fol. 481a.

60 See, for instance, Benjamin N. Nelson, *The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 3–28.

61 Stephen of Bourbon, *Anecdotes*, pars 4, titulus 11, p. 372.

stone, making it resemble the devil's own heart.[62] With this observation, Peraldus thus hearkened back to Gregory the Great's language about the devastating impact of this vice upon the heart, reinforcing thereby the severity of the threat avarice posed to the emotional norms that he believed ought to govern Christian society.

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The vilification of greed in thirteenth-century moral discourse co-existed, of course, with sophisticated attempts to define the boundaries of licit mercantile activity.[63] But for moralists who continued to view avarice as the major social problem of their day, the rhetoric of emotions was a key part of their strategy to combat this vice. For them, avarice served as a useful litmus test for the emotional value of family relationships, determined by whether those relationships were properly oriented towards eternal salvation. Wives who attempted to influence their husbands towards upright economic practices were described as good and loving while wives who supposedly cared more about temporal enrichment than their spouse's salvation were demeaned. Avaricious parents were characterised as hateful, rather than loving, towards their children. The emotions thus offered another domain for moral assertion, where the morality of particular behaviours determined how the feelings that motivated them were assessed.

Because it played upon aspects of life to which penitents and sermon audience members could easily relate, the very network of affections connecting the individual *viator* with God, family, community, faith tradition, and even all of humanity offered a convenient means of criticising a range of behaviours deemed immoral. By embedding judgements about affective norms within their denunciations of avarice, thirteenth-century moralists like William Peraldus and Stephen of Bourbon claimed the emotions as part of the territory they saw as theirs to define and reform. In their view, those they characterised as avaricious were both emotionally unfit and a threat to the community (in some cases even worthy of removal). In this, their work reminds us that the observation and classification of emotions are rarely (if ever) neutral practices, but rather ones inextricably entwined with broader processes of social ordering and exclusion.

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62 Peraldus, *Summa de vitiis*, tractatus 4, pars 1, caput 7, fol. 467b: "Unde Job XL[I] *Cor eius indurabitur quasi lapis*: cor diaboli est avarus."

63 See, for example, Little, *Religious Poverty*; for an excellent recent discussion of this problem, along with its historiography, see Davis, *Medieval Market Morality*, esp. 22–31.

CHAPTER 5

Affective Memory across Time: The Emotive City of Christine de Pizan

Louise D'Arcens

An account of emotions in the Middle Ages, especially an account linking emotion and cognition, must negotiate two potentially competing ideas of how emotions have moved throughout time. On the one hand, it must take into account the long human evolutionary timeline of cognitive theory, in which, to quote Paula Leverage, "the time lapse between the Middle Ages and the twenty-first century is insignificant in terms of the evolution of the human brain . . . the neural hardware is the same."[1] On the other hand, it must trace the briefer and more conspicuously dramatic course of historical change, undertaking a nuanced interpretation of the specific ways in which the 'software' of culture has enabled this purportedly unchanging hardware to express itself.

The implications of negotiating these two timelines are considerable, as they underpin two opposing approaches to how the past relates to the present. Embracing the longer, evolutionary timeframe underpins a 'universalist' approach that emphasises continuities in the emotional experiences of the past and present. Some, such as Aranye Fradenberg, have pointed to the potential for such an approach to move beyond an 'alterist' subscription to historical periodisation, in order to develop an 'epistemology of contact' between the Middle Ages and the present.[2] Others have cautioned against its promotion of a neuro-reductionism that uses neurobiology as a rigid ordering system for the emotions and does not sufficiently acknowledge the deeply contextual nature in which emotions are elicited and understood. This latter position, which favours the shorter timeline's focus on the social and historical contingencies of emotional life, and the ways in which emotions are discursively structured and understood within historical contexts, is summed up by Barbara H. Rosenwein's argument that "to assume that our emotions were also

1 Paula Leverage, *Reception and Memory: A Cognitive Approach to the Chansons de Geste* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 110.

2 Aranye Fradenberg, "Going Mental," *Postmedieval* 3 (2012): 361–72, at 369.

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the emotions of the past is to be utterly unhistorical."[3] Rosenwein has argued forcefully for the complexity of medieval 'emotional communities' and discourses, *contra* the dominant perception that emotional self-consciousness and restraint are modern phenomena.[4] The historicists' sceptical stance on neuro-emotionalism is put most bluntly by Daniel Gross, who argues

> we do not just naturally express emotions converging on our amygdala or whatever, but rather . . . are constituted as expressive agents by what the philosophers of the Scottish enlightenment called "social passions."[5]

The possibility of a *rapprochement* between the two positions is flagged, however, in Jane Chance's envisaging of an "evolutionary literary studies" which "might embrace a necessary . . . reductionism" that enables modern readers to recognise emotional and cognitive commonalities with medieval people, but which "refus[es] mere reductionism in empirical approaches," always reflecting critically on its engagement with the cognitive sciences.[6] Such an approach calls for a definition of 'emotion' that simultaneously registers its transhistorical, experiential physicality and its historical specificity. Borrowing definitions developed by aesthetic theorists Carl Plantinga and Greg Smith, then, I am defining *emotion* as a cognitive-physical sensation which is object-directed and, as such, structured within a belief system to which the emotional subject is responding.[7]

This balancing of human commonality and historical specificity offers a helpful way to grasp the cognitive-emotional complexity to be found in the work of Christine de Pizan (1365–*c.*1429), in particular *Le livre de la cité des dames* (henceforth *The Book of the City of Ladies*) (1405). With an *œuvre* punctuated by anguished self-portraits in which she laments the hardships of widowhood and womanhood, and by passionate denunciations of textual and cultural misogyny, Christine has frequently been regarded by twentieth- and twenty first-century readers as a strikingly proximate figure. The opening scene

3 Jan Plamper, "The History of Emotions: An Interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns," *History and Theory* 49 (2010): 237–65, at 253.

4 Barbara H. Rosenwein, "Worrying about Emotions in History," *American Historical Review* 107 (2002): 821–45.

5 Daniel Gross, *The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle's Rhetoric to Modern Brain Science* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007), 5.

6 Jane Chance, "Cognitive Alterities: From Cultural Studies to Neuroscience and Back," *Postmedieval* 3 (2012): 247–61, at 257.

7 See, for instance, Greg Smith and Carl Plantinga, eds., *Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and Emotion* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 1–17.

of the *City of Ladies* where she weeps, overwhelmed by confused self-loathing in the face of a centuries-old 'flood' of textual misogyny, has elicited sympathy and arguably even transhistorical emotional identification from her feminist readership. This non-alterist reading would appear to be corroborated, moreover, by a consideration of the remarkable parallels between this scene and the scene in *A Room of One's Own* where Virginia Woolf describes her "stupefaction, wonder and bewilderment" at the denigration of women by "innumerable schoolmasters, innumerable clergymen mounting their platforms and pulpits and holding forth."[8] That this complex jumble of outrage, confusion, and despair at entrenched textual misogyny is shared by two women writers separated by over five centuries seems to confirm the 'shared hardware' thesis promoted by cognitive scientists and their followers in the humanities. And yet, as I have argued elsewhere, the tearful self-portraits that open so many of Christine's texts are very much of their time, being densely allusive not only of late medieval Marian iconography (in particular the affectively intense Mater Dolorosa) but also the biblical images of the widowed Jerusalem, and the *vox clamantis*.[9] The similarities between the emotional states described in the two texts, while admittedly arresting, should not be emphasised at the expense of acknowledging the sophisticated ways in which Christine's emotional *personae* emerge out of the late medieval discursive field.

This is also the case with Christine's famed tearfulness at the opening of *The City of Ladies*, which, as this essay will show, is not just channelling pious traditions but also, for the purpose of defending women against misogyny, ingeniously redeploying medieval beliefs about the cognitive and emotional experiences involved in the use of memory—beliefs which were, furthermore, central to ideas about how the processes of textual reception and composition took place. I wish to argue, in agreement with others such as Jody Enders,[10] that the *City of Ladies* is most profoundly understood as a memorial text that reveals the importance of memory within the medieval authorising process and, in so doing, offers an alternative feminine textual memory.

I will add to earlier accounts, however, by suggesting that in her deployment of medieval memorial conventions, Christine creates a text that relies

8 Virginia Woolf, *A Room of One's Own*, University of Adelaide ebook, http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/w/woolf/virginia/w91r/complete.html, pt. 3.

9 Louise D'Arcens, "Petit Estat Vesval: Christine de Pizan's Grieving Body Politic," in *Healing the Body Politic: Christine de Pizan's Political Philosophy*, eds. Karen Green and Constant J. Mews (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 201–26.

10 Jody Enders, "The Feminist Mnemonics of Christine de Pizan," *Modern Language Quarterly* 55, no. 3 (1994): 231–49.

on emotion as both an agent and an outcome of memory, and solicits from her readers a range of emotions that differ from those exploited by misogynist tradition. From the male humanist readership of her milieu, she solicits admiration for women rather than derision through her recollection of a redemptive feminine history; from a female readership she solicits pride, safety and sociability instead of shame, fear, and isolation. Furthermore, I argue that in doing this she also creates a text with a cognitive-emotional structure that reaches beyond her time, creating an 'emotional environment' that accommodates readers across historical periods. The trans-temporality of Christine's affective-memorial vision, despite her text being grounded in the practices of her own time, can be understood via William M. Reddy's influential concept of 'emotives'; that is, emotional expressions which are "similar to performatives" in that they are not merely influenced by emotional states but also create, change, or intensify, the emotions they relate or describe, and in so doing, create or alter "emotional environments."[11] For all her tearful self-presentation in the *City of Ladies*, Christine is not the uncontrolled *femme passionée* derided by her Humanist detractors, but rather an erudite compilator whose literary currency is emotives: she represents her own heightened cognitive-emotional state in order to generate parallel states in her readers, and builds a mnemonic city as an 'emotional environment' they can inhabit with her readily because they can replicate its structure in their own memories.

Throughout the Middle Ages, as both Frances Yates and Mary Carruthers attest, the faculty of memory was regarded as central to both reading and writing practices. Medieval mnemonic theory had its roots in the rhetorical tradition of classical Rome, the two major *auctores* being Cicero's *De inventione* and the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which were copied together and referred to respectively as the First and Second Rhetorics of Tullius.[12] The centrality of memory in rhetorical technique is stressed in the *Ad Herennium*, where it is referred to as "the custodian of all the parts of rhetoric."[13] Influential meditations on memory had also been offered by St. Augustine in book ten of the *Confessions*, as well as in *De Trinitate*, and book eleven of the *Civitas Dei*,

11 William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 105. For "emotional environments" see William M. Reddy, "Against Constructionism: The Historical Ethnography of Emotions," *Current Anthropology* 38 (1997): 327–51, at 331.

12 See Frances Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London: Pimlico, 1966), 36; and Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 307 at n. 116. All future references to 'Tullius' refer to the combined *Ad Herennium* and *De inventione.*

13 Cited in Yates, *Art of Memory*, 20.

where he included memory as one of the three powers of the soul along with understanding and will. The early pedagogical sections of Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* were also known to teachers of rhetoric throughout the Middle Ages, although before 1418 it was only available in incomplete form. These texts were later supplemented by the thirteenth-century Dominican revival of the memorial system outlined in Aristotle's *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*. Although Aristotle's system was more concerned with psychology than rhetoric, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas interpreted it as a reaffirmation of the schema offered by Tullius. In the secular realm, Italian and French humanists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were also interested in classical memory schema, with Brunetto Latini producing in 1266 his florilegial *Li Livres dou Trésor* and Petrarch his *Rerum memorandum libri* of *c*.1343–45. Yates states that this enthusiasm continued into Christine's time, with the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessing a proliferation of treatises on memory.[14]

Although the various mnemonic schemata differed in both their terminology and their understanding of the relationship between memory and the functioning of intellect, imagination, and emotion, their grounding in, or relationship to, the rhetorical tradition meant that emotion was an implicit part of their cognitive systems, both as a goal (to be solicited via eloquence) and, as I will discuss later, as an agent of memorisation. This is related to their shared belief in the apprehending and selective nature of memory. To offer just one example among many, the *Ad Herennium*'s recommendation of *memoria rerum* (selection and storage of the 'gist' of an argument) over *memoria verborum* (verbatim memory) is based on a belief in the memory's capacity for economical storage of information. This belief was also extended to the practice of the retrieval of stored memories. The related practices of *collectio* and *collatio*, by which scattered memories were consciously selected and gathered together, were central to medieval recollection. These concepts are discussed in texts as diverse as Augustine's *Confessions* and Hugh of St. Victor's *Didascalicon* and *De arca Noe morali*.[15] In the later Middle Ages, the recovery of Aristotle's distinction between *memoria* (*mneme*) and *reminiscentia* (*anamnesis*), in which the mind consciously calls up information,[16] was also vitally important, influencing both Albertus Magnus's and Aquinas's meditations on memory.[17]

14 Yates, *Art of Memory*, 114.

15 Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 198–99, 208.

16 See Richard Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory* (London: Duckworth, 1972) for a discussion of this distinction (35–46) and a fully annotated English translation of *De memoria et reminiscentia* (47–114).

17 Yates, *Art of Memory*, 74–91.

The widespread belief in the value of active memory led ancient and medieval thinkers to develop *artes memorativae*, or arts of memory—mnemothechnical systems aimed at training and expanding the memory's capacities of retention and recollection. Originally written, as I mentioned above, to assist the orator in ordering his thoughts to achieve eloquence, these *artes* elaborated processes through which the memory could be structured to organise matter for swift, accurate retrieval. Among the classical *artes memorativae* the *Ad Herrenium* and Quintillian's *Institutio oratoria* figure most prominently, although mnemotechnical features are also apparent in rhetorical works such as Cicero's *De oratoria*. The period from the scholastics on was especially marked by an interest in discovering how one might augment one's natural memory with practices of mnemotechnique (*memoria artificialis*). While elements derived from these treatises can be found in the works of Albertus Magnus, Hugh of St. Victor, and John of Garland, Thomas Bradwardine's early fourteenth-century *De memoria artificiali adquirenda* stands as the most comprehensive example of a later medieval *ars memorativa*. Mnemotechnique was not only important for intellectual and textual practices. Another central point on which most memory treatises agreed was the ethical nature of memory. In Cicero's *De inventione, memoria* pertained, along with *intellegentia* and *providentia*, to the virtue of prudence. The ethical function of memory was most strongly emphasised in the Dominican revival of memorial arts, with both Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas emphasising the importance of memory for the attainment of virtue. Albertus Magnus, in particular, concluded that "memory can be a moral habit when it is used to remember past things with a view to prudent conduct in the present and prudent looking forward to the future."[18]

Most commonly, writing was regarded as functioning to support memory and safeguard it from oblivion. An important proponent of this view was Isidore of Seville, who remarked in the *Etymologiae* that writing existed "in order to remember things" ("propter memoriam rerum").[19] Writing was itself regarded as both a technological practice of remembering and a means of prompting memory. It is with these issues in view that I turn again to Christine's creation and preservation of feminine memory in *The Book of the City of Ladies*.

Given that these texts were conceptualising memory in relation either to rhetorical traditions or the scientific and intellectual interests of the scholastic sphere, how many of them Christine can have known directly is not a settled

18 *De Bono*, article 1, cited in Yates, *Art of Memory*, 74.

19 Isidore, *Etymologiae* 1.3.2. Cited and translated in Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 111, 316 at n. 107.

question. But the knowledge she displays in her work of how classical rhetoric was taught in the schoolroom, plus her access to the Royal Library, which held copies of Evrart de Conty's and Nicole Oresme's translations and glosses of Aristotle,[20] suggest there is good reason to think she had a working knowledge of their cognitive schemata. As will become clear, this is also borne out in her use of terminology. In the case of the *City of Ladies*, however, memory is less meditated on than deployed with a view to creating an alternative feminine history for an audience comprising courtly, humanist, and female readers.

In a portrait that offers a significant commentary on Christine's own art, Reason tells the story of Carmentis's invention of the Latin alphabet. Having censured men for their "massive ingratitude"[21] in the face of women's ingenuity she goes on to claim that Carmentis's inventiveness has resulted in

> an endless number of book and volumes . . . where the deeds of man and the noble and excellent glories of God, as well as the sciences and the arts, have been held in perpetual memory.[22]

Having endorsed the memorial power of writing, Reason then proceeds to praise its authoritative, public nature. She states that through the development of writing humanity has gained

> the means to send the secrets and meditations of their minds far away as they want, to announce and report whatever they wish anywhere, and, by the same token, the means to know the past, present and future.[23]

Here Reason suggests that because written words can exist "anywhere," at a spatio-temporal distance from their authors, they have the capacity to become *communes loci*, or texts whose place in public memory endows them with authority. Their assimilation into readerly memory, she continues, in turn enables written texts to benefit their readers ethically: Reason's statement that reading confers knowledge of the "past, present, and future" clearly makes

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20 See Pieter de Leemans, "Aristotle Transmitted: Reflections on the Transmission of Aristotelian Scientific Thought in the Middle Ages," *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 13, no. 3 (2010): 325–53, at 328.

21 Christine de Pizan, *The Book of the City of Ladies*, trans. Earl Jeffrey Richards, foreword Marina Warner (New York: Persea, 1982), 77 (margin note I.37.1). All references are to this edition.

22 Pizan, *The Book of the City of Ladies*, 78 (I.37.1).

23 Pizan, *The Book of the City of Ladies*, 78 (I.37.1).

reference to the virtue of prudence as the ethical outcome of textual ingestion. Thus, in what is arguably Christine's clearest statement concerning the activity to which she has devoted her life, she establishes textual practice as inherently memorial, authoritative and ethical. As will become clear later, it is also emotional.

A brief survey of Christine's available *œuvre* reveals her abiding concern with the relationship between writing, authority, memory, and virtue. This concern is detectable in such earlier works as the *Dit de la Rose* and *Epistre au Dieu d'amours*. In the *Dit*, for instance, Christine refers to the *auctores* as "men of excellent renown" ("grant memoire").[24] Both texts also refer to retentive reading using the verb *retenir*.[25] Several years later in the *Livre du corps de policie*, she again asserts writing's capacity to perpetuate memories. This is most apparent when she states her intention to provide *exempla* of "magnificent men in the past, who for their merit are memorialized in this book." Further on she explicitly links textual authority to the memory of the *auctor's* name, observing that authors "want to . . . perpetuat[e] their names [veulent perpeteur la memoire de leur nom] by writing them on their books."[26] In her *Epistre de la prison de vie humaine*, Christine attempts to comfort the anguished Marie de Berry by "recalling . . . to mind" ("ramener a memoire") authoritative statements that deal with such issues as grief, hardship, and forbearance. This ethical practice of *collection* is signified in her repeated use of the verbs *ramener* and *ramentevoir*. The *Epistre* is of special interest because it contains one of Christine's most extensive accounts of mnemonic practice. This discussion is framed within an Aristotelian-derived discussion of the tripartite cognitive character of contemplation:

> To go back to the particular things for which the gift of comprehension, which is and has its location in the head, is used, we must know that three very special and noble virtues come from it and stay in it. One is retention (*retentive*), the second memory (*memoire*), and the third is reason. Retention is used to receive in oneself the things that comprehension controls and entrusts to it, and then it retains them. Memory is used in order not to forget things retained; it keeps and reminds you of them.

24 Thelma Fenster and Mary Carpenter Erler, eds. and trans., *Poems of Cupid, God of Love* (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 49.

25 *Poems of Cupid*, 98, line 141.

26 Kate Langdon Forhan, ed. and trans., *Book of the Body Politic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 25, 82.

> Reason, which is the third, opens the way to put into practice what comprehension has understood and retention has kept and what memory has recorded.[27]

Christine's terms *retentive* and *memoire* here correspond to Aristotle's concepts of *memoria* and *reminscentia*. The Aristotelianism of her mnemonic schema becomes even more apparent as she goes on to associate rational memory with the virtue of prudence. In a formulation reminiscent of that of Albertus Magnus in *de Bono*, she describes the prudent person in the following way:

> [H]e will keep in mind the things of the past to set an example in front of his eyes, the things to come to provide for them, and the things of the present to live them well.[28]

Although in this passage Christine does not directly link ethical memory to writing, a connection is implied by the fact that this discussion occurs in a text designed specifically for the ethical purpose of fortifying a bereaved woman. Here, prudential memory formulated in her text seems to be offered as a kind of stoic containment of the potentially debilitating emotion of grief. It is in the *City*, however, that Christine's formulation of writing-as-memory reaches its fullest development. For this text not only discusses memory and authority, but is founded upon the principle of memory structured according to one of the central medieval metaphors for memory: the image of the city.

One memorial aspect of the *City* is, as mentioned earlier, its *forma* as a compilation or *florilegium* in which brief accounts of famous women from classical, Christian, and French history have been picked and gathered together. The main source from which Christine gathered her accounts was Boccaccio's

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27 Christine de Pizan, *Lamentacion sur les maux de la guerre civile, Epistre de la prison de vie humaine, and Epistre a la royne*, ed. and trans. Josette A. Wisman (New York: Garland, 1984), 35: "A revenir aux particularitez de quoy sert cellui don d'entendement—le quel est et a sa situation ou chief—est a savoir que de lui viennent at avecques lui demeurent.iii.par especial moult nobles vertus. L'une est retentive, l'autre memoire, et la tierce est raison. Retentive sert de recevoir en soy les choses que l'entendement lui administre at baille, si les retient. Memoire sert de ne laissier oublier les choses retenues, ains les ramentoit et en donne souvenance. Raison, qui est la tierce, euvre la voye de metre par effect a oeuvre ce qui l'entendement a compris et retentive a retendu et que memoire recorde."

28 Pizan, *Lamentacion*, 35: "avoir a memoire les choses passes pour y prendre exemple devant les yeulx, celles a venir pour y pourveoir, et les presents pour les bien passer."

De mulieribus claris (henceforth *Concerning Famous Women*), which had been translated into French four years earlier by Laurent de Premierfait for his royal patrons. Her hagiographies of virgin martyrs were from Vincent de Beauvais's *Speculum historiale* and from Jacobus de Voragine's famous *Legenda Aurea*, both of which had been translated into French in the fourteenth century by Jean de Vignay. She also makes passing references throughout the text to a host of *auctores*, both classical (Aristotle, Cicero, Virgil, and Seneca) and Christian (St. Paul, St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, and Gregory the Great). As Alistair Minnis and Cynthia J. Brown have established, by Christine's time *compilatio* had become a widely-practised compositional technique and was in fact regarded as an inventive process, while the role of *compilator* functioned as an enabling *topos* that allowed writers to introduce original materials into their works.[29] While Carruthers situates the practice of *compilatio* within a continuous tradition of medieval memorial composition, she does say "perhaps more concretely than any other genre, the florilegium is the essential book of memory."[30] These texts epitomised medieval memorial textuality because they were not only composed by means of *collatio* but were structured in such a way as to facilitate the transmission of their contents to the memories of their readers. *Florilegia* were also characteristically memorial in that their fundamental intent was to advance the ethical development of their readers. The presence of all three of these compositional, structural, and ethical characteristics in the *City* thus establishes this text as an essential book of memory. Christine's compositional process in the *City* is clear evidence of this. When read alongside her *auctores*, particularly Boccaccio, it becomes apparent that her *collatio* in the *City* involves a number of significant departures at the levels of narrative detail and commentary. As this subject has been the focus of numerous thorough studies, I will confine myself to a few brief examples. One particularly striking instance is her redemptive account of Semiramis, the "great and large stone"[31] on which Christine founds her City. In her account Christine omits remarks of Boccaccio's where he ascribes Semiramis's greatness to her rejection of "womanly pursuits."[32] She also passes over Boccaccio's discussion of

29 Alastair J. Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages* (London: Scolar Press, 1984), 160–217; and Cynthia J. Brown, *Poets, Patrons, and Printers: Crisis of Authority in Late Medieval France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 31, 201.

30 Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 176.

31 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 38 (1.14.4).

32 Giovanni Boccaccio, *Concerning Famous Women*, trans. and intro Guido A. Guarino (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964), 6.

Semiramis's decision to masquerade as a man—an anecdote Boccaccio offers as proof of her "feminine deceit."[33] Most significantly, she has Reason audaciously assert that Semiramis's incestuous relationship with her son, which Boccaccio roundly condemned, cannot be judged "because there was still no written law" at the time.[34] Similarly, Christine's account of learned and ingenious women subtly yet significantly alters Boccaccio's text. Her account of Leontium in book one (chapter thirty) is of special interest, not least because Christine had herself been compared to this philosophic prostitute by Jean de Montreuil. Christine omits Boccaccio's portrayal of this woman as a prostitute (he refers to her by the term *meretrix* and its more derogatory cognate *meretricula*),[35] as well as her adulteration of philosophy. Instead, she presents Leontium (and, implicitly, herself) as a blameless and learned woman. Her laudatory commentary at the end of these accounts constitutes, moreover, a direct response to Boccaccio's ambivalence about women's ingenuity. When discussing Ceres's contribution to civilisation, Boccaccio interjects with "I do not really know whether to praise or condemn [her] ingenuity."[36] Proceeding to argue that civilisation has corrupted the "golden" bucolic innocence of previous ages, he ends reiterating his ambivalence: "I hardly know whether, or rather I do know that, those golden centuries, although primitive and uncivilized, were greatly to be preferred to our age of iron to all other centuries."[37] In response to this, Christine has Reason say of Boccaccio

> with all due respect for him and for those who argue that it was unfortunate for the world that such things were discovered. . . . I would maintain that the more goods, favors, and boons the human creature receives from God, the better he is required to serve God.[38]

Here she answers her *auctor* even as she appropriates material from him. These examples illustrate the memorial nature of Christine's compilatorial practice as they contain elements of both remembering and forgetting. To begin with, Christine recollects the stories she has encountered in Boccaccio's text. Indeed, there are numerous points throughout the text when she recalls Boccaccio in order to legitimate her own account. Her discussion of Carmentis

33 Boccaccio, *Concerning Famous Women*, 5.
34 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 40 (1.15.2).
35 Boccaccio, *Concerning Famous Women*, 146.
36 Boccaccio, *Concerning Famous Women*, 12.
37 Boccaccio, *Concerning Famous Women*, 13.
38 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 82 (1.39.3).

provides an apt demonstration of this. When praising this woman's ingenuity, Reason interrupts herself with the words

> [I] let no one say that I am telling you these things just to be pleasant; they are Boccaccio's own words, and his credibility is well-known and evident.[39]

Elsewhere, however, Christine 'forgets' Boccaccio, reinterpreting or omitting uncomplimentary narrative details from his accounts. Here, compilatorial practice is signified as selective recollection. Another profound difference between Christine's and Boccaccio's *collatio* is their fundamentally opposed memorial aims and emotional tenors. Boccaccio's aim is made clear in his dedicatory letter in *Concerning Famous Women*. He states that his intent is to honour those noble women who have overcome their feminine nature and acquired "a manly spirit."[40] Christine, conversely, while praising noble women, presents them as simply embodying "the natural behaviour and character of women."[41] Here she refuses the implicit shaming of women in Boccaccio's formulation, instead encouraging a serene appreciation of women's noble nature.

In terms of the text's overall structure, Christine's inclusion of hagiographic *vitae* in book three marks a crucial departure from *Concerning Famous Women*.[42] Boccaccio states in the preface to *Concerning Famous Women* that he did not include Christian women because "they did not strive for the same goal."[43] Christine, however, as I mentioned earlier, creates her city for "all the holy ladies who have lived, who are living, and who will live."[44] This formulation constitutes important corrective to *Concerning Famous Women* because it redresses Boccaccio's 'forgetting' of Christian women—an omission which enabled him to privilege the women of pagan antiquity and disavow the possibility of continuous feminine virtue. In this respect it is significant that throughout this final book Justice repeatedly exhorts Christine not to forget the virgin martyrs.[45]

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39 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 78 (I.37.1).

40 Boccaccio, *Concerning Famous Women*, xxxvii.

41 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 4 (I.1.1).

42 Maureen Quilligan refers to this as "Christine's major departure" from Boccaccio: Maureen Quilligan, *The Allegory of Female Authority* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 19.

43 Boccaccio, *Concerning Famous Women*, xxxviii.

44 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 254 (III.18.9).

45 See especially Christine's *vitae* of Sts. Margaret, Lucy, and Martina, and Theodosina.

The other major deviation from Boccaccio is Christine's inclusion of contemporary women. While Boccaccio considers that the number of contemporary illustrious women is "so small"[46] as to merit their exclusion, in book two (chapter sixty-eight) Christine includes such contemporary women as Valentina Visconti, Queen Isabeau, and other duchesses and countesses. In book one (chapter forty-one) she also mentions Anastasia, the illuminator who had painted borders for the miniatures in a number of her texts, as an example of a contemporary woman artist whose skill equalled that of the ancients.[47] In juxtaposing these women Christine formulates her text as a universal history of illustrious women, a historical account whose continuity demonstrates women's essentially virtuous and intelligent nature. Male humanist readers would have recognised in this a corrective to Boccaccio; for Christine and her female readers, however, the emotional implications of this are greater, in that the transhistorical female sociability offers them a self-understanding that is a celebratory antidote to the misogynist litany that reduced Christine to tears in the text's opening scene.

Christine's conception of her compilatorial activity as memorial is also apparent from the fact that when she cites misogynist texts she makes repeated references to her own powers of recollection. One notable example of this takes place during the conversation between Christine and Reason concerning the lies written by the unidentified author of the *Secreta Mulierium*. Reason asks

> *don't you remember* that he says . . . that some pope—I don't know which one—excommunicated every man who read the work to a woman or gave it to a woman to read?[48]

In a response that marks the accuracy of her recollection, Christine says "My lady, I remember it well."[49] She then goes on to begin a further discussion of the *Secreta* with the recollective phrase "I recall . . . "[50] The conspicuous lexical repetition of this exchange underlines the memorial nature of Christine's compositional practice in the *City*.

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46 Boccaccio, *Concerning Famous Women*, 251.

47 See Sandra L. Hindman's discussion of Anastasia in *Christine de Pizan's "Epistre Othéa": Painting and Politics at the Court of Charles VI* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1986), 69–71.

48 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 22 (1.9.2). Emphasis added.

49 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 22 (1.9.2).

50 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 23 (1.9.2).

Christine does not, however, always represent her memorial practice as comprehensive and accurate recollection. Also of interest in the opening stages of the *City* are a number of apparent lapses of memory in Christine's recollection of misogynist sources. An example of this occurs when Christine criticises

> the man—*I cannot remember which one*—who tries to prove in his work, *De philosophia*, that is not fitting that some men have revered women.[51]

This is soon followed by more instances where Christine forgets the name of the male authors. These lapses are particularly noticeable when considered alongside Christine's avowal that she clearly recalls Reason's words: "Lady, I remember well what you told me before."[52] Even more pointed is the fact that while Christine forgets *auctores*' names, her own works are commemorated by Reason in the remarks "you have yourself touched on this point quite well elsewhere in your writings"[53] and "just as you have said elsewhere."[54] From this it becomes apparent that within Reason's textual memory Christine's own remarks rank more highly than those of the *auctores* on whom the text is based.

In addition to the abovementioned examples, this strategy is apparent in her opening description of her encounter with the "gushing fountain" of misogynist *auctores*. Here her claim that "it would take too long to mention their names" makes use of the rhetorical technique of *abbreviatio* in such a way as to allow Christine to deprive misogynist lies of their authoritative base. This gesture reinforces Christine's remarks in the *Corps de policie* that authors attach their names to their books to secure their lasting fame, yet also functions to undermine the authorising principle it describes.

The selective amnesia in Christine's *collectio*, which expresses Christine's emotional recovery from, and quiet defiance of, the shame induced by the misogynist "fountain", also points to another aspect of medieval compositional practice that is vital to my essay's argument: its grounding in the emotions or *affectus*. A revealing account in which composition is directly presented as affective is that of Thomas Aquinas written by his companion Reginald.[55] Reginald reports that in the state of meditative composition—a state characterised by intense prayer and tearfulness—Aquinas's *intellectus* was animated by his memory, which had itself been inflamed by his *affectus*. Aquinas's tearful

51 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 19 (1.8.8). Emphasis added.

52 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 16 (1.8.3).

53 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 17 (1.8.3).

54 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 18 (1.8.3).

55 Cited in Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 201–2.

process of composition suggests that although *meditatio* resulted in works of rational argumentation, it was nevertheless inextricably linked to, and in fact prompted by, the emotions. This is noteworthy because it reinforces that Christine's tearful response to misogynist texts in the *City*'s opening scene is a scene not simply of grief but of composition via the agency of emotion, as her tears provide the impetus that summons up the three ladies. Having appeared, however, these ladies assist Christine in a *collectio* that dismantles the authority of the very texts that instigated their appearance. Having initially ignited her *affectus*, the antifeminist *auctores* are now supplanted in Christine's memory by the more cheerful and affirmative lessons of the Reason, Rectitude, and Justice. These tears thus represent Christine's engagement in an intense affective process of *meditatio*. Her positioning of these tearfulness *topoi* at the opening of her texts, the conventional location of the author's self-presentation, lends further credence to this argument as it situates her tears firmly within the process of composition.

Having established the memorial nature of the *City*'s composition, I wish to examine the image of the city as its principal structuring metaphor. Tracing how Christine adopts this spatial image from the rhetorical tradition, I will examine how its intense and increasingly layered visuality is crucial to enabling Christine to create a cognitive-emotional environment for herself and other women to inhabit jubilantly and safely. Alongside her inclusion of Christian and contemporary French women in the *City*, Christine's most conspicuous structural departure from *Concerning Famous Women* is her provision of an allegorical frame for her stories. Unlike Boccaccio, whose text is simply structured as a chronological series of portraits, Christine deploys the allegorical narrative of building a city to depict the process whereby she compiles a feminine history. It is this image, I suggest, that most fully expresses the memorial nature of Christine's text.

Having introduced herself to the bewildered author, Dame Reason reveals to Christine her divine commission to construct "a particular edifice built like a city wall, strongly constructed and well founded."[56] This city will be "stronger and more durable than any marble with cement could be"[57] because its "heavy and sturdy stones"[58] will be a transhistorical congregation of accomplished and virtuous women. As Reason and Rectitude point out, these women not only make up the city's enclosure walls, streets, palaces, towers and defence turrets, but are also its inhabitants. It becomes a sociable space in which

56 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 10 (1.3.3).

57 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 11 (1.4.1).

58 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 38 (1.14.4).

women can dwell together proudly and peaceably. The compilatorial nature of this project is most clearly rendered in the image of Christine and her allegorical co-labourers quarrying the soil of the Field of Letters for the authoritative stones that will make up the "foundation of the walls."[59] Its selective nature is evident in Reason's command that Christine, having recalled slanderous accounts against women, must exclude these slanders from her city, exhorting her to "throw aside these black, dirty, and uneven stones."[60] Christine relates that under the ladies' direction "I began to excavate and dig,"[61] citing as her tools "the pick of cross examination"[62] and "the trowel of [my] pen."[63]

Christine's use of an architectural motif for compilation is not confined to the *City*. Another example can be found in *Le Livre des fais et bonnes meurs du sage roy Charles V*:

> for as the architect or mason has not made the stones from which he builds and constructs the castle or house which he attempts to perfect and on which he labours, although he assembles the materials, putting each object where it belongs according to the plan he is trying to carry out . . . in just the same way I have not created the subjects of which my compiled treatise is composed; it is sufficient for me merely to know how to apply all of this to my purposes, so that it may serve the inspiration which I am trying to fulfil.[64]

In this passage, as in the *City*, Christine conceptualises the act of compilation according to a literary trope used throughout the Middle Ages: that of writer as *architectus* or master builder. Carruthers traces this tradition, which she

59 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 38 (1.14.4).

60 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 18 (1.8.3).

61 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 16 (1.8.2).

62 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 16 (1.8.1).

63 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, 38 (1.14.4).

64 Christine de Pizan, *Le Livre des Fais et bonnes meurs du sage roy Charles V*, ed. Suzanne Solente, 2 vols (Paris: Librarie Honoré Champion, 1936–41), 1:191: "ainsi comme l'ovrier de architecture ou maçonnage n'a mie fait les pierres et les estoffes, dont il bastist et edoffoe le chastel ou maison qu'il tent à parfaire at où il labeure, non obstant assemble les matieres ensemble, chascune où elle doit server, selon la fin de l'entencion où il tent . . . tout ainsi vrayement n'ay je mie fait toutes les matieres de quoy le traitté de ma compilacion est compose; il me souffist seulement que les sache appliquer à propos, si que bien puissent servir à la fin d'ymaginacion, à lequelle je tends à perfaire." In this passage, I have added my own translation of the central section to Charity Cannon Willard's partial translation in *Christine de Pizan: Her Life and Works* (New York: Persea, 1984), 125–26.

calls "a virtual industry," to St. Paul's description of himself in 1 Corinthians 3:10–17 as a "wise master-builder."[65] This description, she recounts, gave rise to a widespread tradition in which both exegesis and the act of composition were depicted as processes of building, carried out by the exegete and author as *architecti*. One the most influential examples that she cites is found in Hugh of St. Victor's *Didascalicon*:

> [Y]ou are about to construct the spiritual building. Already the foundations of history have been laid out in you: it remains now that you found the bases of the superstructure. You stretch out your cord, you line it up precisely, you place your square stones into the course, and, moving around the course, you lay out the track, so to say, of the future walls.[66]

In the *City*, Christine also presents the allegorical ladies and herself as *architecti*, their shared compositional process comprising both exegesis and production. Although Carruthers does not mention Christine's use of this trope, it is clear that she belongs to the medieval writer-as-builder tradition, and that, moreover, she is using the trope in a unique and affectively arresting way, building a textual city that is not just memorially but also emotionally welcoming to women.

Interpreting Christine's compositional practice in terms of the *architectus* tradition still does not fully explain the particular relevance of the architectural trope for the writing of a florilegial redemptive history. It is in order to explore this relationship that I return to medieval *artes memorativae*. I wish to suggest that it is through an examination of the spatial metaphorics within these texts that one finds the key to interpreting Christine's *City* as a memorial text.

As I discussed above, these *artes* were initially designed to train the memories of (implicitly male) orators so that they could achieve *ex tempore* eloquence. One fundamental discipline advocated to the *artes* involved the speaker dividing information up into manageable portions and organising them mentally for swift retrieval. In order to achieve this, the speaker was to divide his mind into a series of *loci* or places, the order of which he must memorise. Into these *loci* were placed the manageable pieces of information

65 Mary Carruthers, "The Poet as Master Builder: Composition and Locational Memory in the Middle Ages," *New Literary History* 24 (1993): 881–904, at 890.

66 Jerome Taylor, trans., *The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor: A Medieval Guide to the Arts* (1961; New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), bk. 6, ch. 4, 140–41. Cited in Carruthers, "The Poet as Master Builder," 887–88.

that he wished to remember, formed either as brief verbal *notae* or cues, or else, significantly, as *imagines agentes*—associative agent images into which material was condensed. The *Ad Herennium* suggests that the speaker make these images as striking and emotionally engaging as possible, recommending extreme beauty, singular ugliness, bloody disfigurement and comedy as effects whose appeal to the *affectus* makes them more eligible for recollection. This ensured that the speaker would be able to accurately recall the information condensed into this image.[67]

Having stored the required information, the speaker was expected to be able to move quickly and surely between *loci*. In order to do so, he was encouraged to create a visual system that would facilitate a passage through the memorial space. Numerical grid systems and alphabetical systems were formulated by some, but the imagery that occurs most persistently throughout the rhetorical treatises, appearing early on in the *Ad Herennium, De oratore*, and *Institutio oratoria*, and later in Bradwardine's *De memoria artificiali* and Albertus Magnus's *De bono*, is that of architectural spaces. In order to locate information, one travels through the architectural space of the memory searching for the appropriately placed affective image. Images in these texts range in scale and complexity from walled gardens to houses and even, in Quintilian's text, to cities. The influence of these texts ensured that in the Middle Ages architectural images came to be crucial repositories of memory. Furthermore, as the representations of authors and commentators as *architecti* testify, the central role played by rhetoric in medieval education ensured these mnemonic techniques and their accompanying tropes were absorbed into general textual practices not involving oratory, such as simple reading and composing. A close analysis of the *City* in relation to this tradition thus reveals Christine's appropriative engagement with the affective memorial culture of her day, as a number of apparently narrative details are revealed to be memorial metaphors deployed in the service of her ethical and emotional endeavour to rewrite misogynist textual tradition.

One final narrative element in the *City* that has special significance as a memorial trope is the image of Christine digging the soil of the Field of Letters. According to Carruthers, one term used by Augustine to characterise the activity of critical reading was the verb *rimor*—to turn up or tear open the ground.[68] The popularity of digging as a metaphor for exegesis is also apparent in the marginalia of later medieval manuscripts, where, Carruthers observes, images of "implements such as shovels" abound. Thus, Christine's *pioche d'inquisition*

67 *Ad Herennium*, bk. 3, xxii, cited in Yates, *Art of Memory*, 25–26.

68 Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 172.

is recognisable as a late medieval image of critical exegesis, and one that fittingly supplements her architectural metaphor. It is, however, the *City*'s architectural structure that best reflects the text's profoundly memorial nature. To begin with, as discussed earlier, it is divided into *loci*—foundations, walls, palaces, mansions, towers and roofs. Into these *loci* Christine has placed a series of vivid, emotionally-charged portraits or *imagines agentes*, such as that of Semiramis going into battle with half-braided hair,[69] or St. Fausta with a thousand nails hammered into her head,[70] the dishevelled Sabine women trailing onto the battlefield,[71] or the anonymous Roman woman breastfeeding her imprisoned mother.[72] Arranged and portrayed in this highly structured yet also emotionally resonant way, the stories of the city have been rendered intensely memorable, entering her readers' memories via their emotions. Christine has arranged her book, then, according to the spatial layout suggested by the *artes memorativae*, literally structuring it as a textual memory, the contents of which her female readers can memorise and then later 'visit' at will.

The specific nature of Christine's memorial text becomes even clearer when one considers the location of her city within the contrasting space of the *champ des scriptures*, another popular medieval metaphor for memory. As this field represents the misogynist textual memory of the late medieval culture, the city that she builds from the stones found in this field is an assertion of feminine authority. It is also an ethico-political gesture that mobilises both emotions and memory, through which Christine refigures the past in order to offer a utopian future both for women and, as Richards points out, for humanity at large.[73] The emotional tenor of this utopia at its conclusion is jubilation, a complete inversion of the turmoil and despair that provoked its commencement.

It is striking that in *Epistre a la prison de vie humaine*, Christine's vision of a memorial space is in fact a Platonic heavenly utopia which, she predicts, will be characterised by "memory, recollection, and knowledge; no ignorance nor oblivion of all the past things."[74] Here, memory is not bound by time, but is central to an ideal order of emotional and moral harmony. Christine's city, as

69 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, (I.15).

70 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, (III.7).

71 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, (II.33).

72 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, (II.11).

73 Earl Jeffrey Richards, "Christine de Pizan and Sacred History," in *The City of Scholars: New Approaches to Christine de Pizan*, eds. Margarete Zimmerman and Dina de Rentiis (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 15–30.

74 Pizan, *Lamentacion*, 63: "memoire, souvenir, et cognoissance, sans ignorance ne oblivion de toutes choses passes."

a utopian haven and memorial citadel, can be regarded as just such a space. It is, finally, as *loci* of emotional memory that both her book and her city become bastions of feminine authority; bastions which, as Reason proclaims in book one, have been built to remain "prosperous forever."[75] These words reflect Christine's wish for her text to extend beyond its moment of composition and provide a gladdening alternative history for women into the distant future. This aspiration is surprisingly compatible with the notion of the text as a transhistorical 'emotional environment' that I raised toward the beginning of this essay. This is significant for a consideration of what methodological practices are appropriate to formulating a history of emotions: it demonstrates that drawing on an 'epistemology of contact' to interpret the emotional-cognitive system of Christine's *City of Ladies* should not be dismissed as an ahistorical or presentist intrusion, but should be understood rather as a recognition of the extent to which the text itself imagines, and attempts to bring into being, an emotional commonality between women across time. Considering Christine's *City of Ladies* within the longer timeline of cognitive theory, its cognitive-emotional 'environment' is arguably not only habitable by Christine and her contemporaries but by women across time (including Virginia Woolf, who would surely appreciate such a home). Leverage argues that medieval mnemonic theory, with its cognitive-affective models, 'anticipates' contemporary ideas of cognition.[76] Though this should not be enlisted as unequivocal proof that modern readers' 'hardware' is the same as that of Christine and her contemporaries, what it does suggest is that compatible ideas about memory, emotion, and cognition pertain in the era of cognitive science, and that these parallel ideas about memory, cognition and emotion make The *Book of the City of Ladies* transhistorically accessible even to modern readers who are unaware of medieval mnemonics practices or schemata. The strong emotional engagement with her text into the present thus suggests, in conclusion, that the *City*, while deeply medieval, also appeals to a cognitive-emotional schema that still pertains today.

75 Pizan, *Book of the City of Ladies*, (1.4).

76 Leverage, *Reception and Memory*, 293.

CHAPTER 6

Nicholas of Modruš's *De consolatione* (1465–1466): A New Approach to Grief Management

Han Baltussen

Writings on coping with grief, whether by those directly afflicted or those attempting to console, are strongly rooted in classical literature: from the time of Homer down to Seneca in the Roman Empire, we find evidence for attempts to offer solace to another human being at the loss of family, friends, country, or property. But our evidence becomes thin on the ground after Boethius (*c*.480–525CE), who wrote a now famous (self-)consolation while in prison, *Consolation of Philosophy* (524CE).[1] It is hard to believe that the genre—if that is the right word—disappeared.[2] In Christian times, compassion and grief counselling became considered a part of pastoral care, so that different formats developed with regard to consoling believers, as had the arguments about (im)mortality and hope for a next life. What is needed for a full story on the 'genre' after Boethius is better evidence for the study of the evolution of the classical tradition in relation to Christian ideas.

In this chapter, I propose to examine a much-neglected work on consolation from the fifteenth century that offers one piece of the puzzle. It was rediscovered some three decades ago and published in a scholarly edition only twelve

1 It is my pleasure and honour to dedicate this essay to Philippa Maddern, whose leadership in the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions has been inspirational, and who enthusiastically supported my own forays into the early modern age. Her untimely death is a sad loss to family, friends, colleagues, and the humanities. *Sit tibi terra levis*. I would like to thank several Croatian scholars for assistance while preparing this paper: Danijel Dzino and Luka Budak for the opportunity to present my analysis in embryonic form to the international Croatia Conference at Macquarie University, in February 2014, and the participants for useful feedback; Nevenko Bartulin for translating Luka Špoljarić, "Ex Libris Nicolai Episcopi Modrussiensis: The Library of Nicholas of Modrus," *Colloquia Maruliana* 21 (2012): 25–68 into English; and Luka Špoljarić for additional bibliographical information.

2 On the problematic nature of the 'genre' for ancient works, see J.H.D. Scourfield, "Towards a Genre of Consolation," in *Greek and Roman Consolations: Eight Studies of a Tradition and its Afterlife*, ed. Han Baltussen (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2013), 1–47. Scourfield emphasises its complexity due to the different formats such as letters, philosophical treatises, and manuals; all are concerned with a form of compassionate consolation.

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years ago. Nicholas de Korto (later known as Nicolaus Modrussiensis, Bishop of Modruš) wrote his *De consolatione*, which he dedicated to the Bishop of Vicenza, Marco Barbo, in 1465–66.[3] We might call it a rhetorical handbook, as the editor Neven Jovanović does,[4] but it is clearly more than that in its attempt to give a comprehensive set of tools for offering solace. My essay has three aims: firstly, to consolidate G.W. McClure's claim—not established in great detail by himself—for the importance of the contribution this document makes as a handbook of consolation strategies (at a time when consolation was becoming mostly a personal obligation from one individual to another); secondly, to illustrate how much it informs us about the influence of the classical tradition; and thirdly, to investigate whether McClure's further claim—that the work offers a new 'science' of consolation[5]—bears up to scrutiny, especially since the Latin word *scientia* is involved. The three points overlap to some extent, but I submit that we can evaluate the third point most fruitfully after we have dealt with the previous two points.

That Nicholas's *De consolatione* is worth a closer examination can be argued from its unusual characteristics and its historical position. At least three qualities attract attention: the structure of the work; the overall method advocated; and its relation to the consolatory tradition. Historically speaking, the work also manages to establish an interesting synthesis of the classical and Christian perspectives, and thus marks an important stage in the development of consolatory manuals after Petrarch, who set the agenda for the genre in the quattrocento in his *De Remediis utriusque fortunae* dialogues (usually dated to 1360).[6] It is perhaps not too great a stretch to suggest that Nicholas took his cue regarding his

3 G.W. McClure, "A Little Known Renaissance Manual of Consolation: Nicholas Modrussiense's *De Consolatione* 1465–1466," in *Supplementum Festivum: Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller*, eds. J. Hankins, J. Monfasani, and F. Purnell, Jr. (Binghamton: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1987) (hereafter "Renaissance Manual"), 247–77, at 251. See title page "ad Dominum Marcum Vincentum Praesulem." Remarkably, none of his works, except one letter, were published before the twentieth century. We know about four other works: *De mortalium felicitate* ("On the happiness of mortals") to Pius II; *De bello Gothorum* ("On the war of the Goths," *c.*1473); *Oratio in funere Petri* ("Speech on the death of Pietro Riario," 1474); and *Defensio ecclesiasticae libertatis* ("In Defence of ecclesiastical freedom"), for Sixtus IV. See Špoljarić, "Ex Libris Nicolai Episcopi Modrussiensis."

4 See the summary in Neven Jovanović, ed., "Nicolai Modrussiensis *De Consolatione Liber*," *Hrvatska Knjizevna Bastina* 1 (2002): 55–251, at 250. Quotations are from this edition of *De Consolatione*. Translations from Latin are the author's own unless otherwise indicated.

5 McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 263, on which see below.

6 For the medieval tradition of dictamen, see Peter von Moos, *Consolatio: Studien zur mittellateinischen Trostliteratur über den Tod und zum Problem der christlichen Trauer* (Munich: Fink, 1971–72), 403), who speaks of "Trostdictamina."

style and choice of audience partly from Petrarch.[7] In his study on Ciceronianism and literary imitation, Martin I. McLaughlin describes the *De Remediis* as a

> series of dialogues, . . . in which he was pursuing a more common style of dialogue, since it was aimed more at the common man than at philosophers ("vulgatam et publicatum loquendi morem secutus sermo").[8]

McLaughlin also emphasises that "unlike some extreme Ciceronians of the Quattrocento, Petrarch never believed that Cicero was the only model for good Latin."[9]

Put in general terms, the ground-breaking innovations in the *De consolatione* concern several factors: Nicholas's new organisation of all relevant factors involved in the grief 'management' process, the detailed analysis of the situations in which grief may occur (including the relationship of the consoler to the bereaved, their age, their own 'input' into the process), and the modes of grieving he suggests (with the help of certain *topoi*). In short, the work deserves particular attention for its re-ordering of the roles of the bereaved and the consolation *topoi* and the unprecedented psychological depth in the analysis of character and emotional needs. Moreover, as McClure's preliminary study suggests, it forms an important further stage in the reception story of ancient consolations. I will first briefly introduce the author, who is not very well known, after which I will proceed to discuss the structure of the text, and then contextualise the work within the consolation tradition. A brief conclusion will highlight the new insights Nicholas's *De consolatione* may offer into the attitude towards grief as a striking emotion in history and the contemporary achievements of the manual, while also sketching what remains to be done to understand more fully its influence and impact on later grief writings.

Nicholas of Modruš: Prelate, Bishop, Scholar, and Consoler

Nicholas was born in Korta,[10] Dalmatia, in the early fifteenth century and educated in Italy. At that time, Dalmatia was a territory of the Republic of Venice

7 For another reason, see n. 17 below.

8 Martin L. McLaughlin, *Literary Imitation in the Italian Renaissance: The Theory and Practice of Literary Imitation in Italy from Dante to Bembo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 39.

9 McLaughlin, *Literary Imitation*, 32.

10 Modern-day Kotor, in Croatia. This now small village is historically noted as the seat of one of the medieval Catholic bishoprics, established in 1185 in Krbava and moved to Modruš in the 1460s. It later became the Roman Catholic Diocese of Senj-Modruš.

(1420–1796) and dominated by Venetian culture. Also known as Nicholas Machienensis or Nicholas Cattarus, Nicholas "studied in Italy under the philosopher and theologian Paolo della Pergola in Venice." After becoming a cleric, "he held ecclesiastical positions in Dalmatia and Italy (e.g., Viterbo, Spoleto)."[11] He also had close links to the Hungarian court of King Matthias Corvinus (1458–1490) before he went on to a career in the Church.[12] Later, he became a papal envoy and Bishop of Modruš. The Roman Catholic Church, as the religion of both the Venetians and the Croats, exerted the majority influence over the region. The Serb Orthodox Church in Dalmatia built several monasteries in the hinterland, such as early fourteenth-century Krupa, Krka, and Dragović.

Nicholas's importance is only now becoming known. A forthcoming study will soon further elucidate Nicholas's career and the crucial decisions he made at certain stages of his life which influenced his writings. His long-neglected *De consolatione*, written in 1465–66, still awaits detailed analysis, but this is now possible following the publication of the full Latin text of the work in 2002.[13] McClure, who first brought the work to the attention of the scholarly world, has made a number of valuable points about its importance and originality. He has argued that Nicholas offers a unique record of the "interest and innovation in consolation" in the early Renaissance.[14] In addition, he shows how Nicholas created a useful blend of the classical and Christian consolatory strategies, combining these with two later genres from the medieval period: the rhetorical letter and works of pastoral care. This means that we can regard it as an important stepping-stone in the story of how we can trace attitudes to grief between the Middle Ages and today, even if its immediate influence on subsequent centuries is still obscure.

Awareness of the historical position of Nicholas and his work is of some significance, because it places him between Petrarch, who did much to pioneer a

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11 Both quotes from McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 251. For further details of his career, see J. Neralić, "Nicholas of Modruš (1427–1480): Bishop, Man of Letters and Victim of Circumstances," *Bulletin of the Society for Renaissance Studies* 20, no. 2 (2003): 15–23; and Luka Špoljarić, *Nicholas of Modruš, "The Glory of Illyria": Humanist Patriotism and Self-Fashioning in Renaissance Rome* (forthcoming). Viterbo was a favourite papal residence in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but became lost to the popes for a while.

12 Špoljarić, in an English summary of Špoljarić, *Nicholas of Modruš, "The Glory of Illyria"* (personal communication).

13 See Jovanović, "Nicolai Modrussiensis *De Consolatione Liber*." I am grateful to Dr Danijel Dzino for providing me with a copy of the text. I should perhaps also mention that McClure has confirmed to me in a personal email that he is not doing further work on this treatise.

14 McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 250.

modern typology of consolatory *topoi*, and the rise of the Renaissance culture of consolation letters in the following two centuries. Furthermore, we will see that his role as an envoy of the papal court was cause for some personal misfortune, a factor that would play a role in his decision to write the manual.

The *De consolatione*: Structure and Intellectual Context

Nicholas's *De consolatione* presents a systematic treatise in four or five 'books,' and his approach is strongly based on ancient literature, in particular Cicero and Boethius. But, it also uses scripture and many poems and letters of consolation from antiquity for inspiration.[15]

As this is not the place to cover the full structure of the work in detail, I will give an outline of the work's structure and highlight a selection of the novel proposals in 'managing grief.' Firstly, Nicholas's overall arrangement of the material is striking. Book one begins by considering the bereaved and how they are affected when in need of consolation, before talking about the specific effects of grief.[16] This opening seems to signal Nicholas's focus on the human role rather than strategies or method. In view of our earlier observation that he was more inclusive and aimed to offer consolation to as many people as possible, it should be noted that such a focus stands out in the tradition of reflective writings offering broad advice on grief (*solacia*). The inspiration comes from Christ (so Nicholas tells us in the prologue),[17] who mingled with the lower classes. In book one, he also offers a definition of consolation,[18] one that signals his particular focus on curing the *soul*: "consolation is a form of revivifying (*refocillatio quaedam*) of a grieving soul by way of friendly words or acts."[19] This definition is followed by a Stoicising clarification (Zeno and Chrysippus are mentioned later), stating that "the soul grieves because of a belief that an evil

15 Jovanović distinguishes four books, but keeps the Roman numerals going from I–V. Another inconvenience is that the manuscript's folio pagination is absent (there are section numbers). Jovanović also does not list McClure, "Renaissance Manual"—while he does speak of "rhetorical handbook."

16 *De consolatione* 1.1: "qualiter affecti sunt qui consolatione egent"; 1.2: "quae nocumenta afferit aegritudo."

17 *De consolatione* prolog. 15.

18 *De consolatione* 1.1.2: "quae ipsa consolatio sit videamus."

19 *De consolatione* 1.1.4: "est igitur consolatio (quatenus ad propositum negotium spectat) amicis dictis vel factis maerentis animi refocillatio quaedam."

is present; by 'present' I mean not so much in reality as in its imagination."[20] By relying on the Stoic point of view, Nicholas seems to commit to a philosophical position that considers grief as an excessive emotion (passion) and aims to suppress or eradicate it.[21] But several remarks suggest that his view is a mitigated version of this Stoic stance: at *Prologus* 6 his aim is articulated as "to lighten the grief to the most agreeable extent possible."[22] Here "to lighten" (*levare*) echoes one of Cicero's five possible objectives for consoling others in his *Tusculanae Disputationes*:

> These then are the comforter's responsibilities: (1) to remove distress altogether, or to (2) cause it to subside, or (3) to diminish it as much as possible, or (4) to restrain it so that it cannot spread any further, or (5) to divert it elsewhere.[23]

We may further compare section II.1.1, *qua ratione et quibus modis mitigandus dolor amici sit* ("with which manner and methods the distress of a friend should be softened"), which also suggests a milder version of treating grief or more generally II.1.6, where Nicholas diversifies the different methods by listing 'options' among ancient theories (mostly Stoic), depending on what the comforter is trying to achieve. Nicholas would seem to follow Chrysippus.[24]

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20 *De consolatione* 1.1.5. For the original Stoic definition using Chrysippus's notion of 'fresh impression' as a more precise articulation of the intensity and abating of distress, see, for example, H. von Arnim, ed., *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 4 vols (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1903–1905), vol. 3, fr. 481 (Galen), 394 (Stobaeus). Compare A.A. Long and D. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), vol. 1, texts 65O and 65P.

21 *De consolatione* 1.2.7 states: "passiones vero, quae appetitum in fugam vertunt et eum in se ipsum contrahere cogunt . . . non tantum nocent ratione motus, sed etiam ipsius pestiferi cibi administratione." ("the passions, which chase the soul's volition out and force it to turn onto itself, . . . not only cause damage by the manner of movement, but also with the aid of poisonous food of itself.")

22 *De consolatione* prolog. 6: "aegritudinem quam commodissime levare."

23 Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes* 3.75: " 'tollere aegritudinem funditus aut sedare aut detrahere quam plurumum aut supprimere nec pati manare longius aut ad alia traducere."

24 *De consolatione* 2.1.6: "Idcirco qui morbum funditus eradicare cupit, Cleanthis sequatur rationem, Chrysippi vero qui mitigare desiderat; porro qui detrahere dolori vult, peripateticorum observet monstrata; qui supprimere, Anaxagorae; et qui abducere aut divertere, Epicurum non dedignetur praeceptorem". ("Therefore the person who desires to eradicate the illness root and all, should follow the method of Cleanthes, but [the person] who wants to soften it [should follow] that of Chrysippus; next, he who wants to diminish the pain, should look to the tenets of the Peripatetics; to suppress it, to the view

Book two goes into the methods of consolation, outlining approaches for different cases (for instance, the role of timing, how to deal with the more serious cases, the universality of grief). Here we see quotations from poetry, a feature also present in classical works. Such evidence of higher learning stands in partial contrast to the broader audience this work is likely to have in mind, especially given its practical objectives; it is certainly different from the narrower focus that many classical examples exhibit. In book three, the focus is on the justice of human misery (he mentions Job), divine will, the human condition, and fate and necessity. Book four discusses solace regarding shame, exemplarity, virtue, fear, and enemies, while book five looks at notions such as compassion, lamentation, praise, word and deed, future hope, duty, frustration, contemplating the human end, and remembering death.

This leads me to my second point, the work's relationship to the consolation tradition. It is quite clear that only a well-educated man with a deep knowledge of the classical tradition could have written this work. His awareness of the consolation tradition, going all the way back to the Greeks and Romans, is clear from his comment on how his work stands in relation to this earlier body of work. He makes use of existing examples and treatments but this does not prevent him from adding his own contribution: the *prologus* ('introduction') reveals his conscious decision to write this work on consolation, *despite the fact* that there were already quite a few such works out there:

> I do not think that I have undertaken this as an idle work: although many eminent, momentous works written by great experts in this manner survive, as these are almost all very famous, such as Boethius's books *On consolation*, and in equal measure Seneca's excellent book *On consolation* and his other book, which he called *On the remedies of good and bad fortune*. [There is] also Isidore's renowned gem of the *Synonyms*.[25]

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of Anaxagoras; and he who wants to take it away or divert, should not disdain Epicurus as a teacher.")

25 *De consolatione* prolog. 7: "Nec mihi vanum hunc laborem assumpsisse puto: tametsi multa a peritissimis viris egregia monumenta exstent in hanc rationem conscripta, ut sunt paene omnes illi et praeclari quidem Boethii De consolatione, et Senecae tam ille De consolatione codex insignis quam alter, quem De remediis fortuitorum appellavit. Isidori quoque Synonymorum clarissima gemulla." Some of the titles appear abbreviated: he no doubt refers to Boethius's *On the Consolation of Philosophy*; he omits Petrarch's name, presumably as too obvious to mention. Špoljarić ("Ex Libris Nicolai Episcopi Modrussiensis") thinks Cicero and Boethius are the inspiration for the work. The evidence for Cicero is strong, for Boethius less so (unless we count the overall format of the work, which

This first short list of ancient sources reveals which works were known in the mid-fifteenth century in Italy regarding consolation. The titles are not all the same as we have them now, but the works are clearly considered important (he calls them *egregia monumenta*; Seneca's *On consolation*, probably the one addressed to his mother Helvia, is labelled *codex insignis*).[26] From these and other references, he shows his knowledge of a wide range of authors that we encounter in other sources, and he places the work clearly within that tradition. This does not necessarily mean that he had (direct) access to all of these works himself, but his justification for writing—despite such weighty predecessors—is a revealing point about the man and his ambitions.[27]

One important passage is especially worth highlighting, since it confirms that Cicero's (self-)consolation was certainly lost by this time:

> [I]f, indeed, the work that Cicero composed about this method had survived, we [ourselves?] and others might have been freed of this labour. There are extant, however, the greater part of his valuable consolatory epistles.[28]

This highly positive judgement of Cicero's work indicates how its reputation had lasted until the fifteenth century despite its loss.[29] Nicholas is relying on the letters and book three of the *Tusculanae Disputationes*, in which Cicero

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combines prose and poetry). Isidore is quoted at 3.2.8 (Jovanović, "Nicolai Modrussiensis *De Consolatione Liber*," 128). On the statistics for each author see also n. 60 below.

26 Seneca, *Ad Helviam*, written when he was in forced exile *c*.42–43CE. The work is remarkable because Seneca aims to console both Helvia and himself. See Marcus Wilson, "Seneca the Consoler?" in *Greek and Roman Consolations*, ed. Baltussen, 93–122. Nicholas mentions many other authors in a list that resembles that in Jerome, *Letter to Heliodorus* 60; and Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, book 2–3. See McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 254 n. 16.

27 Špoljarić ("Ex Libris Nicolai Episcopi Modrussiensis") has painstakingly reconstructed the contents of Nicholas's library. Among others it included works of Aristotle, Cicero (including *Tusculanae Disputationes*), Quintilian, Macrobius, Augustine, Jerome, Lactantius; cf. McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 252.

28 *De consolatione* prolog. 8. Translated in McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 254.

29 The comment about the loss of Cicero's work is echoed by a close contemporary: in December 1463, the Florentine scholar Alamannus Rinuccinus translated into Latin Plutarch's *Consolatio Ad Apollonium*. The 'Prologue' addressed to Cosimo de' Medici (London, British Library, MS Additional 20703, fol. 1v, 16–19 states: "Itaque mihi persuadebam post consolatione qu(a)e a Cicerone scripta ad nostram non pervenerit (a)etatem." My own diplomatic transcription of the text is supported by that of Vito R. Guistiniani, *A. Rinuccini. Lettere e Orazione* (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1953), 60. On Rinuccini see

discusses grief and refers back to his own *Consolatio*, written at the death of his daughter (March–April, 45BCE).[30] A further indication that Nicholas followed established (and conventional) views is the comment that Cicero "followed Crantor." Crantor was a member of Plato's Academy and, as far as we know, was the first to write a (now lost) philosophical consolation for a friend. It had a lasting influence on the later writers of similar works (Cicero calls it a "golden booklet,"[31] which the Stoic Panaetius considered worth memorising). The connection between Cicero and Crantor has been much discussed and should probably be taken as an indication of a general resemblance—in that he chose not to suppress negative emotions completely (*apatheia*), but chose to alleviate them (*metriopatheia*)—not as simply 'imitating' the views Crantor expressed.[32]

With these broad contextual comments in mind, we can now turn to the third point, McClure's claim about the nature of the work as a 'science'. In his book on consolation literature in the Italian Renaissance, McClure has made a rather strong claim:

> Nicholas' work is unique, to my knowledge, in its attempt to construct, in an autonomous work, a systematic treatment of both the *topoi* and the administering of consolations.[33]

Even if we accept that what Nicholas did is new, the question remains whether it amounts to a 'science.' We will revisit this question in the context of the consolation of its time, and that of the classical tradition.

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also id., *Alamanni Rinucci (1429–1499): Materialien und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Florentinischen Humanismus* (Köln: Graz, 1965).

30 See Han Baltussen, "Cicero's *Consolatio ad se*: Character, Purpose and Impact of a Curious Treatise," in *Greek and Roman Consolations*, ed. Baltussen, 67–91; and G.W. McClure, "The Art of Mourning: Autobiographical Writings on the Loss of a Son in Italian Humanist Thought," *Renaissance Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (1986): 440–75, at 443 n. 5.

31 Cicero, *Academica* 2.44.

32 Based on the elder Pliny's *Natural History* (*Preface* 22), which constitutes fragment 4 in the latest collection of fragments of the *Consolatio* in C. Vitelli, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Consolationis Fragmenta* (Firenze: A. Mondadori, 1979). I have argued along with others that this is only true in a very limited sense, see Baltussen, "Cicero's *Consolatio ad se*," 69–70. See also, Margaret Graver, trans., *Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 83–84, 187; K. Kumaniecki, "Die verlorenen *Consolatio* des Cicero," *Acta Classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debreceniensis* 4 (1968): 27–47, at 27–28 (countering the older view of imitation).

33 McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 263.

Nicholas's treatise seems unusual by its intention to offer a non-philosophic treatment of the method of consolation.[34] There are, however, a few precedents for limiting or suppressing philosophy in the classical tradition, which can be identified in Cicero and Seneca:[35] the small and only mildly subversive comment in Cicero—that he was unable to follow Chrysippus's advice to treat "his wound" and restrain his mourning[36]—is one; another is Seneca's attitude to philosophy, which is a more sophisticated attempt at illustrating that "death is not a strictly academic matter," as Marcus Wilson has recently pointed out.[37] It follows, then, that neither grief nor the manner of coping with it need be an academic matter. Nicholas seems to follow this line in that he seeks to bring together the venerable tradition of philosophical insights with more pragmatic pastoral care. From these considerations it becomes clear that we need to establish in greater detail how Nicholas differs in his approach from his predecessors.

Innovation: More than a Synthesis

Apart from the elements that Nicholas brings in from later traditions, several significant points stand out in the treatment of grieving.[38] In this section, a selection of his innovative moves will be analysed without any claim to comprehensiveness. The elements I highlight concern children, the physiology of grief, the care for the aged, and the suitability of consolation.

Probably the most striking element in the work is the role given to minors. Ancient consolations always address adults. Although a long-held belief in classical scholarship that children did not get equal treatment when it came to bereavement in antiquity is no longer accepted—children do feature in some grief accounts, most commonly as the deceased[39]—Nicholas makes the remarkable comment that

34 Cf. McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 250.

35 Should we take Nicholas's ignorance of these as proof that he did not know these works at all?

36 Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 63.

37 Wilson, "Seneca the Consoler?" 104.

38 McClure ("Renaissance Manual," 259–60) has argued that Nicholas includes two other traditions: those of the *ars dictaminis* (medieval rhetorical treatments); and the confessor's manual. See n. 6 above.

39 For consolation regarding a two-year-old girl, see Plutarch's *Letter to his Wife*, in Han Baltussen, "Personal Grief and Public Mourning in Plutarch's *Consolation to His Wife*," *American Journal of Philology* 130, no. 1 (2009): 67–98.

> when we professed the art of curing souls I decided that it was required of us—as it is of physicians of bodies—to hand down certain general methods of healing, but to leave the particular [methods] and those which can occur to [any] diligent person, to the prudence of the doctor.[40]

He then continues to outline what a consoler must know. Here, his advice differs to some extent from the ancient practice:

> It is expedient for the ideal consoler to know three things: first, how depressed are those who stand in need of consolation; then, from which persons in particular they are desiring it . . . [; and] thirdly, in what way the duty of consolation should be taken up and what matters should be pursued.[41]

He not only confirms that he has given considerable thought to *what* the consoler must know, but also *who the best consoler is*.[42] Here he does align himself with ancient evidence, in particular Ciceronian evidence, except that the parallel occurs in a letter *to* Cicero, namely the famous letter of consolation written by Servius Sulpicius upon the death of Cicero's daughter.[43] Servius invoked the old Roman virtues and was (in modern eyes at least) a rather harsh counsellor. But the opening lines of the letter show some empathy, expressing the sadness he experienced upon hearing the news.[44] He also emphasises that he would have wanted to be with Cicero in person, if he could have.[45] The aspect of immediate relevance here is the suitability of the consoler. Servius suggested it concerned those close to the bereaved (*familiares, propinqui*). Nicholas opens with a similar point, but develops it quite differently:

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40 *De consolatione* prolog. 17, translated in McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 260.

41 *De consolatione* 1.1.1, translated in McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 260.

42 *De consolatione* 1.1.3.

43 Cicero, *Letters to* [*and from*] *Friends*, [=*ad Fam.*] 4.5.

44 *ad Fam.* 4.5.1: "graviter molesteque tuli, communemque calamitatem existimavi." ("[the news] was a painful and bitter blow to me, and I regarded it as a calamity to both of us alike".)

45 Servius Sulpicius to Cicero (Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, 4.5): "meum dolorem tibi declarassem" ("I would have declared my grief to you"); Cicero welcomed the comment in his response, *Ad Fam.* 4.6 "How much you could have helped, had you been with me, by comforting me and bearing an almost equal share of my grief". Cf. Baltussen, "Cicero's *Consolatio ad se*," 79–80.

> Therefore friends, parents, children, or persons connected by some necessity are best able to console, and among these the consolation of children is the most valuable, especially adolescents or little ones, if it ever chance that some of them should express themselves rather appropriately, or weep with their parent: the former is a great source of delight to parents; the latter, after it is enjoyed, constrains the parents through paternal piety to restrain themselves, lest they should cause pain or suffering to their children whom they dearly love. For this same reason the consolation of a wife or a beloved friend avails greatly.[46]

The opening line is remarkably close to Servius's position (it should be remembered that, unlike Cicero's consolation, the letters had resurfaced in 1345 thanks to Petrarch's efforts[47]). But what comes next is rather unusual: Nicholas highlights the positive effect children can have *on adults* ("the consolation *of* children" here clearly means "*by* children"): the salutary effect of the "young and innocent" may come from a fortunate comment or sympathy with the parents' grief. For the latter, it aids the adults to constrain their behaviour in order to prevent emotions from spiralling out of control (and, therefore, affecting the children). Furthermore, the child's assistance is put on a par with the consolation given by a wife or a friend. The underlying perspective here is a Christian one, because we have no evidence in the pagan tradition that children had an active role in the grief process *while alive*. I am thinking especially of the contrast with, for instance, the case of Plutarch, where his striking *evocation* of his dead two-year-old daughter is intended to console his wife: he does this by way of a lively description of the girl playing with her dolls.[48] For Nicholas, children can play a very different role in their parents' grief.

These examples clarify how the overall perspective is framed in the manner of a 'clinical' context (as McClure noted), and how Nicholas takes a very new approach to the process of consoling the bereaved. It is not quite a science yet, but there is clearly great sensitivity to the real needs of human suffering and loss.

We may also note that the causes of grief (*aegritudo*) are said to affect both body and soul; for him, it is an embodied experience. Nicholas highlights black bile—"which the Greeks call melancholia"—that may obstruct both physical

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46 *De consolatione* 1.9.1–5, translated in McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 262.

47 Nicholas explicitly quotes Cicero's letters at 1.4.20, 1.5.6, 1.6.1 and 1.9.10.

48 Plutarch, *Consolatio Ad Uxorem* 608C. As I explain in Baltussen, "Personal Grief and Public Mourning," the 'lively description' of the child fits the ancient literary technique called *ekphrasis* ('vivid vignette').

and mental processes in the body.[49] In other words, there is a physiological component to grief, whereby the person is so badly afflicted that he or she "is left senseless as if devoid of life."[50] The model used here resembles the Hippocratic system, in which the body has passages for transporting the four humours that can sometimes become blocked, causing illness.[51] At any rate, the disruption caused by grief affects both body and soul.

Two further brief examples may illustrate the extraordinary detail of Nicholas's perceptive analysis. The first concerns the aged: while he tries to determine who most needs consolation, Nicholas makes some fine distinctions about the extent to which some are more affected by grief than others.[52] It turns out that younger people and women are among those who are "more prone to be uplifted."[53] By contrast, elderly men cannot easily be persuaded to review their situation and think better of it.[54] This claim is illustrated with a passage from Virgil about Anchises, Aeneas's father, who tells his son and crew to flee without him. This story sounds a note of resignation in old age, and acceptance of one's limited capacity to pursue adventurous journeys, even if dictated by the gods and fate. Secondly, religious people and those of cheerful character repel sadness and grief with ease, because they are "sanguine or liberated about human affairs out of contempt."[55]

With these points in mind we may end this section by considering the question of whether we are dealing with a new 'science' of grief management. According to McClure "Nicholas truly creates a [new] science" of consolatory advice.[56] This claim needs some further clarification (and qualification). McClure's judgement may well have been guided by a comment in the *prologus*, for which we should consider the precise wording. Nicholas tries to give a more general characterisation of the work, after he has opened with his dedication and main objectives:

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49 *De consolatione* 1.2.11: "itaque exsiccatur ac gelu constringitur humorque eius generis, quem Graeci melancholia [literally 'black bile'] appellant, incrementum capit et invalescit vehementius."

50 *De consolatione* 1.3.8: "stupidus ac veluti exanimis linquitur."

51 De consolatione 1.1.3.

52 *De consolatione* 1.4.1–4.

53 *De consolatione* 1.4.1: "ad laetitiam voluptatemque proniores."

54 *De consolatione* 1.4.5: "neque ullis rationibus adduci possunt melius de se sperare."

55 *De consolatione* 1.4.19: "Similiter et illi facilem maerorem reiciunt, quos nature ipsa finxit hilariores, ut sanguineos aut liberales aut humanarum rerum contemptores."

56 McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 263.

> I was compelled to share the knowledge without jealousy or to search for gain or interest from acquired money, and not to be ashamed to have to provide milk to children, for whom Christ did not blush to die.[57]

Nicholas's motivation for writing the work is presented as an act of selfless charity, so to speak a *pro bono* endeavour for the greater good of humanity (he wanted to provide "milk to children"—*lac infantibus* presumably means 'God's children,' or humans).

More importantly, the word 'knowledge' (*scientia*) here certainly is not sufficient evidence to talk of a 'science.'[58] But the term puts us on the trail for the ambition and aims of Nicholas's work. The notion of a 'science' has changed much over time and the modern understanding is a very complex one involving a theoretically coherent and practically viable method, and one which has the power to solve problems, deal with a variety of grief types, and generalise hypotheses, even have predictive power. *Scientia* could mean a particular kind of knowledge that is better characterised as 'know-how' than 'know-that,' that is, the kind of knowledge that controls and creates.[59] Nicholas's methodology, as we saw from the components and structure of his work, does not quite fit that description, although it goes some way towards it.

Conclusion

In my highly selective exploration of this fifteenth-century 'manual' for consolation we have come to see that Nicholas of Modruš stands at an important point in the history of 'grief management.' While the various pagan works from classical and late antiquity offer infrequent innovations in the style and focus on coping with grief, Nicholas single-handedly develops the genre, beyond the pioneering work of classical authors as well as that of Petrarch, for the early

57 *De consolatione* prolog. 14: "Mihi | autem iubetur *scientiam* absque invidia communicare et ex percepto talento lucrum vel fenore quaerere, nec pudori esse debere infantibus lac praebere, pro quibus Christus mori non erubuit."

58 As J.S. Ackerman ("On Scientia," *Daedalus* 94, no. 1 (1965): 14–23, at 13–14) explains, it would have the sense of 'higher learning' in the Middle Ages as opposed to the *artes* ('techniques').

59 Cf. Ackerman, "On Scientia," 15, where he gives an expanded 'definition': "*Scientia* is the controlling form of every discipline, within which techniques are exercised and through which their development and change should be guided. In the natural sciences and humanities it would be a system of hypotheses and theories; in the arts, it would be what we call the principles of a style." Neither of these types applies here.

modern world.[60] By overcoming traditional categories of the bereaved and by proposing novel techniques to use for this purpose of grief management, he creates a new framework for the assessment and treatment of grief.

But many questions remain. It would be interesting to understand clearly why he inserts Christian texts at particular points in the text, as well as to consider the use of poetic texts (Juvenal is a particularly unexpected addition), and to find out what his immediate sources were (for instance, Boethius' use of poetry springs to mind). When we look carefully at his philosophical stance in individual sections, he leans towards the Stoic doctrine of emotions and passions, even if he does not exclude other points of view. While building on the ancient advice he develops subtle psychological insights, emphasising the importance of relatives and friends during the time of bereavement and even propounding ideas about therapeutic weeping.[61] McClure's claim that "Nicholas truly creates a science" may overstate the author's achievement somewhat, but that does not take away from the innovative nature of the work.[62] Despite the very rational nature of his procedure, it can plausibly be argued that professional duty and personal emotional turmoil had a role in Nicholas's decision to write this work.[63] As a bishop, he had a duty of pastoral care, and as someone who had suffered several recent setbacks (for instance, imprisonment and banishment from the Hungarian court[64]), consolation could be something that was very much on his mind.

De consolatione's achievement is to organise the consolation strategies in a new way, place the 'patient' at the centre, offer subtle distinctions about the parties involved, and consider a wider audience beyond those directly affected. The strategies were inspired by both classical ideas and Christian ideology: an explicit synthesis that did not yet exist in this area.[65] The new classification

60 Jovanović's useful index in "Nicolai Modrussiensis *De Consolatione Liber*" gives a clear picture of the works used and quoted: Cicero's letters (42) and *Tusculanae Disputationes* (35), Jerome's epp. 4, 40, 41, 60 (29 passages across all four books); Ovid (32), Horace (7), Juvenal (24), and Virgil (38) also feature frequently; for the Christian tradition, we find Augustine (7), Boethius (14), Gregory (1), and the Vulgate (38); for the remainder some scattered quotations from historians.

61 Cf. McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 265–66.

62 McClure, "Renaissance Manual," 263.

63 From English summary of Špoljarić, *Nicholas of Modruš, "The Glory of Illyria."* See n. 12 above.

64 Neralić ("Nicholas of Modruš (1427–1480)," 22–23) solves the mystery of the reason for this banishment.

65 McClure ("Renaissance Manual," 270) describes the combination of "Christian and classical perspectives" as possibly providing "the complete guide for the Quattrocento humanist and Christian."

allowed two intellectual traditions to coexist in a very explicit way, fusing pagan (especially Stoic) and Christian ideas about coping with grief. In addition, while the work deals with one main type of emotion, it also illustrates the complexity of this emotional state and forces readers to acknowledge that Nicholas was sensitive to a rich conceptual notion of grief and its cure, based on associated aspects of bereavement.

Nicholas's work on consolation will require further detailed examination (and a full translation) to unlock its secrets and determine its precise place in the evolution of consolatory writings. As an important testimony for the influence of the classical consolatory tradition it represents an unusual new stage in thinking about grief: Nicholas stands between the pioneer of early modern grief management, Petrarch, a century earlier, and the consolatory writings of the sixteenth century, which were deeply influenced by Cicero's *Tusculanae Disputationes*.[66] The work also offers fascinating insights into the direction of grief management in the fifteenth century. Its unusual treatment of age groups, gender, and coping mechanisms make it unique in the surviving material from the late medieval and early modern consolations. Clearly Nicholas's aim was to offer a work that had both theoretical foundations and practical applications. In line with Stoic thought, Nicholas saw grief as a regrettable affliction to be avoided or cured.[67] One may speculate on the extent to which Nicholas's background played a role in his decision to be more inclusive at a time when such intellectual endeavours were mostly *by* and *for* the social elites (that is, written in Latin and grounded in the classical tradition), but it is certain that it was his ambition to widen his target audience and thereby avoid the conventional approach of creating a philosophical work for philosophical readers. In doing so, he provided compact guidance for pastoral care and thus empowered both the professional and the private reader.

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66 Thus it is also a product of Ciceronianism (the scholar's choice to adopt Ciceronian classical Latin as the norm), which ended up suffocating the writing style and hence aroused resistance and rejection.

67 The Christian view, presented at *De consolatione* 1.2.1 and quoting Proverbs 25:20, states: "nulla autem saevior animi pestis quam aegritudo, sacra Scriptura attestante" ("there is no worse affliction than grief, as Holy Scripture attest"). At *De consolatione* 1.3.1, Nicholas adds: "porro animum debilitat, gravat, et facultatem adimit philosophandi." ("further it debilitates and weighs down the mind and takes away the capacity to philosophise.")

CHAPTER 7

Hearts on Fire: Compassion and Love in Nicolas Houel's *Traité de la Charité chrestienne*

Susan Broomhall

In 1578 Nicolas Houel, an apothecary with contacts at the French court, prepared a richly illustrated manuscript, the *Traité de la Charité chrestienne*, to present to Henri III. The work was a key tool in Houel's campaign to secure funds for his charitable institution, the Maison de la Charité chrétienne. The Maison aimed to provide orphan boys with pharmaceutical training, and to offer the fruits of their labours, drawn from its medicinal garden, freely to Paris's poor and needy. This was, however, just the first stage in an ambitious vision; Houel also hoped to provide education in the liberal arts, schooling for girls, and respite for the ill and elderly. Through this manuscript—one of a series of texts targeting different donor groups—Houel hoped to inspire the king, and the French Catholic citizens of Paris, to support and expand his facility. He provoked readers by appealing to a variety of motivations, including even national pride, but chief among them were fellow feeling, compassion, and love. Here, Houel articulated in textual and visual form emotions that would drive his vision forward, and the organ in which they were located: the heart.

This chapter explores the role of emotions—love and compassion in particular—in Houel's attempt to seek patronage for the Maison. If what was to drive both monarch and citizens to participate was the heart though, the benefits that Houel stressed might accrue from their charitable acts concerned the mind and the soul. They would produce practical gains for Parisian society, promising order in social relations between richer and poorer inhabitants of the shared urban space, and they would also produce spiritual benefits, since these devotional practices would enable faithful Catholics to order their souls in relation to God. This essay analyses how an educated man from the professional ranks of sixteenth-century Paris sought to convey this message and his vision, negotiating the attentions, interests and identities of his multiple and varied audiences—from kings and queens to the everyday women and men of Paris.

I examine Houel's strategy through the texts and images that he devised and composed in the *Traité de la Charité chrestienne*, teasing out in particular his textual and visual performance of emotional acts, expressions and gestures

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in the pursuit of his vision. The composition was inflected by Houel's understanding of selfhood and community, and their relationship to social status, gender, and faith. It was also shaped by his comprehension of the theology and politics of contemporary Catholic devotional practices. Finally, it was framed by his conceptualisation of the emotions, and particularly their power to drive human behaviour. These ideas informed Houel's work and reflected how he understood social relations in a sixteenth-century city experiencing the fervour of new ascetic and penitential practices of Catholic renewal; that is, the dynamics of individuals and communities in relation to each other and to the divine, which were critical to emotional states such as pity, compassion and love.

Houel's Academy of All Piety and Science

Nicolas Houel has been studied by historians of pharmacy, art, and charity, and this diverse attention reflects the multifaceted nature of his endeavours.[1]

1 Gustave Planchon, "Le Jardin des Apothicaires," *Le journal de pharmacie et de chimie* 28 (1893): 250–58, 289–98, 342–49, 412–16; 29 (1894): 196–212, 261–76; and 30 (1894): 350–62; Jules Guiffrey, "Nicolas Houel, Apothicaire Parisien fondateur de la Maison de la Charité chrétienne et Premier Auteur de la Tenture d'Artémise," *Mémoires de la Société de Paris et de l'Ile-de-France* 25 (1898): 179–270; S.-E. Lépinois, *Nicolas Houel, apothicaire et bourgeois parisien, fondateur du Jardin et de l'École des apothicaires de Paris* (Dijon: E. Jacquot, 1911); Léon Mirot, "Notes sur Nicolas Houel et sa famille," *Mémoires de la société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Ile-de-France* 49 (1927): 44–56; Alexandre de Laborde, *Un Philanthrope au XVI^e Siècle: Nicolas Houel, Fondateur de la Maison de la Charité chrétienne* (Paris: Société des bibliophiles français, 1937); Maurice Bouvet, "Les trois mariages de Nicolas Houel," *Revue d'histoire de la pharmacie* 25, no. 100 (1937): 188–90; Sheila ffolliott, "Catherine de Médici as Artemisia: Figuring the Powerful Widow in Early Modern Europe," in *Rewriting the Renaissance: The Discourses of Sexual Difference in Early Modern Europe*, eds. Margaret W. Ferguson, Maureen Quilligan and Nancy J. Vickers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 227–41; Christian Warolin, "Un testament authentique de Nicolas Houel (5 septembre 1551)," *Revue d'histoire de la pharmacie* 302 (1994): 331–41; Sheila ffolliott, "The Ideal Queenly Patron of the Renaissance: Catherine de Médici Defining Herself or Defined By Others?" in *Women and Art in Early Modern Europe: Patrons, Collectors and Connoisseurs*, ed. Cynthia Miller Lawrence (University Park: Penn State Press, 1997), 99–109; Christian Warolin, "Trois contrats passés avec Nicolas Houel, intendant et gouverneur de la Maison de la charité chrétienne," *Revue d' Histoire de la Pharmacie* 317 (1998): 63–66; Valérie Auclair, "De l'exemple anique à la chronique contemporaine: L'Histoire de la Royne Artémise de l'invention de Nicolas Houel," *Journal de la Renaissance* 1 (2000): 155–88; Valérie Auclair, "Nicolas Houel et Petrus Stephanus: un manuscrt enluminé du XVI^e siècle, le *Traité de la Charité chrestienne*," *Revue de l'art* 132 (2001): 9–28; Valérie Auclair

By the 1570s, Houel was a man who was already known to the royal court.[2] His first known contact appears to have been a literary and artistic one. In the late 1560s, he presented the king's mother, Catherine de Medici, with a grand folio manuscript containing an idealised biography of the ancient queen Artemisia, which was intended to accompany, it seems, a set of designs by Antoine Caron for tapestries.[3] Houel also composed a history of France that included biographies of the nation's monarchs, which he intended to dedicate to the king, but Charles IX died in 1574 before it was completed.[4] Already in the 1560s charity was close to Houel's heart: in his text for Catherine, he listed a number of queens who had not only engaged in charitable acts themselves, but who also encouraged their husbands to do the same.[5]

These manuscript works reflected Houel's expansive artistic and literary interests and his hopes to attract patronage from the court; they were followed by a series of published texts that reflected his professional training as an apothecary. In 1571, he published a Latin composition based on the work of the Arabic physician John Mesue (Yûḥannâ ibn Mâsawayh, *c*.786–857), related to laxatives and purgatives.[6] This contained a dedicatory epistle in Latin from

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"Un logis pour l'âme des rois. Nicolas Houel (ça. 1520–ça. 1587) et les dessins de procession à la maison de la Charité chrétienne pour la famille royale," in *Henri III mécène des arts, des sciences et des lettres*, eds. Isabelle de Conihout, Jean-François Maillard and Guy Poirier (Paris: Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne (PUPS), 2006), 39–54; Susan Broomhall, "The Politics of Charitable Men: Governing Poverty in Sixteenth-Century Paris," in *Experiences of Poverty in Late Medieval and Early Modern England and France*, ed. Anne M. Scott (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 133–58; Lisa Keane Elliott, "In Pursuit of Charity: Nicolas Houel and his *Maison de la Charité chrétienne* in Late Sixteenth-Century Paris' in *Experiences of Charity, 1250–1650: Revisiting Religious Motivations in the Charitable Endeavour*, ed. Anne M. Scott (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 149-70.

2 Houel may have achieved a connection via his sister, Marie, who was married to Adrien Rougeault, a surgeon and a *valet de chambre ordinaire du Roi*. Bouvet, "Les trois mariages de Nicolas Houel," 189.

3 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France (hereafter B.n.F.), manuscrit français 306. See also articles by Guiffrey, ffolliott and Auclair detailed above. Caron's designs are located at B.n.F., Département des Estampes, Réserve Ad. 105. See the discussion on the dating of this manuscript to 1566 in Auclair, "De l'exemple antique", 162.

4 Lépinois, *Nicolas Houel*, 54.

5 ffolliott, "The Ideal Queenly Patron," 104. Houel had also served as a city alderman in the mid-1550s, a role that exposed him to the responsibilities of civic duty and charitable management. See Barbara B. Diefendorf, *Paris City Councillors in the Sixteenth Century: The Politics of Patrimony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 71–72.

6 *Pharmaceutices libri duo: prior continet omnia Mesuae theoremata, canones universales vocant, in tabulas redacta, per Nicolaum Houel* (Paris: apud A. Gorbinum, 1571).

the king's poet, Jean Dorat, to Catherine de Medici, as well as a preface to the reader in which he explained the choice of Latin by arguing that scientific knowledge should be restricted to trained individuals alone.[7] Houel soon changed his tune though, for his next work, which was published in 1573 and dedicated to the prominent magistrate Christofle de Thou, *premier président* of the *parlement* of Paris, was a French–language treatise explicating the conventional views of his day on the causes of, and treatments for, the plague.[8] In the same year he published a second treatise on theriac and mithridatium that he dedicated to Charles IX.[9] This treatise reflected his concerns that knowing the origins of medicinal plants was crucial, and warned readers of the potential risks of falsification. This seems to have been part of a campaign Houel was advancing for the king to allow free distribution of theriac, which Houel believed would be efficacious in treating a wide range of illnesses.[10]

With this campaign, Houel's grand vision for the provision of charitable medicine in Paris began to emerge. He conceived of an ambitious facility that would partly function as a training academy for young orphaned or fatherless boys of good birth, teaching them the profession of the apothecary and putting their developing skills to use in a pharmacy that could support the city's poor and needy. This was to be his "academy of all piety and science."[11] The plight of the ill, the elderly, and young girls was by no means ignored; Houel

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7 Lépinois, *Nicolas Houel*, 81–83. A presentation manuscript with elaborate binding and gold tooling of Catherine's emblems and symbols was also made, in which the epistle to readers and Dorat's elegy were translated into French. Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 53969 Réserve.

8 *Traité de la peste, auquel est amplement discouru de l'origine, cause, signes, préservation et curation d'icelle, avec les vertus et facultez de l'électuaire de l'oeuf* (Paris: G. Du Pré/Jean Parent, 1573).

9 These were compositions of multiple ingredients initially designed as poison antidotes for treatment of snake and animal bites, but which had taken on far wider therapeutic powers by the early modern period.

10 Warolin, "Nicolas Houel et Michel Dusseau," 327; and Auclair, "Nicolas Houel et Petrus Stephanus," 10; *Traité de la thériaque et mithridat, contenant plusieurs questions générales et particulières, avec un entier examen des simples médicamens qui y entrent* (Paris: J. de Bordeaux, 1573).

11 Nicolas Houel, *Advertissement et déclaration de l'institution de la maison de la Charité chrestienne establie ès faux-bourgs Sainct Marcel, par l'authorité du roy et sa court de parlement, 1578; ensemble plusieurs sainctes exhortations, instructions et enseignemens tant en prose qu'en vers pour induire le chrestien à aimer Dieu et les pauvres, le tout recueilly des Sainctes Escritures et authoritez des saincts docteurs de l'Église catholique* (Paris: P. Chevillot, 1580), fol. Biiv: "une Academie de toute pieté et science." All translations are my own.

had longer-term hopes to provide a school and lodgings for them, and to include in his establishment a chapel and a medicinal garden to support the pharmaceutical needs of his apprentices and the city. He also anticipated, in time, expanding the curriculum beyond professional skills to the traditional arts and languages. Houel had been envisaging his charitable foundation for some time, and he used his connections to the court to seek patronage. In a later work, Houel implied that it was the French queen, Louise de Lorraine, who had first responded to his call for support, and then secured the assistance of her husband, Henri III.[12] In 1576, he received an interview before the king and was granted the use of a ready-made building, the Hôtel des Tournelles.[13] However, by 1578, with the backing of both king and *parlement*, he had moved the institution to the hôpital de Lourcine, facing onto the river Bièvre on the city's outskirts in the faubourg Saint-Marcel. At this point the facility was officially given the name Maison de la Charité chrétienne, and Houel was awarded the post of *intendant général*.[14] In the *Traité*, the manuscript he dedicated to Henri III the same year, Houel depicts himself at his desk, contemplating his spiritual quest, while boys produce and distribute medicines in an idealised version of the Maison's pharmacy in the background (see Figure 7.1). Houel's plan was not without opposition from the apothecaries' corporation, however, which was understandably nervous about the free delivery of medicines and had taken Houel to court in 1577 because of the "disloyal" competition that the Maison represented.[15]

This was not the achievement of all Houel dreamed, however. The institution required constant funds, and Houel set about the task of securing them with a series of new texts that he hoped would compel the court and Parisian citizens to support his endeavour. In 1578, he began to compile the manuscript *Traité* and its companion, *L'Ordre et Police en l'institution de l'Appothicairerie*.[16] The first set out a spiritual justification for contribution to the Maison, while

12 See *Les Mémoires et recherches de la dévotion, piété, et charité des illustres Roynes de France, ensemble les églises, monastères, hospitaux et collèges qu'elles ont fondez et édifiez en divers endroits de ce royaume* (Paris: J. Mettayer, 1586).

13 "Déclaration pour la reddition des comptes des maladeries et hôpitaux, Blois, 30 janvier 1577," in *Recueil Général des Anciennes Lois Françaises Depuis l'An 420 Jusqu'a la Révolution de* 1789, eds. F.A. Isambert, Decrusy & A.H. Taillandier, 29 vols. (Paris: Belin-Leprieur / Verdière, 1829), vol. 14, pt. 2, mai 1574–août 1589, 318. Cited in Elliott, "In Pursuit of Charity," n. 18.

14 Warolin, "Nicolas Houel et Michel Dusseau," 320.

15 Auclair, "Nicolas Houel et Petrus Stephanus," 11 and 23 n. 13.

16 B.n.F., manuscript français nouvelle acquisition 19737; Auclair, "Nicolas Houel et Petrus Stephanus," 13.

FIGURE 7.1 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *69. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

the second provided operational guidelines for the institution. Both of these works were dedicated to Henri III, but the illustrations made it clear that his wife, Louise de Lorraine, and mother, Catherine de Medici, were also important targets. In 1579, Houel turned a disastrous event to his favour. In early October 1578, the Bièvre had overflowed, killing a number of people and destroying parts of the Maison. By 1579, Houel had published an account of the remarkable events, insisting that the miraculous survival of his institution was a clear sign of God's validation of his work.[17] In 1580, he wrote and published a new call to assistance, dedicated to Louise de Lorraine once more, comparing her to Hester and exhorting her to use her influence "to beg the king that, from Charity, the Maison be built"; that is, a full complement of dedicated buildings which would fulfil his grand vision.[18] This *Advertissement et déclaration de l'institution de la maison de la Charité chrestienne* sought though to appeal to a wider readership, noting the support of women at court thus far and calling on the citizenry of Paris to give generously.[19]

Houel's works connected directly with the spiritual politics of his era. Processions had emerged as a popular part of Catholic renewal devotional practices at this period; in fact, in the 1578 *L'Ordre et police*, Houel outlined an annual procession to be undertaken by the children and teaching staff of the Maison, which was designed to inspire Parisians to support it.[20] By the

17 *Ample discours de ce qui est nouvellement survenu ès faulxbourgs S. Marcel lez Paris, ensemble les miracles advenus en la maison de la Charité chrestienne naguères establie esdits faulxbourgs* (Paris: J. d'Ongoys, 1579).

18 Houel, *Advertissement*, fol. Aiiir: "c'est pourquoy je vous prye | Pour agreer à Dieu de supplier le Roy | Que de la Charité la Maison soit bastie."

19 Houel, *Advertissement*, fol. Biir. A manuscript version of this work was dedicated to Henri III: B.n.F., Fonds français 5726.

20 Auclair, "Un logis pour l'âme des rois," 42. On these confraternities, see Robert Schneider, "Mortification on Parade: Pentiential Processions in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century France," *Renaissance and Reformation/ Renaissance et réforme* 10 (1986): 123–46; Andrew E. Barnes, "The Wars of Religion and the Origins of Reformed Confraternities of Penitents: A Theoretical Approach," *Archives de sciences sociales des religions* 64, no. 1 (1987): 117–36; Andrew E. Barnes, "Religious Anxiety and Devotional Change in Sixteenth-Century French Penitential Confraternities," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 29, no. 3 (1988): 389–405; Marc Venard, "Les confréries en France au XVI^{e} siècle et dans la première moitié du XVII^{e} siècle," in *Société, culture, vie religieuse aux XVI^{e} et XVII^{e} siècles*, eds. Yves-Marie Bercé et al. (Paris: Presses de Paris-Sorbonne, 1995), 44–65; Benoist Pierre, "Émotion religieuse et ordre monarchique. Du prince et des passions humaines chez les Feuillants au début du XVII^{e} siècle," in *Hypothèses 2001: l'Émotion en politique* (*Actes des journées organisées par l'École doctorale d'histoire de l'Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne au cours de l'année 2001*) (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002), 335–44; Benoist Pierre,

mid-1580s, with the encouragement of powerful Jesuit figures at court, Henri III had established four new penitential congregations, devotions that were a sign of his desire to provide religious leadership.[21] The highly influential Jesuit, Edmond Auger, had lent his support to and defended these devotions, in particular the flagellant Congrégation des Pénitents blancs.[22] In a set of manuscript designs attributed to Houel, Henri III and the members of this confraternity are shown processing past a lavish imaginary Maison amongst other contemporary buildings in Paris.[23] In 1584, Houel commissioned the design of a frieze that depicted a formal procession by the royal family, including Henri, Louise and Catherine, to the Maison. The establishment depicted in the frieze was a far cry from the modest reality of the hôpital de Lourcine; it showed instead his vision of an extensive and complex set of dedicated buildings designed to accommodate each aspect of his enterprise.[24] Houel was acutely aware of the growing power of the Jesuits and his *Advertissement* specifically noted that Auger's *Catéchisme et sommaire de la Religion Chrestienne* (first published in 1563) would feature in the reading material for the boys in his Maison.[25] Houel's calculations and appeals to Henri were not without risk. The strong presence of the Jesuits at Henri's court, and the performative elements of their spiritual culture, did not make them universally popular. Indeed, even senior Jesuits expressed concern at the political dimensions of Auger's influence.[26]

"Le corps pénitent et l'ordre social chez les religieux parisiens de la fin du XVI^e^ siècle," *Mémoires de la Fédération des Sociétés historiques et archéologiques de Paris et de l'Île-de-France* 55 (2004): 63–78.

21 A. Lynn Martin, *Henri III and the Jesuits Politicians* (Geneva: Droz, 1973), 88–89, 117–18, 147, 150–51. See also Jacqueline Boucher, *Société et mentalités autour de Henri III* (PhD Diss., Université de Lille III, 1981); Jacqueline Boucher, "L'ordre du St Esprit dans la pensée politique et religieuse de Henri III," *Cahier d'Histoire* 18, no. 2 (1973): 129–42; Nicolas le Roux, *La faveur du roi: mignons et courtisans au temps des derniers Valois* (Seyssel: Champ Vallon 2001).

22 Frances A. Yates, *Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Routledge, 1985), 184. On the relationship of Auger and the Jesuits more broadly with the French court, see Susan Broomhall, "Devoted politics: Jesuits and elite Catholic women at the later sixteenth-century Valois court," *Journal of Jesuit Studies* 2, no. 4 (2016) (forthcoming).

23 B.n.F., Département des Estampes, Rés. Pd. 29. See also Auclair, "Un logis pour l'âme des rois," 41–2.

24 B.n.F., Département des Estampes, Rés. Pd. 30. See also Auclair, "Un logis pour l'âme des rois."

25 See *L'Ordre et police*, article 6, p. 17, cited in Auclair, "Nicolas Houel et Petrus Stephanus," 23 n. 22.

26 Harro Höpfl, *Jesuit Political Thought: The Society of Jesus and the State, c.1540–1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 21. See also Broomhall, "Devoted politics".

Nonetheless, the visible expressions of Catholic devotion in the era, in the fasting, prayers and processions that brought the Catholic community together in communication with the divine, and the power of the spiritual allies who advocated these practices, suited Houel's mission very well.[27]

In 1586, Houel returned to a favoured female target for patronage, Catherine de Medici, dedicating his publication of *Les Mémoires et recherches de la dévotion, piété, et charité des illustres Roynes de France* to her. Here, Houel reprised his earlier historical work on royal women, compiling a history of the charitable acts of pious queens and reinforcing his message that the ideal queen was one who engaged in acts of benevolence.[28] Houel also took the opportunity to publicise Catherine's previous support for the Maison and openly remind her of her commitment to build its chapel.[29] However, Houel died the following year, leaving the majority of his grand charitable enterprise incomplete. The same year, his widow Catherine Le Vallée married Charles Audens, the man who replaced Houel as the Maison's *intendant*.[30]

Houel designed his compositions strategically to compel his targeted patrons into action. For his courtly connections, he personalised manuscripts that reflected their own emblems, interests, and gender. Henri's well-known attention to religious devotion was reflected in the focus of the *Traité* on the theological rationale for sponsoring the Maison. For royal women, on the other hand, historical and thinly veiled instructional texts that provided practical exemplars of pious women of the past who had sponsored charitable foundations, and encouraged their husbands to do likewise, were prioritised. Images—as illuminations, sketches and cartoons—formed an important part of his pedagogical technique in his texts for both men and women. Around 1563, Houel had composed a short manuscript text, which it seems he had planned to dedicate to Catherine, in which he compiled anecdotes that demonstrated the prestige of painting in antiquity.[31] In his later history of Artemisia, he had also noted Horace's words:

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27 Ann W. Ramsey, *Liturgy, Politics, and Salvation: The Catholic League in Paris and the Nature of Catholic Reform, 1540–1630* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1999), 122.

28 See *Les Mémoires et recherches de la dévotion.*

29 Lépinois, *Nicolas Houel*, 69–74.

30 Bouvet, "Les trois mariages de Nicolas Houel," 190.

31 See Auclair, "Le Discours de l'excellence de la platte painture en l'antiquité de Nicolas Houel", in *Peindre en France à la Renaissance. Volume 2: Fontainebleau et son rayonnement*, ed. Frédéric Elsig (Milan: Silvana Editoriale, 2012), 145–57.

> [T]he things that are represented to our eye, move and revive our spirit so much more, and render understanding more quickly touched, than those that enter by the ear.[32]

Images were not merely decorative inclusions, then, but rather opportunities for pedagogy to be articulated and readers' emotions roused in alternative forms.

In his printed works, Houel continued to highlight his networks to the court, through dedications and phrasing that made clear the proximity and long-term nature of his connections. These works also reflected his ties to influential men in the *parlement* who, along with the king, had been important in supporting the establishment of the Maison at Saint-Marcel. They also demonstrated his (unfulfilled) hopes to persuade his professional fraternity of the spiritual and social benefits of his endeavour. Finally, he addressed the Parisian people, speaking as a member of the Catholic faithful to others, and thus positioning himself within a community of believers on a shared path to salvation, towards which good works played a key role. Therefore, although his appeals took on different resonances to cater to his intended audiences, they did not concern only men or only the elite. Rather, they were made to all of the Catholic faithful in Paris, each of whom had a responsibility to save their soul.

The *Traité*

The *Traité de la Charité chrestienne* appears to present the first half of a carefully-designed work that Houel was compiling across two manuscripts in 1578.[33] Containing twenty-two lavish full-page colour illuminations and additional decorated pages, this work was intended for a royal readership. As the meticulous analysis of Valérie Auclair makes clear, the coherency of the work suggests that Houel was responsible not only for the manuscript's text, which comprised a combination of biblical quotes, religious verse and prose, but also for the design of the images that were first sketched in preparatory drafts, then illuminated by Petrus Stephanus.[34]

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32 B.n.F., MS fr. 306, fol. 7v, cited in Auclair, "Nicolas Houel et Petrus Stephanus," 24 n. 59: "les choses qui nous sont representees a la vue, esmeuvent et suscitent davantage lesprit, et rendent l'entendement plus vifvement touche, que celles qui ont leur entrée par loreille."

33 Princes Czartoryski Foundation, Kraków, MS 3092.

34 Auclair, "Nicolas Houel et Petrus Stephanus."

The work's full title is provided on the first page of the manuscript and clearly reveals its intentions:

> Treatise of Christian Charity, containing several holy remonstrances, exhortations, elegies, odes, spiritual sonnets, hymns, prayers, orisons, meditations and other necessary and useful things to every Christian man and woman, to live well and happily and die in the grace of God. The whole gathered up with several passages of Holy Scripture and the works of the doctors of the Catholic Church. With the Institution of the Apothecary, College and Chapel of the said Christian Charity, as much for the instruction of the poor orphan children as for the shamefaced poor priests, schoolboys, gentleman, merchants and artisans of the town and suburbs of Paris, detained there in extreme illness. The whole founded and maintained by the alms of good people, invented by Nicolas Houel Parisian.[35]

While the heavens are shown at the top of this frontispiece-style illumination, it is Nicolas Houel himself who appears underneath, presenting a manuscript (entitled *Sancta Charitas*) directly to Caritas herself. To his side the very individuals whose suffering he aimed to alleviate kneel in supplication—a mother and child, a cripple, and an elderly couple. To Caritas's left, the inhabitants of the Maison—its staff and pupils dressed in their violet blue uniforms—kneel in prayer. Angels on each side of the page hold the instruments of the Passion: the cross and crown of thorns, nails and the whipping post (or pillar), and whips (see Figure 7.2).

Several of the *Traité*'s illuminations portray Henri III, and the inclusion of his heraldic arms strongly suggests that he was the intended target of the work. Early in the manuscript, a young Henri, with Catherine de Medici to his left, is shown as the recipient of a miniature chapel from the Maison complex,

35 Princes Czartoryski Foundation, Kraków, MS 3092, *Traité de la Charité chrestienne* (hereafter *Traité*), 1: "Traité de la Charité chrestienne, contenant plusieurs saintes remonstrances, exhortations, Elegies, Odes, Sonnets spirituels, Hymnes, Prieres, Oraisons, Meditations, & autres choses necessaires & utiles à un chacun Chrestien & Chrestienne, pour bien & heureusement vivre & mourir en la grace de Dieu. Le tout recueilly de plusieurs passages des saintes scriptures, & des livres des docteurs de l'Eglise Catholique. Avec l'Institution de l'Apotiquarerye, College & Chapelle de ladicte Charité Chrestienne, tant pour l'instruction des pauvres enfans orphelins, que pour les pauvres honteux, Prestres, Escoliers, gentilzhommes, marchans & artisans de la ville & faulzbourgs de Paris, detenus en extremité de maladie. Le tout fondé & entretenus des Aumosnes des gens de bien. De l'invention de Nicolas Houel Parisien."

·I·N·R·I·
CHARITAS DEVS EST.
TRAITÉ
DE LA CHARITÉ CHRESTIENNE, CONtenant plusieurs sainctes remonstrances, exhortations, Elegies, Odes, Sonnets spirituels, Hymnes, Prieres, Oraisons, Meditations, & autres choses necessaires & vtiles à vn chacun Chrestien & Chrestienne, pour bien & heureusement viure & mourir en la grace de Dieu. Le tout recueilly de plusieurs passages des sainctes escritures, & des liures des docteurs de l'Eglise Catholique.
AVEC
l'institution de l'Apotiquairerye, College & Chappelle de ladicte Charite Chrestienne, tant pour l'instruction des pauures enfans orphelins, que pour les pauures honteux, Prestres, Escoliers, gentilzhõmes, marchans, & artisans de la ville & fauxbourgs de Paris, detenus en extremité de maladie. Le tout fondé & entretenu des Aumosnes des gens de bien.
DE L'INVENTION DE NICOLAS HOVEL PARISIE.
I·PETR·4·
VNIVERSA·DELICTA·OPERIT·CHARITAS·
PROVERB·10·

FIGURE 7.2 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *1. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

which is presented to him by Houel himself. This was to be the religious heart of Houel's institutional vision. Houel is surrounded by paupers who are pleading for assistance, rendering Henri (and Houel) their saviours (see Figure 7.3). Both Henri and his queen, Louise de Lorraine, are depicted in the foreground in another scene, in which Christ is shown to be the foundation stone of the new facility. Here, they attend the imaginary foundation of a grand, dedicated facility that was in fact never built. Catherine de Medici is not forgotten; she appears directly to their side (see Figure 7.4).

While royal patronage was clearly a target of this elaborate enterprise, Houel did not fail to represent also his hope for a wider pool of donors. A scene depicting the imagined reception room of the Maison shows a long line of generous donors, bulging purses in hand, queuing to make their donations to the Maison's officials. It shows both men and women, dressed according to their different social levels and occupations, all aligned in their mission to support the charity (see Figure 7.5). The broad scope of Houel's intended audience is reinforced by another illumination that depicts Caritas welcoming the faithful donors into heaven. In it, rows upon rows of faithful kings and queens share with ordinary women and men the pathway to a glorious world beyond (see Figure 7.6).

Self-assurance was key in this text, and was a pattern that Houel also used elsewhere. As the reader moved through the manuscript, later images built upon the imagined Maison as it had been constructed in earlier images. Confidence was crucial to the success of the *Traité*'s message, and ultimately to the Maison itself. In the same way that Houel carefully documented the rules and regulations, and detailed the colour of uniforms, curricula and activities of his fledgling institution, he used illustrations to depict identifiable individuals—kings, queens, the court, confraternities—processing through Paris past Maison buildings that did not yet exist. Images were, for Houel, a way to render his vision powerfully concrete, for himself and for his potential donors.

Houel's use of emotions to invoke charity in his king and fellow citizens stemmed from the comprehension of beliefs and practices of an educated Catholic lay man, not a theologian, spiritual leader or political operator of his time. The targets for this work were first and foremost the royal family, but Houel spoke through the text to a wider pool of potential male and female donors. The following sections explore how Houel considered the emotional and spiritual practices of his audience, and employed the vocabulary and concepts of charity, compassion and love, in order to drive his appeal for charitable endeavour.

FIGURE 7.3 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *37. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

FIGURE 7.4 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *81. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

FIGURE 7.5 *Nicolas Houel,* Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*]*, 45. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

FIGURE 7.6 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *61. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

"The love that exceeds all things": Divine Compassion and Human Contrition

The Council of Trent (1545–63), which determined much of the blueprint of Catholic reform in the early modern period, had placed the sacrament of penance in the spotlight, advocating three necessary stages: contrition, confession, and satisfaction.[36] The first step, contrition, required recognition by the sinner of divine charity—God's sacrifice of his only son to save humanity.

Houel insisted upon a redemptive Christ across multiple texts, sonnets and illuminations in the *Traité*. God's love for the world was his Charity (always capitalised when Houel intended divine love as opposed to human acts of benevolence): "[H]e purged my sins in his blood . . . he died that my life be assured."[37] This accompanied a graphic illustration of true Christians bathing in the mystical fountain of blood springing forth from Christ's five wounds (Houel's image acknowledged the cult of the five wounds that gained popularity after Trent),[38] below Saint Peter, who holds a text which reads "Jesus Christ suffered for our sins." (see Figure 7.7).

Houel insisted upon God's own suffering as a key component of his love for humanity. Articulating the meaning of 2 Corinthians 8, he recalled for readers an emotional state that they had to imagine for themselves in his sorrow: "Think of the pain . . . his greatness stems from this pity . . . that he wanted to suffer to remove our cares."[39] This divine love was a generous compassion and feeling for humanity:

> [T]he most marvellous thing in heaven, is the ardent eternal and living Charity which the celestial spirit excites in the heart . . . it was his Charity that all the world embraces, and which penetrates to the depths of Hell, to show that Love which exceeds all things.[40]

36 The Council of Trent, "The Parts and Fruits of this Sacrament," session 14, ch. 3.

37 *Traité*, 92: "il a purge mes peschez de son sang . . . il est mort pour ma vie asseurer."

38 Auclair, "Nicolas Houel et Petrus Stephanus," 15–16.

39 *Traité*, 3: "Pensez à la douleur . . . a cête pitié sa grandeur est venüe, | Qu'il à voulu souffrir pour nous oster d'esmoy."

40 *Traité*, 52: "ce qui est dans le Ciel de plus esmerueillable, /Est l'ardente eternelle, & vifve Charite | Dont tout celeste esprit à le Coeur excite . . . C'estoit sa Charité qui tout le monde embrasse, | Et qui vive penetre iusqu'au fond des Enfers, | Pour monstrer qu'à l'Amour, qui toutes choses passe."

FIGURE 7.7 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *93. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

Opposite another sonnet articulating that God is love, an illumination showing Christ's face depicts Caritas holding a flaming heart, and surrounded by the needy, at the top of the page, and the staff and students of Houel's Maison at the bottom (see Figure 7.8).

For Houel, it was necessary that his readers felt the Passion, and experienced the sufferings of Christ for themselves. It was a shared experience of faith, as he conceived of it, to "carry in hand the torch of fiery Charity."[41] He steered his readers through the 'appropriate' affective practices of compassion: "Cry my eyes, for the memory of his death."[42] However, to experience God's suffering required one also to accept his love, without which such fellow feeling was not possible: "[W]ho can feel this sweet torment if the soul is not enflamed by love?"[43] In guiding his readers through both divine and human emotional states of compassion, Houel brought them towards an understanding of themselves not as individual souls in relationship to God, but as a shared emotional community; as Catholics who believed that "men are made [by divine Charity] the elect children of God."[44] Houel's views were represented visually. One illumination shows a man (perhaps even Houel himself) embracing the cross, kneeling before Caritas who holds the flaming heart. Faith holds the instruments of the Passion in one hand and a miniature of the Maison chapel in her other, while skulls, bones and the praying orphans of the Maison complete the image (see Figure 7.9). Contrition, Houel argued, would bind the faithful to each other, for divine charity held the power

> like a devouring fire which penetrates everywhere, . . . the thoughts, hearts and minds of men . . . being thus linked, love will not perish, instead growing stronger and stronger, it will flourish.

As a result, "members of God will see themselves sustained." Divine love and Charity could protect and sustain the Catholic community as a bonded emotional unity, but only if they were repentant.[45]

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41 *Traité*, 3: "Portez la torche en main d'ardente Charité."

42 *Traité*, 94: "Pleurez mes yeux, de sa mort la memoire."

43 *Traité*, 94: "Mais qui pourra sentir ce doux torment / Si l'ame n'est par l'amour enflame."

44 *Traité*, 64: "Les hommes sont par elle enfans éleus de Dieu."

45 *Traité*, 4: "Comme un feu devorant qui penetre par tout . . . Des pensers & du Coeur, & de l'esprit de l'homme . . . Estant ainsi liez, l'amour ne perira, Ains plus fort, en plus fort, croissant, il florira, . . . Dont les membres de Dieu se voyant soustenus." On the notion of 'communities' defined by emotional expression and behaviour, see Barbara H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).


DIEV EST CHARITE · I · IEHA · 4 ·
Laisser Les petis enfans venir a moy · et ne Les
empescher point car dieu est le royaume de dieu · marc · 10
IHS

FIGURE 7.8 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *31. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*



FIGURE 7.9 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *65. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

Through his exploration of the emotions of contrition—recognition of God's love as divine Charity—Houel brought his readers together as an emotional community of believers: "Make us feel your kindness and mercy."[46] This, he argued, entailed obligations upon one another, for "as he gave his life for us, so must we give our lives for our brothers."[47]

"My brothers and friends": Fellow Feeling and Pity

If Catholics shared in the emotional experience of the Passion with Christ, Houel argued, they also shared other obligations, namely to support each other. Essential to his call for assistance was Houel's ability to inspire the crown and citizenry into action. This required particular persuasive skill, drawing upon a rhetorical performance that evoked powerful feelings in order to spur readers to a response that was as political as it was spiritual. To do so, Houel sketched a deeply emotional picture of contemporary Paris that would evoke a particular range of feelings within his readers, and which reveals the responsive, communal self that underpinned his work.

Although Henri III seemed to be the identified recipient of this manuscript, Houel positioned much of his text as a dialogue between citizens, a discursive space in which he could talk as an equal with his readership and even offer instruction to them. He approached his readers both as members of a Catholic contrite community but also as one Parisian citizen to another. He framed his identity in almost every work as "Nicolas Houel Parisian."[48] "My brothers and friends," he commenced, immediately drawing his readership together in solidarity with shared concerns and responses to the crises of poverty.[49] They were

> those for whom the love and fear of God, and spiritual desire for the next [life] is ever present, [those who] greatly deplore the miserable desolation of this century, to see so many poor people suffering and enduring, indeed to see them die for lack of being assisted and helped by some small remedies.[50]

46 *Traité*, 35: "fay nous sentir ta bonte & misericorde."

47 *Traité*, 2: "iceluy à mis sa vie pour nous, aussi devons nous mettre noz vies pour noz frères."

48 *Traité*, 17.

49 *Traité*, 17: "Mes frères & amis."

50 *Traité*, 18: "ceux qui ont l'amour & crainte de Dieu, & la dilection du prochain devant les yeux deplorent grandement la miserable desolation de ce siecle, de veoir tant de pauvres

They were, moreover, his fellow Parisians. One of the verse and sonnet combinations in the *Traité* encouraged his readers to feel and respond through their national and civic identities:

> [W]e pray to you, o merciful Father, that concord, peace and true Charity are re-established in this kingdom, so that we can render grace eternally to your Name. Grant us that all Citizens and inhabitants of this town of Paris generate good works.[51]

The needy were depicted as first and foremost Catholic brothers in arms. To help them was to align oneself confessionally. As Houel's sonnet, drawn from Ecclesiastes 17 and 29, made clear, "If you are charitable towards the indigent, you will soon see your enemies defeated."[52] He articulated his fears for readers:

> [T]here are few people who busy themselves with helping them and embracing the virtue of charity so advocated by our God as they should. For each seeks his own profit and not to serve Jesus Christ, about which we have just cause to accuse ourselves and to make general and public complaint.[53]

Houel assured his readers, based on Luke 10, that the true Christian faithful were expected to assist not just each other in need, but also that whoever was in need was one's neighbour.[54] The illumination accompanying this text depicts a well-to-do man assisting an injured man under a tree, while two priests hurry by without stopping. The good Samaritan is shown taking the man back into town on his horse and providing the funds to a hostel owner to care for him (see Figure 7.10).

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personnes souffrir & endurer, voire iusques a les veoir mourir a faute d'estre secourus & aydez de quelques petits remedes."

51 *Traité*, 35: "nous te prions, ô Pere pitoyable, que la concorde, la paix & la vraye Charité soyent restablyes en ce Royaume, à fin que sans cesse nous rendions grace à ton Nom. Octroye nous que tous les Citoyens & habitans de ceste ville de Paris abondent en toutes bonnes oeuvres."

52 *Traité*, 5: "Si vers les indignes vous estiez pitoyables | Vous verriez aussi tost voz ennemys defaicts."

53 *Traité*, 18: "il y a peu de personnes qui s'employent a les secourir, & embrasser la vertu de charité tant recommandee de nostre Dieu comme ilz devroient. Car chacun cherche son proufit & non point de servir a IESUSCHRIST, en quoy nous avons iust occasion de nous en accuser, & d'en faire une generalle & publique complainte."

54 *Traité*, 76.

FIGURE 7.10 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *77. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

This compassion for others in need was not described in Houel's work as the particular concern of women, nor did it entail a set of emotional responses to which they would be especially disposed. Indeed, Houel's 'brotherhood' evoked instead the image of the civic man, for whom participation in the good ordering of the city's civic, spiritual and social space was a responsibility. Houel provides no sense in which the spiritual acts and the emotional state of care and compassion would be effeminising or anxious for his male readers; rather, he suggests that no good Catholic with the skills and opportunity should do less.[55] Furthermore, Houel had identified an impoverished cohort of particular concern to him, and to the readers he had in mind. He was worried "especially [for] the great number of artisans burdened with wives and children, shamefaced and timid, to our great regret."[56] These were paupers who had once been men like himself and, by extension, his readers. Importantly, Houel assumed an emotional engagement with these fellow men. He did not evoke pity for an "Other." His charity for these poor artisans was framed as an act of compassion; a desire to act that was borne from their communal spiritual and similar social identities. Houel seems to argue that the experience of fellow feeling might partly be generated because the type of paupers Houel had in mind were much like his readers in social level and status, with experiences of city life much like their own.

Thus, the kind of fellow feeling that Houel drew upon here to encourage mercy and care for others had its foundation in shared confessional membership as the Catholic faithful, which gave them responsibilities of support through their good works (as well as to prove their solidarity and superiority over Huguenots). As John R. Yamamoto-Wilson has argued, by the seventeenth century, Catholic culture certainly struggled with the notion of extending compassion to one's enemies.[57] Houel's attempt to apply mercy strictly within the Catholic community was by no means a radical interpretation of compassion and yet, by the seventeenth century, it was more commonly Protestant writers who discussed compassion and mercy within human society, while Catholic authors used the concept more often to consider God's mercy towards sinners on earth.[58] It was also a communal notion that aligned with his experience

55 See Broomhall, "The Politics of Charitable Men."

56 *Traité*, 18: "Et specialement grand nombre de pauvres Artisans chargez de femmes & enfans qui sont honteux & timides, a nostre grand regret."

57 See John R. Yamamoto-Wilson, *Pain, Pleasure and Perversity: Discourses of Suffering in Seventeenth-Century England* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 128–34.

58 Yamamoto-Wilson, *Pain, Pleasure and Perversity*, 135. See also John Staines, "Compassion in the Public Sphere of Milton and Charles," in *Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays*

as a member of a corporate body, his occupational guild. Houel's instruction offered a notion of selfhood that was mostly appropriate to satisfy his call; one that was communal, and embedded in corporate, civic, and confessional group cohorts. The emotions he sought to rouse in his readers through these mutual identities were ones that would spur his 'brothers and friends' to action.

Hearts on Fire: Translating Emotion into Devotional Action

If Houel's readers could develop fellow feeling as Catholics and Parisians, then he could hope to stir them to action. His *Traité* did not just detail the circumstances in which poverty and strife had occurred, but led his readers towards the kinds of Christian endeavours that would alleviate the suffering of their Parisian compatriots. Houel's ambitious charitable scheme and his texts in support of it emerged during a time of intense religious devotion in France. A series of scholars have noted the intensification of Catholic penitential practices intended to secure salvation at this time, and the widespread expression of profound spiritual anxieties, especially in print, that appeared to underpin them.[59] These devotional acts ranged from processions and pilgrimages, to membership in old and new formations of confraternities—confraternities such as the one founded by Henri III that Houel had depicted processing past his imagined Maison.[60] Henri's favoured Jesuit confessor, Edmond Auger, had been instrumental in producing a catechism, widely reprinted in the period, which explained that the satisfaction stage of the sacrament of penance could be achieved through fasting, prayers and alms-giving.[61] As Howard G. Brown has argued, by the early 1580s people, especially ultra-Catholic League affiliates,

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in the Cultural History of Emotion, eds Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe and Mary Floyd-Wilson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 89–111.

59 See for example Denis Crouzet, *Les Guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion* (*vers 1525–vers 1610*), 2 vols. (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 1990); Barbara B. Diefendorf, *From Penitence to Charity: Pious Women and the Catholic Reformation in Paris* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), and studies cited at note 20.

60 Megan C. Armstrong, *The Politics of Piety: Franciscan Preachers during the Wars of Religion, 1560–1600* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2004), 22–24 and 99–100.

61 On the extent to which Tridentine reforms were adopted in France, see Marc Venard, *Histoire de la France religieuse*, 4 vols. (Paris: Seuil, 1988–1992), vol. 2 (1988), 298–305; and Marc Venard, *Le Catholicisme à l'épreuve dans la France du XVI^e siècle* (Paris: Cerf, 2000).

> put greater emphasis on God's immanence in the world and, therefore, supported to a much greater extent religious processions, memorial masses, and penitential confraternities. In this way, their affective investment in religious performances both strengthened the bonds of community and heightened the sacral importance for individual salvation of the liturgy and the sacraments.[62]

Houel showed an acute awareness of these ideas, anxieties and penitential alternatives and incorporated them into his call of support for the Maison. He was juggling multiple divisions within the Catholic community, each with their own political focus, with an eye to what would achieve the best outcome for his Maison and prevent alienating potential donors.[63] He rejected the notion that penitential devotions need turn his readers inwards, but instead encouraged them to use these practices to connect with fellow Parisians and Catholics.

Firstly, Houel argued that acceptance of divine Charity, adhesion to the Catholic faithful, and individual satisfaction, were best shown in deeds rather than words. In his sonnet expounding Galatians 6, he wrote, in the voice of God, that "all souls that are truly mine will be ready to do good works and with joyous Zeal."[64] And, as Houel explained in a sonnet directed to the king, whose fervour for dramatic spiritual devotions was well known, "prayers are good as too is fasting, but alms-giving is worth more than making gold treasure."[65] In addition, this would feel like a natural human sentiment, Houel suggested. Those who could "see with their own eyes" their fellow brother "importuned by thirst or hunger" seemed "hardly human." Any man who could "watch him perish in his harsh fate, and not be worried by his disaster" was "certainly

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62 Howard G. Brown, "Conflict and the Making of Religious Cultures in Sixteenth-Century France," 13. Research paper, available online at: <http:/evolution.binghamton.edu/evos/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/Brown.pdf> [accessed 15 August 2014].

63 However, as John Staines has argued in his analysis of the interpretation of historical narratives about Mary, Queen of Scots, emotional rhetoric varied widely among the different Catholic readerships in contemporary France and prevented a unified politico-religious response to Mary's death and its historicization. Staines, *The Tragic Histories of Mary Queen of Scots 1560–1690: Rhetoric, Passions, and Political Literature* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 85.

64 *Traité*, 64: "Tout ame qui de moy vivement est attainte, | Se rend pronte à bonne oeuvre, & d'un Zele ioyeus."

65 *Traité*, 38: "l'oraison est bonne avec le jeusne, mais l'aumosne vaut mieux que faire trésor d'or."

distanced from compassion."[66] These sentiments, that seemed to stem so naturally as human responses, were in fact, Houel suggested, the operation of the divine. He drew upon Philippians 2: it was God who "makes in us good will and good works as well."[67] Thus, to feel the desire to render aid to the needy was evidence of God's attention and consideration of the faithful. And for the man who was "moved by right compassion" to help another in need, "God, who sees him . . . who loves and honours him."[68]

Compassion, experienced as a human emotion but instilled in the faithful by God, was the best form of satisfaction. Should this seem too abstract an endeavour though, Houel provided his readers with a ready opportunity to realise it: "putting before your eyes the description and architecture of this holy Apothecary."[69] Houel had even secured, from the Cardinal de Bourbon in February 1578 at the establishment of the Maison at Saint-Marcel, a one-hundred-day remission of penance for those who provided donations for the right penitential motivation. This was printed at the end of his 1580 *Advertissement*, and read: "[W]e believe it makes an agreeable and acceptable service to God when we incite faithful Christians to works of charity, by which they procure the salvation of their souls."[70]

In the first instance, Houel positioned Henri III as an exemplar for his (other, imagined) readers. This was indeed the precise purpose of the *Traité*. Houel advocated peace in the realm. By the 1570s, particularly after 1572, the threat that the Huguenots appeared to pose, certainly in a Catholic stronghold such as Paris, must have been waning.[71] Perhaps too, or perhaps because of this, an older and more experienced Houel was more alert to war's destructive consequences, particularly poverty and shifting social relations. With peace came the opportunity to rebuild; not by building palaces, but by re-ordering communities riven by poverty and factionalism:

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66 *Traité*, 90: "Celuy qui peu humain, regarde de ses yeux | Son frere, que la faim, & la soif importune, | Qui le voit perissant en sa dure fortune, | Et n'est de son desastre autrement soucieux . . . il c'est esloigné bien loing de la pitié."

67 *Traité*, 68: "Le Dieu treshaut ensemble faict en nous | Le bon vouloir et la bonne oeuvre encore."

68 *Traité*, 67: "Meu de iuste pitié, . . . Dieu, qui voit cela, qui l'ayme & qui l'honore."

69 *Traité*, 24: "de mectre devant voz yeux le pourtraict & Architecture de ceste saincte Apothiquererye."

70 Houel, *Advertissement*, fol. 15v: "nous croyons faire service aggreable & acceptables à Dieu, quand nous incitons les fideles chrestiens aux oeuvres de charité, par lesquelz est procure le salut de leurs ames."

71 See Brown, "Conflict and the Making of Religious Cultures."

> Appease fighting, drive away all war, and nourish peace in all your cities . . . build hospitals for sick paupers and not great palaces in which to hold masquerades.[72]

Houel prayed that the king would embrace charity, reminding Henri: "Reflect that God only makes reigns prosper as far as kings are good and charitable",[73] and "[t]hat is why for fear of offending him, you should think of the poor day and night."[74] Moreover, Henri's own emotional equilibrium depended upon it: "Happy is the prince who has compassion for the suffering poor."[75] Houel offered a chance for Paris, and by extension France, to become a great Catholic nation, under its leader Henri—a monarch whom he proposed as capable of binding together a community where generosity and compassion replaced warfare and destruction.[76] Houel's tone was optimistic, reflecting perhaps what he understood of Henri's own desires, and echoing a prevalent hope among educated men surrounding the king at this period: that a peaceful age might come to pass in his reign.[77]

Good men, like their monarch, were peace-loving and productive in Houel's mind. His appeals reflected a masculinity that was not found in aristocratic military or courtly models, but in the civic and intellectual culture of the university- and corporate-trained professional circles in the city, including *parlementarians* such as Christofle de Thou. These men, Houel offered, could build a better society through their actions. An illumination of himself consulting the architect before the rising Christian edifice of the Maison reflected his aspirations that constructing a better Paris, a better France, and better men was what the Maison offered (see Figure 7.11). Such civic men were seeking spiritual expression suited to their social status and relations in the city, and charitable organisations offered these men of means an outlet to demonstrate personal piety: "[M]y friends, I do not doubt that [such things] are always in

72 *Traité*, 96: "Apaisez les debats, esloignez toute guerre, | Et nourrisez la paix en toutes voz citez. . . . Batissez hospitaux pour les pauvres malades, | Et non de grands Palais à faire mascarades."

73 *Traité*, 36: "Pensez que Dieu ne faict les regnes prosperer | Que d'aultant que les Roys sont bons & charitables."

74 *Traité*, 40: "C'est pourquoy vous devez de peur de l'offencer, Soit de iour, soit de nuit, sur le pauvre penser."

75 *Traité*, 40: "Que le prince est heureux qui à conpassion | Du pauvre soufreteux."

76 *Traité*, 13.

77 See Mark Greengrass, *Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in The French Kingdom, 1576–1585* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

your heart and thought, and that you seek to satisfy it."[78] Houel offered concrete visualisations of the rewards of those who achieved such satisfaction. In a Last Judgment scene, the undeserving are depicted being shunted off to hell, while others await their entry into heaven. Underneath, well-to-do citizens perform varied acts of mercy (see Figure 7.12). These were not subtle illustrations, but rather clear indications intended to inspire fear while also raising hope that good works could be rewarded.

Supporting children was a particular priority for Houel, and so they feature heavily in his works. Houel emphasises biblical verses that highlighted Christ's particular relationship with children. His illustration of the gospel of Matthew 19:14 depicts Christ welcoming young children, with arms outstretched before him (see Figure 7.13). Indeed, the potential intercessory effect support for children might have upon Christ was also broadly suggested in another text, sonnet and illumination collaboration that highlights how children's voices in prayer were particularly sweet to God's ears: "[T]he voices of children have always pleased you. Hear them now and lengthen the days of those whose benefactions maintain them here."[79] The boys, who were shown kneeling with male and female benefactors before the altar, were clearly those of the Maison. They were dressed in their violet blue uniform, in the yet-to-be-built chapel that Houel had already depicted in earlier parts of the manuscript (see Figure 7.14).

Houel treats a specific compassion for children as natural and Christian. Houel himself had two sons, Gérome and Guilbert, with his first wife Madeleine de Foulon (both of whom appear to have died young), and was tutor to his second wife, Jeanne Le Breton's, three brothers, Gilles, Jacques and Pierre.[80] Houel had provided the funds of 300 *livres tournois* in 1569 for Jacques to train as a *marchand drapier chaussetier*.[81] Care for children, particularly through the provision of apprenticeships and training, was something that flowed perhaps naturally for a guild professional such as Houel. This was a world that he knew and had himself experienced. This likely explains why the first stage of his grand vision would begin with the step that he knew best, the training of boys in the pharmaceutical profession. These were choices and contexts that were familiar to him, where he could make a charitable contribution based on his

78 *Traité*, 23–24: "mes amys ie ne doute point qu'elles ne soient continullement en vostre coeur & pensee, & que mettrez peine d'y satisfaire." See also Broomhall, "The Politics of Charitable Men."

79 *Traité*, 100: "a la voix des enfans vous estes pleu touiours, | Oyez les maintenant, & allongex les iours | De ceux dont les bien-faicts icy les entretiennent."

80 Bouvet, "Les trois mariages de Nicolas Houel," 188–90.

81 Bouvet, "Les trois mariages de Nicolas Houel," 190.

FIGURE 7.11 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *97. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*



FIGURE 7.12 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *85. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

FIGURE 7.13 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *57. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

FIGURE 7.14 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *101. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

personal experience; it was a world whose needs and struggles were familiar to him.

Houel hoped that compassion would light the fire of charity in the hearts of his readers. The vocabulary of the flaming heart worked its way through his sonnets and the illuminations of the manuscript in a coordinated manner. In employing this imagery, Houel came close to the emerging visual vocabulary of the devotion of the sacred heart. Houel might have appreciated seventeenth-century Catholic culture's intense, 'visceral notion of compassion', something that moved the entire body and soul, in which, as John Staines has suggested, for French Catholic authors, 'the contagion of compassion was the bond that held their society together'.[82] Houel's passionate, flaming heart was reflected too on the uniforms of the Maison's orphans, where symbols of the Passion were embroidered onto their tunics: the cross and crown of thorns overlaid by a heart. Houel offered his readers concrete connections between the flaming heart and their potential for charitable action. One of the *Traité*'s illuminations depicts a man giving bread and wine to a cripple, who is assisted by a saint, and all the while Caritas behind him holds the burning heart in her hand (see Figure 7.15). The Maison's young charges are also shown observing this practice and, it was hoped, would one day follow the benefactor's lead.

Of all the penitential devotions proposed at this period, it is hardly surprising that Houel would prioritise charity. Reinforcing his point at the text's conclusion, the *Traité*'s final image shows Caritas with a flaming sword, engraved "Verbum Dei," in one hand and the flaming heart in the other, crushing underfoot the bad, greedy and powerful individuals of the world who had not achieved her (and Houel's) desired plan (see Figure 7.16). In the *Traité*, Houel gives both abstract expression and explicit direction as to how the ardent fire of divine Charity inspires human feelings and how they translate into the devotional practices of his time, offering the Maison as a fitting object for such spiritual feeling.

Conclusions

In many ways, the ideas and actions that Nicolas Houel advanced in his works were hardly innovative, but the desire to seek the support of his readers led him to interpret contemporary beliefs and practices in interesting ways. He drew upon his layman's understanding of Tridentine theology, particularly as he interpreted Auger's catechism and Henri III's politico-spiritual aspirations,

82 Staines, "Compassion in the Public Sphere," 101.

SCOPVS VITÆ CHRISTVS.
MATH. CE QVI EST FAICT AVX PAVVRE
25. EST FAICT A IESV CHRIST.
DE NOSTRE VRAY SALVT IESVS CHRIST EST LE BVT.

FIGURE 7.15 *Nicolas Houel*, Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*], *73. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

FIGURE 7.16 *Nicolas Houel,* Traité de la Charité chrestienne [*1578*]*, 105. The item belongs to the collections of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation.*

in order to emphasise the spiritual foundation of the compassion he wanted to evoke in his fellow citizens and king. At the same time, his ideas echoed his own experience in corporate culture as a member of a guild-trained profession, and the civic and social responsibilities that this status demanded of him. He aligned his readers with himself and with each other through their affiliations as faithful Catholics and Parisian citizens. These communal identities were crucial to the evocation of fellow feeling among them, as Catholics with an individual but shared goal to seek the salvation of their souls, and as Parisians for whom peace, order and social relations depended on mutual obligation.

Houel demonstrated an acute awareness of the power of emotions to drive human action. He drew heavily upon his readers' emotional states to secure his success. He reflected back the ambitions of his monarch as a moral leader, the spiritual anxieties and intense interest in personal piety of his confessional adherents, and the social responsibilities of his corporate compatriots, offering each the same solution of compassionate charity. He assured his readers of God's love and divine Charity, which he argued could be seen in their personal feelings of kindness, care and concern for others. Thus, human compassionate emotion became evidence of God's compassion for humanity, which was visualised in the *Traité de la Charité chrestienne* through the emblematic flaming heart. Notably, there was little heuristic distinction in Houel's use of terms such as *pitié, miséricorde, compassion*: these were all terms that seemed to imply for him a generous outward-focused action.[83] This may have reflected contemporary usage, but it was also logical to the cause that Houel saw himself advancing.

For each of the wide variety of potential patrons Houel had in mind, he adjusted his message. Civic men and the king were particular targets whose aspirations, interests and sense of duty were perhaps familiar to Houel, and certainly he benefited from this understanding in his quest to secure support from both crown and *parlement*. Yet his appeals to the pride, representative concerns, and feelings of women of the courtly elite, the royal family, and the middling citizenry of Paris were also effective. Houel praised and publicised the generosity and support of Louise de Lorraine and the queen mother, Catherine de Medici, in a wide range of printed and manuscript works. And one of the few remaining sources of evidence for the operation of the Maison is the notarial act of a donation made in December 1586 that records the gift to

83 See by contrast Katherine Ibbett, who discerns some distinction between less and more compassion in these terms by the seventeenth century: Katherine Ibbett, "Pity, Compassion, Commiseration: Theories of Theatrical Relatedness," *Seventeenth-Century French Studies* 30, no. 2 (2008): 196–208.

the institution of one Elisabeth le Riche, the widow of a *marchand bourgeois* of Paris.[84] Houel had recognised that the support of women was vital to his enterprise, and to the encouragement of powerful men; this was a lesson that would also be learned by the spiritual leaders of Catholic revival movements in the early seventeenth century.[85]

Houel understood how emotions could drive practical behaviour and contribute to a new social and Catholic order to his beloved city that would reflect widely over the whole kingdom. He knew how to balance and appeal to his donors with rich rewards in this world and the next. But also compelling to them must have been the knowledge that they were ideals he and his wives lived themselves, pouring their own financial resources into his beloved institution.[86] Charity was, for Houel and for each of the three wives who shared his path, not just an idea to discuss but a practice that they lived their lives by. And they were acts in which he showed more than a little personal pride, suggesting another notion of selfhood that was rather more individual than the communal identities whose virtues he extolled. Houel was not averse to visualising himself across his work, and a streak of vainglorious pride was surely reflected in the regular attribution to his works, "by the invention of Nicolas Houel Parisian."

84 Bouvet, "Les trois mariages de Nicolas Houel," 190.

85 See Diefendorf, *From Penitence to Charity*.

86 Guiffrey, "Nicolas Houel, Apothicaire," 256.

CHAPTER 8

Living Anxiously: The Senses, Society and Morality in Pre-Modern England

Danijela Kambaskovic

An early modern English reader interested in self-improvement might turn to one of the manuals giving guidance on matters medical as well as spiritual, which were gaining in popularity in the circles of educated male readers in the late 1500s and early 1600s. If he did so, and before long, he could expect to encounter an opinion on how best to employ his senses.[1] These 'channels of understanding'[2] at the boundary between interior and exterior worlds brought great gifts of sensation, cognition and pleasure; but the gifts were offset by the equally great dangers of temptation, sin and perdition. Opinions and injunctions concerned with the epistemology and ethics of sensory perception—the 'how-tos' and 'whys' of ordering the use of one's senses and sensory experience, *aesthetics*—appear in discussions of the most important topics of the seventeenth century, which are equally relevant today: the need to be healthy, to lead a satisfying, yet moral life, and to align one's practices with one's (religious) identity.

Various treatises written in the period, which we can, anachronistically, divide into medical (concerned with the health of the body) and spiritual (concerned with either religious doctrine or mental health, a category more often than not determined in moral terms), seem to reflect anxious interest in orderly government of the senses and interpretation of sensual data, and often promote varying or contradictory views. Although the senses are not always

1 I owe the historical focus of my recent work on the senses in the European Renaissance to Philippa Maddern's encouragement. The central idea of this article came out of our conversations surrounding Philippa's work on the nexus of body and soul for my edited collection of essays: Philippa C. Maddern, "Murdering Souls and Killing Bodies: Understanding Spiritual and Physical Sin in Late-Medieval English Devotional Works," in *Conjunctions of Mind, Soul and Body from Plato to the Enlightenment*, ed. Danijela Kambaskovic (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014). I am deeply grateful to Pip for enriching all my lives—as a scholar, a friend and a family person—by her warm presence.

2 The name for the senses used in the *Malleus Maleficarum*: Heinrich Kramer and Jakob Sprenger, *The Malleus Maleficarum of Heinrich Kramer and James Sprenger*, trans. Montague Summers (New York: Dover, 1971), pt. 1, question 5.

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mentioned explicitly in pre-modern treatises, their orderly and 'proper' use generated much moral anxiety. Interestingly, concepts that imply sensual perception are equally important as those that refer to the senses directly, as long as the focus is on ordering and governing one's sensual perception with a view to leading a good life. The centrality of the senses in these discourses, the frequency with which the senses are discussed, the fretful tone of the injunctions, the contradictions that often riddle the arguments, both internally and across different authors and works,[3] and the centrality of sensual perception to arguments where senses may not be directly mentioned, all stand as evidence of anxiety that accompanied contemplation of the orderly ways in which to use one's senses. The burgeoning scholarship about the senses in the pre-modern period tends to focus on a single sense,[4] or to examine senses in the context of a single discipline.[5] Historians of ideas favour a particular philosophical principle of interpretation[6] The fact that doctrines are often grounded in the role of the senses remains without proper foregrounding.[7] This chapter is concerned

3 I have written in more detail on contradictions in pre-modern interpretations of the senses in Danijela Kambaskovic, "'Among the Rest of the Senses . . . Proved Most Sure': Ethics of the Senses in Early Modern Europe," in *Conjunctions of Mind, Soul and Body*, ed. Danijela Kambaskovic; and Danijela Kambaskovic and Charles T. Wolfe, "The Senses in Philosophy and Science: From the Nobility of Sight to the Materialism of Touch," in *A Cultural History of the Senses in the Renaissance*, ed. Herman Roodenburg, 6 vols (New York: Berg, 2014), vol. 3, ch. 5.

4 For sight, see Stuart Clark, *Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); K.H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345* (Leiden: Brill, 1988); for touch, see Elizabeth D. Harvey, ed., *Sensible Flesh: On Touch in Early Modern Culture* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); for taste, see Juliann Vitullo, "Taste and Temptation in Early Modern Italy," *The Senses and Society* 5, no. 1 (2010): 106–118.

5 For art, see Sharon Assaf, "The Ambivalence of the Sense of Touch in Early Modern Prints," *Renaissance and Reformation* 29, no. 1 (2005): 75–98; for literature, see Patricia A. Cahill, "Take Five: Renaissance Literature and the Study of the Senses," *Literature Compass* 6, no. 5 (2009): 1014–1030; for theology, see Matthew Milner, *The Senses and the English Reformation* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 163–206; Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley, eds., *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

6 On epicureanism, see Catherine Wilson, *Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); on empiricism, see Charles T. Wolfe and Ofer Gal, eds., *The Body as an Object and Instrument Knowledge: Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010).

7 Brian Cummings, "'The Oral Versus the Written': The Debates over Scripture in More and Tyndale," *Moreana* 45, no. 175 (2008): 14–50; Brian Cummings, "Conscience and the Law in Thomas More," *Renaissance Studies* 23, no. 4 (2009): 463–85; Brian Cummings, "The Protestant

with early modern views on ordering the aesthetic experience—not in terms of the classification of the senses themselves, but primarily in terms of ordering their *use* (a moral aesthetics, rather than a physiological classification)—in early modern 'non-fiction': a convenient modern-day word for grouping writings that are non-literary, but that can be both secular and religious.

Many pre-modern classifications of the senses and their use testify to the difficulty inherent in understanding the work of the senses. Ordering the *use* of the senses is part of this attempt at classification, and it seems a simple matter to us today when the way we think about the senses is quietly underwritten by modern-day physiology and neurology. By contrast, many attempts at ordering the work of the senses made since classical times often include senses that we do not recognise as proper senses today. For instance, imagination and common sense (respectively believed to receive and hold the impression of the perceived, dating back to Aristotle and Avicenna), the eye of the body versus the eye of the mind in St. Augustine's teaching,[8] or Calvin's *sensus divinitatis*, the divine sense whereby we can sense God's presence, are relatively common in the period and relevant to pre-modern thinking on the work of the senses. I will focus in this chapter on early modern opinions about the proper use of the five senses that are accepted by today's neural science as contributing to cognition (sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste). This article will not discuss 'inner senses,' 'the common sense,' 'spiritual senses,' 'the divine sense,' or other concepts in which the word 'sense' is used metaphorically.[9] One example of this is the work of Gavrilyuk and Coakley, in which the notion of 'spiritual senses' is used to describe an ability to 'perceive' God, and mystical experiences, or 'non-physical human perception' are nevertheless described by using the language of sensory perception.[10] Although perhaps a self-explanatory

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and Catholic Reformations," in *The Oxford Handbook of English Literature and Theology*, eds. Andrew Hass, David Jasper and Elizabeth Jay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 79–96; Eamon Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England 1400–1570*, 2nd edn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Patricia Crawford, *Women and Religion in England 1500–1720* (London: Routledge, 1993).

8 Saint Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Stephen McKenna (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1963). For more on this, see also See Margaret Miles, "Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint Augustine's 'De Trinitate' and 'Confessions'," *The Journal of Religion* 63, no. 2 (1983): 125–42.

9 For more on such views on the senses, see Kambaskovic, "Among the Rest of the Senses . . ."; Simon Kemp and Garth J.O. Fletcher, "The Medieval Theory of the Inner Senses," *The American Journal of Psychology* 106, no. 4 (1993): 559–76.

10 Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley, "Introduction," in *The Spiritual Senses*, eds. Gavrilyuk and Coakley, 4.

concept within the discipline of the history of theology, it is problematic for us here not only as it side-steps neurology and aesthetics as irrelevances, but also because non-sensual perception is considered morally problematic in the early modern period. For instance, preacher William Perkins considered "an illusion of the outward senses" to be

> a worke of the deuil, wherby he makes a man to thinke that he heareth, seeeth, feeleth, or toucheth such things as indeede he doth not.[11]

The concept of inward senses explicates non-sensory phenomena, which are, and have been, matters for separate studies. The five 'outward' senses will be my focus also because historical concepts that are unrelated to modern-day understanding of sensory perception may detract from the main purpose of this article: a discussion of the deep and anxiously held *connection* that an early modern mind made among the concepts of sensory engagement, cognition, physical health, mental health, religious identity and morality.

The anxious care surrounding the use of the senses in early modern treatises on physical and mental health, moral living and religious doctrine can help us to re-evaluate the place of sensory perception in the understanding of the health of the body, cognition, and spirituality, and, by extension, life's material and social aspects. Anxieties arising out of doctrinal debates and divisions in pre-modern Europe, which are recorded in early medical treatises on mental health and spiritual health, are now increasingly seen as a part of the intellectually complex landscapes of Catholic, as well as Protestant communities in pre-modern Europe.[12] *Doctor Faustus, Hamlet*, and *Paradise Lost* all provide poignant literary reminders of sensory challenges to religious thinking, each with its own disturbing anxiety.[13] But what is not sufficiently recognised is a link that is made in the early modern mind between sensual perceptions on the one hand, and physical, mental and moral health on the other. I suggest that this link is found at the centre of public beliefs on knowledge and morality, and that religious debate, religious practice and identity also often centred on core injunctions concerning the senses. Whatever their primary topic, discourses on physical health, mental health, cognition, social involvement and religion embed discussions on the senses and their use within ethical or moral categories. The sustained interest in the relationship between the governing

11 William Perkins, *A Discourse of the Damned Art of Witchcraft* (Cambridge: Printed by Cantrel Legge, 1610), 22.

12 Duffy, *Stripping of the Altars*.

13 Cummings, "Protestant and Catholic Reformations."

of sensory perception and the physical, mental and spiritual wellbeing of the individual is the defining nexus of the era, as is the way in which crucial tenets of religious doctrines, on closer scrutiny, seem to revolve around the question of using one's senses. At a time when discourses of the history of medicine, philosophy, psychology and sociology tend to exclude one another, I have made an attempt, necessarily limited by available space, to re-examine the deeply held early modern views connecting sensory perception with physical, mental and, above all, moral health and religious identity, and return this connection to the scholarly table for discussion.

Senses and Mental Health

"The melancholic heart," wrote Timothie Bright in his seminal work on melancholy written in 1586 during Shakespeare's lifetime, "withdraweth it selfe, and shroudeth it as secrete and close."[14] Bright's very definition of mental illness is centred on withdrawal from people and activities, a symptom that remains important for diagnosis of depression to this day.[15] Such withdrawal implies a refusal to engage one's senses. Sensual enjoyment, or at least engagement, underlie therefore most of the cures that Bright proposes: a melancholic can be healed by "bookes of the Scriptures, and moral Precepts of the Philosophers, to the godly instructions of the diuines, and comfort of their friends," for which healing one would require the use of eyes, ears and hands. If love melancholy has gone too far and thickened the blood—at which stage it is too late to drive it out, "as one pinne would drive another" by inducing a different strong emotion such as fear or anger—then "all kind of greeuance is to be shunned, and onely plasaunt, and delectable things to be admitted."[16] Ears should be pleased: music will work "as if it were a magicall charme"; its comforts are "less euident," but no less effective than those of reason.[17] Taste should be pleased: meats and

14 Timothie Bright, *A Treatise of Melancholie Containing the Causes Thereof, & Reasons of the Strange Effects It Worketh in Our Minds and Bodies: With the Physicke Cure, and Spirituall Consolation for Such as Haue Thereto Adioyned an Afflicted Conscience* (London: Thomas Vautrollier, 1586), 107.

15 Healthdirect Australia, "Depression," <http://www.mindhealthconnect.org.au/depression> [accessed 15 July 2014]; *Handbook of Chronic Depression: Diagnosis and Therapeutic Management*, ed. Jonathan Edward Alpert and Maurizio Fava (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2004); Lee H. Coleman, *Depression: a guide for the newly diagnosed* (Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, 2012).

16 Bright, *Treatise of Melancholie*, 256.

17 Bright, *Treatise of Melancholie*, 248.

vegetables should be chosen so as to be "well stored of heate and moisture," and so balance the cold and dry temperament of a melancholic, but also "cooked with . . . good store of sweet butter, and sauored with pepper."[18] Sight should be pleased: the melancholic's clothes should be perfect, since any imperfection is offensive to the sight of the melancholic by "being euer in his eye [as a] representation of his present calamitie"; they should be "decent and comely," and "well-fitting." Touch should be pleased: clothes should be pleasant to the touch—"light, cleane, fitte." A melancholic's eyes should also be delighted by a house made "cheerful, lightsome, trimme and neate," furnished in "gay and fresh colours," and "delightful of all ornamentes of house, a pleasaunt gardin and hortyeard," with "sumptuous . . . furniture"; hearing should be delighted "with a livelie springe."[19] Smelling sweet smells is recommended as a cure for greensickness, or the malady of virgins,[20] although pronounced sweet smells can be seen as an indication of an underlying sickness: "well-smelling, strange savours, may rightly be held suspicious in such as vse them."[21] Bright's account of melancholy represents the illness as non-gendered, although it helps to bear in mind that all illnesses of emotion described in a non-gendered way, and not specifically marked as female illnesses of emotion, were assumed to be male. Despite the light tone, the treatment is meant to promote the restoration of the humoural balance to hotness and dryness more resembling one indicative of sanguine maleness. Profound anxiety surrounds descriptions of melancholic illness showing a patient preoccupied with the minutiae of personal appearance and home furnishings, normally considered the domain of the mistress of the household or the valet, and thus beneath the interest of sane, rational adult

18 Bright, *Treatise of Melancholie*, 259, 260.

19 Bright, *Treatise of Melancholie*, 262, 264.

20 William Shakespeare and John Fletcher, *The Two Noble Kinsmen*, in *The Riverside Shakespeare*, ed. G. Blakemore Evans (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974), 1642–81. This is not a self-help book, but I thought it would be interesting to include this remedy. See also Ursula Potter, "Navigating the Dangers of Female Puberty in Renaissance Drama," *SEL Studies in English Literature 1500–1900* 53, no. 2 (2013): 421–439, esp. 434; and, for other cures for green sickness, Patricia Crawford, *Blood, Bodies, and Families in Early Modern England* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2004), 35–36.

21 Michael de Montaigne, "Of Smels and Odors," in *Essays Vvritten in French by Michael Lord of Montaigne, Knight of the Order of S. Michael, Gentleman of the French Kings Chamber: Done into English, According to the Last French Edition, by Iohn Florio Reader of the Italian Tongue Vnto the Soueraigne Maiestie of Anna, Queene of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, &C. And One of the Gentlemen of Hir Royall Priuie Chamber* (London: Melch. Bradwood, 1613), 171.

men. Bright's descriptions of ideal housing is interesting also in that it points at an educated and affluent readership of urban dwellers or landed gentry.

Physician Walter Bayley, writing in Elizabethan England, warns that lunacy can enter through the closed eyelids at night. Bayley enjoins the reader to ensure that he "sleepe not in a chamber, or any place in vvhich the moone doth shine."[22] This warning is issued in a treatise on the preservation of eyesight, not one on mental illness: this points not only to the anxiety surrounding the 'proper' use of the senses, but also to a strong link between categories of physical and mental health, which we would consider today to be separate. Aligning disturbances in sight with illness or mental illness is a commonplace of Renaissance thought, probably emerging out of the Platonic privileging of eyesight as the truest sense which keeps "everything of a coarser nature" out of the mind, allowing only "pure" elements to pass, and things at a distance to be perceived with a focus on their essence.[23] Notions of eyesight as the purveyor of truth and rationality persist throughout the pre-modern period; but pre-modern theories of optics (such as those produced by Roger Bacon and William of Ockham),[24] and Leon Battista Alberti's treatise on perspective,[25] showed that arbitrary principles form the foundation for the impression of truthfulness and coherence demonstrated within the 'world' of a painting. Philosophical anxieties about the nature of vision also emerge. To use a famous literary example, the dead king's ghost can be seen by Hamlet, but not by his mother Gertrude.[26] Can eyes be trusted? No, thought George Hakewill in 1608. According to Hakewill, covetousness, idolatry and pride all depended on the eye, and no less than a chapter of his treatise *The Vanitie of the Eie* is devoted to "the false report which the eye makes to the inner faculties in the

22 Walter Bayley, *A Briefe Treatise Touching the Preseruation of the Eie Sight, Consisting Partly in Good Order of Diet and Partly in Vse of Medicines* (Oxford: Eliot's Court Press, 1586), 16.

23 Plato, *Timaeus* 45b–d, in *Plato, the Collected Dialogues*, eds. H. Edith and C. Huntington (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

24 Roger Bacon, *Roger Bacon and the Origins of Perspectiva in the Middle Ages: A Critical Edition and English Translation of Bacon's Perspectiva, With Introduction and Notes* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996); William of Ockham, *Guillelmi De Ockham Opera Philosophica Et Theologica Ad Fidem Codicum Manuscriptorum Edita Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae Opera Philosophica* (St. Bonaventure: Editiones Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae, 1974–1988).

25 Leon Battista Alberti, *De Pictura Praestantissima, Et Nunquam Satis Laudata Arte Libri Tres Absolutissimi* [On Painting] (Basileae: Bartholomaeus Westheimer, 1540).

26 William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, act 3, scene 4, lines 93–127, *The Norton Shakespeare*, eds. Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean E. Howard and Katharine Eisaman Maus (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 1723.

apprehension of naturall things."[27] The problem of untrustworthy sight illuminates the anxieties associated with uncorroborated individual perception, bringing the question from a private level to the level of society. What is the societal impact of this anxiety? Who can be believed? What are the conditions for believing someone's testimony? This question goes to the heart of civil liberty, in that it examines the limitations of individual consciousness, and proclaims outliers to be mentally ill. The same question, also, of course, goes to the heart of anxiety, and attempts to order the use of eyesight in order to quell personal and social anxieties generated more questions than they answered.

Senses, Cognition and Knowledge

In proportion with the enormous importance accorded to rationality and learning in the early modern period, the perceived role of the senses as gateways of learning have generated considerable anxiety. This anxiety is most easily perceived if we ponder the contradictions in pre-modern views on the role of the senses in learning and cognition, which can be traced—according to theologian aesthetician Hans von Balthasar—to a fundamental contradiction between the Platonic view, in which spirituality takes precedence over the senses, and the Aristotelian view, in which the senses play a central role within a naturalist approach.[28] On one hand, there are those who think that senses are irrelevant to learning about anything that matters (God): Calvin, for instance, considers sensual perception "unfytte . . . to seeke and fynde trueth."[29] In a late seventeenth-century English translation, ethical philosopher Jacques Abbadie argues that sensory perception is so insignificant to our ability to learn the truth that we would do better to lose all our bodily senses:

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27 George Hakewill, *The Vanitie of the Eie First Beganne for the Comfort of a Gentlewoman Bereaved of Her Sight, and since Vpon Occasion Inlarged & Published for the Common Good, by George Hakewill Master of Arts, and Fellow of Exeter Coll* (Oxford: Printed by Joseph Barnes, 1608), 1, 13, 17, and 49.

28 Hans von Balthasar, *In the Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics*, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis, eds. Joseph Fessio and John Riches, 7 vols (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1983–1991), 1:55–76.

29 John Calvin, *Institutes*, bk. 2, fols. 11r–13v and bk. 3, fols. 131v, 169v, 239v, in *A harmonie vpon the three Euangelists, Matthew, Mark and Luke into English, by E.P. Whereunto is also added a commentaie vpon the Euangelist S. Iohn, by the same author* (London, 1584), 449. Cited in Milner, *Senses and the English Reformation*, 203.

> But suppose we should not have these very Sensations, what does that signify, since we shall certainly have Others, and those of a more noble and elevated Kind? For as by losing the Body we shall not be depriv'd of any thing but what confin'd and degraded us, we ought not to fear that our Soul will lose any thing of the Purity and Excellency of its Operations, by disentangling it self from the Embraces of Matter.[30]

On the other hand, there are those who, like Thomas Aquinas, believed that "all true knowledge begins with sense perception."[31] The anxiety surrounding sensory cognition, is, of course, an ethical anxiety, and centres on the dangers of sensual pleasure. One of the books most widely read in pre-modern Europe, *The Hammer of the Witches*, fears the senses as avenues of evil influence precisely *because* they are crucial for cognitive processes:

> [The devil] adapts himself to colours, he attaches himself to sounds . . . he abides in smells, he impregnates with flavours and fills with certain exhalations *all the channels of the understanding*. Therefore it is seen that it is in the devil's power to *influence the will, which is directly the cause of sin*.[32]

The anxiety in these lines is profound. In the *Malleus*, the reader is warned not to succumb to the power of pleasure, which uses the gateway of the senses to enter and infect the mind, and lead it away from contemplation of godliness, towards damnation.

Anxieties surrounding the link between sensory perception and cognition can be seen also in the worry that diseased bodily senses can signify a diseased morality, and even a diseased state. The anonymously published *Preservative for the Sight . . . to Restore the Poreblind, and Make the Squint-Eye to Looke Forthright*,[33] is not a treatise on eye health, as one could be forgiven for

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30 Jacques Abbadie, *The Art of Knowing One-Self, or, an Enquiry into the Sources of Morality Written Originally in French, by the Reverend Dr. Abbadie* (Oxford: Printed by Leonard Lichfield, 1695), 58.

31 Thomas Aquinas, *Questiones Disputatae de Veritate* [Truth], trans. Robert W. Mulligan, 3 vols (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1952–54), 1:41 (question 1, article 9). See also G. Leff, "The Fourteenth Century and the Decline of Scholasticism," *Past & Present* 9 (1956): 30–41.

32 Kramer and Sprenger, *Malleus Maleficarum*, pt. 1, question 5.

33 Anon, *The Eye Cleard, or, a Preservative for the Sight Being a Quaint Composition without Fenell or Eye-Bright to Restore the Poreblind, and Make the Squint-Eye to Looke Forthright: Vvith the Gratefull Acknowledgement of Much Comfort Already Received in That Kinde by Divers, through This, and Other Remedies Applyed by the Author* (London: Printed for G. Bishop, 1644).

assuming, but rather political and economic health. The famous quotes from *Hamlet*, "Something is rotten in the state of Denmark,"[34] and *The Sonnets*, "lillies that fester, smell far worse than weeds,"[35] draw on *synderesis*, a concept of pre-modern epistemology and ethics that associates the sense of smell with pre-cognitive knowledge or intuition, especially moral intuition.[36] A bad smell is associated with disorder (which is not always a bad thing, in that the smell allows the disorder to be located and righted). But what this example makes clear is that disorder in ethical categories is feared above all things. Richard Braithwaite, author of a treatise on a good life for intellectual early modern Englishmen, uses the metaphor of each of the senses performing its rightful function to indicate the importance of order between the senses performing the "mutuall offices of our bodie" and the members in the "Bodie of the State," with no member set to:

> incroach or intrude into anothers place or employment: The Eye it sees, and handles not; the Hand it handles, and sees not; the Palat it tastes, and smells not; the Nose it smells, and tastes not; the Eare it heares, and walkes not; the Foot it walkes, and heares not.[37]

Yet injunctions make it clear that the work of some senses may very well impair the work of others, and cause disorder. If the taste is profligate, for instance, it may endanger the health of eyesight by tempting the owner of the body to indulge in too much food. In his 1586 treatise on eye health, Bayley argued that nothing could possibly be more important for good eye sight than robust bodily functions, dependant on a moderate diet:

> As generally in the preservation of health: so especially to continue the sight, it is convenient that the body bee obedient, and doe his office for evacuation accordingly . . . Nothing is more hurtfull to health then

34 Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, act 1, scene 4, line 67, in *Norton Shakespeare*, eds. Greenblatt, Cohen, Howard and Eisaman Maus, 1683.

35 William Shakespeare, "Sonnet 94," line 14, in *Norton Shakespeare*, eds. Greenblatt, Cohen, Howard and Eisaman Maus, 1995.

36 For more on this, see Kambaskovic, "Among the Rest of the Senses . . . ."

37 Richard Brathwaite, *The English Gentleman Containing Sundry Excellent Rules or Exquisite Observations, Tending to Direction of Every Gentleman, of Selecter Ranke and Qualitie; How to Demeane or Accommodate Himselfe in the Manage of Publike or Private Affaires* (London: Printed by Iohn Haviland, 1630), 119–20.

> Fulnesse. And he that will continue his sight good, must bee carefull of over plentifull feeding, and therefore must end his meales with appetite: and never lay gorge vppon gorge.[38]

The anxiety surrounding the perceived link between eyes and the sense of taste/diet (and, therefore, between the important tasks of keeping your separate senses well governed, so that each sense can perform its given function in an orderly way), was still present a hundred years later, when Richard Seabrooke wrote that you will know people with "enflamed fierie and corrupt eyes" also by the rank smell caused by their indigestion, noting a "very strong and corrupt breath" requiring the patient to "purge his body well, either with purgation . . . or vomite."[39] Those who eat and sleep slothfully in the daytime hours can lose their sight. A sense is preserved by the preservation of social order, and a moralistic approach creeps into discourse on physical wellbeing:

> Very long sleepes are more hurtfull the meane sleepes of about vij. houres, are best: ye, better to abridge the sleepe & to inlarge watching, then contrariwise; sleepe taken in the night is best, as most naturall, when externall aire doth not distract natures motion, and all externall things concurre to helpe sleepe, therefore the moe houres a man doth borrow of the day for sleepe, the worser.[40]

Senses, Religion, Morality and Society

Changing religious identities often centre on moral issues which surround the use of the senses; unsurprisingly, writings on the issue reflect underlying anxieties about morally correct ways in which to use one's senses. Some section titles in Stephen Egerton's treatise on *The Boring of the Eare* (1623)—especially "Our Demeanor in Hearing" and "Our Exercise after we Haue Heard the Word of

38 Bayley, *A Briefe Treatise Touching the Preseruation of the Eie Sight*, 14–15.

39 Richard Seabrooke, *Seabrookes Caueat: Or His Warning Piece to All His Louing Country-Men, to Beware How They Meddle with the Eyes in Which Is Contayned the Exact and Most Certaine Remedies for All Manner of Infirmities, Which Shall Happen Vnto the Eyes. Written for the Generall Good of This Whole Monarchie of Great Brittaine. By Richard Seabrooke, Practicioner in the Art of the Occulist* (London: Printed by Edw. All-de, 1620), ch. 6.

40 Bayley, *A Briefe Treatise Touching the Preseruation of the Eie Sight*, 16.

God"[41]—already suggest that *displaying the use of your hearing within a socially sanctioned and public ritual*—the performance of hearing, as it were—comes higher on a list of priorities than using your hearing in order to learn. In other words, the social practice of a ritual comes above private cognition on the list of ethical priorities associated with the use of hearing. The work of the sense is assessed against a clear outcome: "to attend with the eare, to receiue with the heart, to conuert in the life conuersation, else our sinfull soules can neuer bee healed."[42] Hearing becomes a key to proper living: if men heard as they ought to, their hearing would bring forth "excellent graces" and beget true faith,[43] and hearing the word of God is the reason why we have hearing in the first place. Egerton insists that, when we listen to the word of God, we must overcome the base impulse of having done with things quickly: it is not enough to simply *understand* what is said. One did not hear in order to understand, but to *do*: "Because the end of hearing is not chiefly to know and vnderstand, but rather to beleeue, practise, and obey that which is taught."[44] The anxiety inherent in the injunction to accompany your hearing with a strict protocol of actions and rituals, and the dangers of not doing so, are best glimpsed if we examine Egerton's delightful list of the five kinds of 'non-hearing' ears:

> The first is a dull Eare, when a man is either drousie, or carelesse, or ignorant.
>
> The second is a stopped Eare, as the Serpent stoppeth his eare against the voyce of the Charmer. Such are our Recusants, and secure Persons, that will not heare, lest they should bee thawed from their dregs, and so conuerted and saued.
>
> The third, is a preiudiciall or sinister Eare: this man like. Malchus hath lost his right Eare, and hee comes as the Pharisee to Christ, to tempt the Minister, to catch him in his talke, turning all his speech to the worst, because hee hates or despiseth the person of the Preacher. This man is like the Spider that sucketh poyson out of the sweetest flowers.

41 Stephen Egerton, *The Boring of the Eare Contayning a Plaine and Profitable Discourse by Way of Dialogue: Concerning 1. Our Preparation before Hearing, 2. Our Demeanour in Hearing, 3. Our Exercise after We Haue Heard the Word of God / Written by That Faithfull and Diligent Minister of Gods Word, Master Stephen Egerton* (London: Printed by William Stansby, 1623).

42 Egerton, *Boring of the Eare*, n.p.

43 Egerton, *Boring of the Eare*, n.p.

44 Egerton, *Boring of the Eare*, 51.

> The fourth, is the nice or itching Eare that must bee clawed, that will heare nothing but nouelties, and dainties, that lookes not so much to the goodnesse of the meat, as to the sweetnesse of the sawce. [A man with an itching ear has a "thinne and pined" soul, and often encounters things he cannot understand or digest, and so never profits by the word of God.]
>
> The fift, is an adulterous Eare, that will heare any but the voice of their owne Shepherds. You shall know them as the Harlot is knowne, they are euer gadding to seeke their new Louers: but God shall one day discouer their adultery.[45]

It would be a hard task indeed for an early modern reader not to allow his ears to become any of these kinds of non-hearing ears. It would be even harder to find the middle ground between having ears that are "stopped" (do not wish to hear new arguments), and those that are "itching and adulterous" (keen to hear them). This kind of contradiction would have been likely to cause much anxiety in an earnest reader trying to follow the injunctions in his life.

The hearer further improves the performance of his hearing if he also uses his eyes to enhance it. If literate, the hearer's duty during the sermon is to bring their bible to the public assembly so that he may follow the text of the Psalms, and readily turn to the scriptural passages being read. Engaging both ears and eyes simultaneously may be difficult, but it may help to prevent sinful stimuli from entering the church-goer's intellect (ministered to by the eyes) and the heart (ministered to by the ears), and makes it almost impossible to try to think seditiously at the same time. Incidentally, it also helps to improve the minister's performance in the longer term:

> Hauing the helpe, not only of their Eare in hearing, but also of their Eye in perusing those scriptures, that are alleaged, to see whether they be truly alleaged or no: by which meanes also the Minister shall bee made more.[46]

A similar practice-oriented approach to other senses is found in other treatises. Touch is governed carefully, as the giving of a hand bound the person giving it more firmly than any word: the giving of a hand signifies a real contract "by which . . . we deeply ingage our selves to a punctuall accomplishment of that which our Hand had protested to." The hand stood "surety that our deeds

45 Egerton, *Boring of the Eare*, n.p.

46 Egerton, *Boring of the Eare*, 38.

shall bee forth-comming, and be found answerable to our words." The person who . . .

> forfeits the Recognizance of his Hand, he breaks the most sacred and strongest band of of Truth; and by falsifying his manuall faith proves a kinde of Renegado to himselfe.[47]

The touching of the face or the body during a conversation signified "truth and substance" to what is said, and good intentions. This gained additional gravitas by being undertaken in imitation of Christ, who touched the areas of the face and body he wished to heal.[48] Every one of those injunctions teams with the anxious care of the writer to establish, preserve and maintain social order through ordering the use of the senses.

Jean Delumeau, Michael MacDonald and Ursula Potter write of the religious anxieties that emerged in the wake of Protestant reformation in Europe and England.[49] Potter discusses the devastating effects of religious fasting on pre-pubescent girls in Renaissance England, reminding us that, although widespread, the practice is considered by Robert Burton to allow the devil in rather than keep him out.[50] Fasting is, of course, a denial of the senses, as it is of

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47 John Bulwer, *Chirologia, or, the Naturall Language of the Hand Composed of the Speaking Motions, and Discoursing Gestures Thereof: Whereunto Is Added, Chironomia, or, the Art of Manual Rhetoricke, Consisting of the Naturall Expressions, Digested by Art in the Hand . . .: With Types, or Chyrograms, a Long-Wish'd for Illustration of This Argument* (London: Printed by Thomas Harper, 1644), 101.

48 Bulwer, *Chirologia*, 146.

49 Jean Delumeau, *Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture 13th–18th Centuries*, trans. Eric Nicholson (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 27–28. The exception is Erasmus. See Michael MacDonald, *Mystical Bedlam: Madness, Anxiety, and Healing in Seventeenth-Century England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 20–22, 233 and 244; Ursula Potter, "The Trauma of Puberty for Daughters in Godly Households," in *The British World: Religion, Memory, Society, Culture: Refereed Proceedings of the Conference Hosted by the University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, July 2nd–5th, 2012*, eds. Marcus K. Harmes, Lindsay Henderson, Barbara Harmes and Amy Antonio (Toowoomba: University of Southern Queensland, 2012), 75–86. We know now that religiosity of a number of denominations can be associated with both decreased and increased anxiety levels, depending on the circumstances. For details of this, see the fascinating literature review by Andrea K. Shreve-Neiger and Barry A. Edelstein, "Religion and Anxiety: A Critical Review of the Literature," *Clinical Psychology Review* 24, no. 4 (2004): 379–397.

50 Potter, "The Trauma of Puberty for Daughters in Godly Households," 75; Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy Vvhat It Is. Vvith All the Kindes, Causes, Symptomes, Prognostickes, and Seuerall Cures of It. In Three Maine Partitions with Their Seuerall Sections, Members, and*

physiological processes: the main aim of anxious injunctions on how to use the senses morally is addressed at curbing sensual pleasure, and thereby blocking the pathways to sin and damnation.

Matters of creativity and public engagement, to which senses are instrumental as pathways of rationality and of engagement, also appear to be inseparable from their moral aspects. No issue is closer to this one than the issue of veneration/rejection of images, crucial for the formation of the Protestant identity of the Church of England. Ursula Potter posits that the higher rate of anxiety amongst young Protestant women, in a situation where the imperative of virtue remained unchanged, could be explained by the loss of trust in the Virgin Mary and the saints,[51] including a prohibition on viewing icons and sculptures, in the church or at home, for the purposes of prayer. Doctrinal discord on iconoclasm is rife in Europe in the mid-sixteenth century. Iconoclasm remained absent in the Catholic strongholds of Spain, Italy, and Portugal, but in France it broke out as early as the 1520s. Hans von Balthasar explains the difference by contrasting the Catholic doctrine of perfectibility and essential divinity of man, and therefore his attempts to understand and represent the Divine, with the Calvinist doctrine of despair for the human soul, which rejected any suggestion of human capability to capture the Divine essence in an image, an idea or any kind of contemplation whatsoever.[52] Antoine Duprat, cardinal-archbishop of Sens, convoked in 1527 the most important local synod of the sixteenth century before the Council of Trent, with a decree dealing specifically with the sensuality of images and their deviation from the truth of the scripture. The recommendation was that vicars approve images beforehand.[53] The Colloquy of Poissy in 1563 brought thirty-four articles on reform, the twenty-ninth of which instructed the Church to take measures to eliminate the abuses and superstitious practices surrounding the veneration of images.[54] Again, curbing the pleasure of the senses—the comfort one takes

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Subsections. Philosophically, Medicinally, Historically, Opened and Cut Vp. By Democritus Iunior. With a Satyricall Preface, Conducing to the Following Discourse (Oxford: Printed by John Lichfield and James Short, 1621), 895, 957–958, and 968.

51 Potter, "The Trauma of Puberty for Daughters in Godly Households," 77.

52 von Balthasar, *Glory of the Lord*, 120–45.

53 Giovanni Domenico Mansi and Nicola Coletti, ed. *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio*, 50 vols (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1960–1962), 32:1200, cited and translated in John W. O'Malley, "Trent, Sacred Images and Catholics' Senses of the Sensuous," in *The Sensuous in the Counter Reformation Church*, eds. Marcia Hall and Tracy Cooper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013), 28–48, at 32 n. 17.

54 Council of Trent and Klaus Ganzer, *Concilium Tridentinum, Diariorum, actorum, epistularum, tractatuum nova collection*, ed. Societas Goerresiana Promovendis inter Germanos

in viewing inspiring images, hearing the words of an old prayer and handling the old rosary beads—must be taken away, as sensual pleasure leads to sin; and feeling pleasure in images and symbols is misguided. The papal reply received shortly afterwards, however, brought the issue back to the drawing board by giving a contradictory ruling: on the one hand, it reaffirmed the need to eradicate superstition, but on the other it also affirmed any decisions reached by Nicaea II, which had allowed the use of images and condemned iconoclasm,[55] resembling the later Lutheran view that people could use images as long as they did not venerate them in lieu of God. Avoiding sensual pleasure, or the comfort taken in it, and belief in its symbolic force became central points of the doctrine of reformation. Such diplomatic contradiction took root in Britain until the late seventeenth century and the civil wars, when widespread and aggressive iconoclasm broke out as a result of Puritanism, commencing state-sanctioned image destruction.[56]

Matters are no different when it comes to secular art and lascivious images of classical stories. Bette Talvacchia writes about attempts to legitimise nudity in public images by citing pre-pubescent innocence and classical pedigree of nude images as frisky but ingenuous.[57] The belief in early modern writing, however, seems to be that exposing such images to (public) sight can have significant social consequences. The matter is clearly one of some moral anguish, including for the artists themselves. In 1582, Bartolommeo Ammanati addressed an impassioned letter to the Accademia del Disegno, in which he lamented his youthful decision to adorn public monuments with sculptures of suggestive nymphs and lustful satyrs because "with a single glance of the eye" such images were able "to move a soul that is otherwise gentle and healthy to excited and filthy thoughts," setting a "horrible example for his viewers and committing a terrible crime against the body politic and God."[58] Exposing an

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Catholicos Litterarum Studiis, 13 vols (Freiburg: Herder, 1901–2001), 13:108. Cited and translated in O'Malley, "Trent, Sacred Images," 44 n. 21.

55 O'Malley, "Trent, Sacred Images," 45.

56 William Dowsing, *The Journal of William Dowsing of Stratford, Parliamentary Visitor, Appointed Under a Warrant From the Earl of Manchester, for Demolishing the Superstitious Pictures and Ornaments of Churches &c., Within the County of Suffolk, in the Years 1643–1644*, ed. Charles H. Evelyn-White, new edn (Ipswich: Pawsey and Hayes, 1885), 15.

57 Bette Talvacchia, "The World Made Flesh: Spiritual Subjects and Carnal Depictions in Renaissance Art," in *The Sensuous in the Counter Reformation Church*, eds. Hall and Cooper, 49–73, at 55 and 58.

58 Bartolomeo Ammannati, "Lettera agli Accademici del Disegno" (1582), in *Trattati d'Arte del Cinquecento, fra manierismo e Controriforma*, ed. Paola Barocch, 3 vols (Bari: Laterza, 1960–1962), 3:119, 121.

image to public view is thought to have the power to corrupt on a large scale, again through the corruptive power of sensual pleasure.

Literature for the care of the soul concerns itself with some of these questions. In the Middle Ages, responsibility for caring for the soul (*cura animarum*) is largely entrusted to priests, who were assigned to provide regular instruction and guidance to the lay Christians in their charge. These doctors of the soul were the primary audience for a massive outpouring of literature from the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries, *pastoralia*, which is designed to equip them with the knowledge and skills necessary to help cure the souls of their parishioners through tasks such as preaching and hearing confession. These books included lists of capital sins and their daughter sins, where various misbehaviours are understood as the manifestations of the principal vicious inclinations that required confession, satisfaction, and renunciation in order to help restore the soul to its proper health.[59] Later writings on spiritual help show an interesting shift towards lay writers, offering spiritual comfort along well-established medieval lines, eliding the question of mental and spiritual health. Written thirty years after Timothie Bright's *A Treatise of Melancholie*, but some years before the appearance of Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* in 1620, physician Thomas Adams published *Mystical Bedlam, or the World of Mad-Men* (1615) and *Diseases of the Soul a Discourse Diuine, Morall and Physicall* (1616), two medical treatises on mental health structured around "diseases of the soul." These are interesting as they use religious terms in order to heal readers afflicted with physical and emotional disorders; in other words, they offer spiritual (mental, theological and religious) guidance in a holistic medical context. In other works of this genre, such as Phineas Fletcher's *Joy in Tribulation, or, Consolations for Afflicted Spirits* (1632), Richard Overton's *Man's Moralitie* (1643), and Abiezer Coppe's *Great Fiery Roll* (1649), we find the overall framework and style associated with books of spiritual guidance that theorise mental health issues, but are also interesting in literary terms, as 'hybrid' works providing a holistic approach to emotional health. This is understood by a concern for mental health, spiritual health, and physical health, often discussed in the same treatise, which seems, at first sight, to be concerned with only one of those categories. These writers combine theories of medicine, psychiatry and theology. They are medical and theological treatises in one, but they are also works which are sometimes interesting from the perspective of literary history, as they are innovative in literary terms.[60]

59 Spencer E. Young, *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215–1248* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 177–91.

60 Coppe wrote *The Great Fiery Roll* in the first person, with God as his narrator.

While anxieties surrounding the senses are expected at a time of changing religious, political and social mores—after all, the acquisition and practice of knowledge, and the exercise of morals in society, all depend on the work of the senses—it is interesting to observe that central teachings of religious doctrine also centre on matters of the use of the senses. For instance, the cultural distinction between Catholic and Anglican devotional practices before the civil wars in the centrality of the Eucharist for one, and the sermon for the other,[61] can be narrowed down to the question of organising cognitive and emotional participation in religious practices, in relation to the question of which of the senses is more central: taste/touch in one version, versus hearing in the other. Brian Cummings talks of a "material anxiety" inherent in "the wars over the authority" of "the oral" and "the written," which he sees to be exemplified by the debate between Martin Luther (who, despite promoting hearing as the *proper* sense, also insisted on the ultimate doctrinal authority of the text of the scripture, implicitly giving prevalence to sight, on which reading, translation and writing all rely) and Bishop Fisher (who refuted Luther's "pernicious" theology, yet implicitly favoured hearing by citing the example of past generations who developed laws "from man to man by mouth onely and not by wrytyng"). The anxieties of which Brian Cummings speaks boil down to the question of what the morally proper way to sensually perceive the word of God is—since, barring disability, our absorption of ideas is entirely dependent on sight and hearing. Debates on the physical, moral and mental health of the individual, but also questions of religious observance and identity, pivot on the use of the senses, and vice versa: attempts to understand and theorise issues to do with the use of the senses must be contextualised within the broader context of the Reformation, and seen as crucial to understanding the real-life impact of the process of religious change in pre-modern Europe.

Finally, if, as I have shown, the deepest areas of human personhood and engagement with the world in the early modern period—physical and mental health, cognition, identity, religious practice and morality—are all seen to be inextricably linked with the way we use our senses, it is sobering to be reminded also of the view that the work of the senses in fact means nothing in itself; that any attempt to seek meaning in the work of the senses is fatally flawed, and should be void of interest for any thinking individual. In his courtesy book for young men, *The English Gentleman* (1630), poet Richard Brathwaite, counsels the young against seeking meaning in the work of the senses:

61 Crawford, *Women and Religion*, 45.

> For neither is the eye satisfied with seeing, be the object never so pleasing, nor the eare with hearing, be the accent never so moving, nor the pallat with tasting, be the Cates never so relishing, nor the nose with smelling, be the Confection never so perfuming, nor the hand with touching, be the Subject never so affecting.[62]

Peace and enlightenment are not found in the external world or in sensory gratification, but within ourselves, in a space kept as far away as possible from stimulation and desires—as a strategy for avoiding anxiety.

The presence of moral injunctions on ordering the use of one's senses and sensory experience in English medical and spiritual treatises of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries suggests an assumed link between the body, its affective and moral capacity and religious identity. It also suggests a burning need to translate sensual input and associated emotions into sustainable affective practices within the larger governing systems of religious doctrine and moral philosophy. Although this was not always clearly articulated, sensual practices and their interpretation often underpin pivotal points of the emerging protestant theological doctrines. Discussions of the use and ordering of the senses and sensations are, therefore, driven by the moral value assigned to sensation and cognition, with concomitant—often doctrinally or scientifically driven—assumptions about the subject's age, social class, and, particularly, gender.

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62 Brathwaite, *English Gentleman*, 390.

CHAPTER 9

Conceptual Eclecticism and Ethical Prescription in Early Modern Jesuit Discourses about Affects: Suárez and Caussin on Maternal Love

Raphaële Garrod

In recent years, the history of emotions has supplemented the social history of the family and the intellectual history of education by paying attention to the household and to the classroom as affective communities.[1] This emerging historiographical field has thus contributed to a reappraisal of the Annales school's take on these topics, partly by revitalising its agenda. The heated and ideologically loaded critique of Philippe Ariès's *L'Enfant et la vie familiale sous l'Ancien Régime*, launched in the 1980s in social history, has changed the course of the 'Histoire des mentalités' and impacted the works of subsequent generations of historians of the Annales school, from Georges Duby to Arlette Farge. This critique still informs the cultural and intellectual history of the notion of childhood in the early modern period, even if its conceptual outlines have now been established and constitute a new historiographical orthodoxy in the field.[2]

This chapter investigates the other side of the intellectual history of early modern childhood, namely early modern motherhood. While early modern mothering has been a lasting subject of enquiry for demographic, social and literary historians, its intellectual history still remains to be written.[3] In this

1 Philippa C. Maddern, "How Children were Supposed to Feel; How Children Felt: England 1350–1550," in *Childhood and Emotion across Cultures, 1450–1800*, eds. Claudia Jarzebowski and Thomas Max Safley (London: Routledge, 2013), 121–40. For a domestic history of emotions in the household at large, see Susan Broomhall, ed., *Emotions in the Household 1200–1900* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

2 See Albrecht Classen, ed., *Childhood in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance: The Results of a Paradigm Shift in the History of Mentality* (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2005).

3 Early modern motherhood has been investigated in gender studies, cultural and literary history, and demographic history. The seminal and controversial work in cultural history is Elisabeth Badinter, *L'Amour en plus: histoire de l'amour maternel: 17^{è}–20^{è} siècles* (Paris: Flammarion, 1980). See also Arlette Farge and Natalie Zemon Davis, eds., *Histoire des Femmes, XVI^{e}–XVII^{e} siècles* (Paris: Plon, 1991), 46–69; Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux, "Famille urbaines et maternité consciente au XVIII^{e} siècle: Reims entre Genève et Rouen," in *Familles,*

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chapter, I explore the conceptual definitions of maternal love articulated by the Company of Jesus in France in the first half of the seventeenth century. I do so by tracing the continuities and the ruptures between Francisco Suárez's commentaries on Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*, published in Lyon, probably as textbooks for a theology class, and the works of spiritual and moral direction written in the vernacular by Nicolas Caussin. This straightforward piece of intellectual history is therefore a comparison between the learned, theological dogma of the Company regarding maternal love (Suárez), and its more practical instantiation in the moral and spiritual prescriptions voiced by one of its most eloquent representatives (Caussin). Theological dogma, and spiritual as well as moral prescriptions, defined the 'ordering structure' articulated by the Company; that is, a set of expectations regarding the right affective behaviours, and the means to implement them. The Jesuit spiritual directors and teachers were those in charge of implementing the affective containment this ordering structure was meant to carry out. Such implementation enacted the standard scholastic analysis of the relationship between affects and virtues and vices in ethics. According to this view, ingrained affects became habits, and morally good or bad habits were virtues or vices.[4] The prescriptive and pedagogical nature of these sources, written and disseminated by the Company of Jesus—that is, the early modern teachers of Europe—begs the question of their impact on the affective behaviours of their audience, be they future members of the Order undergoing theological training and destined to become teachers and spiritual directors themselves, or mournful mothers of the Parisian gentry.[5] Reading Jesuit ethical assessments and prescriptions regarding maternal love and its expression suggests a culture of heightened affective states that were the paradoxical means for self-restraint and sacrifice

Parenté et réseaux en Occident: XVII^e–XX^e siècles, eds. Anne-Lise Head-König, Luigi Lorenzetti, Béatrice Veyrasset (Geneva: Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Genève, 2001), 359–80; Susan Reid, "Writing Motherhood in the Reign of Louis XIV: Some Fictional and Political Representations," in *Women in Renaissance and Early Modern Europe*, ed. Christine Meek (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2000), 172–84. By contrast, the intellectual history of early modern concepts of womanhood has been systematically written: Ian McLean, *The Renaissance Notion of Woman* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

4 I use the word 'affect' because it is a straightforward translation of 'affectus,' which is the term commonly used in my sources.

5 See Yasmin Haskell, "Child Murder and Child's Play: The Emotions of Children in Jakob Bidermann's Epic on the Massacre of the Innocents (*Herodiados libri iii*, 1622)," *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 20, no. 3 (2013): 83–100. For a survey of philosophical prescriptions regarding family life, see Joseph F. Freedman, "Philosophical Writing on the Family in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe," *Journal of Family History* 27 (2002): 292–342.

driven by an eschatological worldview. Investigating these prescriptions is integral to understanding the archaeology of the 'modern self'—the rational and autonomous self of the French *Âge classique*—as a site shaped, in this case, by the pedagogical and spiritual enforcement of an ethical norm.[6]

As this chapter will make clear, Jesuit views on maternal love were informed by the two extremes of the animalistic instinct and the Marian ideal of the Virgin's love and care for Jesus. As a specific expression of the sensitive appetite, maternal love was suspicious and its potential excesses had to be contained—Mary was the perfect expression of such containment. At the horizon of Jesuit prescription about maternal love was the idea that one could lose one's child; that one should be ready to lose one's child. The first two sections of this chapter will therefore map these two conceptual extremes. The last section will explore the way in which those theoretical views and prescriptions about maternal love shaped Jesuit spiritual direction, by focusing on the consolatory letter Father Nicolas Caussin wrote to Madame Dargouge on the death of her daughter in 1649.[7]

Brutish Love: The Contested Ethical Status of Motherhood

The following section traces Jesuit notions of maternal love in the manual of conduct written by Nicolas Caussin, *La Cour sainte*, and in Francisco Suárez's commentary on Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*.[8] Affects were one of the subject matter of ethics: they were envisaged as constitutive parts of human intentions, choices, and actions. Their systematic account from this perspective can be found in Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* and in the "prima secundae" of the *Summa theologiae*.[9] Amalgamating this tradition with the patristic and,

6 Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975).

7 Nicolas Caussin, S.J. (1583–1651) epitomises the significance of the Jesuits in the early modern French and European intellectual landscape. He was the author of a best-selling textbook on rhetoric, the *Eloquentiae sacrae et humanae parallela*, also known as the *De eloquentia sacra et humana*, first printed in 1623 in Lyon, Paris and Cologne, and of a very successful manual of conduct, *La Cour sainte*, which was first published in 1624 and translated into English in 1626. He was, very briefly, the confessor of Louis XIII in 1637, but fell out of grace for having antagonised Richelieu.

8 Aristotle and Aquinas are the official authorities of the Jesuits on philosophical matters—their status is asserted in the programme of studies (the *Ratio studiorum*) of the Company. See G.M. Pachtler, ed., *Ratio studiorum et intitutiones scholasticae Societatis Jesu* in *Documenta germaniae paedagogica*, ed. Karl Kehrbach, 34 vols (Berlin: Hoffman & comp., 1887), 5:284.

9 The *Summa theologiae* consists of four parts: "prima" ("On God"), "prima secundae" ("On human actions and passions, law and grace"), "secunda secundae" ("On vices and virtues"),

in Caussin's case, Augustinian one proved a tricky exercise, which resulted in a specific conceptual categorisation of motherhood and maternal love.

Maternal love was defined with regards to the criteria of selflessness or interest on the one hand, and to those of mindless spontaneity or rational judgement on the other. As far as the patristic tradition was concerned, Caussin, paraphrasing Augustine, voiced a disparaging definition of 'natural' maternal love as pure spontaneity and brutish instinct in the *Cour sainte:*

> Thus, Augustine says, a mother who loves her children in the name of flesh and blood, without raising in any other way her thoughts to God, does not do more than a hen, a dove, a tiger or a snake, and so many other animals who make such great shows of tenderness for their offspring.[10]

While Caussin went on to emphasize that this natural instinct, shared by beasts and men alike, was good because it was necessary to the conservation of the world, his dismissal of any irrational love purely grounded in the sensitive appetite shone through in his condemnation of lust in the eighth book of his rhetoric:

> Animal love is a sort of violent burst towards the loved thing, *originating from the senses*, most blind, inopportune, bold, *common to the voluptuous man and to animated beasts*.[11]

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and "tertia" ("On Christ and the sacraments"). Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, ed. G. Bañuelos, I. Gamboa, J. Medina and J. Morán, *Corpus Thomisticum*, electronic ed. by Enrique Alárcon (Barcelona: University of Navarre, 2013) <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org> [accessed 22 July 2014]. For the intellectual history of the philosophical accounts of affects in ethics, see Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri, *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes* (Dordrecht: Klüwer Academic Publishers, 2002).

10 Nicolas Caussin, "L'Empire de la raison sur les passions," in *La Cour Sainte*, 2 vols. (Paris: Denis Bechet, 1664), vol. 1, pt. 3, p. 28: "Ainsi, dit Sainct Augustin, une mere qui ayme ses enfans par la consideration de la chair & du sang, sans elever autrement ses pensees en Dieu, ne fait pas plus qu'une poule, une colombe ou une tigresse, un serpent, et tant d'autres animaux qui ont de si grandes tendresses pour leurs petits." The marginal gloss "Pro magno laudaturus sum in homine, quod videam in tygride" is ascribed to Augustine 10, homil. 38. I have been unable to find it literally in the Augustinian corpus. Translations are the author's own.

11 Nicolas Caussin, *De eloquentia sacra et humana libri XVI*, 8th edn (Cologne: Demen, 1681), 487: "Amor animalis, impulsio quaedam vehemens est in sensu, ad rem amatam, plerunque caeca, importuna, temeraria, animali & voluptario homini cum brutis animantibus communis." Translations are the author's own.

Caussin's negative assessment of the brutish nature of maternal love contrasted sharply with the Aristotelian account of maternal love in book eight of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, dedicated to friendship. While the opening of the book did indeed state that "the affection of parents for offspring . . . seems to be a natural instinct, not only in man, but also in birds and in most animals,"[12] Aristotle then identified maternal love as the paradigm of friendship: it was selfless, and this selflessness was grounded in a conscious and rational goodwill towards one's offspring.[13] Aquinas highlighted these two features of selflessness and rationality in his commentary on the *Nichomachean Ethics*. He identified maternal love with benevolent love or friendship—*amicitia* or *amor benevolentiae*—characterised by goodwill towards another for his or her own sake. By contrast, concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*) used the object of one's affection: one wished someone well for the good—pleasure or usefulness—one hoped to gain for oneself by means of that person. Aquinas insisted that, according to Aristotle, what made maternal love the paradigm of benevolent love was that the mother knew the child to be hers—her affection was also the result of rational cognition. By contrast, the infant was unable to return her love until he had the cognitive power to identify her as his mother.[14] Yet maternal love no longer featured as exemplary of *amicitia* in Thomas's own account of love in *quaestio* twenty-six of the "prima secundae."[15] This *quaestio* emphasized the distinction between a rational and an irrational form of love. Every animal experienced the sensitive appetite as a 'natural love,' that is, a search for what was suitable to one's nature as defined not by oneself but by the divine knowledge of God himself: in irrational animals, this natural love was purely necessary and unconscious (it was, in some respects, an expression of the orderliness of nature testifying to the divine plan), whereas because human beings were rational, their sensitive appetite fell within the realm of the exercise of free will insofar as it could be controlled by reason. While in the commentary on the *Nichomachean Ethics* the rationality of human love meant that its object was known and that this knowledge, in turn, contributed to the

12 Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, 1936), 8.1.3, 450–53.

13 Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 8.8.3, 452–53: "in its essence friendship seems to consist more in giving than in receiving affection: witness the pleasure that mothers take in loving their children . . . and though *knowing* and loving them, do not ask to be loved by them in return, if it be impossible to have this as well . . . the children, not *knowing* them, cannot render them any part of what is due to a mother."

14 Thomas Aquinas, *In decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nichomachum expositio*, ed. Raimondo R. Spiazzi (Roma: Marietti, 1949), 433–34.

15 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, "prima secundae," *quaestio* 26, art. 4.

strength and moral dignity of this affect, in the *Summa* the rationality of love meant that it could be disciplined by reason and fell within the remits of the exercise of free will.

Jesuit views on the matter offered significant re-workings of both traditions articulated in their textbook commentaries on the "prima secundae." These commentaries extended the category of benevolent love, instantiated in maternal love, to include the non-rational yet selfless maternal instinct of animals, whereas Aristotelian friendship proper—that is, a rational and self-conscious goodwill that could be reciprocal—became a paternal affect. Thus, Francisco Suárez acknowledged that the category of benevolent love, as selfless goodwill for someone or something else, applied to beasts, whose maternal behaviour displayed such selflessness and self-sacrifice.[16] A goat could endure pain and danger for the good of her kid: he compared this affect with the love a human being might experience for a rose—that is, an aesthetic enjoyment devoid of any concupiscence.[17] However, the moral status of this newly-extended category of benevolent love was unclear. Indeed, it seemed that the maternal instinct displayed by the goat towards her kid was an instance of what Suárez called necessary love, which expressed a natural or physical reality—that is, the drive of the sensitive appetite. According to Suárez, such love was not, as such, within the remit of morality, which would involve some form of knowledge of the loved object "accommodated to the sensitive appetite" (that is, mediated by imagination) and its election by free

16 Contemporary intellectual history and philosophy has re-emphasized the importance of Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548–1617) as a leading theologian and innovative scholastic philosopher: see Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund, eds., *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012); Marco Sgarbi, ed., *Francisco Suárez and His Legacy: The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2010); Daniel Schwartz, ed., *Interpreting Suárez* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). The short account above does not do justice to the Suárezian theory of love, defined generally as the vital act of the sensitive appetite, the will, and the intellect—that is, the principle of intentionality—and therefore central to his concept of freedom. I am concerned with love as an act of the sensitive appetite, and its interaction with imagination and reason. See Francisco Suárez, *Ad primam secundae D. Thomae tractatus quinque theologici* (Lyon: Jacob Cardon, 1628), tract. 4, disp. 1, sect. 4, 331–33: "Utrum amor sit in appetitu sentiente, et quas causas, & effectus habeat." For a philosophical account of Suárezian freedom, see Thomas Pink, "Action and Freedom in Suárez's Ethics," in *Interpreting Suárez*, ed. Schwartz, 115–41.

17 Suárez, *Ad primam secundae* tract. 4, disp. 1, sect. 4, notat. 3, 334: "Quid sit cupiditas, seu concupiscentia, & qualis sit divisio amoris in concupiscentiae, & amicitae."

will.[18] Yet, in another interpretation of the Aristotelian *amicitia* proper (now a species of benevolent love), Suárez discussed the 'accidental' causes of friendship, as it were, and contrasted intrinsic, self-conscious, and therefore rational similitude which prompted friendship—he mentioned the father–son relationship: fathers recognized themselves in their sons—with an extrinsic and coincidental similitude that prompts animosity and rivalry: the other 'same' is a potential competitor impeding the satisfaction of the love of concupiscence by desiring the same good.[19] From Aristotle to Suárez, paternal rather than maternal love had become the new paradigm of rational friendship, whereas the ethical status of the maternal instinct was at best confused, and at worst irrelevant, because it was outside the remit of morality.

The ethical framework within which affects, including maternal love, were accounted for and assessed by Aquinas in the *Summa theologiae*, and by its Jesuit commentators, underpinned Jesuit prescriptions regarding the best way to contain and channel them in manuals of conduct and spiritual directions. A significant instance of such manuals is Nicolas Caussin's *Cour sainte*. Intended for the educated, lay audience whose mundane paradigm could be found in the more worldly Court surrounding Louis XIII and Richelieu at the Louvres, the *Cour sainte* was a successful book throughout Europe, and was translated into English.[20] These prescriptions reflected the Jesuit ordering structure of

18 Suárez, *Ad primam secundae* tract. 3, disp. 1, sect. 2, notat. 3, 203: "Quid sit in huiusmodi actu morali ipsum esse morale"; and tract. 4, disp. 1, sect. 4, notat. 3, 332: "Utrum amor sit in appetitus sentiente, & quas causas, & effectus habeat." On the mediation of the imagination, see tract. 2, disp. 10, sect. 2, notat. 1–3, 197: "Utrum actus appetitus sensitivi imperentur." On Suárezian imagination, see James B. South, "Francisco Suárez on Imagination," *Vivarium* 29, no. 1 (2001): 119–58.

19 Suárez, *Ad primam secundae*, 332: "Hinc pater amat filium, amicus amicum tamquam alterum se." ["in such way the father loves his son, the friend his friend like another self."]. Translations are the author's own. This rational definition of friendship put forward by Suárez and 'commonly shared' was criticised by the Jesuit Roderigo de Arriaga in his own commentary on the "prima secundae": he opposed to it the benevolent love demonstrated by birds towards their chicks. Arriaga also acknowledged Suárez's own endeavour to address this problem by extending the concept of benevolent love. See Roderigo de Arriaga, *Disputationes theologicae in primam secundae D. Thomae tomus primus* (Antwerp: Plantin, 1644), sect. 3. annot. 17–8, 324: "De causis & effectibus amoris." On Jesuit views on friendship, see Yasmin Haskell's chapter in this volume.

20 An anonymous translation of the first two volumes was printed in Saint Omer under the title *The Holy Court* in 1626. Another edition, including the third volume, was printed in 1634 in Rouen. Sir Th. H, the translator, could be the English poet Thomas Hawkins. His nephew Francis Hawkins (1628–81, S.J.) completed the English translation of the whole *Cour sainte*, printed in London in 1678 by John Williams.

ethical ends, and therefore the overall eschatological worldview promoted by the Company. As James B. South has pointed out, Suárez explicitly grounded virtue in the belief of the immortality of the soul and its related retribution in the afterlife.[21] Worldly human intentionality, confined within the limits set by the necessity of the sensitive appetite obeying the laws of an orderly nature, and by the choices of free will informed by practical reason, had ultimately to be ordered and directed towards its true end, namely the beatific contemplation of God.[22] The appropriate manipulation of affects and the policing of their outward expression were integral to this eschatological, moral agenda. Maternal love as sheer intentionality of the natural, sensitive appetite was simply unacceptable in this context.

Eschatological Prescriptions: Marian Love

Suppressing affects or prompting appropriate ones was central to the Christian devotional tradition, which subordinated maternal love (like any other affect) to charity and channelled it towards the Creator rather than his creatures. While the Aristotelian tradition defined maternal love as the paradigm of self-conscious friendship—the mother loved her child all the more because she *knew* it to be hers—the Christian moral agenda prescribed an eschatological awareness in which the mother had to rise above the purely sensitive appetite of maternal love, and acknowledge that she should love her child only insofar as it is God's gift and one of his creatures. The extreme form of such subordination of the maternal instinct by means of eschatological awareness was sacrificial and found its paradigm in the figure of Mary at the foot of the Cross. The child's death not only tested the 'limits' of maternal love as a natural expression of the sensitive appetite, it called for its channelling towards a higher ethical end, as a stark reminder that the child's fate was not the mother's choice, but God's own.

In its naturalistic form, maternal love was indeed a purely worldly affect. It could therefore be harmful because it demonstrated a brutish unawareness of the immortality of the soul and of the hierarchy of moral ends ordering human intentions. Like any other passions, it therefore had to be mortified. In the *Cour sainte*, Caussin provided his reader with a striking patristic anecdote

21 James B. South, "Suárez, Immortality, and the Soul's Dependence on the Body," in *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez*, eds. Hill and Lagerlund, 121–36.

22 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, "prima secundae," quaestio 3, art. 8; Francisco Suárez, *Ad primam secundae* tract. 1, disp. 16, 108–13: "De appetitu beatitudinis."

instantiating such mortification. While attending to the needs of the holy eremite Julian Sabas and receiving his teachings, a lady was informed that her beloved child had fallen into a well and had drowned. To the distressed crowd of servants informing her of the catastrophe, she calmly replied: "God gave him to me, God took him back: seal the well." Caussin concluded that she had obviously benefited from Julian's teachings, since she was able to contain what must have been excruciating grief. She thus demonstrated excellent awareness of the orderliness of Christian ethical ends, and control over the worldly affects it involved: Caussin expressed her clear moral sense by means of the metaphor of the compass, that indicates steadily the right direction in the midst of a tempest.[23]

The rightful affective expression of the dichotomy between the worldliness of 'carnal love' and its spiritual transformation into charity was therefore the sort of heroic mortification displayed by this lady. In many respects, she emulated the unattainable perfection of the Virgin at the bottom of the Cross. While recent studies have pointed to the growing dramatisation and pathos of pictorial representations of this scene in the early modern period,[24] the Jesuit theological dogma on the matter reflected once again the eschatological dichotomy between nature and grace. Explanations regarding the countenance of the Virgin and her affective state during the Passion featured in Jesuit commentaries on the third part of the *Summa theologiae*, which discusses the mysteries of the life of Christ. According to Suárez, Mary was experiencing the greatest pain ever in seeing her son crucified, yet she did not indulge in excessive tears and laments like the group of holy women there. Suárez contrasted

23 Caussin, *Cour sainte*, vol. 1, pt. 3, Ai.v–Aii.r: "mais sans s'estonner, elle dit, Dieu me l'avoit donné, Dieu me l'a osté, couvrez le puits, & me laisser achever les services que je rends à ce grand homme de bien. D'où vient qu'une femme, qui est naturellement si fragile, & qui a si peu de retenuë, dans semblables accidents, demeure si ferme dans une une mort si soudaine de ce qu'elle aimoit le plus au monde, parmi les pleurs et les frayeurs de ses domestiques, d'où vient qu'elle est immobile comme l'aiguille du cadran dans une si grande tempeste, sinon qu'elle avoit appris à mortifier ses passions par la direction de ce grand Maistre?" ("But without any astonishment, she said: 'God gave him to me, God took him back, seal the well, and let me complete the services I am rendering to this great and holy man.' How come that a woman, who by nature is so frail and unable to contain herself in such circumstances, remained so steady in the event of such sudden death of that whom she loved most in the world, amidst the tears and fears of her servants, like the needle of a compass in one such great tempest, if it was not for the fact that she had learnt to mortify her passions under the guidance of such a great master?") Caussin's source is Theodoret of Cyrrhus's *Religiosa historia*.

24 Miri Rubin, *Mary, Mother of God: A History of the Virgin Mary* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 313–16.

those women's worldly tears, a form of natural piety grounded in a faulty estimation of the cause of Christ's death (which they thought was imposed upon him as a result of his weakness) with Mary's modest countenance. This testified to her own awareness of the eschatological significance of the death of her son, freely bestowing redemption upon humanity.[25]

In many respects, the exemplarity of Mary and of the lady in Caussin's anecdote illustrated a commonplace of Christian devotion, relaying the evangelical message that one had to abandon one's kin for God and his Church, and hold these dearer than one's own blood—that not doing so was falling prey to a form of carnal love, and remaining trapped in the corrupt world of nature rather than rising to the redeemed world of grace, where carnal love metamorphosed into charity. This sort of argument was frequently used to convince hesitant secular recruits to join a monastic order, or to deter their parents from preventing them from doing so in the Middle Ages.[26] This argument also featured in the weaponry of the Jesuit controversialist Louis Richeome

25 Francisco Suárez, *Disputationum in tertiam partem divi Thomae tomus secundus* (Lyon: Horace Cardon, 1614), disp. 36, sect. 3, 352: "An vere Christus Dominus fuerit crucifixus"; "Cavendum est tamen, ne quis existimet beatam Virginem fuisse inter mulieres illas, quae Christum flebant, ad quas ipsi dixit, *Nolite flere super me*. Ila enim . . . solum movebantur quodam humane affectu, *quo solet infirmior sexus, etiam pro iis qui digni sunt morte, ad lacrymas moveri* quem non reprehendit Christus, nam licet supernaturalis non esset, erat tamen pius; sed reprehendit earum existimationem. Putabant enim eum coactum pati ut imbecillem, et qui se tueri non posset, & causam mortis non intelligebant nec peccatum eorum qui eum occidebant, & ideo illis dixit Christus, *Nollite flere super me: sed super filios vestros*. Haec autem existimatio in beatam Virginem cadere non poterat. Et quamvis summe doleret, ac fleret: tamen exterius nullum signum vociferationis, aut perturbationis edidisse, sed summa modestia ac constantia dolorem hunc vehementissimum tulisse, putandum est." ("One should be cautious not to let anybody hold the view that the blessed Virgin was among those women who shed tears for Christ, and to whom he himself said 'Do not cry over me.' For they were only moved by some human emotion, which usually drives the weaker sex to be moved to tears for those deemed worthy to die—this Christ did not condemn: while it did not rise above nature, yet it was pious: but he condemned their belief. Indeed they thought he was forced into suffering because he was weak, and unable to protect himself; thus they failed to understand the cause of his death, and those who were killing him failed to understand their own sin, this is why Christ told them: 'do not cry over me, but over your own sons.' This belief could not have fallen into the blessed Virgin. And while she was suffering most, and crying: yet it is held that she did not display any outward sign of lament or emotion but that she sustained the direst pangs of pain with the greatest modesty and constancy.") Translations are the author's own.

26 See Spencer E. Young's chapter in this volume.

(1544–1625): it was used against heretic doubts regarding the motherhood of Mary. To the Reformers wondering why, in several passages (especially in Matthew 12) Christ did not acknowledge his mother, Richeome replied that Christ, in refusing to call Mary 'mother,' was not denying her motherhood—which Richeome depicted as obvious to all in its worldliness: giving birth, nursing, feeding, and raising a child—but pointing to a mystery of a higher order.[27] Such mystery was the spiritual transfiguration of any worldly kinship and family ties into the charitable community of the nascent Church of his disciples, in the redeemed world of grace.[28] Richeome adduced a whole list of patristic interpretations of Matthew 12 to support his view: Ambrose, Tertullian, Jerome, and Augustine. All of these men located 'worldly' motherhood in the less worthy 'natural' world of carnal, bodily love, equated with family ties and contrasted with the worthier spiritual world of heavenly charity.

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27 Louis Richeome, *Les Oeuvres du R. père Louis Richeome, Provençal religieux de la Compagnie de Jésus, divisées en deux tomes: le premier, contenant les défenses de la foy, le second, les traités de dévotion*, 2 vols (Paris: Sébastien Cramoisy, 1628), 1:84.

28 Richeome, *Les Oeuvres du R. père Louis Richeome*, 1:83: "Il est dict en S. Mathieu douziesme, que comme Iesus-Christ preschoit au temple, un quidam l'interrompant assez mal à propos luy dict, voila ta mere et tes freres dehors, qui te cerchent: auquel Jesus-Christ respondit, *Qui est ma mere & mon frere? & estendant les mains sur ses Disciples, voici* (dict-il) *ma mere & mes freres*. De ce lieu . . . Manicheus colligeoit, que la Vierge Marie n'estoit point mere de Dieu, & vous le produisez pour diminuer la gloire de Dieu. A vos gloses et des Manichéens, nous respondons avec sainct Ambroise, que par ces paroles Iesus Christ n'a pas nié, ny desdaigné sa mere: mais il a enseigné, qu'il faut faire plus de cas des mandements celestes, que de la parenté charnelle: Avec Tertulian, qu'il faut laisser tout pour la parole de Dieu: Avec sainct Hierosme, qu'en la dilection, il faut preferer l'esprit au corps: Avec sainct Augustin, que Iesus-Chirst monstroit par doctrine & par exemple, que pour Dieu, il faut abandonner pere & mere." ("It is said in Matthew 12 that, as Christ was preaching in the temple, someone interrupted him in a quite inopportune fashion and told him 'here are your mother and brothers outside looking for you'; to which Jesus replied: 'who are my mother and my brother?' and extending his hands over his disciples: 'here—says he—are my mother and brothers.' Manicheus deduced from this place that the Virgin Mary was not the mother of God, and you bring it forth to belittle the glory of God. To your glosses, and to the ones of Manicheans, we shall reply with Saint Ambrose that Jesus Christ did neither deny nor disdain his mother through these words, but taught thus that one should attend to heavenly demands more carefully than to carnal kinship; with Tertullian, that one should leave everything behind for God's word; with Saint Jerome, that in love one should favour the soul over the body; with Saint Augustine, that Jesus Christ taught by principle and by his own example that one should forsake mother and father.") Translations are the author's own.

Yet the Jesuit specificity on this matter was twofold. Unlike their medieval predecessors, Caussin and Richeome did not write for a monastic community in the making—their readership was the laity. They brought the evangelical message regarding the mortification of carnal love to the very heart of the worldliness, as it were, to the court, which Caussin hoped to turn into a holy one. The 'mortification' of carnal, maternal love involved in the eschatological ethics described above was not a purely Stoic or ascetic suppression of natural affects.[29] On the contrary, Jesuit moral prescriptions regarding the right affective and social expression of maternal love made full use of the rhetorical *movere* in order to channel this natural affect into a more spiritual *habitus* (or virtue). This process was twofold. First, it involved heightening the affective experience of the contingence and misdirection of worldly love by highlighting the pains associated with it—an experience epitomised by grief at the loss of a child. Grief could then be redirected and associated with the spiritual solace brought by the consideration of the divine plan and the afterlife. Caussin's *Lettre à Mme Dargouge sur la mort de sa fille* (1649) instantiates such a process.

A Study in Spiritual Direction of Maternal Love: Caussin's *Lettre à Madame Dargouge sur la mort de sa fille* (1649)

The conceptual framework informing the spiritual direction of worldly love is one of 'stoicism with feeling.' Stoic *apatheia* or suppression of the passions grounded in the awareness of the fateful course of the world was incompatible with the Jesuit commitment to human free will and to the importance of rightly directed passions—especially the passion of love—in human ethics. This last point was part of the overall Aristotelian and Thomist outlook on the passions, which postulated that ingrained 'natural' passions could agree with the reasonable will in aiming for an ethically good end: such ingrained passions were habits, and when they tended towards the good, they were virtues. This notion therefore acknowledged that the well-directed sensitive appetite was constitutive of virtue: its corollary was the Aristotelian definition of virtue as an affective golden mean. It was towards such a notion that Suárez somewhat

29 Yet Neo-Stoicism permeates the Jesuit intellectual production in a variety of ways, the most striking of which is the conception of martyrdom. The aesthetics of the Senecan tragic model thus informs Jesuit martyr plays: Caussin's *Felicitas* (1618) fits neatly in that tradition, with its dismembered, gory corpses or martyred sons on stage piling up under the gaze of their constant mother. Caussin also repeatedly praises Seneca in the *Cour sainte*: Caussin, *Cour sainte*, vol. 1, pt. 3, p. 422 and 472.

'bended' the stoicism of Seneca and Plutarch.[30] More importantly, Suarez appropriated the Stoic *propassiones* and modified significantly their meaning. In the Stoic tradition—taken up by Aquinas in his explanation of the sadness of Christ on the Cross—a *propassio* was the drive of the sensitive appetite prior to any intervention of the will. A Stoic *propassio* was a mere 'pre-emotion': it only became a perfect or fully fledged emotion once the will had assented to it and allowed it to become a motive for action. Aquinas thus held the view that Christ's sadness on the cross was a mere *propassio*, grounded in his bodily nature.[31] For Suárez, however, *propassiones* were voluntary affective states generated to better the will's commitment to, and operation of, a specific action. Suarez paraphrased Aristotle, who stated that being drawn to action out of anger was not the sign of a courageous man, but that stirring anger in oneself for the sake of improving the operation of the virtue of courage was. The patristic authority of Augustine stating that the wise man could not live in this life without affects further supported this view. Suárez cautiously suggested that in order to decide whether or not such voluntary affects had any impact on the will, one would have had to check if the *conatus* (the intentional momentum) of the will had intensified after the induced affective state had been experienced.[32]

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30 Suárez, *Tractatus quinque theologici* tract. 4, disp. 1, sect. 2, 328: "De bonitate et malitia passionum"; "Plutarchus *Liber de virtute morum* dixit non esse sapientis affectus radicitus evellere, quia neque potest, neque expedit, sed ordinem eis praescribere, confirmatur. Nam affectus saepe habent bonos effectus, ut de timore poenae, & misericordia patet, ac de tristitia peccatis commissi, &c. Item delectatio natura sua comitatur virutem; denique virtus non destruit naturam, . . . sed temperat." ("Plutarch, in his *Moralia* states that it is not the philosopher's duty to uproot affects, for this is neither possible, nor convenient, but he reasserts that it is the philosopher's duty to order them. For affects often generate good effects, as it is obvious in the case of the fear of castigation, or misericord, or the sadness caused by committed sins, &c. Similarly, enjoyment is of its own nature the mate of virtue; finally virtue does not suppress nature . . . but it tempers it.") Translation is the author's own.

31 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* 3.15.6. On this topic, see Patrick Mahaney Clark: "For the Greater Glory: Courage, Death and Virtue in Aquinas and his Philosophical Inheritance" (PhD Diss., University of Notre-Dame, 2009).

32 Suárez, *Tractatus quinque theologici* tract. 2, disp. 3, sect. 3, 150: "utrum concupiscentia augeat voluntarium"; "fuerunt in Christo quae dicuntur propassiones, & homines studiosi excitant in se similes affectus ad melius exercendas actiones, & de hac dixit Aristot.*3 Ethicor.c.8* operari ex ira non esse viri fortis, sed excitare in se iram per vitutem fortitudinis ut melius operetur . . .; de hac etiam August.14 *de Civit.c.9* dicit sapientem non posse in hac vita vivere sine affectibus."

If Suárez expressed philosophical doubt about the possibility for voluntary affects to modify the will, and favoured the model of the affective 'golden mean,' Caussin's own rhetorical theory and practice as a spiritual director showed that he thoroughly embraced such a possibility. Since the sensitive appetite could affect the rational will by means of the imagination, one needed only stir the right affects in the sensitive appetite by means of the right images. *Enargia* and hypotyposes were therefore central to the manipulation of affects anatomized by Caussin in his rhetoric.[33] Moreover, as a spiritual director, Caussin deemed it necessary to remind his flock—in all likelihood the devout ladies of the same Parisian gentry Madame Dargouge belonged to—of the worldliness of their imperfect nature, experienced in the painful pangs that the passions could inflict, in order to better stir them towards a spiritual awareness of such imperfection. This could then be construed as a testimony of election: martyrdom loomed large on the horizon of Jesuit ethical prescription. The mourning mother had to experience to the full excessive pain and grief prompted by worldly affects—only then did such unbearable affects demand as their justification the promise of the afterlife and of divine retribution; otherwise, they would just have been a moral abomination.[34] Once such justification was provided, excessive pains could paradoxically be greeted as the sign of the beatitude to come.

The letter to Madame Dargouge instantiates the various phases of such affective conditioning, intended to turn 'worldly' maternal love into a spiritual longing for the afterlife. Caussin reported to Madame Dargouge the sudden death of her daughter, a devout and modest maiden, after a quick and brutal

33 Caussin, *De Eloquentia*, bk. 8, "De affectibus," 459–555.

34 Caussin, *La Cour sainte*, vol. 1, pt. 3, pp. 471–73. "Enfin je dis que la tribulation nous confirme en la foy des choses futures, comme estant une manifeste preuve de la beatitude . . . quand nous voyons des hommes innocents . . . qui sortent mesme de cette vie par des issües sanglantes & horribles . . . nous concluons necessairement qu'il y a en l'autre vie une autre Justice & un autre tribunal, où les causes se doivent decider en dernier ressort . . . C'est ce qui consoloit tous les Martyrs dans des peines effroyables . . . Car si bien les membres mortels succomboient au fer de la persecution, si est-ce qu'ils voyoient, quoyque d'un oeil trempé de sang & de larmes, cette belle gloire qui les attendoit." ("Finally I state that tribulation strengthens our faith in future things, for it is an obvious proof of beatitude . . . when we see innocent men . . . who even make their exits in horrible and gory ways . . . we must necessarily conclude that there is another Justice and tribunal in the afterlife . . . This brought solace to all martyrs in horrible pains . . . For their mortal limbs might well indeed have succumbed under the iron of persecution, yet they were at the same time looking to this beautiful glory awaiting them, although with a bloodied and tearful eye.") Translations are the author's own.

illness. Caussin attended her final moments. The first part of the letter is a masterpiece of dramatic *enargia*, intended to have Madame Dargouge experience maternal love as unbearable grief at the loss of her child. Caussin did not spare her the analeptic suspense of hope shared by who witnessed her death: a few hours before she died, her daughter suddenly seemed better.[35] This dramatic depiction, where pathos is heightened by references to the trivia in the maiden's final conversation, puts her very last moments under the eyes of her mother. It is intended to prompt a climax of grief. Indeed, Caussin expected the mother, at this stage, to stop reading as she cried over her daughter's death and vented her regrets.[36] Once this climactic grief (the *propassio*) had rendered the experience of maternal love unbearably painful, Caussin reined it in towards a more restrained expression, grounded in the austere contemplation of the eschatological end of humanity: Madame Dargouge had then to be more 'virtuous' than a mother, and rise above the potentially impious 'language of nature' of desperate grief, in order to find solace in the eschatological promise of the afterlife and her Christian faith in the immortality of the soul.[37]

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35 Nicolas Caussin, *Lettre de consolation du Reverend pere Caussin, à Mme Dargouge sur la mort de Mademoiselle sa fille* (Paris, 1649), 3: "sur les approches de la mort elle . . . m'entretint d'un esprit gay & contant, me demandant si je m'estois souvenu d'une affaire qu'elle m'avoit recommandé & qu'elle ne manqueroit pas de me venir voir pour en sçavoir . . . Je la vis alors en un si bon estat que je ne pouvois m'imaginer qu'elle fut proche de sa fin, tant elle avoit l'esprit present, la parole ferme, & le jugement asseuré. Cependant sur le soir le mal redoubla ses furie . . . et l'emporta sur le poinct du jour." ("As death drew closer, she . . . chatted to me with a merry and contented mind, and asked me if I had remembered some business that she had entrusted me with, and that she would make sure she would pay me a visit to know about it . . . She seemed in such good state to me then that I could not imagine she was drawing close to her end: so sharply present was her mind, so firm her voice, so solid her judgment. Yet her illness worsened furiously in the evening . . . and took her at dawn.") Translations are the author's own.

36 Caussin, *Lettre*, 3: "Je sçay que vous estes vertueuse, mais aussi je n'ignore que vous estes mere: donnez des larmes à la meilleure des filles; je ne suis pas un rocher pour empescher un sacrifice que la nature doit à la douleur. Si vous quittez ioy ma lettre pour pleurer, reprenez-la une autre fois pour vous consoler." ("I know that you are virtuous, yet I do not ignore the fact that you are a mother: offer some tears to the best of all daughters: I am not a rock to prevent the sacrifice that nature owes to grief. If you now leave my letter to cry, take it back again to console yourself."). Translations are the author's own.

37 Caussin, *Lettre*, 5: "c'est parler le langage de la nature, & non celuy de la grace, qui nous deffend . . . de pleurer les morts à la façon de ceux qui n'ont point d'esperance de leur immortalité. Ignorez-vous qu'il y a des arrests de Dieu sur nostre vie & sur nostre mort, qu'il nous faut plutost accepter avec sousmission, que plaindre avec chagrain?" ("this is speaking the language of nature, not the one of grace, which forbids us to cry over the

Prompting her excessive grief thus allowed Caussin to channel her maternal love towards a spiritual longing for the afterlife, the place where her daughter was. The celestial reunion of mother and daughter—a part of herself, in accordance with the ideal of *amicitia*—was, in fact, the opening, consolatory image of the letter.[38]

Conclusion: Eschatology and the Affective Response to Contingency

Mademoiselle Dargouge waiting for her mother in heaven opened the consolatory letter of Caussin. Caussin concluded one of his college plays, *Felicitas*, in the same vein. In the last scene, the martyred son of Felicitas whose gory remains were still scattered on stage called from the heavens for his mother dying on the stage to join him.[39] Both images look to the martyr as their type. As I hope to have shown, both are intended to reform the 'carnal love' at the heart of natural motherhood into the spiritual charity of the afterlife. The manipulation of affects involved in such reform, namely, the unbearably painful experience of loss through which Caussin puts his mothers-as-readers or spectators—in person for Madame Dargouge, vicariously for others—was intended to make them feel the limits of their ethics 'according to nature,' and to awaken their eschatological awareness and its related moral demands: these were the affective mechanics of Jesuit eschatological ethics as an ordering structure. Caussin's focus on maternal love and its expression is therefore bound to early modern concerns regarding the affective essence of ethics, and the right exercise of human (free) will—this is where we find them articulated by Suárez. These early modern forms of affective conditioning may seem revolting to the (post)-modern reader whose worldview does not do away easily with the moral abomination of children's death in the name of second-order eschatological optimism. This discrepancy reflects, in fact, a characteristic feature of the early modern *mentalité*. Jesuit—and for that

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dead in the fashion of those who do not hope for their immortality. Do you not know that there are divine decrees over our life and death, that we ought to submit to rather than to bemoan?"). Translations are the author's own.

38 Caussin, *Lettre*, 1: "Madame, je craindrois d'offencer vostre vertu, si je vous celois que dans le ciel . . . vous avez une chere partie de vous mesme, qui vous a devancé" ("Madam, I fear I might offend your virtue were I to hide from you that in the heavens . . . there is a dear part of yourself that has pre-empted you."). Translations are the author's own.

39 Nicolas Caussin, *Felicitas* in *Tragoediae sacrae* (Cologne: J. Kinch, 1621), 260–61.

matter early modern Catholic—eschatological prescriptions were affective strategies to cope with a tragic figure of contingency. The ways in which they ordered emotions attempted to provide a form of outlet for, and solace to, the experience of loss that is the other history hiding behind the figures of early modern infant mortality rates. The very 'harshness'—for want of a better word—of these prescriptions, their omnipresence, bear oblique testament to the intensity of the 'natural' affective experience they attempted to harness.[40]

40 On average, the fecundity rate is between seven and eight children per woman, and the infantile mortality rate at or above fifty percent in the first year of life in seventeenth-century France: see Benoît Garnot, *La Population en France au XVI^ème, XVII^ème, et XVIII^ème siècle* (1988; Paris: Ophrys, 2005).

CHAPTER 10

Anatomy of a Passion: Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale* as Case Study*

Louis C. Charland and R.S. White

This essay results from a common interest in the history of emotions shared by an academic with appointments in philosophy and psychiatry (Charland) and a literary historian (White). Where our interests converge is in the early modern concept of 'the passions,' as explanatory of what we now call mental illness. The task we have set ourselves is to see how this might:

(a) be exemplified in a 'case study' of the dramatic revelation of Leontes's jealousy in the first half of William Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale*, and his 'cure' which takes sixteen years. Both events have troubled literary critics as implausible, lacking in realistic motivation, and clumsy as narrative devices, but can be explained in terms of theories of the passions; and
(b) open up a greater, *modern* understanding of irrational, pathological states, their onset and termination, by using as an explanatory model the early modern understanding of passions as revived and refined in the nineteenth century by Théodule Ribot.

Janus-like, this chapter faces into the past and the future (our present) via a play written in 1610 that is still performed to receptive audiences today. We hope to show that the theory can illuminate a playtext, and that the play can revivify the theory, and to contend that historical analysis can shed light on modern clinical problems.

The particular historical distinction which lies at the heart of our approach derives from early modern terminology offered by Thomas Wright in his book, *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* (first published in 1601; corrected, enlarged and augmented in 1604), and presented in more modern fashion in the nineteenth century by Théodule Ribot, in his *La Psychologie des sentiments*

* We dedicate this essay to Philippa Maddern, whose inspiration has generated so much interdisciplinary research in the history of emotions and has brought so many like-minded scholars into fertile contact—in our cases, linking Western Ontario and Western Australia.

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(1896) and *Essai sur les passions* (1907). It lies between the 'passions,' considered as rigid, 'organised emotion' (long-term affective states that involve planning and enlist reason in determining their course), and more transitory, changeable 'affections,' which were later named emotions (shorter, more abrupt and less reflective states than passions). This formulation seems to offer both a clue to interpreting early literature in its own medical context, and also the possibility of fresh insight into the nature of complex affective syndromes and pathologies today. The distinction is in some ways analogous to that between 'chronic' (a condition lasting for a long time) and 'acute' (a brief 'episode'). Interestingly, Immanuel Kant seems to make this exact distinction in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, in which a chapter is titled "On Emotion in Contrast to Passion."[1] The orginal German terms, however, are '*Affekte*' (emotion) and '*Leidenschaft*' (passion). Ribot translates these into French as '*émotion*' and '*passion*,' though experts contend that there is no truly adequate translation in German for the English 'emotion.'[2] It should be noted that the full, modern use of the term 'emotion' as a predominantly psychological term of art did not develop until the mid-nineteenth century, and when it did it became a catch-all term subsuming the older term 'passion.' Thomas Dixon traces the first official use of the new, largely psychological, meaning of 'emotion' (in English) to the writings of Thomas Brown and Charles Bell.[3] To make things even more complicated, some theorists these days distinguish 'affect' as quite close to 'effect' in signifying a spontaneous and unreflective bodily response ("she burst out crying"), from 'emotion' as more conscious and discursive states.[4] However, our exploration is into 'passions' as dominant states.

We are proposing, then, that in early modern times a central ordering structure concerning what we now know as emotions, turned on the distinction between the dominant and abiding passions and the subsidiary, changeable affections. These states of the mind are generated within the more comprehensive analysis of bodily conditions that are explained in terms of the humours.

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1 Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1796; 1800), rev. and ed. Hans H. Rudnick, intro. Frederick P. Van de Pitte (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996), see especially "On Emotion in Contrast to Passion." Ribot notes this precedent: Théodule Ribot, *Essai sur les passions* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1907), 4.

2 See for example Anna Wierzbicka, *Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3. The same, we believe, can be said for the French '*émotion*.'

3 Thomas Dixon, "'Emotion': The History of a Keyword in Crisis," *Emotion Review* 4 (2012): 338–44.

4 See Stephanie Trigg, "Introduction: Emotional Histories—Beyond the Personalization of the Past and the Abstraction of Affect Theory," *Exemplaria* 26 (2014): 3–15, esp. 7–9.

In this sense, mental and physiological dimensions were ordered and interrelated within a single system, which saw illness in both mental and physical terms without a sharp distinction between the two. The medical strategy governing the system of learning as a whole depended on bringing all into a state of balance and correspondences. The basis of this classification of health and illness, we further argue, existed in some form through to the eighteenth century, when profound changes in medical paradigms were being developed, in which mind and body were increasingly seen as separate spheres. One writer, however, Théodule Ribot, saw wisdom in maintaining the early modern distinction between passions and affections linked within a larger unity between emotions and the body, and the analytical *schema* he proposed adapts the traditional terminology to more recent developments in his time. In turn his ideas hold promise of therapeutic utility today in dealing with *idées fixes* which characterise certain forms of mental illness.

Emotional Problems in *The Winter's Tale*

Despite many successful theatrical realisations of *The Winter's Tale* over the last hundred years, critics still struggle to explain, or perhaps even understand, the source of its power. Amongst some of the play's staging difficulties, we find the apparent suddenness and lack of preparation for revealing to the audience Leontes's jealousy in the first scenes. What is going on here? Among literary and dramatic critics, Nevill Coghill argued that Shakespeare was writing a play-script for performance, and surprises are inescapably a part of drama in the theatre.[5] The play has also been seen as 'spatial metaphor,' a poem where we look not for consecutive, narrative threads but visionary truths, of which unmotivated jealousy may be one.[6] Other commentators argue that the play can be coaxed into a more realistic mode if we impute motivation.[7] Others point out that Shakespeare was following stage fashion in reviving an older and recalcitrantly cruder genre, romance, which was always marked by narrative surprises, and non-psychological, paratactic devices.[8] Like romance itself,

5 Nevill Coghill, "Six Points of Stage-Craft in *The Winter's Tale*," *Shakespeare Survey* 11 (1958): 31–41.

6 G. Wilson Knight, " 'Great Creating Nature': An Essay on *The Winter's Tale*," in *The Crown of Life: Essays in Interpretation of Shakespeare's Final Plays* (London: Methuen, 1948), 76–128.

7 Norman Sanders, "Introduction," in *The Winter's Tale*, ed. Norman Sanders (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987).

8 Helen Cooper, *The English Romance in Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

the play has been seen as offering not linear narrativity but the metaphorical logic of dreams in which unexpected emotional states dominate,[9] an approach that lends itself to Freudian elucidation,[10] while feminist readings of the play emphasise ways in which the maternal presence is initially overruled by masculine authority but finally reasserts itself as an agency for recovery.[11] However, all these explanations stem from literary and dramatic considerations, whereas our approach lies through the history of emotions. There has never been a study which suggests that there is a medical dimension to the play, which can explain a lot. We apply a distinctively early modern, medical approach, whose basis was current in Shakespeare's England. *The Winter's Tale* was performed on the public Globe Theatre and then in the presence of King James at court, both in 1611; Wright's book on medicine (1601–1604) would have had limited readers among scholars and those who could afford to buy books, but still synthesises concepts available in other works suggesting a wider knowledge; while Shakespeare's direct source, the prose work *Pandosto* by Thomas Greene, was printed in 1607 as a cheap romance, available to all but the poorest and illiterate, but perhaps still read even to them.

The train of reasoning we are pursuing here is that awareness of early modern conceptions of the passions, especially as later 'translated' into more modern terminology by Ribot, make perfect sense of the play as an emotionally conceived whole, to the extent that *The Winter's Tale* might fairly be described as Shakespeare's systematic anatomy of passion theory, in his own time, and potentially for ours. It suggests why the play still 'works' in the theatre today as effectively as it presumably did in 1610. In a nutshell, Shakespeare draws on the quasi-medical theory of passions to structure his play. The first half is a case study of the passion of jealousy, terminated by the shock of the death of Leontes's son Mamillius, who is not returned to him, and the apparent deaths of his wife Hermione and newborn daughter (Perdita or 'the lost one'), who are both returned; while the second half of the play is a case study of the passion of grief driven by renewed love, as well as the theatrical 'distraction' of the sheepshearing scene, which reinforces the pattern of psychic recovery effected by substituting one passion, jealousy, with another, love. In both, it is the nature of passion itself as an affective category that provides unity. When, and how, other affective states of shorter duration, like changing 'affections'

9 Marjorie B. Garber, *Dream in Shakespeare: From Metaphor to Metamorphosis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 163–86.

10 Ruth Nevo, *Shakespeare's Other Language* (London: Methuen, 1987), 95–129.

11 Janet Adelman, *Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin in Shakespeare's Plays* (New York: Routledge, 1992), ch. 8.

(our modern 'emotions'), operate, is then largely determined by their relationship to the overarching passion in the context in which they occur. We do not here consider the latter in any detail, but concentrate on the former. A single passion is what provides unity, and coherence, to the various behaviours (affective and cognitive) that fall under its purview. It is what explains their rule-governed character, or 'ordering'; that is, the fact that the various behavioural episodes do not succeed one another in an accidental sequence, but instead occur in a 'rational,' explicable, manner holding to its own inner logic.

The Theory of Passions from Wright to Ribot

Thomas Wright, in his book *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* (1604 edition) provides evidence of how 'passion' was understood in Shakespeare's time, and appears to anticipate Ribot's later understanding of 'passion' as a clinical term. Wright emphasises the diagnostic importance of a guiding passion (an "inordinate appetite"), described as 'perturbations of the mind' which are difficult to dislodge.[12] Wright also repeats several times that there is a hierarchy in which passions, proceeding from the 'soul' or mind, can dominate and in time unbalance the four bodily humours, so that observable, physical disease results:

> As this Treatise affordeth great riches to the Physitian of the soule, so it importeth much the Physitian of the bodie, for that there is no Passion very vehement, but that it alters extreamely some of the foure humors of the bodie; and all Physitians commonly agree, that among diverse other extrinsecall causes of diseases, one, and not the least, is, the excesse of some inordinate Passion: for although it busieth their braines, as also the naturall philosophers, to explicate the manner how an operation that lodgeth in the soule can alter the bodie, and move the humors from one place to another, (as for example, recall most of the bloud in the face, of other partes, to the heart, as wee see by daily experience to chance in fear and anger) yet they contend that it may proceede from a certaine sympathie of nature, a subordination of one part to another, and that the spirites and humors wait upon the Passions, as their Lords and Maisters. The Physitians therefore knowing by what Passion the maladie was caused,

12 For some examples of the 'holistic' nature of early modern medicine and passion theory, affecting as it does both body and soul, see Erin Sullivan, "A Disease Unto Death: Sadness in the Time of Shakespeare," in *Emotions and Health 1200–1700*, ed. Elena Carrera (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 159–83, esp. 163–65.

> may well inferre what humor aboundeth, & consequently what ought to be purged, what remedy to be applied; & after, how it may be prevented.[13]

This passage, besides making clear the central distinction Wright is making (and which he continues to make through repetition) between passions and humours (mind and body, soul and sense), also gives valuable examples of what may constitute a passion, as a persisting malady of the spirit that, if untreated, may cause bodily or humoural symptoms of disease. He mentions explicitly fear and anger as examples of such dominating passions, while cataloguing the seven deadly sins amongst other examples: pride and ambition, anger, lust, avarice and jealousy, gluttony and drunkenness (obsessive appetites), sloth 'or such like passion,[14] may become passions when they "over-rule" (literally 'rule over') the man's mind and behaviour. For example, when speaking to a person predisposed to eruptions of anger, one must "see in what height or elevation his affections are, lest, by casting forth a sparke of fire, his gun-powdred minde of a sodayne be inflamed."[15]

In Chapter two Wright presents yet another hierarchy. Reason stands above both passion (whose domain is the soul) and sense or sensuality (from the body), but if passion and sense "enter into league" they can over time distort or infect the reason, which "straightways inventeth tenne thousand sorts of new delights, which the passions never could have imagined," and which "feede sensualitie";[16] an "ignominious industry of reason . . . to please their inordinate appetites."[17] In short, the person governed by a passion ends up under its power, and even reason is coerced into an extreme state that commonly tends towards vice of some kind. In our own modern terminology that person is obsessed, neurotic, fixated, and effectively addicted to a state of mind as a 'rationalisation' of a strongly held and subjectively plausible point of view. However, such a process need not be negative, since later in Wright's book we discover that among those passions are some "wherewith we prosecute good." The prime example he gives is that "love holdeth the principall place" as "the root of other affections," and Wright clearly implies this is not sensual but spiritual love, which is curative rather than destructive in its long-term effects. Shakespeare in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* supports the view that love is just as much a disordered state of mind as madness: "The lunatic, the lover, and the

13 Wright, *Passions of the Minde in Generall*, 4.
14 Wright, *Passions of the Minde in Generall*, 6.
15 Wright, *Passions of the Minde in Generall*, 6.
16 Wright, *Passions of the Minde in Generall*, 10–11.
17 Wright, *Passions of the Minde in Generall*, 11.

poet/ Are of imagination all compact," in holding onto "Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend / More than cool reason ever comprehends" (5.1.5–8).

Ever since Wright wrote *The Passions of the Mind*, some of his terms have remained consistently in use: even humoral theory vestigially survives—though not in medical parlance except 'bilious'—in 'phlegmatic,' 'sanguine,' 'splenetic,' and 'melancholy'). However, their meanings have changed either subtly or markedly, to such an extent that by the nineteenth century the early modern understanding of passions had been effectively lost to mainstream theories of affectivity as the study of the mind was turning into psychology. In particular, the tendency, gradually increasing from the later seventeenth century, to use the word 'emotions' (previously meaning simply an exodus or 'moving away, ex-motion') signalled a fundamental change of approach. Thomas Dixon has traced the change, and encapsulates it in his title, *From Passions to Emotions*.[18] Previously, passion had a religious component linked to the spirit or soul,[19] and inevitably this was also a moral force since, under the influence of natural law (the innate faculty persuading humans to follow virtue and shun vice), it could sway one to either good or evil.[20] However, during the eighteenth century in particular, 'passions' became gradually displaced as a term of analysis by 'emotions', which, in Dixon's subtitle, belong within "a secular category," so that the term 'passion' no longer plays a serious role in Western science, psychology, or philosophy. It is a relic from the past, now referring mainly to a strong enthusiasm ("a passion for stamp collecting") and heightened sexual attraction, and as a clinical term it has completely fallen out of use. However, tenuous but tenacious vestiges occurred from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, in the works of celebrated writers from different countries, such as John Locke's *An Essay on Human Understanding* (1689), René Descartes's *Les Passions de l'Ame* (1649), Benedict de Spinoza's *The Ethics* (1677), Arthur Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Idea* (1818), Sir Alexander Crichton's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Mental Derangement* (1798), and Philippe Pinel's *Traité médico-philosophique sur l'alienation mentale ou la manie* (1801). Despite the general waning of the underlying model of the psychopathology of affectivity, there was a brief and flourishing revival during the nineteenth

18 Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

19 See R.S. White, " 'False Friends': Affective Semantics in Shakespeare," *Shakespeare* 8 (2012): 286–99.

20 See R.S. White, *Natural Law in English Renaissance Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

century, especially in France.[21] One of the leading figures of this period is Théodule Ribot (1839–1916). Although he is neglected, he was a considerable figure in the history of psychology then taking root in Europe and America. Significantly a philosopher by training, Ribot in 1888 became the first person appointed to the newly created Chair of Experimental and Comparative Psychology at the illustrious Collège de France.[22] Along with his contemporaries, William James and Wilhelm Wundt, he is widely recognised as one of the founding figures of modern, scientific psychology. Ribot was a prolific author. He is usually remembered for his pioneering work on memory, heredity, and personality.[23] Yet he also wrote five books on various aspects of what he called "affective psychology" (*la psychologie affective*) and the "affective life" (*la vie affective*). His first and most important publication on the psychology of the affective life was *La psychologie des sentiments* (1896). Unfortunately, the title of this major work was incorrectly rendered into English as *The Psychology of the Emotions*. As a result, English readers of Ribot are likely to miss the theoretical rationale and significance of his tripartite division of the affective life into feelings (*sentiments*), emotions (*émotions*), and passions (*passions*). As it turns out, the passions (*les passions*) play an absolutely central—and theoretically ineliminable—role in Ribot's theory of the affective life. In his view, neither psychology nor psychopathology can do without this theoretical explanatory posit. It is this concept of 'passion' that we wish to reinstate in the context, since its precursors were contemporary with Shakespeare. In his *Essai sur les passions* (1907), Ribot laments the fact that the term 'passion' has fallen into disuse (*désuétude*). Drawing on the work of philosophers such as Descartes, Schopenhauer, Spinoza, and Kant, he undertakes a full-scale scientific re-examination and reformulation of the concept of 'passion.' His final theoretical statement on the matter is without parallel in the history of contemporary psychology and psychopathology. It represents the culmination of a long tradition of nineteenth-century French medical reflection on the psychopathology of the passions.[24]

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21 G.E. Berrios, "Psychopathology of Affectivity: Conceptual and Historical Aspects," *Psychological Medicine* 15, no. 4 (1985): 745–58.

22 S. Nicolas, *Théodule Ribot: Philosophe breton, fondateur de la psychologie française* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005); S. Nicolas and A. Charvillat, "Introducing Psychology as an Academic Discipline in France: Théodule Ribot and the College de France (1888–1901)," *Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences* 37, no. 2 (2001): 143–64.

23 Nicolas, *Théodule Ribot*.

24 Louis C. Charland, "Reinstating the Passions: Lessons from the History of Psychopathology," in *The Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Emotion*, ed. P. Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 237–63.

Ribot downplays the religious and moral connotations, and allows the passions to stand beside emotions, a distinct but subsidiary explanatory category.[25] Charland states the difference in this way:

> A common feature of both the traditional and modern conceptions of the passions is the recognition that they are states of long duration. According to Ribot, this is a crucial distinguishing feature of the passions compared to the emotions, which are states of relatively brief duration, with sudden onset.[26]

The significance of Ribot's formulation from an historical point of view is that, although it was not destined to become the dominant paradigm, it kept alive the theory of the passions for a later audience, expressed in secularised language and with the addition of detailed refinements of analysis. Extrapolating from Ribot's analysis, we find eight distinctive criteria for defining a passion in his secular, psychologising terms, which again are reflected in the system explained by Wright, though without the religious emphasis. We spell these out here in brief and summary form since each of them will become relevant to our reading of *The Winter's Tale*.[27]

1. *Long-term affective orientation*

According to Ribot, feeling (*sentiment*), which represents the most basic level of affective experience, is a fleeting domain where constant change and movement are the norm. In contrast, emotions (*émotions*) and passions (*passions*) represent more complex and stable forms of affective organisation and orientation. While emotions are usually states and processes of relatively short duration, passions, in contrast, can endure for months, or even years. Avarice, ambition, and envy are passions in this sense. They provide fixed points of orientation that endure over time, as the most stable and complex forms of affective organisation. A passion is like a normative filter through which a substantial proportion of transactions with the environment are interpreted, evaluated, processed, and responded to. Thus, a passion like jealousy dictates

25 S. Nicolas and D. J. Murray, "Théodule Ribot (1839–1916), Founder of French Psychology: A Biographical Introduction," *History of Psychology* 2, no. 4 (1999): 277–301.

26 Louis C. Charland, "Moral Undertow and the Passions: Two Challenges for Contemporary Emotion Regulation," *Emotion Review* 5, no. 3 (2011): 83–91, at 84.

27 These criteria are adapted from Louis C. Charland, A. Hope, A. Stewart, and J. Tan, "Anorexia Nervosa as a Passion," *Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology* 20, no. 4 (2013): 353–65.

what, when, and how jealous individuals will respond to their environment: when and at whom they will be angry; what they will feel in the absence or presence of a loved one; and how they will organise their activities during the day, week, or month. Passions not only help to direct and organise feelings and emotions, but also cognition and motivation.

2. *Fixed, possibly obsessive or delusional, ideational focus*

At the organisational core of every passion lies a fixed intellectual component or idea (*idée fixe*). The fixed idea that defines the core orientation in a passion can admit different formulations of greater or lesser scope and specificity, but there must be a fixed idea to generate, sustain, and direct, the organisational focus of a passion over time. In some cases, the fixed idea in question may be obsessive or delusional, such as pathological, or morbid, jealousy which is relevant in *The Winter's Tale*.

3. *Felt aspects, motivating power, and 'movement'*

Passions are mixed and complex affective states and processes. They have a felt dimension, which can vary in duration or intensity, and which accounts for their affective nature. Those feelings and related emotional states and processes move the organism to action in quite specific ways, and so passions also affect motivation. As stated by Wright above, passions also have an intellectual component involving the rational faculty, sometimes luring it into the passion's net of obsession and 'justifying' the passion in an apparently logical way. They are centred around a fixed idea and they often generate and are tied to multiple additional intellectual states and processes. Obviously, in this sense, passions are not passive (the semantic root of 'passion')—quite the contrary—they are dynamic, active, ingredients of mind, that move the organism to action in often very specifically calculated and defined ways. However, such movement is consistent and constantly reinforced in its inner core of self-certainty, so that they are in this sense unmoving, 'passive'. This is a defining paradox. One aspect of the passions is that they change and develop over time, however, such change is dictated by a kind of 'tunnel vision': they typically draw the afflicted into the grip of a settled presumption. In this sense, a passion differs from the ever-changing feelings provoked in 'normal' everyday life.

4. *Organising and ordering schema for feelings and emotions*

Passions organise and order feelings and emotions in accordance with a specific long-term affective orientation, centred around a fixed idea. But, in addition, they provide intellectual and behavioural schemas for thought and action that also derive from their dominating, fixed idea. Indeed, passions might

be viewed as a specific category of 'schemas,' of the sort that are sometimes referred to in cognitive behavioural therapy. They are, however, fundamentally affective in nature, and never mainly cognitive. Reason is coerced to support the passion, not the other way around.

5. *Integration with cognition and reason*
Passions require reason and cognition (in Wright's terms, the senses). They are both tied to and susceptible to reason, though they can also exercise an affective hold and constrain voluntary action. It is important to emphasise that passion and reason are not incompatible in this view, just as Wright's analysis suggests. Reason can sometimes still be 'slave' to passion, although, as indicated above, reason may also be invoked therapeutically to combat passion, often through the intermediary of a contradictory or opposite passion.

6. *Progressive, cumulative, course*
Many passions have a progressive, cumulative, course and this plays an important part in their psychopathology. Jealousy, guilt, and even romantic love, are famous examples of passions that can lead to mental illness and disorder in this way. Ribot likens passions that assume such a morbid character to parasitic growths or tumours.

7. *Morbidity and psychopathology*
Passions represent an 'abnormal' break or rupture in the otherwise ceaseless ebb and flow of feeling, which is the more 'normal' state of the events and processes that underlie our affective life. Therefore, passions are abnormal. Yet their 'abnormality' in this sense does not mean that passions do not bring much good to the affective life as we know it. Many passions do carry an inherent risk of morbidity and lead to serious psychopathology, though not all passions lead to mental illness. Hence, the passions are not all necessarily pathological, but the link between passion and potential psychopathology is close and intimate. Again, individual passions can be either malign or benign in their influence.

8. *Refusal of treatment, advice or relinquishing agency*
Under the influence of an increasingly strong passion, the sufferer typically retreats into a potentially nightmarish world of his own, refusing to listen to or act upon advice from others, refusing treatment because 'nothing is wrong,' and refusing to allow others to act on his behalf. In this worst-case scenario the passion can affect much of the personality. It can be seen as like an avalanche that gains more and more power, or like a magnet that draws to itself increasingly significant parts of the person's personality and

compulsively guides behaviour. It can become increasingly out of control and lead to pathology and death (in extreme cases including suicide or even murder—both of which are incidentally tragic conclusions in *Othello*, another study in jealousy). Or, alternatively, a person afflicted with a passion may eventually give up struggling against it, so difficult is the struggle, which may be internalised not as an effective treatment but a gesture of succumbing or even defeat. Related to this are problems of agency: the difficulty in resisting the effects of the passion even though the person might in part, and to some extent, wish to resist. There are Shakespearean examples of passions taking over someone's life with subsequent loss of control and agency in *Romeo and Juliet* (sexual love), *Macbeth* (ambition and fear), *King Lear* (lust for power) and *Hamlet* (desire for revenge).

One more aspect of Ribot's analysis will become relevant to our analysis of *The Winter's Tale*. Given that the earlier tradition of the passions emphasised the difficulty of helping someone to overcome a passion, since it is also characteristic of a passion that the person is not motivated to overcome it, nor listen to other counsel—how in fact can it be overcome? Ribot suggests that people may be almost powerless to overcome a passion, since that agency is reduced even as it is more vehemently asserted. Passions, he suggests, can end in a variety of ways: exhaustion, transformation, substitution, insanity, and even death.[28] However, one passion may sometimes be overcome either by sudden bursts or shocks of feeling, or by another powerful passion that changes or replaces the original fixation. A turning point may come when something dramatic happens to affect the person (for example, they collapse and are rushed into hospital). An interesting implication of Ribot's account is that when passions lead to exhaustion and we are no longer able to combat or resist them, strength may be gained by turning to an outside power, perhaps another person, a group, or an institution. Such an approach would be effective only for a person who had some urgent motivation to overcome the condition. Given such motivation, it might be easier to hand over control to someone else than personally bring about behavioural change. Ribot also suggested that order and routine may be helpful in overcoming a passion.

Jealousy, the mainspring in *The Winter's Tale*, is a good example of a passion in Ribot's sense. It often arises out of fear of loss, and like an avalanche, jealousy can grow until it consumes just about all aspects of an individual's psychic life, to the point of pathological obsession. The fixed or overvalued idea at the core of this enduring state and disposition acts like a magnetic core, which attracts or repels all outside events that come to pass. Once it has

28 Ribot, *Essai sur les passions*, 142.

reached this stage, jealousy becomes a super-ordinate affective state and disposition that dominates and organises virtually all aspects of an individual's affective life, defining when and how that individual will respond emotionally, and why. At the same time, it circumscribes the parameters of when and how they will feel what they do, and why. Once it has reached the level of a passion, jealousy organises and directs the individual's life in accordance with a particular, fixed idea, probably as some variant of the belief that one's loved one is being unfaithful in some way. Something like the instinct to protect oneself and one's 'possessions' soon comes into play and the fixed idea acquires motivational force, to keep and defend the bonds one has with the loved one. Finally, in light of its stated goal, the fixed idea starts to generate specific feelings and emotions as the individual interacts with their surroundings. It becomes affectively toned with specific dispositions, that in turn generate formulaic, affective reactions and responses, which reflect the fixed idea in question and its supporting drive.

The Source of *The Winter's Tale*

An immediate clue, which may have sparked Shakespeare's own interest, comes from the very first section of his source for *The Winter's Tale*, a popular prose romance by contemporary Robert Greene. This work bears two names, *Dorastus and Fawnia* and *Pandosto, or The Triumph of Time*. It was first published in 1588 and reprinted in 1607, a few years before the play was performed in 1610–11:

> Among all the passions wherewith humane mindes are perplexed, there is none that so galleth with restlesse despight, as the infectious soare of ielousy: for all other griefes are either to bee appeased with sensible perswasions, to be cured with wholesome counsell, to be relieued in want, or by tract of time to be worne out (Iealousie only excepted) which is so sawsed with suspitious doubtes, and pinching mistrust, that whoso seekes by friendly counsaile to rase out this hellish passion, it forthwith suspecteth that he giueth this aduise to couer his owne guiltinesse. Yea, who so is payned with this restlesse torment doubteth all, distrusteth himselfe, is alwayes frozen with feare, and fired with suspition, hauing that wherein consists all his ioy, to be the breeder of his misery. Yea, it is such a heauy enemy to that holy estate of matrimony, sowing betweene the married couples such deadly seeds of secret hatred, as Loue being once rased out by spitefull distrust, there oft ensueth bloudy

> reuenge, as this ensuing Historie manifestly prooueth: wherein Pandosto (furiously incensed by causelesse iealousie) procured the death of his most louing and loyall wife, and his owne endlesse sorrow and misery.[29]

Already, we see the bases of Wright's concepts, and many of Ribot's explanatory criteria. When Shakespeare read this passage it may have struck him as a keynote theme or 'moral' of *Pandosto*, and the way it is presented by Greene suggests that he intended it in exactly this light—a *roman à clef* to unlock the meaning of the central thread of his story. It explicitly asserts that "Among all the passions wherewith humane mindes are perplexed, there is none that so galleth with restlesse despight, as the infectious soare of ielousy". Jealousy is a "hellish passion" which cannot be "rased out" by friendly counsel because it breeds mistrust and "is alwayes frozen with feare, and fired with suspition" despite the fact that it is "causeless". No justification is given for the sudden and inexplicable onset, but it is clearly set up as a mental illness.

There is not much hope given of recovery for King Pandosto, but at the height of his jealous passion, as he rejects even the Oracle's pronouncement, there is a sudden turning point. His wife's vital spirits stop and she falls dead, not to be revived. At this the king swoons and is rendered speechless for three days. With their king incapacitated by grief, and the queen and young prince dead, the people in their mourning and lamentation become like shadows rather than men. This too provides another clue to our reading of *The Winter's Tale* in the light of passion theory, since in three days after his wife's death Pandosto is completely purged of his jealousy. In both Greene's story and Shakespeare's, the passion of jealousy is forcibly driven out and replaced by a new, equally obsessive but morally more curative passion, conscience-stricken grief and renewed love. Pandosto once a day retires to his wife's tomb and bewails his misfortune, having no companion but sorrow. Thus far Shakespeare follows Greene quite closely, but he now adds a significant element of his own. In Greene's account, in which Pandosto commits sucide, we see the full gravity of a passion, which may lead to death. Leontes, unlike Pandosto, gives himself over completely to the 'dead' queen's lady-in-waiting, Paulina (whose husband is also killed, this time definitively, by an unexpected bear), rendering agency over his life to her. Paulina rules his emotional life with iron resolve, forcing him to maintain his new, painful, passion for sixteen years. Shakespeare's critical divergence from his source at the very end of the play is true to poetic justice as well as the dramatist's craftsmanlike desire to surprise his audience with an *anagnorisis* or resolution. Whereas Pandosto eventually kills himself in remorse for ending

29 Robert Greene, *Pandosto, or The Triumph of Time* (1588; London, 1607), A3r.

his wife's life (and also for harbouring incestuous feelings towards his restored daugher, which Shakespeare avoids), Shakespeare's Leontes is after sixteen years fully repentant. He is now 'cured' of one passion by another, and deemed worthy of reconciliation with his wife whom Paulina has sheltered all these years until she decides the time is right. With a deft mastery of drawing human significance even from conventions, Shakespeare emphasises that when the 'statue' moves and Hermione steps down, she is not (as she would be in some fairy tale) young, but wrinkled through the passing of 'real time,' emphasising the duration. Leontes, Hermione, and Perdita are all given a 'second chance'. It may be a happy ending, but it is muted by the realistic perception that Time, a character in the play, has not stopped and, as Paulina laments, some losses cannot be recovered:

> . . . I, an old turtle,
> Will wing me to some wither'd bough and there
> My mate, that's never to be found again,
> Lament till I am lost.[30]

She too, it seems, is in the grip of a lifelong passion of grief for her husband. Although the rest of this essay will concentrate on the first half of the play, and in particular on Leontes as a 'case study' for the passion of jealousy, we suggest that the theory of passion presented above makes perfect and profound sense of the play as whole in terms of its emotional structure and 'medical' logic of the day. The theory illuminates the play, and equally the play confirms the theory, which may prove in time to be just as relevant in our own day as in Shakespeare's.

Leontes's Jealousy as a Passion

In working through the quotations and analysis of *The Winter's Tale*, it becomes very clear that Leontes' affliction is regarded as primarily a medical problem that has grown to influence all aspects of his life. It is significant, and at least initially puzzling, that the brief, opening scene gives no hint of the problems to come. Archidamus and Camillo are fully agreed on two things. First, that the King of Bohemia (Polixenes) and the King of Sicily (Leontes)

30 William Shakespeare, *The Winter's Tale*, 5.3.132–35. References are to act, scene and line. Quotations are taken from *The Arden Shakespeare Complete Works*, ed. Richard Proudfoot et al. (London: The Arden Shakespeare, 2001).

were in childhood very close, "and there rooted betwixt them then such an affection, which cannot choose but branch now." Secondly, the young prince of Bohemia, Mamillius, is a "gallant child" whose youthful vitality is identified as therapeutic: "one that, indeed, physics the subject, makes old hearts fresh."[31] Shakespeare in these details has planted two subtle time bombs—the ambiguity of the word "branch" (either to grow, or to grow apart) and the linking of the young prince with imagery of illness and health, life and death:

> CAMILLO
> [T]hey that went on crutches ere he was born desire yet their life to see him a man.
>
> ARCHIDAMUS
> Would they else be content to die?
>
> CAMILLO
> Yes, if there were no other excuse why they should desire to live.[32]

The next scene does not initially disturb the sense of peaceful equanimity which we learn has, on the surface, reigned for nine months while Polixenes has stayed with Leontes and Hermione. Leontes seems sincere in pressing his friend to stay longer, while Polixenes is equally convincing in protesting that he has pressing business to attend to at home. Leontes turns to Hermione to continue the initiation: "Tongue-tied, our queen? Speak you," and so she does to his satisfaction: "Well said, Hermione." Her words contain a hint that the two kings have never really grown up but are instead "boy eternal." Unknown to her, Hermione's joke, that only their wives have come between the men since childhood, is later revealed as an unwitting irony. Shakespeare now springs his first surprise, as Leontes reveals in an aside to the audience that he suspects Polixenes and Hermione of having an affair, and he locates his suspicion in definite physical symptoms:

> LEONTES [*Aside*] Too hot, too hot!
> To mingle friendship far, is mingling bloods.
> I have *tremor cordis* on me: my heart dances,
> But not for joy—not joy.[33]

31 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.1.39–40.

32 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.1.41–4.

33 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.109–13.

The soliloquy, heard only by the audience, seems clearly intended to be a shock, and it demonstrates that up until now Leontes, in his public role, has been concealing his thoughts and feelings in a show of polite hospitality, while 'reading' visual cues in his own way. He inwardly debates the boundaries between innocent "entertainment," stemming "From heartiness, from bounty, fertile bosom," and an over-intimate affection beween Polixenes and his wife in touching hands and smiling (which he interprets as "paddling palms" and "practised smiles").

The groups separate, and Leontes banters with his son Mamillius, but after the revelation of his hidden feelings it is clear to the audience that he is speaking on several levels of meaning. His words to the boy are harmless enough on the surface, though already we realise they stem from his suspicions, since he both asserts and questions his son's physical resemblance to himself. He also breaks out of the semi-jocular tone into further asides, as he watches what is happening on the other side of the room: "still virginalling | Upon his palm!". Slippages of tone occur as he moves in and out of conversation with the child, and words trigger thoughts which lead back to preoccupations with how similar his son looks to him, and with the falsity of women. His language becomes so clouded that it mirrors some kind of more comprehensive breakdown involving 'infection' of his brain:

> LEONTES
> Come, sir page,
> Look on me with your welkin eye: sweet villain!
> Most dear'st, my collop! Can thy dam?—may't be?—
> Affection! thy intention stabs the centre:
> Thou dost make possible things not so held,
> Communicat'st with dreams;—how can this be?—
> With what's unreal thou coactive art,
> And fellow'st nothing: then 'tis very credent
> Thou may'st co-join with something; and thou dost,
> (And that beyond commission), and I find it,
> (And that to the infection of my brains
> And hard'ning of my brows).[34]

By this stage Leontes's thought processes have become disordered in ways conveyed through his private, fragmented utterances, broken syntax, and occluded, confused imagery. He does, however, raise himself the problem of

34 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.134–46.

possible illness, in "the infection of my brains," and this becomes a reference point in the scene. Polixenes and Hermione notice that he is "unsettled," with "a brow of much distraction," and "moved." Leontes offers the disingenuous explanation that speaking with his son has taken him back twenty-three years to his own childhood (an oddly specific age reference which occurs elsewhere in this play), with his toy dagger sheathed in his "green velvet coat." Polixenes agrees that his own son is also a source of joy, and he introduces an idea that will become important later in the play, that children may have some kind of medicinal affect on melancholy adults: "his varying childness cures in me | Thoughts that would thick my blood."[35] As Hermione leads Polixenes outside, Leontes gives vent to his feelings with ferocity, apparently forgetting the presence of the no doubt increasingly puzzled Mamillius before he is bidden to "go play, boy, play." He confides to the audience in an aside that he is "angling," or giving "line" as in fishing, revealing that his passion or obsession does not prevent him from playing social roles and responding to events with appropriate emotional behaviour. However, he identifies this capacity as a form of conscious deception, of "playing":

> Inch-thick, knee-deep, o'er head and ears a fork'd one.
> Go, play, boy, play: thy mother plays, and I
> Play too; but so disgrac'd a part, whose issue
> Will hiss me to my grave: contempt and clamour
> Will be my knell. Go, play, boy, play.[36]

What is significant in Leontes's apparent ramblings, is that he continually pathologises the situation through his barely coherent but obsessive imagery: "Affection! thy intention stabs the centre"; "physic for't there is none | . . . many thousand on's | Have the disease and feel't not." His erroneous diagnosis is that his own illness is caused by being cuckolded, not by his own delusion. The actual condition itself—jealousy—has not yet been named.

There follows a cagey, 'angling' conversation between Leontes and his loyal courtier Camillo, who gradually becomes privy to Leontes's false suspicions of his wife's infidelity. Camillo's admission, that Polixenes agreed to stay only on Hermione's entreaty, becomes another hook for Leontes's feelings, as he interprets the observation from the vantage point of his own fixation, assuming that everybody is aware of the affair and he is last to know of it.[37] Camillo, at

35 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.170–1.

36 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, see 1.2.180–207.

37 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.217–19.

first oblivious of the drift, and then driven by his own loyalty to his king, initially resists, asserting Hermione's innocence, but gradually he is manipulated by the test of his loyalty, and by promises of preferment, into indulging the powerful delusion, very much against his wishes, and he is ordered by Leontes to poison Polixenes. Once again, Camillo is made an inadvertent mouthpiece to emphasise still further the possibility of dealing with illness in himself or another, as

> . . . 'twas a fear
> Which oft infects the wisest: these, my lord,
> Are such allow'd infirmities that honesty
> Is never free of.[38]

On being asked by Camillo for an explanation, Leontes demonstrates that his suspicion his wife is "slippery" has not only hardened into fact in his own mind, but also that he now equates it with "reason," as Wright's theory of passions had suggested:

> (For to a vision so apparent rumour
> Cannot be mute) or thought? (for cogitation
> Resides not in that man that does not think)
> My wife is slippery?[39]

Camillo strongly objects, but Leontes returns to his rigorously self-consistent, if misguided, 'reading' of behaviour and gestures, demonstrating another facet of a passion: its obsessional and even paranoid fixity of reasoning based on certain assumptions. He interprets gestures of whispering, kissing, "stopping the career | Of laughter with a sigh," "Skulking in corners? wishing clocks more swift?," as signs of dishonesty rather than social pleasantries between friends.[40] Camillo's shocked response is again expressed at the medical level: "Good my lord, be cur'd | Of this diseas'd opinion, and betimes, | For 'tis most dangerous".[41] Shakespeare is at pains to highlight that the king is seriously ill. Leontes condemns Camillo flatly as a liar, and he perverts and transfers to his wife and Polixenes the metaphor of disease:

38 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.260–64.
39 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.270–74.
40 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.284–96.
41 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.296–98.

> [W]ere my wife's liver
> Infected, as her life, she would not live
> The running of one glass.
>
> CAMILLO
> Who does infect her?
>
> LEONTES
> Why, he that wears her like a medal, hanging
> About his neck, Bohemia.[42]

In a mental process of self-confirmation belying his muddled logic, Leontes uses the fact that his vision seems so unbelievable to 'prove' paradoxically that it is true:

> Dost think I am so muddy, so unsettled,
> To appoint myself in this vexation; sully
> The purity and whiteness of my sheets,
> (Which to preserve is sleep, which being spotted
> Is goads, thorns, nettles, tails of wasps)
> Give scandal to the blood o' th' prince my son,
> (Who I do think is mine and love as mine)
> Without ripe moving to't? Would I do this?
> Could man so blench?[43]

Camillo prevaricates, compromised between loyalty to his king or his queen, and overwhelmed by the power of Leontes's state of mind as "one | Who in rebellion with himself will have | All that are his so too." Seeing no alternative, and maintaining a frightened, inner resistance to the idea, he finally pretends to promise Leontes that he will poison Polixenes, insisting that Leontes should then forget the idea so as not to sully the honour of the queen and his son. Leontes agrees to "seem friendly," but we immediately learn that his body language now expresses extreme and inexplicable distraction and hostility to Polixenes. Camillo explains that,

> There is a sickness
> Which puts some of us in distemper, but

42 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.303–308.

43 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.325–33.

I cannot name the disease, and it is caught
Of you, that yet are well.[44]

Interestingly, there is still no 'naming' of the 'passion' afflicting Leontes, but the insistence that there is "infection" and "disease" is picked up by Polixenes when he is told that Camillo is charged to murder him. The word "infect" recurs:

O then my best blood turn
To an infected jelly
...
worse than the great'st infection
That e'er was heard or read![45]

Camillo describes Leontes's state of mind as so unshakable that nothing will shift its foundations, although he is at a loss to explain "How should this grow":

Swear his thought over
By each particular star in heaven, and
By all their influences; you may as well
Forbid the sea for to obey the moon,
As or by oath remove or counsel shake
The fabric of his folly, whose foundation
Is pil'd upon his faith, and will continue
The standing of his body.[46]

Camillo suggests that "'tis safer to | Avoid what's grown than question how 'tis born," and advises Polixenes immediately to leave the court to save his life, offering now to disobey his king's command and instead accompany him to Bohemia. Polixenes offers another interesting behavioural symptom from Leontes—"I saw his heart in's face"—and only now, in the last few lines of this lengthy scene, is the word used to describe the passion, rather dubiously attributing its cause to the beauty of Hermione and the strength of Leontes's love for her:

This jealousy
Is for a precious creature, as she's rare,

44 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.384–87.
45 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.417–24.
46 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.424–31.

Must it be great; and, as his person's mighty,
Must it be violent.[47]

This intense and explosive scene has been analysed in detail since it explicitly manifests different facets of a passion in both Wright's and Ribot's senses. The following action can be more rapidly summarised since the main themes have been delineated by this stage of the play. Leontes confronts Hermione with accusations of adultery, a charge which she vehemently rejects, and meanwhile Leontes takes Camillo's absconding as evidence that there is a plot on his own life, which further feeds his paranoia. The extreme state of mind and emotions he has reached is conveyed through another disordered and knotty soliloquy, again referring to "infection":

How blest am I
In my just censure! in my true opinion!
Alack, for lesser knowledge! how accurs'd
In being so blest! There may be in the cup
A spider steep'd, and one may drink, depart,
And yet partake no venom (for his knowledge
Is not infected); but if one present
The abhorr'd ingredient to his eye, make known
How he hath drunk, he cracks his gorge, his sides,
With violent hefts. I have drunk, and seen the spider.[48]

The passage expresses the emotional rigidity of Leontes's passion, marked by the dogmatic certitude of a self-fulfilling prophecy that 'knowledge is misery', reflected in his tangled logic. He sees himself as one whose "knowledge" or rational faculty has been "infected" because he has seen the "spider" in the glass. The image makes little rational sense, and yet it is used to justify an irrational premise through apparent deduction. No wonder the passage has had critics scratching their heads over its exact meaning. Leontes is by this stage insomniac, his mind working feverishly, but driven by its own internal logic that bears no relation to reality. Leontes later refers to "those foundations which I build upon," although every single stage observer sees them as non-existent. Paulina, Hermione's midwife, refers to "These dangerous unsafe lunes i'th'king," (a word related to 'lunatic') and later she describes his state as one of "tyrannous passion." Facing the king's splenetic anger she declares

47 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 1.2.451–5.
48 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 2.1.36–45.

her his "physician," describing him bluntly as "mad." The problem is insistently defined as a medical one, a pathology, and Paulina proposes a method of cure that would have equally been a recognisable medical practice to those in the age, such as Wright, and later to Ribot:

> For, as the case now stands, it is a curse
> (He cannot be compell'd to't) once remove
> The root of his opinion, which is rotten
> As ever oak or stone was sound.[49]

By this stage of the play children become part of the psychodrama. Mamillius, allowed no access to Hermione, sickens and languishes. Leontes interprets this as shame for his mother's actions, but there is, of course, ample reason to believe it is his father's condition that has caused Mamillius's illness. Certainly, his father's mistrust of women has been transferred to the boy, as we see in his chatter with the women as he berates them for the "falsity" of using cosmetics. Hermione gives birth to a girl, which Paulina hopes will provide the longed-for remedy: "The silence often of pure innocence | Persuades, when speaking fails."[50] Again using contemporary medical language, Paulina explains, "I | Do come with words as medicinal as true, | Honest, as either, to purge him of that humour | That presses him from sleep."[51] This child will, in fact, be the right medicine, but in the short term the strategy fails, since Leontes dismisses her as a bastard and orders Paulina's husband, Antigonus, to abandon her in the wilds.

The "trial" called by Leontes demonstrates further his unyielding obsession built on a false premise, and Hermione, in her dignified and reproachful protestations of innocence, accurately describes the problem for those who deal with him:

> Sir,
> You speak a language that I understand not:
> My life stands in the level of your dreams,
> Which I'll lay down.[52]

49 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 2.3.87–90.
50 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 2.1.41–42.
51 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 2.1.36–39.
52 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 3.2.78–81.

Even the Oracle's unambiguous words, "Hermione is chaste; Polixenes blameless; Camillo a true subject; Leontes a jealous tyrant; his innocent babe truly begotten,"[53] are peremptorily dismissed by the king: "there is no truth at all | I'the oracle." At this stage, the Oracle's extra, enigmatic words are left to be fulfilled in the future: "and the king shall live without an heir, if that which is lost be not found." At this moment, however, word is brought that Mamillius has just died, and it is this news, significantly, that instantaneously effects a cure in Leontes: "Apollo's angry, and the heavens themselves | Do strike at my injustice."[54] It is not the oracle that clears his mind into instant contrition and repentance, but rather the trauma of losing his son. Paulina is in no mood to let him off the hook, in light of the enormity of consequences flowing from his illness, which now include the reported death of the queen herself:

> Thy tyranny,
> Together working with thy jealousies
> (Fancies too weak for boys, too green and idle
> For girls of nine,) O think what they have done,
> And then run mad indeed: stark mad! for all
> Thy by-gone fooleries were but spices of it.
> . . .
> But, O thou tyrant!
> Do not repent these things, for they are heavier
> Than all thy woes can stir; therefore betake thee
> To nothing but despair. A thousand knees
> Ten thousand years together, naked, fasting,
> Upon a barren mountain, and still winter
> In storm perpetual, could not move the gods
> To look that way thou wert.[55]

Leontes is penitently willing to take this "medicine" from Paulina, thus handing over agency entirely to her. It will prove to be a state of submission for the next sixteen years, as he vows to visit daily the chapel where his wife and son lie, "and tears shed there will be my recreation."[56] Recreation carries here its root sense of 're-creation' or cure.

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53 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 3.2.131–33.

54 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 3.2.143–44.

55 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 3.2.177–82; 205–12.

56 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 3.2.237–8.

Except for the failure of the protagonist to commit suicide at this point, we would have here the end of a unified and self-sufficient story, the "winter's tale" promised by the title since, as Mamillius says, in beginning to tell a story himself, "A sad tale's best for winter."[57] In Shakespeare's source, Greene's *Pandosto*, the king does indeed commit suicide at this point. We would have a re-run of *Othello*, and in fact there are tantalising echoes that might suggest Shakespeare had a distant memory of that play—for example, Hermione's main lady in waiting is named Emilia, like Desdemona's, though she has little role in this play. However, Shakespeare pulls a trick here, defying not only the narrative authority of his source but also audience expectations, by asserting unambiguously the death of Hermione. In the second half of the play, he gives us a healing tale of spring, leading to a 'second chance' given to Leontes after sixteen years of grief and self-recrimination, with the miraculous return of his wife and daughter. Literally, Time heals, and for such a powerful, all consuming passion as deep-rooted jealousy, it is the most important element of a full cure.

Conclusions

Our reconstruction of the theory of passions in its early modern form from Wright and its more systematic formulation by Ribot neatly explains the story of Leontes in *The Winter's Tale*, each fitting the other like a glove.

1. *Long-term affective orientation*

Although Leontes's revelation through 'Asides' comes as a surprise and shock to the audience, there are ample reasons for us to read his passion as the culmination of a long and slow gestation—almost literally so, since we hear in the opening lines that Polixenes has been a guest in the court for nine months and we have visual evidence that Hermione is heavily pregnant ("she is spread of late | Into a goodly bulk"), and she gives birth soon after. On the other hand, and in Ribot's parlance, at the most basic level of affective experience, seen as a fleeting domain where constant change and movement are the norm, Leontes is responsive to circumstances in ways that effectively conceal from stage onlookers his guiding, enduring passion. This facade of social competence explains why Shakespeare does not reveal the passion immediately, instead allowing it to be revealed as a semi-concealed state of mind.

57 Shakespeare, *Winter's Tale*, 2.1.25.

2. *Fixed, possibly obsessive or delusional, ideational focus*

The fixed, intellectual component or idea (*idée fixe*) driving Leontes as an organisational focus, is his passion of jealousy, which has become obsessive or delusional.

3. *Felt aspects, motivating power, and 'movement'*

In the terms used by both Wright and Ribot, Leontes's jealousy is a mixed and complex state which, considered as a passion in the first half of *The Winter's Tale*, is the all-consuming motivation that lies behind his feelings ('affections') and drives him to act in the way he does. The passion steadily subsumes and subverts his rational faculty, leading Leontes to 'rationalise' observations to vindicate his passion. His state also illustrates the double nature of a passion as both fixed and unmoving (in a sense 'passive,' a semantic root for passion), yet also paradoxically dynamic and active in driving him. His words and actions, which seem perverse and inexplicable to observers, are in fact self-consistent and constantly reinforced in an inner core of self-certainty. In the meantime, Leontes's passion differs from the rapid changes of his immediate feelings and short-term emotional responses stimulated in 'normal' everyday life, allowing his momentary and transitory external affective responses to obscure his fixed and rigid inner, affective state.

4. *Organising and ordering schema for feelings and emotions*

Leontes's passion provides an intellectual and behavioural schema for his thoughts and actions that also derives from their fixed idea. However, his jealousy is fundamentally affective in nature, and never mainly cognitive: it moves him, in an inexorable, complex, organised tendency to action; Ribot, in fact, likens passions to tendencies (*tendances*).

5. *Integration with cognition and reason*

Passion and reason are not incompatible but can 'feed' each other, just as Wright and Ribot suggest, and as Leontes demonstrates. His reason becomes 'slave' to his passion, to the extent that it enables him to 'rationalise' misguided perceptions. It is this disjunction between viewpoints that helps explain the apparent mystery of why Shakespeare delays revealing Leontes's state of mind—he wishes to emphasise that it constitutes a rupture in the fabric of 'normal' rational life, even if it has been developing over a lengthy period.

6. *Progressive, cumulative, course*

As we have seen, although Leontes's jealousy is presented as a sudden, theatrical surprise, yet it seems to have reached an extreme stage after 'gestating'

over nine months. To change the metaphor (recalling Ribot's comparison with growths or tmours), his jealousy has grown like a boil until it is lanced at the moment when his son's death is announced. A further implication is that from this moment on, and despite his swift repentance, Leontes enters a new and equally compulsive affective state, the passion of grief, which now needs to grow in a 'progressive, cumulative course' over sixteen years for full recovery.

7. *Morbidity and psychopathology*

In our case study we have tracked the conspicuous and repeated references to jealousy as a medical problem, a 'disease' that needs to be 'cured.' The imagery attaches not only to Leontes's passionate jealousy but also Mamillius's pivotal dramatic function as a life force who steadily becomes more ill and dies at the moment of Leontes's extreme rejection of the Oracle's statement. In the later stages of the play, Leontes's grief is seen as the kind of necessary passion that can bring recovery to the affective life. Again, we have noted that individual passions can be either malign or benign in their influence.

8. *Refusal of treatment, advice or relinquishing agency*

Under the influence of his strong passion, Leontes refuses to believe anybody who denies his view—Camillo, Hermione, Paulina, and even the Oracle. He retreats into a nightmarish, personal world, reflected in confused imagery and syntax, refusing to listen to others or act upon advice, believing nothing wrong with his perceptions, out of control yet refusing to allow others (like Camillo) to act on his behalf. Others notice that his whole personality and behaviour have changed dramatically. Some kind of complete breakdown and even death seem to be inevitable, but in the play the disastrous consequences are transferred to the innocent boy and, at least ostensibly, Hermione and her newborn baby. However, the moment of Leontes's sudden 'cure' on hearing of his son's death is marked by an almost immediate reflex to 'give up' the passion and hand complete agency over his life to Paulina. She takes responsibility for his 'treatment,' which requires sixteen years of sustained penitence, grief, and love, until she judges him sufficiently redeemed to be reunited with his wife. To close the circle back to Wright's medical description of passions, "love holdeth the principall place" and it is certainly the curative agent in finally dislodging Leontes's dangerous "infection" of the passion of jealousy.

Our larger aim in this essay has been to explore how emotions were analysed in earlier times, with a view first to illuminating a contemporary play in its own conceptual context, and secondly shedding light on psychiatric and psychological problems that are anticipated in early theories and drama. There are many other examples from Shakespeare's plays that could be explored

from this point of view. A part of the abiding appeal of these plays surely includes the fact that similar psychological and affective states still occur, and Shakespeare, with uncanny insight, may offer us illuminating case studies and even implicit advice, based on the historical, medical paradigm of passions in his own day, which might be of clinical use in addressing modern psychiatric concerns in treating mental illness.[58]

58 For research along the lines suggested, see the works cited in footnotes above.

CHAPTER 11

Arts and Games of Love: Genre, Gender and Special Friendships in Eighteenth-Century Jesuit Poetry

Yasmin Haskell

Transforming Loves

In the *epyllia*, or narrative digressions, that adorn a cluster of Latin didactic poems produced by French Jesuits around the turn of the eighteenth century, chaste but intense symmetrical love between young males is celebrated. In a poem about bird-keeping, for example, the distraught shepherd Aristus is transformed into a linnet when his companion Linus is bitten by a snake; Linus becomes the flax on which the bird feeds. In Claude Montaigu's "Method of Writing a Letter", the technology of letter writing is revealed to Alexis when he grieves for his absent friend, Iolas.[1] Sometimes the inseparable friends are brothers, as in the mythical aetiologies of the magnet coined by Gilles-Anne-Xavier de la Sante, "Iron," and Thomas Fellon, "Magnet."[2] In both these confections of pious same-sex attraction, a female is identified as the cause of the protagonists' respective metamorphoses into magnet and iron. Later in the century, in American Jesuit Louis Doissin's "On Sculpture," the grieving Damon becomes the first sculptor when he carves a wooden image of his brother Alcippus, whom he has killed in a hunting accident.[3] Doissin's epyllion is, perhaps unsurprisingly, freighted with allusions to Virgil's fourth georgic (to the episode of the Corycian gardener and the story of Orpheus and Eurydice), but instead of that between man and wife the perfect love commemorated here is of two inseparable brothers:

> They were equal in age, equal in virtue, and in order to escape the empty clamour of the court and the stresses of the city they sought out, alone, already in the earliest bloom of youth, the hidden lairs of the woods, and lived out there a tranquil life under a humble roof, far from their

1 Claude Montaigu, *Ratio conscribendae epistolae* (Paris, 1713), 13–15.

2 Gilles-Anne-Xavier de la Sante, *Ferrum. Carmen* (Bourges, 1707), 19–22; Thomas Fellon, *Magnes* (Lyon, 1696), 8–12.

3 Louis Doissin, *De sculptura* (Paris, 1752), 28–31.

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> homeland and the embrace of their kin. There was an especially wondrous bond of harmony between the brothers: Euryalus did not embrace Nisus with such love, nor so greatly did faithful Pylades burn for Orestes. Together they would take their sweet slumbers on the soft grass, together cheat the tedium of the remote country or drive timid dams across the whole plain. Blessed both, had they never handled the weapons of Diana![4]

One of the two most fêted French neo-Latin georgic poets of the *ancien régime*, Jacques Vanière (1664–1739), hints at a more diffuse yet dangerous experience of male friendship in his early poem on fishing, *Stagna*. A gang of boys is skimming pebbles over the surface of a pond near the mouth of the Po. The nymph, Aegle, rises and reprimands them for disturbing the peace, but the naughty boys respond by redirecting their stones at her. She descends, terrified, to her sisters and divine retribution ensues. A savage monster is sent up from the deep to destroy the offenders, and does not relent even when the nymphs' womanly hearts have melted at the sight of the boys' dying beauty.[5] They are ultimately transformed into the little fish that frequent the shallows: "for this race does not grow with age, they play endless games, fight, and love in turn; and, like the boys they once were, they can neither live together nor break away from

4 Doissin, *De sculptura*, 29: "Ambo pares aetate, pares virtutibus ambo; | Qui vanos aulae strepitus urbisque tumultum | Ut fugerent, primâ vixdum florente juventâ, | Abstrusas soli nemorum petiere latebras; | Atque ibi tranquillam tecto sub paupere vitam | Degebant procul â patriâ, amplexuque suorum. | Mira fuit praesertim inter concordia fratres | Nec tanto Nisum Euryalus complexus amore est | Nec tantum fidus Pylades ardebat Orestem | Una carpebant molli sub gramine somnos | Una secreti fallebant taedia ruris | Aut toto timidos agitabant aequore damas. | Felices ambo, si nunquam tela Dianae | Tractassent." Translations are my own.

5 In *Loyola's Bees: Ideology and Industry in Jesuit Latin Didactic Poetry* (Oxford: British Academy/Oxford University Press, 2003), 44, I saw a reference to Catullus 11.21–24 in these lines: "What can youth not achieve in a woman's heart, and the grace which the boys retained even after death—grace such as there is in a flower, which, when it has been cut down by a plough, lies there still beautiful, even with its neck drooping" ("Foemineo quid non possunt in corde juventus, | Et decor, in pueris etiam post fata superstes, | Qualis inest flori, qui cum succisus aratro est, | Pulcher adhuc, languente licet cervice, recumbi"), but the primary allusion is of course to the death of Euryalus in Virgil's *Aeneid*, 9.435–37: "as when a purple flower, cut down by the plough, languishes as it dies, or the poppies which have bowed their heads on loosened necks when weighed down by a sudden shower" ("purpureus veluti cum flos succisus aratro | languescit moriens, lassove papavera collo | demisere caput pluvia cum forte gravantur"). Virgil's celebration of an exceptional and exclusive male friendship—that of Nisus and Euryalus—is here distributed by Vanière over an entire field of fallen boys.

the group."[6] These homophilic narratives inset in poems by relatively young poets and/or teachers seem both to hint at the experience, and anticipate an audience, of adolescent boys in the early modern Jesuit classroom.

A School for Shepherds

After his highly successful sixteen-book georgic, *Praedium rusticum* ("Country Estate"), into which his juvenile poem, *Stagna*, was later incorporated, Vanière produced a series of eight eclogues on friendship, effectively reversing the usual Virgilian poetic *cursus* from bucolic to georgic poetry.[7] It is in this now forgotten work rather than in a didactic poem proper that Vanière undertakes to expound his mature thoughts on the benefits and conduct of friendship. Perhaps he chose the pastoral genre, relaying the dialogue of shepherds, to capture something of the give-and-take of friendly conversation; perhaps to establish a Platonic/Arcadian 'level playing field' from which tactfully to instruct his royal addressee, the young Louis XV.[8] However that may be, a markedly protreptic tone is evident already in the prefatory poem, which exhorts the future king:

> Receive the laws of friendship from those authors among whom it especially flourished, in the world's youth, and don't despise the characters of speaking shepherds, you who will soon hear that the very offspring of kings used to pasture their paternal flocks in the countryside and cultivated their souls with the aid of woodland masters.[9]

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6 Jacques Vanière, "Stagna," in *Praedium Rusticum* (Toulouse, 1730), 288: "Nam genus hoc nulla crescunt aetate, perennes | Exercent ludos, rixantur, amantque vicissim; | Et nequeunt prisco puerum de more, nec una | Vivere, nec socia sese divellere turba." Translation from Haskell, *Loyola's Bees*, 43–44.

7 There were some thirty complete or partial editions of the poem, and a like number of translations, some partial, into French, English, Spanish, Italian, Hungarian, German and Polish. After his georgic, Vanière attempted an epic on the life of Francis Xavier but set it aside on the advice of the leading Jesuit orator and poet, Charles de la Rue.

8 The eclogues appear in Jacques Vanière's *Opuscula. Editio nova* (Paris, 1730), but a note informs us that they were composed when the king had just attained the age of seven years.

9 Vanière, *Opuscula*, 4: "Accipe amicitiae leges, authoribus illis, | Quos inter primo mundi nascentis in ortu | Floruit imprimis: nec dedignare docentum | Nomina Pastorum, mox auditurus & ipsam | Progeniem Regum quondam pavisse paternos | Rure greges, sylvisque animum coluisse magistris."

Moreover, the voice of the chief of these woodland masters, Vanière—in the person of 'Mopsus'—prevails throughout. Each eclogue bears a subtitle expressly identifying the lesson to be imparted: the nature and origins of friendship, its excellence and character expressed through the deeds of different friends; equal friendships should be sought; choice of friends; in which through fictional examples the plagues which usually destroy friendship are surveyed; the duties of friends; duties toward a fickle friend and one leaving the friendship; duties to a dead friend. The eighth eclogue is prefaced by an *argumentum* explaining that it was written after the death of Father Aribat, the poet's closest *confrère*, and that it was the departure point for the entire work:

> I had collected such sweet fruits from his friendship that, when I found I could barely call my spirit away from them, I decided to write about friendship itself, and to console the pain I had experienced from the death of my friend with the memory of that very friendship. Therefore, reader, you can take as true that which I have recorded about my dearest comrade under the name of Aegon in this final eclogue; in the others I did not intend to indicate anyone [in particular] but merely to adorn my eclogues with made-up examples and to relieve the tedium of instruction.[10]

To what extent does Vanière elaborate a personal and/or distinctively Jesuit model of friendship in these bucolic-didactic poems? He was certainly not writing in a vacuum, as David Garrioch's survey of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century friendship literature in mainly England and France makes clear. Topics such as the necessity of selecting suitable companions (for age, class and shared interests), exclusivity, rules for correcting a friend's faults, and reasons for breaking with him were routinely visited by writers both within and beyond the Society of Jesus. But if "[f]ew writers developed original arguments about friendship, most preferring to cite universally recognized authorities, generally Scripture, Cicero or Aristotle" and if, in France, "Cicero was the most studied author in the colleges of higher education in the period," the significance of the Jesuit hand in this instruction should not be

10 Vanière, *Opuscula*, 63: "tam dulces ab ejus amicitia fructus collegeram, ut cum ab eis avocare animum vix possem, statueram de amicitia ipsa scribere: & quem ab amici morte dolorem ceperam, ipsius amicitiae recordatione consolari. Pro veris itaque habeto, Lector, quacumque in hac ultima Ecloga de carissimo sodali sub Aegonis nomine commemoravi: in reliquis designare neminem volui; sed fictis dumtaxat exemplis Eclogas adornare, & taedia praeceptionum levare."

underestimated.[11] If not singlehandedly responsible for perpetuating the Renaissance cult of Cicero in early modern France and other Catholic lands, the Jesuits had enshrined Ciceronian eloquence as the goal of their humanist curriculum already in their *Ratio studiorum* of 1599; Cicero's *De amicitia* was a set text in the upper grammar class.[12]

It is surely legitimate to wonder, then, how Jesuit teachers reconciled classical ideas of friendship with Christian ones and how they inflected them to meet the specific pedagogical and spiritual priorities of the order.[13] The Society of Jesus had its origins, effectively, in a group of friends, and Jesuit moral philosophers and missionaries from the sixteenth century on would give particular attention to the protocols of friendship between different sexes, classes, and cultures.[14] Vanière, for example, would almost certainly have read *The Holy Court* of his senior *confrère*, Nicolas Caussin, S.J. (1583–1651), an influential writer on moral philosophy and rhetoric, composer of Latin tragedies, and at one time confessor to Louis XIII.[15] The fourth tome of Caussin's *Cour sainte* is devoted to the "empire of reason over the passions" and contains a long section on Christian friendship, including the dangers of friendship between the sexes outside of marriage. Vanière's lyrical exaltation of friendship over

11 David Garrioch, "From Christian Friendship to Secular Sentimentality: Enlightenment Re-evaluations," in *Friendship: A History*, ed. Barbara Caine (London: Equinox, 2009), 165–214, at 168.

12 See *Ratio studiorum* (1599), trans. A.P. Farrell (unpublished typescript), 54. Available at: http://www.bc.edu/sites/libraries/ratio/ratio1599.pdf [accessed 16 May 2015].

13 Already in the *Constitutions*, Ignatius envisages pair bonding of both Jesuit scholastics and missionaries for mutual support and edification. See Ignatius Loyola, *The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus*, trans. George G. Ganss (St Louis: Institute of Jesuit Studies, 1970), pp. 154–5, 186–7, 276–8, 286–7. §§ 247, 249, 349, 350, 624 (j), 659.

14 On Matteo Ricci's and Martino Martini's precepts on friendship in the context of the China mission, see Matteo Ricci, *On Friendship: One Hundred Maxims for a Chinese Prince*, trans. Timothy Billings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Martino Martini, *Trattato dell'amicizia*, trans. G. Bertuccioli (Trent: Centro studi Martino Martini, 2008); and Ana Carolina Hosne, "Friendship among Litterati: Matteo Ricci, SJ (1552–1610) in Late Ming China," *Transcultural Studies* 1 (2014). Available at: http://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/transcultural/article/view/11362/8707 [accessed 16 May 2015].

15 See, for example, Sophie Conte, ed., *Nicolas Caussin: rhétorique et spiritualité à l'époque de Louis XIII, Actes du colloque de Troyes (16–17 Septembre 2004)* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, Ars Rhetorica, 2007); Georg Drew Hocking, *A Study of the 'Tragoediae sacrae' of Father Caussin (1583–1651)* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959).

(sensual) love in his opening eclogue may well owe something to Caussin, although direct influence is difficult to prove.[16]

Ovidian Arts and Antidotes

It is not my aim in this chapter, however, to chart key stages and sources in the long history of Jesuit friendship but rather to isolate the distinctively Jesuit element in a flurry of poetic activity on this subject by members and students of the Society in the first half of the eighteenth century—not only in France but also, for example, in the Habsburg colleges of Vienna and Cluj,[17] where two elegiac didactic poems on friendship were produced in 1738–39 and 1750, in honour of the new graduates in liberal arts and philosophy. Their authorship has been variously attributed to the Transylvanian Jesuit, Stephanus Biro, to the French, Pierre Bimet, and to the Austrian, Antonius Vorster (professor of Rhetoric at Vienna).[18] However, the prefaces of both works describe a collective labour on the part of the *pupils* of the Poetry and Rhetoric classes in their respective colleges. The Viennese 'tribute' (*vectigal*) appears to have been offered in two annual instalments by the same cohort of poets. It is reason-

16 Caussin's advice, following Aristotle, that friendship with great men is to be avoided because they are too self-interested and licentious, and that friendship requires equality, is effectively undermined by Vanière's encouragement of the king to seek out friendships with his inferiors. Caussin's catalogue of the "stains which Amity may contract," viz., forgetfulness, negligence, scorn, dissension, distrust, inequality, impatience and infidelity—in the English translation by Thomas Hawkins (London, 1634)—does not map neatly onto the scenarios described in Vanière's fourth eclogue, on the scourges of friendship. The poet gives examples of the friend who has too many friends; one who looks only to his own interests; one who does not return favours; another is handsome but of bad character; one whose friendship can be bought; the fair-weather friend; one who abandons his friends when his fortunes improve; and one who openly criticises his friend rather than offering correction in private.

17 Otherwise: Claudiopolis, Kolozsvár, and Klausenburg.

18 I have seen both attributed to Biro, as if they were one and the same work. Biro was only born in 1729, as Sommervogel and de Backer note, so can be ruled out as the author of at least the Cluj poem. The confusion is compounded, however, in claiming them here as a single work by Bimet (Carlos Sommervogel and Aloys de Backer, *Bibliothèque des écrivains de la Compagnie de Jésus*, 9 vols. (Brussels, 1890–1916; reprint 1998), vol. 1, col. 1483). It is true that Stefano Fabretti S.J. praises a poem in three books apparently published ("impressit") by Bimet, "De amicitiâ comparandâ, retinendâ, dissolvendâ" (*Lyrica et epistolae* (Lyon, 1747), 287–88), which is said to combine the charms of Ovid, Catullus, Gallus and Propertius. I have found no trace of this work.

able to suppose, I submit, that these works were indeed composed by schoolboys in the emulative and yet collaborative context of the early modern Jesuit classroom.[19]

A separate verse proem to the Viennese poem(s) opens with a repudiation of erotic love and, effectively, of Ovid's *Ars amatoria*. Instead of "that love which breathes Venus, soothing idle hearts," the authors turn for guidance to "the master of harmless and chaste love" to teach "what one might wish to keep; and to avoid."[20] Contrary to the expectations created by its elegiac metre and partition into three books the poem is not straightforwardly modelled on Ovid's *Ars amatoria*—much less so, at least, than its exuberantly playful Transylvanian counterpart.[21] Each book is divided into a series of 'elegies' whose titles, like those of Vanière's eclogues, identify its lesson, foregrounding the work's didactic utility.[22] The *mise en page*, in which individual couplets are

19 At the back of the (two) Vienna and the Cluj volumes is a list of "names of those offering" (*nomina offerentium*). The Vienna volume (hereafter: *De am.*) lists forty names to Cluj's (hereafter *De arte am.*) seven. Whether these are or include the names of the authors of the poems is not clear. The first two books of the *De am.* run to forty-eight pages; the third to forty-four. (References that follow are to book, poem, and page number.)

20 *De am.* Proem, 1: "Hinc procul ille, Paphum qui spirat, inertia mulcens, | Pectora . . . Ergo ades innocui, castique magister amoris: Quae servanda velis; quaeque cavenda, doce."

21 But compare this couplet from *De am.* 1.3, 12: "If he agrees, you should agree; let not words disagree with words! Let your words conform to those he has pronounced!" ("Annuet, annuito; dictis neque dicta repugnent: | Sint tua narratis consona verba suis") with Ovid, *Ars amatoria* 2.199–200: "If she accuses, you should accuse; whatever she approves, you should approve; what she says, you should say; what she denies, you should deny." ("Arguet, arguito; quicquid probat illa, probato; | Quod dicet, dicas; quod negat illa, neges"). We also find quotations from the chastened Ovid of the *Tristia*, for example, in 2.3, 37: "It is more disgraceful to turn a guest out than not to admit one, as Ovid, having experienced that fate, sang" ("Turpius ejicitur, quam non admittitur hospes; | Ut, fatum expertus, Naso poëta canit"); 2.5, 42: "How well Ovid, an exile from his homeland, sang: the mob judges friendships by their utility!" ("Quam bene cantabat Patriis Naso exul ab oris: | Vulgus Amicitias utilitate probat").

22 The overarching theme of book one is the "nature of friendship," and comprises elegies: 1. "the reason for friendship at the same time as its foundation, that on which it relies above all else"; 2. "it cannot exist except between the good"; 3. "it is not contracted by anything better than mutual benevolence"; 4. "similarity of characters is the mother of mutual love and friendship"; 5. "as in all things, thus especially in the cultivation of love, moderation must be maintained"; and 6. "true friendship, though rare in this world, is not completely to be despaired of." The theme of book two is the "choice of friends": 1. "friendship should not be entered into suddenly nor rashly"; 2. "neither many, nor just anyone you should happen to meet, should be accepted as close friends"; 3. "a long trial should be made of a friend so that you should embrace him in the end with your whole

discretely spaced, adds to the impression of modularity.[23] One can well imagine the poem taking shape over the two years of its composition as a series of class projects to which students contributed—or competed to contribute—their diligently honed distichs. Yet the style is crisp and uniform throughout, suggesting careful oversight and revision by the teacher. Examples from myth, ancient history, and especially the physical world abound, evocative of the emblematic imagery so beloved by early modern Jesuits. There are references to boats and reefs, fire and fireworks, tongues, bees, monkey mothers, rain and crops, magnets and mirrors.[24] While the verses, "so that someone may be a Pylades to you, you must be an Orestes. This does not happen through words; that you may be loved, love in deed!" recall Ovid,[25] the ensuing emblematic illustration of the disparity between friendly words and deeds evinces a more Jesuit baroque aesthetic:

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heart"; 4. "the three most important things to be found out about a friend, the chief of these, whether he can keep a secret"; 5. "is he frank with us in prosperous times?"; and 6. "how reliable and steadfast is he in adverse and difficult circumstances?" The final book is about "the mutual duties, rights and laws of friends": 1. "the most important law of friendship, that you should ask nothing dishonourable of a friend, nor do the same if asked"; 2. "saving this [sc. previous] law, to want and not want the same thing is the perfection of friendship"; 3. "one should confidently share all one's plans and indeed the secrets of one's heart with a friend"; 4. "it is preferable, in Seneca's opinion, to run the risk of a confidence being breached than to fear sharing it with a duly tested friend"; 5. "flattering assent is especially to be avoided among friends, nor should all things be approved or imitated"; 6. "excessive severity in censure equally to be moderated"; 7. "the errors of friends should only be corrected in private"; 8. "it is the equal duty of friends, when all is said and done, to praise in season what each has done well and to blame what has been done badly"; 9. "if for any reason the union of friends has been damaged it must swiftly be repaired"; 10. "it should never be dissolved completely on account of any irritating offence or trouble"; 11. "these exercises of benevolence should be maintained even towards the absent"; and 12. "the sweet remembrance of friends should not be obliterated after the passing of this mortal life."

23 The Cluj poem is more continuous, although the first book is articulated in two parts: "Quickly? One or many? What kind, and with what skill should friends be tested and acquired?" ("An mature? Unus an plures? Quales, & qua arte probati sint Amici parandi"); the second: "How are friends duly tested to be won over?" ("Amici ritè probati quo pactô sint conciliandi?").

24 *De am*. 3.6, 22: "Believe that these symbols, imitating our human customs, teach the mutual duties of Friendship" ("Haec nos humanos imitantia symbola mores | Mutua Amicitiae munera, crede, docent").

25 Ovid, *Ars amatoria*, 2.107: "ut ameris, amabilis esto!"

> Thus the same form shines out from the glass which you yourself have painted on it with your body, and yet the image you see in the mirror deceives you. On the outside it is true, on the inside, the man is made of glass.[26]

A Christian-Stoic spirit infuses the work. We should not despair of finding worthy friends but neither should we allow them to distract us from our passion for God.[27] If we start to lose interest in our friend we should try to "imitate God, the example of perfect love, which does not cease to be pious even when wounded!"[28] If our friend should be transferred to the wilds of Britain or to the chilly lands of the Getae—an Ovidian trope—"believe, if you will, thus, that the soul is greater than freezing ice and cannot *not* remember its companion!"[29] The self-pitying Ovid is thus answered with an exhortation to sublime Christian constancy. In the final elegy of the third book, the poets dilate on the metaphor of the inextinguishable, omnipresent, and vivifying sun and chide us: "and—for shame!—are oaths between friends capable of achieving less? Is the sacred heat of the heart inferior?"[30] In perhaps the poem's most Jesuit moment we are urged to recover the spirit of the early Christians, who had no thought for their own safety when coming to the aid of their friends. Yet we should not be tempted to suicide after the death of our bosom buddy. The exotic practices of *sati* in India and *seppuku* in Japan are reported—practices which are emphatically *not* prescribed for the enlightened graduates of this modern Jesuit college. It is noteworthy, however, that the poets do not take the opportunity, here, to commemorate the deaths of missionary Jesuits and their indigenous Christian associates in Asia. Whether this restraint accommodates a wider contemporary distaste for extreme religious fervour and grisly tales of martyrdom, or whether the tide of Jesuit triumphalism was turning from within, we cannot say. Nevertheless, our Viennese *De amicitia* does celebrate, and indeed instantiate in its very composition, a centuries-old Jesuit ethos of chaste, mutually edifying, collaborative, brotherly love. That this is a love with

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26 *De am.* 1.3, 12: "Sic eadem speculi de vitro forma relucet, | Quam foris objectu pinxeris ipse tuo. | Et tamen illudit, speculo quam cernis, imago: | Ille foris verus; vitreus intus homo."

27 *De am.* 1.6, 23–24.

28 *De am.* 3.10, 36: "Fac, imitare Deum, perfecti exemplar amoris, | Quippe nec offensus desinit esse pius."

29 *De am.* 3.11, 39: "Vel sic, crede, animus glaciali est frigore major; | Nec poterit socii non meminisse sui."

30 *De am.*, 3. 12, 42: "Et minus, heu probrum! possint socialia jura? | Inferiorque sacer pectoris ardor erit?"

its roots in and oriented to the Jesuit classroom may be inferred from the fact that, even in the middle of the eighteenth century, it is being defined with minimal reference to women.[31] Thus the beloved friend who mounts the Indian funeral pyre after the death of his master is curiously described as a *socius*, not a wife.[32] It is also noteworthy that these learned, Latin poets seem to turn their backs on the cross-confessional irenism of the *Respublica litterarum*, let alone Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, declaring it "unworthy" to contract a friendship with those of a different faith—or at least with non-believers.[33]

Playing with the Emotions

The subtitle of the later 1750 Cluj poem is the "obtaining, maintaining, and ending of friendship." The first two books are dedicated to identifying the right kind of friend—we only really need one, a sentiment anticipated by Vanière and the Viennese poets—and to attracting, testing, and keeping him; the final book, which is shorter, roughly corresponds to Ovid's *Remedia amoris*. (Ovid's third book, in which the poet directs advice to a female audience, is neatly side-stepped.) The Cluj *De **arte** amicitiae* ("On the *Art* of Love") opens, like Ovid's *Ars amatoria*, with a celebration of art:

31 Vanière, admittedly, devotes twelve lines to an exemplary case of female constancy, but one that is regularised, even in this artificial bucolic setting, through marriage. Amaryllis comes into a fortune yet does not despise her former companion, Menalcas (*Eclogue* 1, p. 15): "I loved you before, when I was poor, you were poor; now that I am rich I love you more, in your need, because I can give you more, and to you, as husband, I can pledge half my dowry with my vow of faithfulness" ("amabam | Nuper inops inopem; jam nunc te dives egenum | Plùs amo, quò possum dare plura, tibique marito | Despondere parem fidei cum pignore dotem").

32 *De arte am*., 3.12, 43: "The companion is added, to be buried on the same pile, that he may voluntarily nourish the pyre with his own death" ("Additus est, busto socius tumulandus eodem, | Augeat ut proprio funere sponte pyram").

33 *De am*. 1.4, 16: "He deems unworthy of the lawful right hand of friendship him for whom the same holy altar does not blaze. And indeed you will seek in vain for reciprocal love from someone capable of betraying GOD in this shameful way" ("Indignum reputat, fas sit cui jungere dextram: | Non eadem quocum Numinis ara calet. | Et sane incassum redamari quaeris ab illo: | Turpe DEO qui sic perfidus esse queat").

> We write by which art noble friends may be joined: bless our enterprise, kind Phoebus, with art, the ornament of things; with art comrades are sought, with art honour is obtained, with art love.[34]

Yet immediately after this breezily worldly proem we are shunted into a somewhat jarring passage on the art of painting and its power to inspire (religious) emotion:

> And how small a part of art is it to paint breathing forms? And yet how great a beauty comes to them from art? Behold Jesus about to die on the painter's canvas: does the burden not seem almost to hang from the cross? If you see tears, which this image counterfeits [*mentitur*], you yourself will not be able to refrain from tears but will cry! You see, and Christ himself weeps, and the wooden form suffers a death in art [*artificem . . . necem*]! If you add a voice to the form, it will soon speak. Thus the dying GOD still lives in art.[35]

Overtly Christian references such as this are surprisingly scarce in the Cluj poem, if not consciously avoided.[36] Yet the conceit of the painted crucifixion, however clumsy, should perhaps not be dismissed out of hand as pious

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34 *De arte am.*, 5: "Scribimus quanam ingenui jungantur amici | Arte: fave coeptis Phoebe benigne meis | Arte decus rebus; quaeruntur & arte sodales | Arte paratur honos, arte paratur amor."

35 *De arte am.*, 5–6: "Et quota pars artis spirantes pingere formas? | Attamen his quantus venit ab arte decor? | Artifici in tabula, moriturum suspice JESUM, | Num verum ferme de trabe pendet onus? | Si cernas lacrymas, quas haec, mentitur imago, | Non poteris lacrymas, ipse tenere, tuas | Sed lacrymare! Vides Christus lacrymatur & ipse! | Et subit artificem lignea forma necem. | Adde suam formae vocem, mox illa loquetur, | Sic moriens etiam vivit in arte DEUS."

36 In the second book, the poets digress on a potent philtre for nourishing chaste and constant love, one not acquired by illicit arts. *De arte am.*, 36: "These love-potions are not prepared by Haemonian arts, an old woman didn't concoct them with magical murmurings. The herbs of Circe or Medea did not produce this work, nor a Thessalian witch. God himself—he saw it, when he was crying in the manger, when he was made man by the great Power—God himself, I say, made this love drug. When he hung from the sacred scaffold a sad burden, and when he saw his feet bruised with chains, his back with scourges, his temples with thorns, his neck with the cross; he made it . . . and I have wandered!" ("Non haec Aemonias sunt phyltra parata per artes, | Non haec cum magico murmure fecit anus. | Non hoc Circaeae, non hoc Medeides herbae, | Non hoc confecit Thessala mulier opus. | Ipse Deus (vidit, quem tunc praesepe gementem, | Cum fuit ex magno Numine factus homo) | Ipse inquam Deus hoc fecit medicamen amoris. | De trabe cum

padding. It can be seen as programmatic: the young writers, under the watchful eye of their teacher, aspire to *move* their audience with *their* work of art, their verses; to inspire in them the ideal form of love/friendship which is the poem's subject. The extent to which this ideal love is presented in a specifically Jesuit frame remains to be seen.

Of course the poem already constitutes the portrait of a friendship of sorts inasmuch it is the work of a group of collaborating classmates. We can only guess at the interpersonal dynamics, the negotiations and compromises that took place in that eighteenth-century classroom, the partitioning of labour between boys and their mixed feelings of excitement, envy and pride. Part of the fun for both poets and audience arises from the barely concealed fiction that this is the work of a single author:

> Read: and don't be ashamed to have read a juvenile Poet. Quite often we youths furnish useful weapons too. I admit Apollo hasn't sneezed on me yet, and I am younger than the advice I have given. But approach nonetheless, just have a look! The orders I have written down have been dug out of ancient mothballs—dug out, but what an unholy labour that was for me! Believe me, writing this poem was a greater work![37]

The humility topos is carried further in a pun on the name of Cluj (*Claudiopolis*), as the juvenile poet(s) describe how their "lame" (*clauda*) Muse limps on the eleven feet of the elegiac couplet—another Ovidian conceit.[38]

In fact the Transylvanian youths were imitating Ovid's *Ars amatoria* to a greater extent than their Viennese brothers.[39] This raises the interesting question of their exposure to such a 'dangerous' text in the first place; needless to say, it was not prescribed reading in the *Ratio studiorum*. The poets exhort the listener to do just those things to win a friend that Ovid's lover does to win a girlfriend. He will bestow praise, which

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sacra triste pependit onus; | Cumque suas vidit plantas livere catenis, | Terga flagris, spinis tempora, colla cruce; | Fecit . . . & erravi!"). Cf. Ovid, *Ars amatoria* 2.97–106.

37 *De arte am*., 33: "Perlege: nec pudeat juvenem legisse Poëtam, | Utilia, & Juvenes saepius, arma damus. | Nondum, Confiteor, mihi sternutavit Apollo; | Quaeque dedi, monitis, sum minor ipse meis; | Sed tamen accedas, tamen inspice, jussa, vetustis | Eruta sunt, quae nos scribimus, ista cedris. | Eruta; sed mihi, quam fuerat labor improbus iste! | Crede fuit, scripto carmine, majus opus."

38 *De arte am*., 6–7: "Hanc tibi (quisquis ades, linguaque animoque faveto) | Praecipit impari-bus nostra Thalia modis | Haec tibi, si sequeris, pede clauda Thalia praeibit, | Sed sequere: est quamvis Clauda, Magistra tamen." Cf. Ovid, *Amores* 1.1–4.

39 There are even some direct quotations, for example *De arte am*., 32 ~ *Ars am*. 2.147–8: "Odimus accipitrem, quia vivit semper in armis, | Et pavidum, solitos in pecus ire, lupos."

> kindles spirits, love the chaste fires of the soul. Praise is honey but love brings its own darts. Yet the wounds these sweet barbs inflict are welcome, I think; the wounds of praise are more pleasing than honey.[40]

He will mirror his companion's interests, read and discuss the same books, send him seductive letters:

> At the same time your letter should bear your blandishments, and words that imitate those of lovers, [words] which will be precious to your friend. Writings ravish hearts, and he who knows how to write smoothly is able to win many over. A letter borne on an apple fooled Cydippe; the girl was caught unawares by its words.[41]

A playful, almost puckish, spirit pervades the Cluj poem. We are enjoined to buy favour with our friend with little gifts, telling him that they "have been sent from exotic gardens when they have in fact been bought on the high street".[42] We must not neglect to host elegant dinner parties: "Believe me, this age has appointed four powers for itself. God is now belly, table, kitchen, and cook".[43]

We are even told to *lie*, to pretend to be poor in order to discover whether or not our friend is stingy.[44] The poets comically imagine how they will feign hardship in spite of their wealthy appearance:

> Don't be swayed by the garments that clothe my limbs, with their wool of Tyrian purple; this is how we now conceal our poverty in the Tyrian

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40 *De arte am*., 28: "laus animos, animi, castos amor excitat ignes, | Laus mel, sed secum spicula gestat amor. | Quae tamen infligunt haec dulcia spicula, grata | Ut puto, plus laudis, vulnera melle placent."

41 *De arte am*., 29: "Blanditias simul illa tuas, imitataque amantum | Verba ferat, socio chara futura tuo. | Scripta animos rapiunt, blande qui scribere novit, | Ille sibi multos conciliare potest. | Littera Cydippen pomo perlata fefellit | Inscia verbis est capta puella suis."

42 *De arte am*., 43: "Ista peregrinis, poteris tibi dicere missa | Hortis, in media sint licet empta via."

43 *De arte am*., 43: "Crede mihi haec aetas quatuor sibi numina fecit, | Nunc Deus est venter, mensa, culina, coquus."

44 In fact a handful of couplets towards the end of the second book of the Viennese poem offer similar advice, but without the comic elaboration of the Cluj poets. See *De am*. 2.6, 48: "Simulate grief in your face: pretend to be wretchedly poor, as if unlucky stars are oppressing you. If he takes pity on you, if he beats his breast in grief, if he will freely supply you with his own resources . . . " ("Maerorem vultu simula: confinge molestam | Pauperiem; veluti fata sinistra premant. | Si tibi compatitur, si plangit pectora questu; | Si sibi subductas suppeditabit opes . . . ").

> shade, so that we should not appear bereft of resources, which we are. Alas, how many of us are now swathed in Sidonian sea snail who barely have three pennies in our piggy-banks at home![45]

That they break into the first person voice here is typical of Ovid, of course, but it also reflects the *play*ful, that is, dramatic, instincts of Jesuit schoolboys.[46] Thus, in another extraordinary passage, they advocate toying with the target friend's emotions to discern his true feelings. We should get him tipsy at dinner, then pretend that another friend, whom he loves, has given us offence; that this third party has said this or that—we must make up the details—according to so and so—and we must also fabricate witnesses. Then we must observe our friend's reaction before deciding whether or not to take our friendship 'to the next level.'

Sometimes the advice offered can seem almost *too* worldly. We are effectively told to run hot and cold with our friends:

> We almost deem worthy of greater love those who are not too needy; those who are first keen and then loosen their bonds; those who now neglect and now love again. The reason is easy to see: because love grows through contraries (thus a flame is wont to grow because of coldness). So that she may test the love of her infant its sweetest mother neglects it, and doesn't speak kind words to the poor thing. But the boy, so that he may return to the maternal embrace again, strives to win his mother over with blandishments.[47]

The modern reader cannot fail to be struck by the lightly erotic tone. Moreover, while the heroic male couples Nisus and Euryalus and Orestes and Pylades are

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45 *De arte am.*, 15: "Nec moveare meos, quod vestis contegat, artus | Cujus de tyrio murice lana rubet | Sic nunc Pauperiem tyria velamus in umbra, | Quod sumus, ut nudi ne videamur opum. | Eheu Sidonio quot nunc insternimur ostro! | Quorum tres obolos vix habet arca domi!"

46 This play- and *play*-ful orientation found its most spectacular outlet, of course, in the Jesuit school dramas and musical plays performed annually by students from each of the classes, with additional productions staged in Lent and at the end of the academic year.

47 *De arte am.*, 44: "Illos majori ferme dignamur amore | Quorum non nimium est relligionis amor. | Qui modò contendunt, modò rursus vîncla relaxant, | Et modò postponunt, & modò rursus amant. | In promptu causa est: quia per contraria (flamma | Sic solet ob frigus crescere) crescit amor. | Ut probet infantis suavissima mater amorem, | Negligit, & misero nec bona verba facit. | At puer, ut redeat maternas rursus in ulnas, | Matrem blanditiis conciliare studet."

duly mentioned, the tenor of the young poets' advice inclines to a softer, almost 'effeminate,' form of love, recalling in some respects the sexual self-abasement of Roman love elegy. How would such (ironic?) histrionics have been received by the poem's eighteenth-century audience, in the context of academic celebrations whose relative solemnity is now difficult for us to reconstruct? How was the poem delivered? Was it felt to be funny, parodic, risqué or titillating? Or were the boys expressing something genuine about the sorts of friendship the Jesuits were encouraging them to contract, or at least not discouraging, in this period?[48]

The checklist in the first book of the different sorts of companions we should avoid[49] concludes with an ambiguous passage that may hint, delicately, at the risks of homosexual attraction:

> What if I should instruct you not to become close with those who are overly smooth in their appearance or words? This is a deceptive breed of men; that they may fool the birds they sing in the manner of a deceptive reed. The pipe plays sweetly while the bird-catcher tricks the birds, and those men, so that they may deceive, will sing many sweet things. You should either flee them or, if you have enough art, deceive the deceivers with your own deception. It will seem a virtue, not a fault; the scoundrel is caught in the same nets he lays for you . . . What am I saying? I wanted to tell you only so much![50]

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48 Garrioch ("From Christian Friendship", 197, citing Raymond Stephanson, "Epicoene Friendship: Understanding Male Friendship in the Early Eighteenth Century, with Some Speculations about Pope", *Eighteenth Century* 38 (1997): 151–70) observes that "[n]ot only were representations of friendship extraordinarily sentimental but in letters just as in novels were frequently eroticized, at least in educated circles"—although he concedes to Stephanson "that . . . verbal cross-gender play that was fairly common in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, at least in literary circles, was to disappear later, as male effeminacy became associated with homosexuality".

49 See, *De arte am.*, 19–20. These include the frivolous, the gloomy, those who praise too much, who are overly chatty, those with different interests, and of a different social station. They will either waste our time or cause us much heartache.

50 *De arte am.*, 20: "Quid si praecipiam, nimium ne admittere blandos, | Vultu, vel verbis in tua vincla velis? | Hoc genus est hominum fallax, hi ut fallere possint | More canunt calami decipientis aves. | Fistula dulce canit, volucres dum decipit auceps | Hique ut decipiant, plurima blanda canent. | Hos tu vel fugias, vel si satis artis habebis, | Fraudem deludas fraude, dolumque dolo | Fallere fallentem, virtus non culpa videtur | Improbus in laqueos, quos tibi tendit, eat | Hos ego . . . Quid dico! Volui tibi dicere tantum!" Cf. Ovid, *Ars amatoria* 3.433–66, and the note ad loc. by Roy Gibson, *Ovid: Ars Amatoria Book 3* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). While the Ovidian passage is not a warning against

Vanière too, at first blush, might seem to be describing same-sex attraction in passages such as: "after him came Menalcas, beautiful to look at. He whom I should have got to know first I madly loved";[51] and

> youngish Crispus pleased me above all: I loved the purity of the boy; and from his fresh flower hoped for sweet fruits. Alas, he saw Phyllis, and having seen her, Crispus could no longer live without his Phyllis.[52]

Yet Vanière's timeless pastoral landscape, hedged with Virgilian reminiscences, is further removed—or at least, artfully isolated—from contemporary social realities than is the urbane Ovidian fantasy of the Cluj poets. Though they are the vehicle through which Vanière teaches the laws of modern-day friendship, his childlike shepherds inhabit a liminal world that may or may not reflect the poet's personal observation of real-life relationships, or even crushes, in the French Jesuit classroom of the early eighteenth century.

As mentioned earlier, the third book of the Cluj poem, on terminating a friendship, is relatively short. Our best friend should not be deserted except for very good reason, for example, if he is a traitor to his country, attempts to draw us into wickedness, or betrays our secrets (the cardinal sins of friendship also for Caussin, Vanière, and the Viennese poets). Interestingly, we are advised to allow such toxic friendships to wither away gradually, to forestall any ongoing hostility.[53] But we should always try to correct our friend's faults first and we

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homosexuals per se, effeminate men, as Gibson (*Ovid*, 276) observes, were "often implied to be more open to sexual experiences of any kind (with either sex) than other men".

51 Vanière, *Opuscula*, 35: "Post illum subiit spectabilis ore Menalcas. | Debueram quem nosse priùs, malesanus amavi."

52 Vanière, *Opuscula*, 37: "Junior ante alios placuit mihi Crispus: amabam | Candorem pueri; dulcesque à flore recenti | Sperabam fructus. Videt eheu Phyllida; visa | Nec potuit posthac sine Phyllide vivere Crispus."

53 Caussin and Vanière both insist on the respect owed to a failed friendship. Caussin (*La Cour sainte*, trans. Thomas Hawkins (London, 1634), 543): "If a friend, one of those who have been very acceptable to you, chance to fail; whether it be by evil life, or through manifest contempt of you, or out of other ill dispositions; yet you must on the rotten trunk honor the last characters of Love, you must rather unstitch than break, you must keep the secrets he at other times hath committed to you, and not publish his defects. Amity is so venerable, that we must honor even its shadows, and imitate the Pythagoreans, who celebrated the obsequies of such as forsook their society, to bury them with honour." Vanière (*Opuscula*, 56) says to "beware of hating the one you recently loved" ("odisse cave, quem nuper amas") and suggests we should even come to the aid, in private, of a friend from whom we have publicly disassociated on the grounds of misconduct. The advice of the Cluj poets is perhaps expressed in more pragmatic and self-interested terms, in keeping with the Ovidian paradigm.

should *never* end a friendship without just cause. At this point the boys engage in a rather interesting counterfactual thought experiment:

> Correct him if you can, if not, let him go. However, let captive love loose its chains slowly. A rather serious reason should dissolve your bond, for it is harmful if severed without cause. If Jason had kept the faith he had contracted with you, Medea, you who were in no part to blame, you would never have taken revenge on the son of Aeson with the blood of his children and the offspring of your own womb. You would not, I declare—for you were a mother, not a tigress, nor a she-bear—have sacrificed, one stepmother, two children. But since Jason violated the pact he had made, you committed two crimes to his one.[54]

Thus, if they bypass the third book of Ovid's poem—his advice to women on seducing men—the young male poets of the Transylvanian college do, for one moment at least, try to see things from a woman's perspective, and from Medea's no less.

Conclusion

Such creative 'cross-dressing' in the context of a poem or on the college stage, the practice of projecting oneself into the lives and minds of others—whether of saints, missionaries, historical figures, classical heroines, and even non-European women[55]—may not have transformed Jesuit schoolboys, seminarians and priests into anthropologists or feminists, exactly, but it did oblige them imaginatively to explore alternative and even subaltern identities.[56] It is not difficult to see how such exercises will historically have

54 *De arte am.*, 51: "Corrige si poteris, si non potes abjice; lentè, | Sed sua captivus vincula solvat amor. | Causa fidem gravior debet dissolvere, namque | Si sine sit causa dissociata, nocet. | Si pactam Medea tibi servasset Jason, | Quae nulla fuerat parte nociva, fidem: | Aesoniden fueras natorum sanguine nunquam, | Nec proprii partu visceris, ulta virum. | Non fateor (nam mater eras, non Tygris, & ursa) | Mactasses natos una noverca duos. | At quia, quod dederat, pactum violavit Iason, | Pro uno (quod fecit) crimine, bina tulit."

55 For example in two plays by the Austrian Jesuit poet and composer team, Johann Baptist Adolph and Johann Bernhardt Staudt, "Pietas in peregrinos" (Vienna, 1703), in which a reconstructed Dido releases Aeneas from his love bond so that he may pursue his Roman mission, and "Mulier fortis" (Vienna, 1698), portraying the purported Christian martyrdom of sixteenth-century Japanese noblewoman, Gratia Hosokawa.

56 See Yasmin Haskell, "Early Modern Anger Management: Seneca, Ovid, and Lieven De Meyere's *De ira libri tres* (Antwerp, 1694)," *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*

served the interests of an apostolic order whose aim was to harvest souls at all levels of European society and in the overseas missions. Playing with, experimenting with, the emotions by playing with Latin verses and classical characters will have had a not insignificant effect on the developing psyches of Jesuit schoolboys. I have argued elsewhere that a 'ludic' element—'playful,' '*play*ful,' and also, in the Latin sense, 'of the school'—may be discerned in poems across the many genres to which Jesuit teachers and students assiduously turned their hands in the early modern period.[57]

As regards the collaborative friendship poems of Vienna and Cluj, the very act of composing them must have been experienced by their adolescent authors as an exciting, emotionally charged, team enterprise and will have created a lifelong bond. Indeed, the higher friendship to which the boy poets are implictly exhorting both themselves and their audience, the new liberal arts and philosophy graduates, is not so much that of the socially, intellectually, and affectively well-matched but exclusive (male) pair, but the corporation and ideology under the banner of which such friendships were originally fostered. Thus the Cluj volume is illustrated with four emblems that tell a somewhat different story from its riskily Ovidian verses. Figures 11.1 and 11.2 hint, I think, at a wider affective network and at a pious, collective self-monitoring that goes beyond the private and secular relationships described in the poem.

It is, perhaps, not so much *what* these Jesuit poets were saying about friendship that mattered, then, as *how* they were saying it: in classicising Latin verse produced within, or near, the classroom.[58] The writing and exchanging of such verse functioned as game, gift, and emotional glue that bound boys and young men not just to one another but also to the Society of Jesus.

18, no. 1 (2011): 36–65, at 46–47. Lieven de Meyere (1655–1730), a Flemish Jesuit theologian and author of a poem on anger modelled on Ovid's erotic didactic poetry, gives advice to women on how to deal with morose husbands, inviting them to behave much as Ovid's lover does to his prospective girlfriend. Francesco Grimaldi (1680–1740), Professor of Rhetoric at the Roman College, in a didactic poem *De vita oeconomica* ("On the Life of the Householder"), also attempted an imaginative leap into the female psyche off the back of Ovid, counselling 'mildness' to the husband in dealing with an unruly wife. Her punishments should be gradual withdrawal of privileges, such as her favourite jewels (!). See Haskell, *Loyola's Bees*, 269.

57 Yasmin Haskell, "The Vineyard of Verse: The State of Scholarship on Latin Poetry of the Old Society of Jesus," *Journal of Jesuit Studies* 1, no. 1 (2014): 26–46, at 46.

58 In his most accomplished Ovidian poem, *De vita urbana* ("on the life about town"), published in Rome in 1725, Grimaldi (see note 54, above) went much further than the Cluj poets in prescribing worldly and witty rules for contracting and cultivating useful friendships. He was expressly writing for students of his Rhetoric class. Cf. Haskell, *Loyola's Bees*, 282–85.


Luminis Author
Cernis in amplexum sol stellas pertrahit omnes,
Illis, dum nitidam, fundit, ab ore facem.
Fax tua sit sincerus amor, sint stella sodales,
Ure face hac socios mox mihi Phœbus eris.

FIGURE 11.1 *"Luminis Author" ("The Author of Light"). First of four emblems illustrating* De arte amicitiae *(Cluj, 1750). Courtesy of the Wienbibliothek im Rathaus, Druckschriftsammlung. The verse inscription reads: "You see the sun draws all the stars into its embrace as it showers its brilliant torch on them from its face. Let your torch be pure love, let your comrades be the star(s)! Burn your companions with this torch and soon you will be a Phoebus to me!"*

Coelesti accendit ab igne
Si ſtatuas ſenſûs expertes, vivere flammâ,
Cœli furtivâ docte Prometheë facis.
Dic, mihi quid faciet ſocialis flamma, ſodales
Si facibus caſtis uſſerit illa pios?

FIGURE 11.2 *"Coelesti accendit ab igne"* (*"He ignites with celestial fire"*). *Second of four emblems illustrating* De arte amicitiae (*Cluj, 1750*). *Courtesy of the Wienbibliothek im Rathaus, Druckschriftsammlung. The verse inscription reads: "If, learned Prometheus, you can make senseless statues live with your flame stolen from heaven, tell me, what will a sociable flame do if it burns pious comrades with chaste torches?"*

CHAPTER 12

Androgyny and the Fear of Demonic Intervention in the Early Modern Iberian Peninsula: Ecclesiastical and Popular Responses

François Soyer

On the afternoon of 3 April 1698, a prisoner was taken from the cells in the building of the inquisitorial tribunal in Coimbra, Portugal, and led into a room described as the "old chapel" (*oratório velho*). There, the prisoner was met by four men: a doctor, a surgeon, and two notaries, all of whom were lay agents (*familiares*) of the Inquisition. The four men had been instructed by one of the inquisitors to conduct a thorough examination of the sexual organs of the prisoner, "to ascertain whether he was a woman or a hermaphrodite." All four men were later questioned separately by inquisitor João Duarte Ribeiro and reported that, apart from a hernia affecting one of his testicles, the penis, scrotum and anus of the prisoner "were in their proper places and of the normal proportions," and that they had not found anything "that was not like that of any man."[1]

The man who was subjected to this humiliating examination was named Pedro Furtado. He was aged forty-six and was the parish priest of the small village of Sambade in the remote northern Portuguese province of Trás-os-Montes. The examination was the result of denunciations that the Inquisition had received since 1695 from various male individuals. These individuals claimed that they had engaged in sexual relations with Father Pedro Furtado, and that during sexual intercourse they had discovered the priest possessed female genitalia. The testimony of António Simões, a twenty-two-year-old servant employed by Furtado, is exemplary of that provided against Pedro Furtado by the witnesses. It was both graphic and unambiguous:

> One evening after dinner, he found himself alone with [Pedro Furtado]... As [António Simões] began to comb his hair, [Pedro Furtado] asked him to keep secret what he was about to tell him and to swear an oath that he would do so. [António Simões] promised to

1 Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon (hereafter A.N.T.T.), Inquisição de Coimbra, trial no. 7622.

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> do this, swearing an oath [by placing his hand] on a breviary belonging to the priest. Thereupon, the aforesaid priest placed his hand on [Simões'] crotch and handled his genitals, profusely kissing him at the same time. . . . Afterwards, the priest told him that they should go to bed and they both . . . lay on top [of the bed]. The priest ordered [António Simões] to undo his trousers and the priest undid his trousers as well. Laying flat on his back, he ordered [António Simões] to place himself on top of him because the aforesaid priest had female genitals rather than male ones. In such a fashion, giving each other many caresses and [with their groins touching], the priest took [António Simões's] penis with one of his hands and placed it between his legs and inside his body, as if he were a woman. It seemed to [António Simões] that it was very similar to [a woman's] vagina. In this manner [António Simões] consummated [the sexual act] and ejaculated semen once in that organ that seemed to him to be a woman's vagina. On that occasion, the priest behaved as if he were a woman and told [António Simões] that he had himself ejaculated semen as if he were a woman although [António Simões] did not sense this.[2]

The inquisitors were puzzled by the extremely detailed nature of the testimony of António Simões and other witnesses, many of whom did not know each other or even live in the same area. Their specific references to a sexual position (the 'missionary position') that was assumed to be a quintessentially heterosexual one, to vaginal penetration, and to 'female ejaculation' (seemingly a reference to the widespread belief that women also ejaculated female semen during sexual intercourse) stood at odds with the unambiguous results of the physical examination. Some witnesses further suggested that Father Furtado practised magic and that he had told them he had previously been pregnant and had given birth to a child. The first medical examination yielded no trace of female genitals, and this discrepancy led the inquisitors to consider a demonic pact as a possible explanation. One of the charges brought against Furtado in the inquisitorial indictment specifically referred to the suspicion of demonic agency resulting from Furtado's sexual relations:

> Forgetting his [priestly] duties, he pretended to be a woman by the will of the Devil and persuaded male individuals to copulate with him, in the manner of a man and a woman, and he also employed other superstitions to the great prejudice of his soul and to the scandal of the faithful.[3]

2 A.N.T.T., Inquisição de Coimbra, trial no. 7622, fols. 5r–7r.

3 A.N.T.T., Inquisição de Coimbra, trial no. 7622, fols. 105r–105v.

In the course of his trial, Pedro Furtado confessed to having committed "lascivious deeds" with other men—essentially masturbating them—but he steadfastly denied having committed acts of consummated "sodomy" (homosexual anal intercourse) with any of his lovers, or of having made a pact with the devil that would have allowed him to deceive his lovers into believing that he had female sexual organs.

When questioning Father Furtado, the inquisitor in charge of the case seemed to express confidence in the possibility of a demonic pact. Father Furtado was urged to confess and repeatedly warned that his behaviour could only lead the inquisitor to presume that the priest had indeed concluded a pact with the devil in order to successfully pass himself off as a woman. Amongst themselves and whilst deliberating their verdict, the inquisitors and theologians rejected the possibility of an actual physical transformation, agreeing that the devil did not possess the power "to transform a man into a woman" and that the majority of the existing authorities did not consider this to be possible. After a lengthy trial and further investigations, including a second physical examination with the same result as the first, Father Pedro Furtado was convicted in 1701, not of a demonic pact but of the lesser charge of indecent behaviour and leading his parishioners into heretical error by pretending that he, an ordained priest, was a woman. He was condemned to serve a sentence of exile and to suffer the confiscation of his personal property in order to pay the court's costs.

The trial of Father Pedro Furtado is one of a dozen different trials or investigations conducted by the Spanish or Portuguese Inquisitions from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries in which the issues of androgyny, hermaphroditism, ambiguous gender and demonic possession coalesced to present challenging cases for the inquisitors.[4] In these cases, men were accused of being women and (less commonly) women were accused of being men, within a variety of communities in which the inquisitors received or collected considerable testimony from both female and male witnesses supporting these claims and, for some them, who claimed to have had sexual relations with the accused. In an early modern Iberian social context, where the secular and ecclesiastical authorities increasingly prosecuted those deemed to infringe the prevailing sexual and moral order (such as bigamists, adulterers, fornicators and homosexuals) from the sixteenth century onwards,

4 In an earlier work (see François Soyer, *Ambiguous Gender in Early Modern Spain and Portugal: Inquisitors, Doctors and the Transgression of Gender Norms* (Leiden: Brill, 2012)), my analysis of these inquisitorial trials and investigations, including many not cited in this chapter for reasons of brevity, focused more on the responses to ambiguous gender amongst churchmen and (to a lesser extent) the medical establishment rather than popular ones.

such cases of suspected ambiguous gender were perceived as threatening a gendered natural order. In each case, the inquisitors and the theological advisors who helped them to decide upon the appropriate sentences and punishments were thus forced to consider a number of problematic questions: could the devil be responsible for altering or even transforming the genitalia of a man or woman? Could the phenomenon be the result of natural causes ('hermaphroditism,' anatomical malformations or, in accordance with Galenic medical theory, problems with bodily thermodynamics)? How were they to respond to cases in which physical evidence obtained as a result of medical examinations contrasted diametrically with consistent testimony obtained from seemingly credible witnesses?

The trials upon which this chapter focuses afford a remarkable and rare insight into beliefs about, and responses to, individuals presenting ambiguous gender not only amongst members of the ecclesiastical elite in early modern Spain and Portugal (particularly the inquisitors) but also among members of the wider population, whose voices have generally been lost from the historical record. These inquisitorial trial dossiers and their transcripts of witness testimony and interrogations were not public documents but rather confidential records preserved for the use of inquisitors only. Whilst they show little concern to record explicit information about the individual emotional reactions of those involved (be they inquisitors, witnesses or defendants), they nonetheless divulge much implicit information about the wider societal anxieties and emotional climate regarding the roles of demonic possession and sex in determining gender. By analysing what these documents reveal about 'official' and 'popular' attitudes, this work examines the question of whether there was a gulf separating elite, or institutional, and popular responses to the notion that the devil possessed the ability to alter the genitalia of individuals, or to deceive individuals in their perception of either their own sexuality and gender or that of others.

The Response of the Catholic Church: Separating Demonic Delusions from Natural Occurrences

The ability of the devil to alter the body of a man or woman was the subject of considerable anxiety and debate within the Catholic Church as early as the fifth century. No less an authority than Saint Augustine of Hippo, after seemingly supporting the notion in his early work *Miscellany of Eighty-Three Questions* but subsequently reconsidering his position and condemning it in his later works *City of God* and *On the Trinity*, contended that only God

possessed the power to actually alter the human body. In the High Middle Ages, numerous theologians, chief amongst them Saint Thomas Aquinas, developed this important concept and sought to define the powers that could solely be attributed to God. They accordingly identified three possible causal orders for the miraculous or wonderful: the supernatural (caused by God), the preternatural (caused by angels or demons) and the natural (ordinary natural occurrences). Thus, Aquinas argued in *De Malo* that demons had no powers over the body beyond the realm of nature and could only *appear* to bring about supernatural transformations.[5]

Such theological developments made their mark in late medieval demonology. In many respects, the debates about the power of the devil to transform genitals mirrored that about his power to turn men and women into beasts, such as werewolves, and the power of witches to deceive human senses as well as the 'passions' of men and women (the emotions of love, fear and hate). In their hugely popular and widely read witch-hunter's manual the *Malleus Maleficarum* ('Hammer of the Witches'), the fifteenth-century German Dominicans Heinrich Kramer and Jacob Sprenger examined the question of apparent sex changes caused by witches and demons in a chapter of the first part of their work, which was widely read by theologians in Spain and Portugal. Amongst the many Iberian readers of the *Malleus* were men such as the Spanish inquisitor Alonso de Salazar Frías (*c*.1564–1636), famous for his role in the Basque witch trials in the early seventeenth century, and Manuel do Vale de Moura (1564–1650), a Portuguese theologian and deputy of the Portuguese Inquisition who wrote a treatise on witchcraft that was popular in the Iberian Peninsula.[6] Kramer and Sprenger were not concerned with sex-changes in general but with the more specific issue of whether witches could, through some "prestidigitatory illusion," make male organs "appear to be entirely removed and separate from the body," or whether a penis could be physically removed through witchcraft. Citing Augustine and Aquinas, they concluded that the devil could, by means of a spell or 'glamour,' deceive the 'external' senses of individuals—sight and touch—causing them to believe that their genitals, or those of others, had disappeared or been altered when in reality they had not.

5 Saint Augustine of Hippo, *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, *De Civitate Dei* 18, and *De Trinitate* 3; Saint Thomas Aquinas, *De Malo* 16.11; See also Fabián Alejandro Campagne, "Witchcraft and the Sense-of-the-Impossible in Early Modern Spain: Some Reflections based on the Literature of Superstition (ca. 1500–1800)," *Harvard Theological Review* 96 (2003): 25–62.

6 Gustav Henningsen, *The Salazar Documents: Inquisitor Alonso de Salazar Frías and Others on the Basque Witch Persecution* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 9; The *Malleus* is frequently cited in Manuel do Vale de Moura, *De incantationibus seu Ensalmis Opusculum Primum* (Evora, 1620).

Consequently, they argued that "when it is performed by witches, it is only a matter of glamour; although it is no illusion in the opinion of the sufferer," who, misled by their senses and emotions, would be convinced that the transformation was a real one.[7] Regarding the actual physical removal or disappearance of the penis of a man by witches, their analysis was more complex. They were, as they admitted in the first paragraph of the chapter, willing to concede the possibility of such a scenario:

> That they can do so is argued *a fortiori*; for since devils can do greater things than this, [such] as killing [men] or carrying them from place to place—as was shown in the cases of the [Books] of Job and Tobias—therefore they can also truly and actually remove men's members.[8]

Yet they nonetheless added a critical *proviso*: that such a state of affairs could only occur if God, for his own reasons, permitted devils to effect a genuinely miraculous sex-change. To support this claim made upon the greater force of logic, Kramer and Sprenger referred to the Old Testament, where they found evidence of God's transformative powers over the human body (as demonstrated by his ability to turn Lot's wife into a pillar of salt in Genesis 19:26 and his use of evil or bad angels to punish the people of Israel in Psalm 78:49). The other possible scenario in which a man's penis could disappear was a 'natural one,' that of eunuchs: men whose genitals were deliberately mutilated or entirely removed by human action, a state-of-affairs that obviously necessitated no divine or demonic intervention.[9]

Overall, it is clear that Kramer and Sprenger did not believe that actual physical transformations of human genitalia happened apart from those exceptionally rare cases that could be attributed to God himself, and that they considered the overwhelming majority of cases to involve delusions or hallucinations induced by demonic spells. To persuade any doubters, Kramer and Sprenger went on in the second part of the *Malleus Maleficarum* to cite numerous examples of cases involving men who had genuinely believed that their genitals had disappeared, yet in reality had been deceived by a demonic glamour hiding their genitals from them. They took the opportunity to hammer home their point once more, emphasising the illusionary nature of the devil's power to 'remove' a man's penis:

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7 Heinrich Kramer and Jacob Sprenger, *Malleus Maleficarum*, ed. and trans. Montague Summers (New York: Dover, 1971), 144–51 (part 1, question 9).

8 Kramer and Sprenger, *Malleus Maleficarum*, 144.

9 Kramer and Sprenger, *Malleus Maleficarum*, 144–45.

> The Devil has the power over inferior things, except only the soul, therefore he is able to effect certain changes in those things, when God allows, so that things appear to be otherwise than they are. And this he does, as I have said, either by confusing or deluding the organ of sight.[10]

Their measured scepticism about the physical transformation of sexual organs was, as will be clear from the attitudes of the inquisitors and theologians in the trials examined in this chapter, one that came to define the responses of inquisitors and theologians in the Iberian Peninsula when confronted with the cases of individuals accused of possessing ambiguous genitalia and suspected of having made a demonic pact.

The German witch-hunters did not factor medical arguments about hermaphroditism into their discussion of the possibility of demonic sex-changes, and were probably not interested in doing so. For many early modern theologians, however, the problem of ambiguous genitalia and gender was complicated by the dominant Galenic 'one-sex' medical model expounded by respected physicians and anatomists such as Andreas Vesalius (1514–64). According to this model, male and female genital organs were essentially believed to be identical but differentiated by the fact that the colder bodies of females had retained their genitals (vagina, uterus and ovaries) within their bodies whilst the warmer bodies of males had pushed their genitals (penis and testicles) outside of it.[11] There therefore existed a medical possibility that gender transmutations could occur naturally if congenital malformations in genitalia were affected either by changes in bodily temperatures brought about by external stimuli. The sixteenth-century Spanish physician Juan Huarte de San Juan, for instance, argued that

> if Nature, having made a perfect male, wants to change him into a female, it merely has to turn his reproductive organs back inside the body.[12]

As the historians Cleminson and Vásquez García have recently highlighted, this approach allowed for an easy medical explanation of the existence of 'hermaphrodites'; individuals who would now be described either as intersex or presenting disorders in the development of their genitalia. Such a medical

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10 Kramer and Sprenger, *Malleus Maleficarum*, 262–69, quote at 265.

11 Thomas Walter Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

12 S. Velasco, *Male Delivery: Reproduction, Effeminacy and Pregnant Men in Early Modern Spain* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2006), 94–99.

model only changed very gradually in the Iberian Peninsula, with the decline of the Galenic model occurring during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[13]

The theological and demonological implications of the Galenic 'one-sex' model were certainly significant. The Jesuit theologian Martín del Rio (1551–1608) closely examined the possibility of diabolical sex changes in his study of magic and the occult, *Disquisitionum magicarum libri sex* (1599). For del Rio, sex changes could occur naturally and he thus, implicitly, admitted that as a natural phenomenon they were subject to demonic manipulation.[14] Such a view was articulated more explicitly by the Italian priest Francesco Maria Guazzo in his book on witchcraft, *Compendium Maleficarum* ('Compendium of the Witches'), first published in 1608. In an entire section of his work devoted to examining whether the sexes could be interchanged through witchcraft and the devil's agency, Guazzo stated that he believed most sex-changes to be natural in origin, but he nevertheless considered it possible for the devil to manipulate such naturally occurring phenomena:

> If [sex changes] can come about naturally, as so many authors maintain, I should think that with God's permission it is possible for the Devil, relying upon natural causes, [to cause such transformations to occur].[15]

Guazzo's position was one adopted by others. A decade later, the Spanish demonologist Francisco Torreblanca Villalpando (d. 1645) addressed the same issue in his own work on magic, *Epitome Delictorum sive de Magia*. He came to the same conclusion that the devil could manipulate such sexual transformations in the case of hermaphrodites. Finally, writing in Spanish-ruled southern Italy, the Dominican theologian Tommaso Campanella (1568–1639) argued in his voluminous *Quaestiones physiologicae* that sexual transformations were always natural and not diabolical in origin but that this was only the case for women who turned into men, since "it is natural that woman can turn into men since they are imperfect men but a man cannot then become a woman." Regarding the transformation of a man into a woman, Campanella declared that he could not find examples of such transformations "as in fairy tales," but

13 See the comprehensive works of Richard Cleminson and Francisco Vásquez García: Richard Cleminson and Francisco Vásquez García, *Hermaphroditism, Medical Science and Sexual Identity in Spain, 1850–1960* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2009); and Richard Cleminson and Francisco Vásquez García, *Sex, Identity and Hermaphrodites in Iberia, 1500–1800* (London: Brookfield, 2013).

14 M. del Rio, *Disquisitionum magicarum libri sex* (Lyon, 1602), bk. 2, question 22, 94–95.

15 F.M. Guazzo, *Compendium Malefijicarum* (Milan, 1626), bk. 1, ch. 17, 106–9.

if they occurred they were to be considered monstruous, a teratologous vagary of nature. Thus, there appears to have been a broad consensus on the 'natural' nature of actual physical sex-changes. Demonic intervention, if it took place, was always considered to be a subsequent development, achieved through witches, spells and glamours.[16]

The discussions and debates of medical practitioners and theologians offer a wealth of information to historians, but an excessive focus upon them leaves an important question unanswered: how did 'ordinary' lay people, ignorant or uninterested in the medical sciences and unaware of the subtleties of theology and demonology, respond to cases of ambiguous gender? This is probably the most interesting aspect to emerge from the inquisitorial trials and investigations that I have studied. The witnesses in these inquisitorial documents included servants, artisans, agricultural labourers, women living in a Magdalene house, and novices and nuns in a small Dominican convent.

It is clear is that there existed popular folk beliefs tied to anxieties about ambiguous gender, and that they were often related to fears about the power of witchcraft (and of the devil) over human genitalia. Works such as the *Malleus Maleficarum* and the case studies it discusses, as well as witchcraft trial proceedings from many regions of Europe, offer abundant proof of this. Recent studies of popular attitudes towards magic and witchcraft in early modern Spain and Portugal have revealed that a great variety of powers were commonly, and often unquestioningly, attributed to the devil and to those who had made a demonic pact.[17] Relating to sex and genitalia, these abilities included the power to cause impotence, sterility, and irresistible sexual appeal through an astonishingly wide variety of magic spells, enchantments, curses and charms exercised by practitioners of magic and those accused of having made a pact with the devil. Given the prevalence of such beliefs, were men and

16 F. Torreblanca Villalpando, *Epitome Delictorum sive de Magia in qua aperta vel occulta invocatio Dæmonis intervenit* (Lyon, 1680 (posthumous edition)), ch. 17, 210–16; G. Ernst, *Tommaso Campanella: The Book and the Body of Nature* (New York: Springer, 2010), 11; and Guido Giglioni, "Immaginazione, spiriti e generazione: la teoria del concepimento nella Philosophia sensibus demonstrate di Campanella," *Bruniana & Campanelliana* 4 (1998): 37–57, esp. 52–53.

17 The variety of popular beliefs about the effects of demonic possession in early modern Portugal are discussed in J.P. Paiva, *Bruxaria e superstição num país sem "caça às bruxas," 1600–1774* (Lisbon: Notícias, 1997), 95–188. For Spain, see R. Martín Soto, *Magia e Inquisición en el antiguo Reino de Granada* (Málaga: Arguval, 2000); M.J. Torquemada, *La Inquisición y el Diablo. Supersticiones en el siglo XVIII* (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, Secretariado de Publicaciones, 2000); M. Tausiet, *Abracadabra Omnipotens: magia urbana en Zaragoza en la Edad Moderna* (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España editores, 2007).

women also prepared to believe that the devil had the capacity to permanently or temporarily alter an individual's genitalia, thereby turning men into women and vice versa?

"Through an Artifice or Illusion of the Devil"? The Cases of Joseph Martins and Maria Duran

A recurrent theme in nearly all of the cases I have surveyed is the shocked reaction of witnesses to the transgression of highly gendered norms of sexual behaviour during intercourse. The sexual position in which one individual lies on top of another and both face each other—what has come to be described as the 'missionary position' since the expression was coined by Dr. Alfred Kinsey in 1948—was perceived to be a quintessentially heterosexual one and not one in which same-sex attracted individuals could physically achieve consummated sexual intercourse. In the trials of men suspected of being women, it rapidly becomes apparent that cultural expectations about sex were paramount, since the phrases "lying on his back like any woman," "lie on top of him . . . as if he were with a woman," and "lying down like a woman" are constantly repeated.[18] When confronted by sexual behaviour that transgressed these gendered and cultural norms, and which consequently bewildered them, individuals were remarkably quick to suspect and fear that their sexual partner was not of the gender that he or she publicly claimed to be. This phenomenon can be observed distinctly not only in the case of Father Furtado, discussed above, but in two more particularly interesting cases of inquisitorial prosecutions in eighteenth-century Portugal in which the ambiguous behaviour of individuals had aroused suspicions within their communities: the trials of Joseph Martins (1725) and Maria Duran (1741–44).[19]

The trial of Joseph Martins, an impoverished young shepherd residing in the village of Ervedal in south-central Portugal, presents a situation very similar to that of Father Pedro Furtado over two decades earlier. The document that initiated the judicial proceedings against Joseph Martins was a letter from a concerned parish priest, which was forwarded to the Inquisition by his superior. The letter is, in itself, a striking document, as the following excerpt demonstrates:

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18 See the frequent appearance of these phrases in the many cases discussed in Soyer, *Ambiguous Gender in Early Modern Spain and Portugal*.

19 A.N.T.T., Inquisição de Évora, trial no. 5923; and Inquisição de Lisboa, trial no. 9230, respectively.

> In the parish of São Bernabeu of the village of Ervedal, there lives a certain Joseph Martins who, according to rumor, is a *macho femea* ["she-man"]. This man, or woman, lives in the following manner: he almost never goes to Mass on holy days and told a man, who was admonishing him for this omission, that he did not wish to go and had an aversion for the Church. [Furthermore,] some women with whom he lived claimed that he ate meat on festival days and other days when it is prohibited. Father Silvestre Antunes Rato, holder of a benefice in the main church of Avis, heard it said by other people, who had themselves heard it from someone else, that [Joseph Martins] dresses as a man but commits carnal acts with men, behaving as a woman.[20]

The letter offers a fascinating glimpse into the process through which public rumours could affect an individual's reputation and how rapidly ambiguous behaviour could lead to suspicions of witchcraft. The author of the letter certainly did not hide the fact that Joseph Martins had been branded a "she-man" in his community, not through any physical or material evidence but rather only on the basis of "rumours" (*fama*). Moreover, these rumours were attributed to "some women" and to the vague third-hand information provided by a priest. The references in this excerpt and elsewhere in the letter to Joseph Martins's alleged irreligious behaviour, including claims that he avoided Communion, were indubitably no accident and, although not explicitly formulated in the letter, were almost certainly there to suggest that the case may have a religious dimension, involving sorcery and perhaps even demonic agency.

Following the arrest and imprisonment of Joseph Martins, the inquisitors of the tribunal in Évora, which enjoyed jurisdiction over the case, ordered the interrogation of eleven witnesses in the village of Ervedal and the nearby town of Avis. They confirmed that their prisoner was indeed widely believed to be a "she-man," known to engage in sexual intercourse with men "like a woman," and was highly impious to boot. Indeed, two witnesses stated that certain unnamed "young men" (*moços*) had publicly boasted in the village that they had heterosexual sex with Joseph. Others reported rumours that, although he dressed in male clothing and possessed a thick beard "like a man," Joseph had given birth twice "when he was a woman." All of the witnesses agreed that his religious conduct had caused "great scandal" within the community, and one even stated that Joseph Martins had told him that he "hated the Church" (*tinha odio a Igreja*). One witness did admit under oath to having had sexual intercourse with Joseph, but was adamant that the latter was female:

20 A.N.T.T., Inquisição de Évora, trial no. 5923, fols. 3r–3v.

> [T]wo years ago more or less, he caught her outside of the village because he had been told that [Joseph Martins] was a *machofemea*. The witness had sexual intercourse with her and he did not see or find [any evidence] that [Joseph Martins] possessed any of the [physical] attributes of a man.[21]

A second male witness later also claimed to have

> copulated four or five times with the aforesaid Joseph Martins during which he did not detect any signs that [Joseph Martins] was anything other than a woman.[22]

The motivation of these witnesses for confessing is not clear. They may well have wanted to pre-empt, and avoid the shame of, accusations of homosexuality by pleading their sincere belief that Joseph was a woman.

Just as in the case of Father Pedro Furtado, the inquisitor in charge of the case ordered Joseph Martins to undergo a medical examination that revealed no trace of female genitalia. Even though none of the witnesses mentioned the devil, the possibility of demonic intervention was one of the avenues of investigations that the inquisitors chose to pursue. In a report to their superiors in Lisbon, the inquisitors of Évora made sense of the contradiction between the medical evidence and the witness testimony by expressing the belief that Joseph Martins might be a hermaphrodite and that the devil might be behind the case:

> It is not farfetched that the accused, being a hermaphrodite, as is supposed, would be able to possess and use a vagina, as the witnesses have testified that he did during sexual intercourse, in the manner of a woman, and afterwards change his sexual organs. This could take place either naturally or through an artifice or illusion of the Devil. He would be able to hide his penis and, although a man, appear to be a woman in order to be able to accomplish all the things that we have described.[23]

The scenario outlined by the inquisitors makes it clear that they approached the possibility of demonic interference in the same manner as that espoused by Kramer and Sprenger before them: that the devil could have allowed Joseph

21 A.N.T.T., Inquisição de Évora, trial no. 5923, fols. 18r–18v.

22 A.N.T.T., Inquisição de Évora, trial no. 5923, fols. 19r–19v.

23 A.N.T.T., Inquisição de Évora, trial no. 5923, fol. 25r.

Martins to temporarily "hide" (*occultar*) his penis and delude others into believing that he possessed a vagina without actually physically transforming or altering it. They returned to the subject in a subsequent interrogation of Joseph Martins:

> [Joseph Martins] was asked whether he, the accused, knows that it has been observed that a single creature can naturally possess both male and female genitals and that it has been known that a creature with only male genitalia can, with the intervention of an evil spell (*maleficio*), hide these [male] genitals and pretend to be a female.
>
> [Joseph Martins] replied that he knows that a creature can possess both [sets of male and female] genitals as he has heard it said. Nevertheless, it is news to him that a creature with male genitals can conceal these in order to appear to have female genitals. He also does not know whether such a thing could happen by means of an evil spell.[24]

Whilst the religious authorities that had contacted the Inquisition were concerned by the claims about Joseph Martins's gender and the threat that they represented to the social and moral order in the district, the defendant himself presented the response of the villagers as one of amused mockery or confusion rather than anger and hostile suspicion. When questioned, Joseph denied being a hermaphrodite and attributed the rumours and ridicule to which he was subjected, not only in Ervedal but also in his native village of Alagoa and other places where he had dwelt, to a (deceased) woman in his native village:

> She took it into her head that he was a woman, and could not be a man, because she had observed in him some signs of femininity, namely because of his [elongated] throat as well as his manner of walking and talking. She started to spread word about this throughout [Alagoa], without any basis except her desire to do so. This was in spite of the fact that he exhibited all the signs of being a perfect man without anything missing, except that he did not [then] have a beard, as he was still a young boy.[25]

He added that some people claimed that his hands and eyes were "too small" to be those of a man. In his desperation, Joseph told the inquisitor questioning him that he had publicly exposed his genitals to the inhabitants of Alagoa

24 A.N.T.T., Inquisição de Évora, trial no. 5923, fols. 44v–45r.

25 A.N.T.T., Inquisição de Évora, trial no. 5923, fol. 30v.

and, advised by another old woman who commiserated with his situation, had grown a beard. Neither of these measures had stopped the rumours and harassment. Eventually, after a second physical examination carried out by medical practitioners once more found no evidence of female genitalia, the inquisitors decided that the significance of the physical evidence outweighed that of the testimony against Joseph Martins. They decided that the two men who claimed to have had heterosexual intercourse with him must be perjurers and that Joseph's impiety did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Inquisition, but rather within that of the local ecclesiastical authorities. Consequently, Joseph Martins was released from captivity in November 1725, after receiving a stern warning to amend his religious conduct or face grave punishments in the future.

The trial of Maria Duran has similarities with that of Joseph Martins, but involved the reverse situation: that of a woman accused of being a man. Seemingly a female homosexual and a Dominican novice in a convent of the town of Évora (southern Portugal), she was arrested in 1741, when many of her successive female sexual partners in Évora denounced and accused her of possessing a penis and, therefore, of being a man. Her trial dossier, over 700 pages long, collected evidence from women in different religious institutions and reveals that Maria Duran forced herself upon other women in various Magdalene houses (*recolhimentos*) and a Dominican convent. But it is the reactions of her alleged victims that are quite remarkable. Whilst her trial offers fascinating evidence of reactions and responses to female homosexuality in eighteenth-century Portugal, the evidence pertaining to the efforts of the inquisitors and witnesses to determine Maria's 'true' gender is equally captivating.[26] Women in different institutions who could not possibly have known one another, and in one case a woman who had already been married before entering into a Magdalene house and who had presumably experienced heterosexual intercourse, accused Maria of being a man. They offered explicit testimony that she possessed a functioning penis, although none of them claimed to have actually seen or handled it. Spurred by Maria's own ambiguous personal behaviour—Maria told her partners that she was really a man and spun various stories to support her claim—twelve women denounced her to the Inquisition, including six who claimed to have had consummated sexual relations with her. Some of the women reported widespread rumours in their various religious institutions that Maria Duran had made a demonic pact and

26 On the subject of Maria Duran's 'lesbianism' see François Soyer, "The Inquisitorial Trial of a Cross-Dressing Lesbian: Reactions and Responses to Female Homosexuality in Eighteenth-Century Portugal," *Journal of Homosexuality*, 61 (2014), 1529–1557.

occasionally bore unexplained scratches on her body upon waking up in the morning. The alarmed Dominican authorities, who first received these reports, strongly suspected her of having made a pact with the devil that provided her with a "secret penis," and consequently informed the Inquisition.

The inquisitors of Lisbon, into whose custody Maria Duran was transferred, investigated the case thoroughly and an investigation carried out at their behest by their colleagues in Barcelona revealed that she had a past history of cross-dressing that had led her, rather extraordinarily, to serve in cavalry units of the Spanish army in the 1730s. After three years, multiple physical examinations that failed to reveal any male genitals, interrogations, a torture session that did not yield a confession, and protracted discussions about her case, Maria Duran was found guilty of having made a pact with the devil. The transcript of the discussions that took place before her sentence was determined reveals that there were serious disagreements amongst the inquisitors and theologians reviewing the case.

Forced to choose between the physical evidence of the medical examinations and the detailed testimony of so many witnesses, the majority of the inquisitors and their theological advisors chose to heed the latter and considered the suspicion that demonic spells concealed Maria Duran's male genitals to be strong enough to justify a verdict of guilt. In their final sentence, the majority stated that the absence of physical evidence found during medical examinations was in itself proof of demonic possession. A group of dissenters (including one inquisitor), however, thought that the only possible explanation was a natural one, and that Maria Duran must possess a penis hidden within her body that simply could not be found by medical examination but that emerged from her when she was aroused. The dissenters mooted the possibility that the emotions and senses of the female witnesses might have been "perturbed" by their "disgusting actions" and that they had persuaded themselves that they were having heterosexual sexual intercourse. In the end, such objections were set aside and the verdict of the majority was confirmed by the General Council of the Portuguese Inquisition. According to her sentence, Maria was presumed to have made a pact with the devil that enabled her to repeatedly engage in "consummated acts of carnal intercourse with penetration by a virile member and ejaculation within the vaginas of the women with whom she had obscene dealing," whilst actually "being a woman and without the assistance of a male sexual organ."[27] Maria was sentenced in June 1744 to endure a public flogging of two hundred lashes and to be banished from Portugal in perpetuity.

27 A.N.T.T., Inquisição de Lisboa, trial no. 9230, fol. 363r.

It is fascinating that the only case in which the inquisitors acted differently was that of Maria Duran: one of the few female defendants involved and the only individual accused of being a secret man (rather than *vice versa*). It is difficult not to believe that their decision to prioritise the significance of witnesses' testimony over medical evidence in her case was driven by a deeply entrenched misogyny. The leading inquisitor in her trial certainly revealed his (and presumably his colleagues') feelings about a female propensity for wickedness during his interrogations of Maria Duran, when he expressed the view that it was "morally impossible" (*moralmente impossivel*) for women not to commit sin when an opportunity arose. Moreover, such a discrepancy is indeed particularly striking given that the inquisitors in Maria Duran's case were aware of the way their colleagues had previously dealt with Father Furtado and referred to his case their deliberations. As in the rest of early modern Europe, women in Spain and Portugal were more readily associated with 'evil,' and were more exposed to accusations of making a demonic pact than men. An analysis of witchcraft cases conducted by the Inquisition in Portugal between 1600 and 1774 has revealed that eighty-three percent concerned women, whilst ninety-three percent of the cases prosecuted by the episcopal authorities in the diocese of Coimbra involved women.[28] Whilst the gender imbalances appears to have been less marked in Spain, women nevertheless continued to form the majority of defendants there as well. [29]

Conclusion

Is it possible to speak of a gulf in attitudes between the ecclesiastical elite and the populace over their responses to the possibility of demonic intervention in cases of ambiguous gender? It is, of course, dangerous to extrapolate from the evidence collected in a limited number of trials that took place in a specific part of Europe. Nonetheless, what the inquisitorial trials and investigations presented in this work clearly indicate is that there was certainly no clear-cut divergence of attitudes in the early modern Iberian Peninsula. The traces of differing views that come to light in these trials are those that emerged amongst the inquisitors and theologians about the nature of the

28 Paiva, *Bruxaria e superstição num país sem "caça às bruxas"*, 95–188.

29 For some evidence of the male/female ratio of witchcraft/sorcery accusation in parts of Spain, see Gunnar W. Knutsen, *Servants of Satan and Masters of Demons: The Spanish Inquisition's Trials for Superstition, Valencia and Barcelona, 1478–1700* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 66–7.

possible transformation of genitalia and whether they were real and natural in origin (that is whether the individuals were 'hermaphrodites'), or feigned and due to demonic spells.

The function of the Inquisition in the early modern Iberian world was to protect the religious, moral and sexual order embraced and promulgated by the Catholic Church. Clearly defined gender roles and gendered identities were also part of this social order, and it is therefore not surprising that individuals who transgressed them also found themselves facing the inquisitors. Yet, such cases were also tied to wider social and cultural anxieties provoked by androgyny and linked to debates amongst theologians about the causes of 'hermaphroditism' and the Devil's power of the human body. The devil's power over human genitalia was accepted by both the ecclesiastical elite and the populace, but whilst the former did not believe that the devil actually had the power to physically alter human genitalia, the latter were more ambiguous in their beliefs. Following the reasoning of the authors of the *Malleus Maleficarum* and other theologians, at no point did the inquisitors or theologians aiding them seriously consider an actual physical sex-change caused by the devil to be a possibility. They did take the option of a demonically-inspired delusion seriously. Through their resort to medical examinations, the inquisitors sought to discount the possibility that the suspects were 'hermaphrodites', naturally born with physically abnormal genitalia (in accordance with the Galenic medical 'one-sex' model discussed above) and without any demonic intervention. For the inquisitors (and the medical practitioners who conducted the medical examinations at their behest), gendered identity was ultimately determined by the possession of genitalia. When forced to choose between witness testimony and the results of the medical examination, the inquisitors prioritised the medical evidence, except in the trial of Maria Duran, the only female defendant.

The populace—or at least the variety of witnesses questioned—was less certain and in none of the trials surveyed did a witness explicitly state that they actually believed that the devil had changed the genitals of the individual that they accused or had deluded them through some spell. They related the emotionally confusing experiences with the accused (whether these were sexual or not) that had led them to believe that the accused was dissimulating his or her real gender and some (though not all) added testimony suggesting that the defendants were engaging in sorcery or witchcraft, seemingly leaving it to the inquisitors to draw their own conclusions. In the case of the women who provided testimony against Maria Duran or some of the men who slept with Joseph Martins, it is possible to speculate that a sense of shame at their sexual conduct might have played a role in limiting the explicitness of

their testimony. What the testimony of the witnesses in the cases of Pedro Furtado, Joseph Martins and others reveals is the surprising popular acceptance of the existence of so-called 'hermaphrodites' as natural rather than supernatural beings. As we have seen, Joseph Martins, for instance, readily admitted that he had "heard it said" that creatures could possess both male and female genitalia, but claimed never to have heard it said that the devil could conceal genitals through a spell.

The acceptance of the existence of 'hermaphrodites' as natural beings must not be understood, however, as proof that lay men and women did not embrace a model of gendered identity dependent upon a dichotomous heterosexual matrix. Judith Butler has argued that the construction of gendered identities is the result of an "operation of exclusion," and the responses to ambiguous gender that the various witnesses articulated in their testimony—whether in their spontaneous denunciations or in the testimony solicited by the inquisitors during investigations—indicate that they created gendered identities through a similar process of exclusion.[30] This model went beyond the biology of sexual differences and was constructed around a broad range of social and cultural expectations or assumptions. Unsurprisingly, these could be sexual in nature, such as, for instance, the one conveyed so clearly and so frequently in the trials: that males were always 'active' and females, correspondingly, always 'passive' during sexual intercourse. Nonetheless, they did not always have to be sexual since they could also revolve around physical characteristics or even the belief that urinating whilst standing or squatting were clear markers of masculinity and femininity respectively. To be publicly identified (and accepted) as a man or a woman therefore entailed fulfilling a whole set of cultural parameters in line with the masculine/feminine and male/female dualism that was widely accepted in society. Paradoxically, far from theological and medical debates, the anorigidity of this culturally-driven system of gendered identity meant that behaviour that transgressed gendered norms could rapidly lead to the emergence of widespread rumours within communities about an individual's gender. Such a response was not an irrational reaction but rather one dictated by deeply entrenched cultural expectations of behaviour and physical appearance.

30 Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 11–12.

CHAPTER 13

Medical Effects and Affects: The Expression of Emotions in Early Modern Patient–Physician Correspondence

Robert L. Weston

> From the year, one thousand, five hundred and fifty, I began to feel a great illness, with a trembling of all my Members, especially after meat and sleep. A pain goes from the middle of my Hip, directly to the brain, comprehending all the right side of my backbone, and reaching into my Arm on the same side; and all my members remain heavy, so as not to be moved, and to desire nothing but to sleep, especially after meals. And I feel through the whole habit of my body, a certain fluxion under the skin of waters, which sometimes make a tumult like a swift torrent; and sometimes they run slowly, so that you would say it were only the elevation of a thick water, through the Nervous parts, as far as my Gums. Now my Head is frequently vexed with coldness, as also other outward parts of my body; nor can I longer stand upright, nor endure to lie still; and the right side of my body seems absolutely fallen away and pined.[1]

This letter was written to Parisian physician Jean Fernel (1497–1558) in 1554, from whom the author sought medical advice. Fernel did not put a name to the condition, but attributed the cause to

> A frequent distillation falling upon the Muscles, Nerves and Membranes . . . whereto is added a weakness of your Body, by reaction of the ill Constitution of your Stomach and bowels.[2]

The man's condition was evidently sorely distressing. Illness, apart from possibly causing pain, could prevent a patient from continuing what they considered to be their normal lifestyle. The degree of emotional response to such deprivations would have depended upon the nature of the disability involved and the individual's expectations. For instance, the situation of Fernel's patient

1 Johannes Fernelius, *Select Medicinal Counsels . . . Being pick'd and chosen out of four hundred consultations and advices, etc.*, trans. Nicholas Culpeper (London, 1658), 344.

2 Fernelius, *Select Medicinal Counsels*, 344.

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was different in degree to the case of a cleric who became aware of the extent to which his sight had become impaired when he found himself unable to read the Church offices.[3] Nonetheless, he also was emotionally affected. These are examples drawn from the extensive French language records of correspondence between patients and physicians in the early modern period.

The provision of written medical advice developed in the late Middle Ages.[4] Early on, written advice (*consilia*) that was provided to a patient resulted from face-to-face medical encounters with a physician, particularly those associated with the leading medical schools. The practice spread from northern Italy into France, Switzerland, the German states and the British Isles.[5] A further development of this process was for written advice, the *consultation*, to be provided without the physician seeing the patient, but rather in response to a written request from either the patient or another physician. This method of obtaining medical advice peaked in the eighteenth century. Substantial numbers of *consilia* and *consultations* have been the subject of historical analysis, particularly over the past twenty years, and historians have used such resources for a variety of purposes. Laurence Brockliss and Lisa Smith have examined epistolary consultations to exemplify the day-to-day practices of individual physicians.[6] Swiss historians have mined the extensive records of Samuel Auguste André David Tissot (1728–97) to elucidate the relationship between patient and physician.[7] Joël Coste has drawn attention to the role of rhetoric employed by French physicians in such correspondence when making diagnoses.[8] It would

3 Louis-Jean Le Thieullier, *Consultations de médecine*, 2 vols (Paris: Charles Osmont, 1739), 2:177.

4 See Nancy Siraisi, *Communities of Learned Experience: Epistolary Medicine in the Renaissance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 7; Gilles Barroux, *Philosophie, maladie et médecine au XIII^e siècle* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2008), 66.

5 Laurence Brockliss, "Consultations by Letter in Early Eighteenth-Century Paris: The Medical Practice of Etienne-François Geoffroy," in *French Medical Culture in the Nineteenth Century*, eds. Ann La Berge and Mordechai Feingold (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), 79–117, at 80–81.

6 Brockliss, "Consultations by Letter in Early Eighteenth-century Paris," 79–117; Lisa Smith, "Women's Health Care in England and France (1650–1755)," (PhD Diss., University of Essex, 2001).

7 Micheline Louis-Courvoisier, "Le Malade et son médecin: le cadre de la relation thérapeutique dans la deuxième moitié du XVIII^e siècle," *Canadian Bulletin of Medical History* 18, no. 2 (2001): 277–96; Micheline Louis-Courvoisier and Séverine Pilloud, "Consulting by Letter in the Eighteenth Century: Mediating the Patient's View?" in *Cultural Approaches to the History of Medicine: Mediating Medicine in Early Modern and Modern Europe*, eds. Willem de Blécourt and Cornelie Usborne (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 71–88.

8 Joël Coste, "La rhetorique des consilia et consultations (France milieu XVI^e siècle –début XIX^e siècle)," in *La Rhétorique médicale à travers les siècles: actes du colloque international de*

be reasonable to expect that such correspondence could also shed light on the emotions experienced by patients and their medical advisors. The emotions expressed in this genre are mostly of a negative nature, with fear and anger being the most common. Positive emotions are rarely encountered, perhaps inevitably, because the correspondence is concerned with illness. Emotional disturbance could have been either the result or the cause of illness, as I demonstrate here. In the early modern period, the term 'passions' was used in the medical literature rather than 'emotions'.[9] The word passion has Latin, if not earlier, roots, and was associated with the notion of suffering. By the Middle Ages it was very much a term used in a theological context.

What is understood by the terms 'disease' or 'illness,' or even 'healthy,' is a contentious issue that has been the subject of debate amongst and between medical practitioners, medical historians, and philosophers.[10] For my purposes here, I adopt the position that if a patient considered himself or herself to be ailing to the point where they sought expert advice, then they were 'ill,' whether physiologically or psychologically. I also use the word patient, even though I have drawn largely from French sources and, as Philip Rieder has pointed out, unlike in England the word 'patient' was rarely used in eighteenth-century France; rather, the term *le/la malade* was employed to identify the sick individual.[11] The dominant medical theory of the period was that ill health was caused by a disturbance to the humoural balance; thus, disease was perceived to be idiosyncratic. Linked to this was movement of the 'spirits', innate spirit,

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Paris, 9 et 12 octobre 2008, eds. Joël Coste, Danielle Jacquart, Jackie Pigeaud (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2012), 229–48. Coste concluded that the consultant physicians utilised mostly deductive logic, but occasionally also inductive logic, to arrive at their diagnoses.

9 According to Thomas Dixon, the word emotion was introduced into English through a translation of de Montaigne's Essays. [Thomas Dixon, " 'Emotions': The History of a Word in Crisis," *Emotion Review* 4 (2012): 338–344, at 340.] He was relying on a translation John Florio's 1603 translation of Montaigne's essays. Michel de Montaigne, *The Essays, or morall, politike and millitairie discourses of Lo. Michael de Montaigne*, trans. John. Florio (London: n.p., 1603), 6. Searching the Bordeaux edition (1588) of Montaigne's *Essais de Michel de Montaigne* (http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/efts/ARTFL/projects/montaigne/) shows that Montaigne used the word *emotion* on nine occasions, of which eight were employed in the context of medicine.

10 See for example Robert P. Hudson, "Concepts of Disease in the West," in *The Cambridge World History of Human Disease*, ed. Kenneth Kiple (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pt. 2.1, 45–52. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521332866.007 > [accessed 8 April 2014].

11 Philip Rieder, "L'histoire du « patient »: aléa, moyen, ou finalité de l'histoire médicale?" *Gesnerus* 60 (2003): 260–71, at 262. Rieder's point is that the word 'patient' fails to distinguish between an individual in a state of sickness and in health.

corresponding to life itself, natural spirit associated with the liver, vital spirit with the heart and the animal spirit with the brain. These were transported around the body in the nerves which were thought to be full of fluid. Pertubations of the spirits, or *passions de l'âme* (passions of the soul) were described in 1670 by Philibert Guybert as responsible for sadness, anger, joy and shame.[12]

The system of medical provision in early modern France was hierarchical, with the university-trained physician at its apex. Below him ranked successively surgeons, apothecaries, midwives, and range of unauthorised practitioners. The analysis here is based on consultations provided by university-trained physicians. They responded to requests for advice from patients or from their local physicians and surgeons (*ordinaires*), who were dealing directly with them. Most of the consultants were closely associated with the elite schools of medicine at Paris and Montpellier. Physicians who were *ordinaires* would also hold degrees in medicine, but possibly of a lower standard than was provided by the major medical schools, and were often less experienced than the elite consultants. Because the *ordinaire* dealt with the patient face-to-face, he had to confront the latter's emotional state whereas the remote consultant did not.

The patients were, for the most part, from elite society. They were educated, often aware of medical theories and treatments, and were frequently socially superior to the physicians who were trying to exert authority over them.[13] Men and women are equally represented as patients in the surviving records, with children also forming a small minority. The physician was very conscious of the life stages peculiar to women: menstruation, menarche and menopause.[14] Whenever a patient was sufficiently ill to call on expert advice, it is reasonable to assume that he or she was emotionally affected as well as physically, even if this was not explicitly stated in the correspondence.

Cognisance has to be taken of not only variables such as the patient's age, sex and social standing, but also of the fact that, as Vincent Barras and Martin Dignes have noted, "illness is steeped in the culture of the age."[15] The effect of

12 Philibert Guybert, *Toutes les œuvres charitables de Philibert Guybert* (Paris : chez Pierre le Mercier, 1670), 364.

13 Robert Weston, *Medical Consulting by Letter in France, 1665–1789* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 149–50.

14 Wendy Churchill, *Female Patients in Early Modern Britain* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 92.

15 Vincent Barras and Martin Dignes, "Maladies en lettres: Une Introduction," in *Maladies en lettres 17^{e}–21^{e} siècles*, eds. Vincent Barras and Martin Dignes (Lausanne: Editions BHMS, 2013), 11–23, at 17.

the emotions on physical wellbeing had long been recognised and had been conceived as relevant to the physician as far back as Hippocrates:

> Men ought to know that from nothing else but the brain come joys, delights, laughter and sports, and sorrows, griefs, despondency, and lamentations. And by this, in an especial manner, we acquire wisdom and knowledge, and see and hear, and know what are foul and what are fair, what are bad and what are good, what are sweet, and what unsavory.[16]

The philosopher (but not physician) Sir Thomas Elyot (1490–1546) wrote *The Castle of Health* (*c*.1534), which was largely devoted to detailing the manner in which the 'non-naturals' should be used to give good health.[17] In a section headed "Of effects of the mind" he declared:

> The last of thinges called not natural, is not the least parte to be considered, the which is of effects and passions of the mynde. For if these be immoderate, they do not only annoy the bodye and threaten the life, but also they do appayr, and sometimes loose utterly a man's estimation. And it much more is, they bring a man from the use of reason, and sometime in the displeasure of Almighty God.[18]

He proceeded to detail advice for dealing with ire, heaviness of the mind, and also hope. The apothecary Moyse Charas (1619–98) noted the influence on the emotions of *syrop de povot* and *mel vulvaria* on the pituitary and womb respectively.[19] His contemporary, the Angevin physician Jacques Chaillou, wrote a treatise that integrated the emotions into humoural theory.[20] The importance of the passions in disease was commented on by Nöel Chomel (1633–1712), who stated that "all upset passions are very dangerous, this is why one tries to control them out of consideration of the ailments that they

16 Hippocrates, *On the Sacred Disease*, trans. Francis Adams, *The Internet Classics Archive*. http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/sacred.html [accessed 8 April 2014].

17 Thomas Elyot, *The Castle of Health*, 2nd edn (London, 1687). The non-naturals, air, motion and rest (exercise), sleeping and waking, food and drink, excretion and passions/emotions, were essential considerations in early modern medicine. They were accounted for when devising therapeutic regimes.

18 Elyot, *Castle of Health*, 64–70.

19 Moyse Charas, *Pharmacopée Royale Galénique et Chymique* (Paris: Chez l'auteur, 1676), 199 and 225.

20 Jacques Chaillou, *Traité du mouvement des humeurs dans les plus ordinaires émotions des hommes* (Paris: Chez Jean Couterot, 1678).

can cause."[21] The sometimes doctor regent of the Paris Faculty of Medicine, Antoine Le Camus (1722–72), addressed physical ailments, particularly those of the head, that were susceptible to influence by the emotions.[22] Whilst in the medieval period passions were regarded as emanating from the heart, by the early modern period they were recognised as emanating from the head, or more particularly, the brain.[23] Nearing the end of the eighteenth century, the physician William Falconer (1744–1824) wrote a prize-winning treatise titled *A Dissertation on the Influence of the Passions upon Disorders of the Body* (1784).[24] In this work he argued that the passions could have positive and negative effects on disease. He split the passions into those that stimulated and those that debilitated a person. He listed them as love, desire, anger, fear, grief, hope, pity, shame, disgust and aversion, envy and jealousy.

Patients in the seventeenth century were generally more open in expressing their emotional state in the letters they wrote than was the case in the eighteenth century.[25] There is one notable eighteenth-century exception to this generalisation, and that was when the patient was suffering from melancholia.[26] In such cases, the patient's state of mind was often dramatically expressed, as will be discussed later. Given that illness was the reason for calling on medical help, it is inevitable that most emotional expressions were associated with the pain or distress involved. There is, however, almost no evidence of the emotional response when patients had obtained relief from whatever had ailed them. Thus, in 1733, a man who reacted violently to eating a peach wrote, in a letter to Montpellier physician Jacques Lazerme (1676–1756), that he was

21 Nöel Chomel, *Dictionnaire oeconomique, contenant divers moyens d'augmenter et conserver son bien, et même sa santé* (Paris: Le Conte & Montalant, 1709), 44: "Toutes les passions dereglées sont tres-dangereuses, c'est pourquoi l'on tâchera de les dompter par la consideration des accidens qu'elles peuvent causer."

22 Antoine Le Camus, *Médecine de l'ésprit: Où l'on cherche: 1° le méchanisme du corps qui influe sur les fonctions de l'âme; 2° les causes physiques qui rendent ce mécanisme ou défectueux ou plus parfait; 3° les moyens qui peuvent l'entretenir dans son état libre, ou le rectifier lorsqu'il est gêné*, 2 vols (Paris: Chez Ganeau, 1753).

23 In nineteenth-century French medical texts the word 'emotions' progressively replaced 'passions.' See also Dixon, " 'Emotion' ".

24 William Falconer, *A Dissertation on the Influence of Passions on Disorders of the Body* (London, 1784).

25 In part, at least, this appears to be a shift in the general style of letter writing over the period.

26 I have used here the word melancholia, but this remark applies equally to the other terms used in the period for much the same condition: hypochondria, hysteria, vapours and others.

> feeling near to suffocating, I got up quickly from the table, said "I am dead," and pleaded with one of the dinner guests to give me some blows to the back of the neck. Later the lady who had given me the peach made me swallow a glass of water, that I vomited on the floor through the nose, with so much redoubling of efforts and of fear, that I did not ask more of God than a quarter of an hour in order to put my conscience in order, and in consequence I called for a confessor.[27]

It might be expected that he would have expressed some joy at avoiding the death he foresaw, but this was not the case. A rare and somewhat more positive record arose in the instance of a woman who had successively lost three infants during pregnancy and was pregnant for a fourth time.[28] Despite various ailments throughout her pregnancy, her consultant Lazare Rivière (1589–1655) commented that she was "happily delivered of a boy, well proportioned in all parts and lively."[29] To a large extent the absence of positive reactions to recovery of health is because the correspondence tends to end with the writing of the consultation. At best a simple "the patient is completely cured" was occasionally added as a footnote by the consultant.

How did physicians express or respond to emotions in their daily practices? Whilst on occasion the physician might express some measure of sympathy towards patients or their families, this was not common; his response was normally couched in a detached fashion. That is not to say that they were in some way devoid of feeling. According to David Harley, the seventeenth-century English physician John Tylston "deeply felt the troubles of his patients" and lost

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27 *Consultations choisies de plusiers médecins célébres de l'Université de Montpellier sur des maladies aigues et chroniques* (hereafter *Consultations choisies*), 10 vols (Paris: Durand et Pissot, 1750–1757), 1:8–9: "Me sentant prêt à suffoqué, je me levai bruisquement de table, en disant, *je suis mort*, & priant un des convives de me donner quelques coups sur le chignon . . . Cependant la Dame qui m'avoit donné la pêche me fit avaler un verre d'eau, que je rendis sur le champ par le nez, avec un tel redoublement d'efforts & de peur, que je ne demandois plus à Dieu qu'un quart d'heure pour mettre ordre à ma conscience, & qu'en conséquence je fis venir un confesseur."

28 Lazare Rivière, *Les Observations de médecine, de Lazare Rivière, . . . qui contiennent quatre centuries de guérisons très remarquables, auxquelles on a joint des observations qui luy avaient été communiquées, le tout mis en françois*, trans. François Deboze (Lyon: Jean Certe, 1680), 103.

29 Rivière, *Les Observations de médecine, de Lazare Rivière*, 104: "Elle acoucha heureusement d'un fils bien proportioné dans toutes ses parties & vivant."

sleep over the dangerously sick ones.[30] Similarly, the French surgeon Henri-François le Dran (1685–1770) declined to operate on the hand of an eight-year-old boy because the child would not have the patience to suffer from what would be a long operation.[31]

A request for expert help did not always come from patients but could come from a family member or friend, or from an *ordinaire*. When family or friends became involved in the correspondence, their feelings about the situation were more likely to be outlined, even if those of the ailing person were not. In July 1714, a M. de Chasteauneuf from Versailles wrote to Etienne-François Geoffroy (1672–1731) in Paris to enquire why he had not replied to a letter some three weeks earlier concerning the health of his sister, repeatedly urging Geoffroy to give an immediate response.[32] In the case of children such requests invariably came from their parents, unless the request came from an *ordinaire*. In what is an extraordinary exception, a seven-year-old girl who had suffered a series of epileptic fits asked Rivière if her head could be cut open with a knife.[33] One can hardly imagine the desperation of the child in making such a request, and in fact she died of another fit before Rivière's conventional and non-surgical remedies could be tried. The wife of a man who had suffered an apoplexy wrote to a friend seeking advice from some eminent physicians; he in turn wrote to Louis-Jean Le Thieullier (d. 1751). Instead of simply responding medically, Le Thieullier noted her tenderness for her husband and her sad situation.[34] This expression of sympathy by a physician was unusual. Montpellier physician Charles Dumas (1765–1813) provided a consultation for an infant who had suffered convulsions and was having difficulty walking unaided as a result.[35] The child's parents were particularly concerned because they had relatives in the mother's family who suffered a similar weakness in the leg, on the same side. A further cause for what Dumas described as the parents' alarm was the large size of the child's head in comparison with the rest of his body. Whilst conceding his head was a little larger than normal, Dumas did not consider it

30 David Harley, "The Good Physician and the Godly Doctor: The Exemplary Life of John Tylston of Chester (1663–99)," *Seventeenth Century* 9, no. 1 (1994): 93–117, at 103.

31 Henri–François Le Dran, *Consultations sur les plupart des maladies qui sont du ressort de la chirurgie* (Paris: P. Fr. Diderot le jeune, 1765), 43–44: "Qui n'est pas susceptible de la patience qui seroit nécessaire pour souffrir l'opération qui seroit longue."

32 Paris, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire de Santé (hereafter B.I.U. Santé), MS 5241, *Correspondance de Geoffroy, médecin parisien*, fols. 135–37.

33 Rivière, *Les Observations de médecine*, 43.

34 Le Thieullier, *Consultations de médecine*, 2:92 and 97.

35 Charles Louis Dumas, *Consultations* et *observations de médecine de feu Ch-L Dumas Publiées par Dr Rouzet* (Paris: Chez Gabon, 1824), 186–98.

to be a cause for concern. As for the leg problem, while he did suggest some external treatments, he regarded it as having been created at birth and made no further comment on the subject. He did not use the term hereditary, which was somewhat contentious in the eighteenth century.[36] The primary objective for Dumas was to address the convulsions, which he attributed to worms. In this instance Dumas had seen the child. In another case, dealt with solely by correspondence, his patient was a seven-year-old boy suffering from both scurvy and a venereal condition.[37] Dumas appears to have been perplexed, because although the parents claimed to be in good health he considered both conditions to be hereditary. Of the many children the mother had borne, only the boys were afflicted with scurvy. Dumas's only explanation was that perhaps the boys had an inherently greater disposition to the causative 'germe' than did the girls, which he believed originated in the parents.

Emotions were understood by physicians and patients to have an effect on health. Anger could, for instance, invoke ill health. A surgeon, M. Del, wrote to Geoffroy from Charentay and related news about one of his patients, who he described as a woman of "extraordinary vivacity."[38] She had, however, been thrown into a passion and violent anger by one of her domestic servants, who had overstepped her status. This caused the patient's menstruation to cease and a range of consequent health problems, for which Del was seeking advice. A similar case was recorded by Rivière.[39] In this instance, the wife of M. d'Aumclas was moved to a state of great anger by her servants in the seventh month of her pregnancy. Rivière, however, commented that her anger was due to a commotion and agitation of the blood. She subsequently aborted, and the women in the locality imputed that this sad event was caused by the remedies employed by the physicians. Ulinka Rublack has argued that in the case of early modern Germany,

36 See for example Sean M. Quinlan, "Inheriting Vice, Acquiring Virtue: Hereditary Disease and Moral Hygiene in Eighteenth-Century France," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 80, no. 4 (2006): 649–76.

37 Dumas, *Consultations et observations de médecine*, 287–93.

38 B.I.U. Santé, MS 5245, *Correspondance de Geoffroy*, fol. 259.

39 Rivière, *Les Observations de médecine*, 189–91. This observation is undated but was probably *c*.1635. Riviére's 'observations' are *consilia* and *consultations*. The majority are dated from the period 1630–45. Unlike most of their eighteenth-century equivalents, the patient's identity is given in the majority of cases, with the notable exception of cases involving venereal disease. They also differ in that the outcome of treatment is usually provided. As a cure had mostly been effected (there are fifteen deaths in 400 items), one has to suspect a degree of selectivity in what has been printed.

> contemporary beliefs about the ways in which social, physical and emotional experiences were linked—the notion, for example, that miscarriages resulted, not from organic deficiencies and mishaps, but from socially delivered shocks, or from withheld anger against others. These presumed linkages made women's emotional well-being during pregnancy highly dependent on public and private support.[40]

There is every reason to believe that much the same attitudes prevailed in other parts of Europe, including France.

Fear was an emotion that recurred in the patients' *mémoires*. A patient sought help in 1730 from Geoffroy because he was suffering from the stone. Unless some relief could be found, his *ordinaire* claimed, "he will die, martyr to the cruel pains."[41] He was prepared to submit to surgery, perhaps as a last resort given that the risks of such an operation were well known, let alone his fear of the pain it would involve. But the disorder in which fear was most commonly expressed was hypochondria (a term that was used interchangeably with melancholia, vapours, and hysteria).[42] This was a disorder that was encountered by men and women in roughly equal proportions. It was a condition that characteristically exhibited multiple symptoms and could be a perennial problem for the physician's practice. Despite the fact that it engendered fear of death amongst patients, physicians were always clear that it was difficult to cure but never fatal. Antoine Deidier (*c.*1691–1746) provided a good example of a physician's view of this disorder when he described the vapours from which a patient was suffering in 1734:

> This illness which one could justly call a veritable Protean because of the different bizarre forms it is accustomed to take [and] is always very alarming.[43]

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40 Ulinka Rublack, "Pregnancy, Childbirth and the Female Body in Early Modern Germany," *Past and Present* 150, no. 1 (1996): 84–110, at 86.

41 B.I.U. Santé, MS 5245, *Correspondance de Geoffroy*, fol. 154: "Il le sera mourir martyr dans des deuleurs cruelles."

42 See Weston, *Medical Consulting by Letter*, 152–59.

43 Antoine Deidier, *Consultations et observations médicinales de M. Antoine Deidier*, 3 vols (Paris: Chez Jean-Thomas Hérissant, 1754), 1:135: "Cette maladie qu'on appelle à juste titre un véritable Prothée, à raison des différents formes bizarres quelle a coutume de prendre cette maladie dis-je est toujours très-allarmante."

He went further in a case of hypochondria, of which he wrote:

> This affection is long and persistent, but it is never dangerous. Whether the difficulty of curing it—makes it usually seem like the scourge, and the bane of physicians, one feels that it is just that the patients, too occupied by their recovery or, of preventing the supposed danger of which they believe themselves afflicted, take too many remedies & consult too many physicians.[44]

In this case, as in most instances where Deidier addressed vapours, melancholy and hypochondria, the root cause was ascribed ultimately to what was taking place in the patient's digestive system. In 1729, however, he located the cause of a hypochondriac's symptoms entirely in the brain, rendering it as much an emotional feature as a physical one. This represented a shift in Deidier's thinking on the pathology of the disease.

Théodore Tourquet de Mayerne (1573–1654) introduced his own feelings into a consultation. He wrote to "a Noble Councellor at Law" suffering from melancholia:

> This Melancholy humour [if it] extended as far as the Brain, which this offensive Enemy of Nature doth assault as an organic part, upon whose temperament an alteration being made by it, from hence the principle Functions of the Soul do act erroneously at sometimes.

In a subsequent letter, Tourquet de Mayerne wrote:

> [N]o account was written to me concerning your health, I was possessed with careful and troublesome thoughts by reason of the great and dreadful Symptoms described in your last letter.[45]

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44 Deidier, *Consultations et observations médicinales de M. Antoine Deidier*, 1:453: "Cette affection est longue, & opiniâtre, mais qu'elle n'est jamais dangereuse. Si la difficulté de la guérir la fait regarder ordinairement comme le fleau, & la pierre de scandale des Medicins, on estime que cela vient de ce que les malades, trop occupés de leur rétablissement ou de prévenir le prétendu danger dont ils se croyent menacés, sont trop de remedes. & consultent trop de Medecins."

45 Théodore Tourquet de Mayerne, *Medicinal Councels or Advices, Written Originally in French by Dr Theodor Tourquet de Mayerne, Translated into Latine at Geneva by Theoph. Bonetus M.D., and Englished by Tho. Sherley M.D.* (London, 1677), 22–23 and 40.

What is noticeable in this letter, as with those sent to Fernel and written by Rivière cited earlier, is a more free flowing dialogue with the patient that is markedly different to most of the correspondence dating from the eighteenth century. Coste has described the rhetoric of French physicians of this later period as sometimes being cant.[46] For the most part, they detailed the known facts, drew conclusions, and recommended treatments in an impersonal manner. This change in tone perhaps reflects a degree of uncertainty on the part of physicians as to their relative social status over time. Likewise, in the majority of cases, eighteenth-century patients' letters were often written in an impersonal manner, aping the physicians' style. They wrote in the third person, with a notable exception being when they were writing about hypochondria, which suggests that this disorder affected their passions more intimately than the more 'physical' diseases.

Le Dran was asked by an *ordinaire* to consult for a twenty-two-year-old woman who had been attacked by convulsive hysterical vapours. These vapours came several times a month and each lasted a good quarter of an hour.[47] In reply, Le Dran wrote that he had observed that these sorts of vapours were more a part of the imagination than a defect in the body fluids; he made a point of this, perhaps intending that it should not go to the patient. Then, after discussing the value of bleeding for such ailments, he added that "when it was a matter of the imagination, bleeding was of little use."[48] Aubagne physician Marie-François-Bernadin Ramel (1752–1811) clearly had similar thoughts when he wrote that he "had seen many patients attacked by these vaporous ailments caused by an erroneous imagination."[49] Perhaps it took the more practically-minded practitioners—a surgeon, or a country physician—to be more forthright than were the more conservative, learned physicians. Even an apothecary could be more candid; one told a patient suffering from the vapours that he needed neither medicine, nor bleeding, nor enema, but rather rest and some good soup.[50] Such 'psychological' cases occurred regularly in French epistolary consultations, and almost always a regimen of bleeding, purging, laxatives,

46 Coste, "La rhetorique des consilia et consultations," 236.

47 Le Dran, *Consultations sur les plupart des maladies*, 409–12.

48 Le Dran, *Consultations sur les plupart des maladies*, 411: "Quand c'est une affaire d'imagination, ces saignées sont peut utiles."

49 Marie-François-Bernadin Ramel le fils, *Consultations médicales et mémoire sur l'air de Gemenos* (La Haye: Chez Les libraires associés, 1785), 318–19.

50 Deidier, *Consultations et observations médicinales*, 1:280: "M. Raucin Apoticaire, qui je consultai, me dit qu'il ne me falloir ni médecine, ni saignée, ni lavement, mais du repos, de bons bouillons."

dietary restrictions and lifestyle strictures was recommended. In contrast, the eighteenth-century British physician Thomas Thompson, when considering a case of hypochondria that stemmed initially from the death of a patient's wife, considered any medical intervention to be almost irrelevant.[51]

Another condition that was at times confounded with this 'set' of diseases was *pâles couleurs*, or, as it was termed in English 'chlorosis' or 'green-sickness.'[52] This disorder was not uncommon amongst young females. Whilst usually addressed as a digestive disorder, it clearly had its origins in the mind. Thomas Sydenham (1624–89) considered it to be a hysterical disease.[53] Of hysterical disease, Sydenham said, "Women are affected with such convulsions, so that they struggle violently and beyond the Strength of Women and at the same time beat their Breasts."[54] In a consultation for a patient suffering from *pâles couleurs*, Ramel described her as having a depraved appetite that was "normal for her sex."[55] Robert James (1703–76) drew attention to the link between this disorder and the emotions: "A way is also paved to this Disorder by the Passions of the Mind; the Influence and Power of which are so great."[56]

Mania was regarded as a form of extreme emotional expression.[57] Dumas provided a consultation for a forty-year-old woman headed "Aliénation Mentalle."[58] She was described as being of a precocious temperament and disposed to strong passions. Having lived over the years in a restless way, she suddenly fell into a totally different situation, in which her nervous dispositions, certainly influenced by her mind, showed the characteristics of an alienation of her spirits. She alternated between fury and apathy, folly and stupidity, silence and loquacity, and suffered from hysteria and nymphomania. There is a sense of empathy from Dumas. Though he offered little hope of a complete cure for this cruel illness, a type of mania, he nonetheless prescribed a list of

51 Thomas Thompson, *Medical Consultations on Various Diseases Published From the Letters of Thomas Thompson M.D.* (London: L. Hawes, W. Clarke and R. Collins, 1773), 34–36.

52 Helen King, *The Diseases of Virgins: Green Sickness, Chlorosis and the Problems of Puberty* (London: Routledge, 2004).

53 See Karl Y. Guggenheim, "Chlorosis: the Rise and Disappearance of a Nutritional Disease," *Journal of Nutrition* 125, no. 7 (1995): 1822–25.

54 Thomas Sydenham, *The Whole Works of that Excellent Practical Physician Dr Thomas Sydenham*, 2nd edn (London, 1697), 430.

55 Ramel, *Consultations médicales et mémoire sur l'air de Gemenos*, 256: "ordinaire à son sexe."

56 Robert James, *A Medicinal Dictionary*, 3 vols (London: J. Roberts, 1743–45), vol. 2, [n.p.]

57 Chomel, *Dictionnaire oeconomique*, 5: "une folie avec rage & furie, toutefois sans fiévre, engendrée d'un sang ou d'une mélancholie brûlée, qui blesse toutes les vertus morales."

58 Dumas, *Consultations et observations de médecine*, 238–46.

treatments in the hope of ameliorating her condition. In another case of mental derangement, a Jewish woman known for her devotion to studying, was described, when out with friends, as

> without having the least cause, conversing as if devoid of good sense that one regarded her as a person who was delirious; this lasted for two or three hours after which she became herself.[59]

Sometime later, when in Ratisbonne, again amongst friends and very well treated, she had occasion to put herself into a lively anger, and became delirious to the point of speaking badly to the people who were with her. The four Montpellier physicians who consulted declared that she was suffering from mania. They made no comment on her emotional state, but prescribed two or three grains of opium at night to make her more docile to otherwise conventional treatments.[60] One might compare this with the view of Herman Boerhaave (1638–1738), who advocated shock treatment to invoke fear as a cure for madness, such as near drowning.[61]

It was accepted within medical circles that shock could bring about illness. Furthermore, it could have a profound effect during pregnancy. A woman was walking with her husband and children by a river in Anjou when she was severely frightened by a dog. An hour later she suffered an apoplexy that caused her to lose her speech, and she was paralysed in one arm. She recovered, but some five weeks later suffered another attack, more violent than the first, and thought she was going to die. A week later she gave birth to a healthy daughter, but continued to have speech problems, cried continuously, and was described by the *ordinaire* as at times being like an imbecile.[62] Geoffroy's response to this correspondence is not available. In 1746, a London woman was surprised and delighted at the sight of a large dolphin in the Thames.[63] Unfortunately, this sight turned into some sort of recurring bad dream, and being about twenty-weeks pregnant she thought this sighting was likely to mark her unborn child. The thought of it

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59 *Consultations choisies*, 8:187: "Sans en avoir eû la moindre occasion, tint des discours si dénués de bon sens qu'on l'a regarda comme une personne qui déliroir; cette especе d'access dura deux ou trois heures, après lesquelles il cessa de lui-même."

60 *Consultations choisies*, 8:194: "on lui sera prendre deux ou trois grains d'opium . . . rendre par-là la malade plus docile."

61 Herman Boerhaave, *Boerhaave's Aphorisms: Concerning the Knowledge and Cure of Diseases* (London, 1715), no. 1123.

62 B.I.U. Santé, MS 5241, *Correspondance de Geoffroy*, fols. 87–88.

63 John Woodward, *Select Cases and Consultations in Physick by the Late Eminent John Woodward*, ed. Peter Templeton (London, 1757), 259–67.

> was now attended with Dread, Fright and Melancholy; and intruded itself upon her much to her Surprize, and without any Reason that she could conceive. But it molested, teized, and put her into a great disorder, so great as almost to distract her.[64]

The description of her torment continued until the time that she was "brought to bed," when

> she had Thoughts of the Devil, as tempting and vehemently urging of her ill; particularly to fling her Child into the fire, beat its Brains out, and the like; to which she had the utmost Horror and Aversion.

There is no record given of the birth of the child, but there are details of extensive treatment for the woman and her subsequent cure. Rublack has argued that shock was often attributed to untoward pregnancy outcomes; she cites a case where a woman attributed the birth of a deformed child to a dog jumping on her when she was pregnant.[65] Such cases suggest that the emotions were considered to be heightened during pregnancy.

Bereavement, as would be expected, was deemed to have an effect on the emotions. An undated letter to Geoffroy concerned a widow who, three months after the death of her husband, found the affairs to which she had been exposed "had overwhelmed her head entirely; she had almost entirely lost her judgement and her memory."[66] It had also given rise to a number of physical ailments. Pierre Chirac (1650–1752) was asked to advise on another case involving a death. In this instance, a man had lost a niece of whom he was very fond. The same day he became very angry with his brother-in-law (almost certainly the girl's father), and these events put his life in such a spin that a surgeon had to be called that night. His anxiety increased over the next six weeks, at which point Chirac's help was sought.[67] Chirac linked the melancholia he developed to the initial grief. Somewhat different was the case of a newly married woman, who was very happy with her husband and with moving to his small town. However, when her mother departed some fifteen

64 Woodward, *Select Cases and Consultations in Physick by the Late Eminent John Woodward*, 259–67.

65 Rublack, "Pregnancy, Childbirth and the Female Body," 95.

66 B.I.U. Santé, MS 5241, *Correspondance de Geoffroy*, fol. 71: "ont accablé la tête entièrement, ensorte qu'elle a perdu presque le jugement comme la mémoire."

67 Pierre Chirac and Jean-Baptiste Silva, *Dissertations et consultations médicinales, de Messieurs Chirac, conseiller d'Etat, et Silva médecin consultant du Roi, et premier médecin de S.A.S. monseigneur le Duc*, 2 vols (Paris: Durand, 1744), 2:348.

days later, she became less gay, reflective, and eventually sad for no reason and melancholic. Her complaint was diagnosed as *mal du pays*: nostalgia.[68] When her brother visited, her spirits rose again, though she never ceased to ask questions about her home region and her parents. When he left, she succumbed to her illness again. The family became involved. First the woman's brother sought the advice of another physician, and then her mother wrote directly to Ramel. He told the mother she should hide her worries and later recorded that the woman had fully recovered.[69] The implication here was that gaining control of the emotions could assist the patient's physical health.

As shown by Ramel, physicians were sometimes responsive to the emotions of their patients. Rarely, however, are their own emotions encountered in the correspondence. The death of an individual was an event that could be expected to give rise to a range of emotions. Le Thieullier described in some detail the last few days of a man's life.[70] In what surely must have been a delicate conversation, Le Thieullier sought the man's permission to perform an autopsy after his death, "in the public interest."[71] Consent was given provided it was *gratis*. Upon which, Le Thieullier told the man to

> close his eyes on such a sordid matter and only concern himself with his worth to the public, and do what he must for his profession and religion.[72]

At least at times, consultants were considerate of the emotions of the patient and their family.

Physicians wrote of their own frustration when patients declined to follow their advice—a complaint that was invariably made of male patients. Thus, Antoine Fizes (1690–1768) reprimanded a patient for not following his recommendations, to the point where, according to Fizes, the patient almost died, only to recover when instructions were followed.[73] In another outburst, Fizes remonstrated with a patient:

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68 Ramel, *Consultations médicales et mémoire sur l'air de Gemenos*, 25–34.

69 Ramel, *Consultations médicales et mémoire sur l'air de Gemenos*, 33: "Elle est entierement rétablie espece d'access dura deux ou trois heures, après lesquelles il cessa de lui-même."

70 Le Thieullier, *Consultations de médecine*, 1:418–23.

71 Le Thieullier, *Consultations de médecine*, 1:421: "pour rendre utiles au Public."

72 Le Thieullier, *Consultations de médecine*, 1:421–23: "Fermer les yeux sur un sordide intèret, & ne se occupier que du desire de mériter la confiance de ce méme Public, en faisant les devoirs de sa profession & de sa religion."

73 *Consultation choisies*, 7:339–46: "Je doit cependant exhorter d'entrée Monsieur à ne pas s'amuser à lire des livres de médecine sur l'affection mélancholique ou vapeurs, cette lecture bien loin de lui faire trouver des remedes à son mal ne seroit que lui entretenir

> I must however exhort for a start Monsieur, not to amuse himself by reading medical books on melancholy or the vapours; this reading far from enabling him to find remedies for his illness will only maintain the imagination in even stronger ideas which do not favour the success of his treatment.[74]

It should perhaps be pointed out that Fizes had a reputation amongst colleagues and patients for being cantankerous.[75] Completeness of advice was, of course, dependent on the consultant being provided with sufficient information to make a correct diagnosis in the first place, which would allow him to recommend the most appropriate treatment. Dumas complained that insufficient information had prevented him from choosing between two possible causes of a patient's colic; as a result, he proposed treatment which could serve both alternative diagnoses.[76] In contrast, Le Thieullier demanded more information from an *ordinaire* when he found it impossible to diagnose between two possible causes of a patient's illness. After dealing with the case he added a footnote in the text expressing his annoyance, saying that he had published this case

> to make it known that one cannot decide clearly from *mémoires* that are sent imperfectly, and to instruct people who do, of the necessity to give some detail of the illness.[77]

Most consultations would comment on a patient's nature in humoural terms, noting their inherent temperament as bilious, choleric, sanguine, or phlegmatic, and attributing their emotional responses in given situations to humoural imbalance. Whilst criticism of a patient's over-indulgence in food, and particularly drink, is not uncommon in correspondence, the *ordinaire* seeking help from a consultant usually had to be circumspect regarding what he said about his patient, as the latter might read it. However, this was not

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l'imagination dans de plus fortes contentions, ce qui ne favoriseroit pas le succès de son traitement."

74 *Consultations choisies*, 8:111.

75 *Dictionnaire des science médicale: Biographie médicale*, 7 vols (Paris: Panckoucke, 1820–25), 4:160.

76 Dumas, *Consultations et observations de médecine*, 271–74.

77 Le Thieullier, *Consultations de médecine*, 2:35–39: "pour faire conoitre qu'il ne ne faut pas décider légerement sur les Mémoires qui sont souvent énvoyes imparfait, & pour instruire des personnes qui sont dans la nécesité de donner quelque détail de maladie."

always the case. A Reims physician wrote to Geoffroy in 1730, making what can only be described as scathing remarks about the lifestyle of his patient, M. Beauvallon, a thirty-three-year-old merchant who sold the best wine in Champagne:[78]

> He often arrived drunk at the table to drink from bowls instead of glasses, and made himself vomit many times in order to go to a new winery and drink on afresh.[79]

The *ordinaire*'s disgust is plainly evident. He continued: "[H]is taste for pleasure was provided by continuous sessions of debauchery, from which he had never escaped since he was fifteen."[80] The *ordinaire* had been called in when Beauvallon had an apoplexy, and was clearly unsympathetic:

> His original way of life continued to the day of the apoplexy . . . it has been more than a year that he could sleep without a headful of wine, in other words the brain has been cooked for a long time.[81]

In his response, Geoffroy noted that given the cause of the patient's plight, the remedies he proposed might be useless. Some patients did recognise that their habits could be hazardous to their well-being, such as a migraine sufferer who wrote that "the table is my greatest enemy, and the least excess causes excessive pain."[82]

In conclusion, illnesses of the body and of the mind were inexorably intertwined. Evidence of the nexus between illness and the emotions is found in early modern medical treatises, in diaries and in individual correspondence. Some ailments were everyday, discomforting rather than life threatening,

78 B.I.U. Santé, MS 5242, *Correspondance de Geoffroy*, fols. 127–29.

79 B.I.U. Santé, MS 5242, *Correspondance de Geoffroy*, fol. 127: "Il luy souvent arrivée dans des pastys de table de boire dans des jettes au lieu de verres, et de le faire vomir plusieurs fois faire nouvelle place au vin et reboire sur nouveaux frais."

80 B.I.U. Santé, MS 5242, *Correspondance de Geoffroy*, fol. 127: "Son gout pour le plaisir luy ont fourni des occasions continuelles de debaucher, et il n'en a échappé aucune depuis quinze ans."

81 B.I.U. Santé, MS 5242, *Correspondance de Geoffroy*, fol. 127: "Son premier genre de vie, et l'a continué jusqu'au jour de l'attaque d'apoplexie . . . il y a meme plus d'un an qu'il ne s'est couché sans avoir la tete prise de vin, soit que le cerveau échauffé depuis longtems."

82 Le Thieullier, *Consultations de médecine*, 1:271: "La table est mon plus grand ennemi, & le moindre excès me cause des douleur excessive."

others were fatal. The strength of the emotions involved was a function of the patients' perceptions of the danger with which they were confronted.

Whilst almost all diseases were treated as though they had a physiological cause, the need to recognise, and address, emotional factors was an inherent part of early modern medical practice. As such, theories about diseases and their treatment paid attention, deliberately or not, to the emotional component of sickness. The 'passions' could be both a cause and a consequence of emotional disturbance. Without doubt, the pre-eminent emotion that arose in sickness was fear. Anger could be deemed a causative agent, or it could be a reaction to fear. The involvement of the physician should have engendered hope at least, and preferably relief, or even joy. However, the positive emotions stemming from recovery from illness were rarely recorded in medical correspondence. Although the ailments of men and women are represented in roughly equal numbers in epistolary consultations, the life stages women went through, particularly pregnancy, were recognised as a time when their 'passions' were more prone to disturbance, with untoward consequences for their health. That the emotions of women were more frequently noted in correspondence can be ascribed to the fixation of early modern physicians with the body to the exclusion of the mind.[83] Women were perceived as weaker, both physically and morally. Illness was primarily considered to be physiological, and in consequence patients and physicians in the eighteenth century wrote more about the physical symptoms of illness than their mental states; it was as if in fixing the bodily complaints, the emotional issues would disappear.

83 See Pierre Roussel, *Systeme physique et moral de la femme, ou tableau philosophique* (Paris: Chez Vincent, 1775), iii–xxxv, particularly xvii.

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